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War by Other Means

BUILDING COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

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Preface

In early 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) asked RAND's National Defense Research Institute to conduct a comprehensive study of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), with a view toward how the United States should improve its capabilities for such conflicts in the 21st century. This is the capstone report of that study, drawing from a dozen RAND research papers on specific cases, issues, and aspects of insurgency and COIN. The study included an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II to learn why and how insurgencies begin, grow, and are resolved. It also analyzed the current challenge of what is becoming known as global insurgency, exemplified by the global jihadist movement, as well as lessons about both insurgency and COIN from a number of cases, including Iraq and Afghanistan.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the current policy context for this study. To be clear, however, the study is concerned with deficiencies in U.S. capabilities revealed in those conflicts, not with how to end them satisfactorily. Most new investments to improve U.S. COIN capabilities would not yield capabilities of immediate use. That said, to the extent that the findings can help the United States tackle the problems it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan, this would be a bonus. Regardless of how Iraq and Afghanistan turn out in the short term, the United States and its international partners will not have seen the last of this sort of challenge, and they must become better prepared than they have been for today's insurgencies.

It is a mistake to regard COIN as just another form of warfare. Insurgencies are movements in which opponents of established govern-

ing authorities use violence and other means to wrest the support of the population away from those authorities. Military force is but one instrument of COIN available for use in such contests, and it ought to be subordinate to a political strategy of offering the people a government deserving of their support. Improvements in local governance, legal systems, public services, and economic conditions may be at least as important as military operations, though the former often depend on the success of the latter. Even in providing security, the military is not the only agency involved: Law enforcement and information sharing are at least as important as combat forces in countering most insurgencies. Accordingly, this report addresses not only military capabilities but all important security capabilities and civil instruments that must be strengthened for effective COIN. Thus, with the encouragement of its sponsor, the study's findings are not confined to the domain of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

Success of COIN depends on the quality and performance of the government that is directly threatened by insurgency—a lesson relearned the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. If a government is seen by its people as illegitimate, sectarian, inept, or otherwise unresponsive to their needs, it is unlikely that the United States can save it from insurgency, perhaps not even from its own people. At the same time, the United States may be able to buy time, create “political space,” and offer assistance for the threatened government to make the reforms that are required to overcome the appeal or fear of the insurgents and thus to win the competition for the population's confidence and allegiance. Indeed, U.S. backing must be contingent on such reforms or it will not work. Of course, the United States is not alone in its ability to help: U.S. global and regional allies, ad hoc collaborators, and international organizations have considerable capacity to do so. Therefore, this report will address security and civil COIN capabilities of three actors: local states, the United States, and U.S. partners.

The history of insurgencies and the particular challenges of COIN in this era of globalization and Islamic militancy demand humility and realism regarding COIN. Theory is easier than practice; plans more impressive than execution. As enemies go, insurgents tend to be highly dedicated, resourceful, and aware of the terrain, especially the “human

terrain,” in which they challenge the state’s control. COIN is messier, riskier, less predictable, and often nastier than intended. Mistakes are inevitable and, given the political essence of the conflict, often consequential. For these reasons, while it is obviously important to have the best possible U.S. capabilities for COIN, there is no assurance that these will produce the outcomes we seek at the costs and losses we might expect. Again, defective local government and deficient local security services can cancel out the advantages of even superior U.S. forces and massive assistance. This reality argues for hedging against disappointment both in the capabilities that the United States builds and in the COIN campaigns that it enters. Thus, capabilities should be adequate both to carry out plans and to recover from plans gone awry, as they often do.

This study comes at a moment of anxiety about the ability of the United States to counter 21st-century insurgency, especially the Islamic-extremist sort. Given this, this study is meant to be objective, systematic, comprehensive, and accessible—all hallmarks of RAND work. The report has three parts: (I) the *challenge* of insurgency in the 21st century, (II) the *capabilities* needed to meet this challenge, and (III) the *investments* and other measures required to create these capabilities. Some of the recommendations in Part III pertain to military capabilities, including recommendations for training, technological innovation, material investment, and organizational change. Some apply to other agencies within the U.S. government, notably the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Some call for creating multilateral COIN capabilities, especially among U.S. partners and international organizations.

By design, this report is a sweeping examination of capabilities for COIN. As such, it does not go into as much depth on every aspect of this subject as would narrower treatment of each aspect. While the authors are unhesitating in their general findings, many of the specific proposals derived from those findings are offered not as the final word but for the sake of prompting further, focused analysis. These are turbulent times in world politics and security, which is reflected in the dynamic and diverse nature of insurgency and the changing requirements for COIN. Research on COIN has just begun to reflect the implications of globalization. At such a juncture, this report and

the study on which it is based have sought to venture new, if unproven, ideas to enrich debate and prompt innovation. A significant measure of speculative analysis is inevitable and desirable. Of course, an effort is made to qualify the analysis and findings accordingly.

The reader looking for guidance on whether and where the United States should engage in COIN will not find it here. Every insurgency is different in circumstances, character, and importance to U.S. interests. Judgments about U.S. involvement, especially with direct military force, can be taken only in the light of those considerations, and with great care. Neither is this a manual on COIN tactics, which the U.S. military has recently refreshed. In concentrating on capabilities, this study is about creating options, not about whether and how the United States should act in a given case. That said, because the study judges the strategic and operational challenges to U.S. interests posed by 21st-century insurgency to be formidable, it recommends correspondingly strong capabilities so that the United States can succeed at COIN when it must. Whatever the future holds for Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States cannot afford to shirk from the challenge of Islamist insurgency.

As noted, numerous other products of this study are or soon will be in the public domain. These include:

- *Byting Back—Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 1*, by Martin C. Libicki, David C. Gompert, David R. Frelinger, and Raymond Smith
- *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 2*, by Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell
- *Heads We Win—The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 1*, by David C. Gompert
- *Subversion and Insurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 2*, by William Rosenau
- *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 3*, by Daniel Byman
- *Money in the Bank—Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 4*,

by Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shukla, and Lesley Anne Warner

- *Rethinking Counterinsurgency—A British Perspective: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 5*, by John Mackinlay and Alison al-Baddawy.

RAND hopes that political leaders, government officials, military officers, other practitioners, policy researchers, scholars, journalists, and concerned citizens will benefit from this growing body of work, including this final report.

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Contents

Preface iii

Figures xvii

Tables xix

Summary xxiii

Acknowledgments lix

Abbreviations lxi

PART I: THE CHALLENGE

CHAPTER ONE

Defining the Problem 1

GWOT or COIN?..... 1

The Globalization of Insurgency and COIN 14

The Untidy and Dynamic World of COIN..... 17

What to Expect from This Report 19

CHAPTER TWO

Framing the Problem 23

A Planning Construct 23

Types of Insurgency..... 23

 Type I—Local Insurgency 25

 Type II—Local-International Insurgency 26

 Type III—Global-Local Insurgency..... 27

 Type IV—Global Insurgency 28

Aspects of COIN..... 32

 Understanding 32

Shaping..... 33

Acting 35

Timing: Understanding, Shaping, and Acting over
the Lifetime of Insurgency..... 36

COIN Capabilities..... 40

 Territorial 40

 Structural 41

 Kinetic..... 42

 Informational..... 43

 Cognitive..... 44

CHAPTER THREE

Countering Type III Insurgency..... 49

The Main Threat 49

COIN Challenges from Type III Insurgencies 58

The Paradox of Force 62

Achieving Legitimacy and Security While Reducing Reliance
on Deadly Force 67

PART II: COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES

CHAPTER FOUR

Overview of Capabilities Needed to Counter Type III Insurgency ... 75

Timely Civil COIN..... 76

The Power of Information..... 78

Improving Local Forces 81

A Change in Emphasis for U.S. Military Forces 83

CHAPTER FIVE

Civil Capabilities 87

Introduction 87

Competition in the Civil Realm 89

Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Type III Insurgency 90

 Carrot-and-Stick..... 90

 Hearts-and-Minds..... 91

 Transformation..... 92

Integrating the Three Strategies to Counter Type III Insurgency	93
Expertise and Resources in Functional Areas	95
Coordinated Participation of Multiple Organizations	97
The Host Nation	98
The U.S. Government	98
Other Governments	99
International Organizations	99
Nongovernmental Organizations	100
Guiding Principles for Implementing a Strategy	100
Coordinate Civil and Military Efforts	100
Start Early	101
Manage Expectations	103
Current Efforts	103
Capabilities: How Ready Is the United States	
to Conduct Civil COIN?	105
Nature of the Quantitative Analysis	106
The Necessary Operational Culture Is Lacking	108
Current Numbers of Personnel Are Too Low	110
Fiscal Resources Are Insufficient	113
Thinking About Future Capabilities	116
Illustrative Scenario 1: “The Big One”	116
Illustrative Scenario 2: Two “Mediums”	117
Illustrative Scenario 3: Two “Mediums” Plus Prevention	117
The Security Problem	120
Conclusion	121

CHAPTER SIX

Information Capabilities	123
Information as a Strategic Resource	123
Putting Users First in Setting and Meeting	
Information Requirements	126
Getting Information	133
Promoting a Cell Phone Society	133
National Registry-Census, ID Cards, and Vetting	137
Three-Dimensional Awareness	139
Embedded Video	140

National Wiki 141

Enabling Information Users to Be Productive Information
Providers 142

ICON..... 144

How Much Difference Would ICON Make?..... 151

An ICONic Vignette 152

Feasibility and Implementation 155

CHAPTER SEVEN

Perception and Cognition..... 161

Influencing Opinion 161

From Information Power to Brain Power 168

Cognitive Capabilities for COIN 169

Conclusion..... 172

CHAPTER EIGHT

General Security Capabilities 175

Rethinking Basic Requirements..... 175

Core Security Capabilities 178

 Institutional Management Capacity 179

 Uniformed Command and Leadership 181

 Logistics..... 182

 IO Capabilities and Competence 183

 Justice Systems 184

 Police and Law Enforcement 185

 Constabulary Police 187

 Technical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 188

 Human Intelligence 189

 Border Security..... 190

 Coastal Security..... 191

 Tactical Air Mobility..... 191

 Long-Range Air Mobility..... 192

 Specialized Forces for High-Value Targets (HVTs)..... 193

 Precision Strike..... 194

 Ground Combat 194

The Relationship of Local and Foreign Capabilities..... 198

CHAPTER NINE

Local Security Capabilities	203
Factors Affecting Local Capability.....	203
Timing	204
Insurgent Strength	205
Initial Condition of the Local Government	208
Priorities for Local Security Capabilities	209
Real-World Obstacles.....	214

CHAPTER TEN

U.S. Security Capabilities	217
Building for Success; Hedging Against Disappointment	217
Building for Success	218
Three U.S. Missions: Prepare, Enable, Operate	218
Requirements for Preparing, Enabling, and Operating	223
Deficient U.S. Capabilities	228
Hedging Against Disappointment	233
Training and Education	238
Nonlethal Force Options	239
Land Mobility	240
Inclusive, Integrated, User-Based Networks for Sharing and Collaboration	240
Sustainable Ground Operations.....	240
U.S. Ground Forces—Better or Bigger?.....	241
Conclusion	247

PART III: ORGANIZING AND INVESTING

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Multilateral Counterinsurgency	249
The Case for Multilateral COIN	249
The Content of Multilateral COIN Capabilities	251
Preparing for Multilateral COIN	256
The NATO-EU Model	261
The Non-NATO Model	264
Conducting Multilateral COIN	266

Multilateral COIN Campaign Models..... 269

Functions, Principles, and Options 272

 Political Authority, Strategy-Setting, and Policymaking..... 273

 Campaign Oversight 274

 Command, Control, and Collaboration in Security Operations..... 274

 Local Cooperation 275

 Information..... 275

Politics..... 276

CHAPTER TWELVE

Investment Priorities..... 279

The Need to Invest..... 279

Setting Investment Priorities..... 281

Planning High-Priority Investments..... 287

Investing for an Uncertain Future 295

Costs..... 297

Conclusion..... 301

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Organization: Unsettled Structures for Unsettled Times..... 303

Organizational Issues in Perspective..... 303

Capability Gaps and Organizational Implications..... 307

 Justice and Police 309

 Building Local Security Institutional Capacity 311

 Organizing, Training, Equipping, and Advising

 Foreign Armed Forces..... 313

 Employment Impact..... 314

 Mass Public Education 314

Macro-Structural Considerations 316

 Government Option 1: Business-as-Usual..... 318

 Government Option 2: Install a COIN Czar 320

 Government Option 3: Create a COIN Agency..... 322

Defense COIN Options..... 324

 Defense Option 1: Business-as-Usual 326

 Defense Option 2: Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM 327

Defense Option 3: Assign COIN as a Principal Mission of Regular Forces.....	330
Defense Option 4: Create a Defense Security Agency	335
Summary.....	338
Micro-Structural Considerations.....	339

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Implications and Recommendations.....	347
Definitions Matter	347
Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities	351
Will It <i>Really</i> Work?	354
Implementation Strategy	357
Investment	357
Organization	359
Harnessing Information Power.....	360
Multilateral COIN	361
Engendering Local Responsibility	363
Getting Started: Specific Recommendations	
for Immediate Attention	365
Civil COIN.....	366
Information and Cognition.....	366
Local Security Services.....	367
U.S. Forces.....	367
Multilateral	368
Organization	368
Conclusion.....	368

Appendixes

A. Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings	373
B. Multilateral COIN Capacity.....	397
C. Indicators and Warnings	431
D. Ground-Force Tasks and Improvements	439

About the RAND COIN Team.....	441
--------------------------------------	------------

Works Cited.....	445
-------------------------	------------

Figures

1.1.	Iraq Insurgent Attrition and Strength, 2004–2006	9
1.2.	Multiple-Casualty Attacks over Time.....	10
1.3.	Insurgent-Initiated Attacks and Fatalities, 2002–2006.....	11
2.1.	Evolution of the Mix of Insurgency Types.....	31
2.2.	Life-Cycle Model of Insurgency and COIN	38
2.3.	Comprehensive COIN Requirements Framework.....	45
2.4.	Priority of Current COIN Capabilities	46
2.5.	Inverse Relationship of COIN and Insurgent Capabilities	47
3.1.	Compression of Time for COIN	61
3.2.	Strengthening Capabilities to Reduce Reliance on Deadly Force.....	70
5.1.	Countries of Potential Concern for Global-Local Insurgency	107
5.2.	U.S. Civilian Personnel Required to Provide PRT-Equivalent Teams to Each Province.....	111
5.3.	Personnel Requirements of a CORDS-Type Involvement	113
5.4.	Vietnam-Equivalent Aid Flows	115
5.5.	Assistance Levels for Countries of Concern Based on Vietnam	116
6.1.	Systems and Sources of Information	144
6.2.	Participation in ICON and Related Systems	147
8.1.	Ground-Force Options.....	197
8.2.	Relationship Between Local and U.S. Capabilities	199
10.1.	U.S. Security Capabilities Under Different Assumptions.....	219
10.2.	Degree of Insurgent Success Versus Total Number of Soldiers.....	242
10.3.	Degree of Insurgent Success Versus Peak Number of Soldiers per 1,000 People.....	242

- 12.1. Investing in Complete and Balanced COIN 298
- 13.1. Merging Defense Options 337
- 13.2. Variable Civil-Military COIN Units 343
- A.1. Length of Insurgency in Years from Shortest to Longest,
 Sorted by Outcome 380

Tables

1.1.	Terrorist Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan Since U.S. Invasions	11
5.1.	Summary of Illustrative Sizing Scenarios.....	118
9.1.	Local Security Capabilities Requirements	210
10.1.	U.S. COIN Security Requirements	224
10.2.	Critical U.S. COIN Security Requirements.....	227
10.3.	Deficient U.S. COIN Capabilities.....	229
11.1.	U.S. and U.S. Partner Ability to Provide Needed COIN Capabilities	252
12.1.	Civil Capabilities.....	284
12.2.	Security Capabilities.....	284
12.3.	Information Capabilities.....	285
12.4.	Cognitive Capabilities.....	285
13.1.	Functional Area Coverage	315
13.2.	Government Option 1: Business-as-Usual.....	319
13.3.	Government Option 2: Install a COIN Czar	321
13.4.	Government Option 3: Create a COIN Agency.....	323
13.5.	Requirements for U.S. Defense in COIN	325
13.6.	Defense Option 1: Business-as-Usual	327
13.7.	Defense Option 2: Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM.....	329
13.8.	Defense Option 4: Create a Defense Security Agency	335
13.9.	Evaluation of Proposed Organization	338
14.1.	Building an Investment Portfolio.....	358
A.1.	The 89 Insurgencies	373
A.2.	Number of Insurgencies by Region, Sorted by Outcome	377
A.3.	Number of Insurgencies as a Function of the Local Religion, Sorted by Outcome	378

A.4.	Surviving Insurgencies After N Years, Sorted by Outcome.....	379
A.5.	Number of Insurgencies by Decade of Onset, Sorted by Outcome.....	380
A.6.	Number of Insurgencies by Country Income, Sorted by Outcome.....	381
A.7.	Number of Insurgencies by Level of Urbanization, Sorted by Outcome.....	381
A.8.	Number of Insurgencies by Goal of Insurgents, Sorted by Outcome.....	382
A.9.	Number of Insurgencies by Force Ratio, Sorted by Outcome.....	383
A.10.	Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Competence, Sorted by Outcome.....	384
A.11.	Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Popularity, Sorted by Outcome.....	384
A.12.	Number of Non-Secessionist Insurgencies by Insurgent Popularity, Sorted by Outcome	385
A.13.	Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Structure, Sorted by Outcome.....	385
A.14.	Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Use of Terror, Sorted by Outcome.....	386
A.15.	Number of Insurgencies by Level of State Support, Sorted by Outcome	387
A.16.	Number of Insurgencies by Type of Sanctuary, Sorted by Outcome.....	388
A.17.	Number of Insurgencies by the Presence and Removal of Dominant Military Leader, Sorted by Outcome.....	388
A.18.	Number of Insurgencies by Type of Government, Sorted by Outcome.....	389
A.19.	Number of Insurgencies by Government Competence, Sorted by Outcome.....	390
A.20.	Number of Insurgencies by Government Competence, Sorted by Outcome (“Africa 8” Excluded).....	390
A.21.	Number of Insurgencies by Government Popularity, Sorted by Outcome.....	391
A.22.	Number of Insurgencies by Government Popularity, Sorted by Outcome (Insurgencies Motivated by Secession or Autonomy Excluded).....	391

A.23.	Insurgencies for Which the Government Had Direct Support from Other Countries	392
A.24.	Number of Insurgencies by Outside Intervention, Sorted by Outcome	393
B.1.	Multilateral COIN Capacity: International Organizations	398
B.2.	Multilateral COIN Capacity: U.S. Allies.....	403
B.3.	Mission-Specific Capabilities for COIN	406
B.4.	Mission-Specific Capabilities, by Country	410
D.1.	Four Recommended Enhancements for Ground Troops	439

Summary

I. The Challenge

Defining the Problem

The difficulties and staggering costs that the United States has faced in trying to secure Iraq and Afghanistan raise a question this study seeks to answer: What capabilities does the United States need to counter such insurgencies, of which today's are unlikely to be the last?

The search for the answer must start with defining the danger to U.S. and world security that is violent Islam. As leaders of jihad—holy war against Islam's supposed enemies—would have it, America and its allies are engaged in aggression against Islam and must be opposed by desperate and daring measures, including suicide terror and counterattacks in the West. Beyond defending Muslims, jihadists aim to demolish the nation-state order in the Muslim world, which they claim the West devised and uses to subjugate Islam. Believing that the West cannot control the Muslim world without its regional proxies, jihadists aim to destroy them. To these ends, their strategy is to aid and exploit local insurgencies, making each one more dangerous, intractable, and consequential.

To grasp the jihadists' definition of this struggle is not to embrace it. If their strategic goal is religious war between the Muslim and Christian worlds, America's goal must be to defuse such a war, not to wage and win it. The U.S. capabilities required to engage in the conflict the jihadists seek differ from those required to protect U.S. interests while averting such conflict. Trying to crush insurgency by military brute force in the Muslim world risks validating the jihadists' claim, increasing their appeal, and replacing their losses. As the United States

considers what capabilities it needs, it should define this conflict as a contest to persuade Muslim populations to choose human dignity and progress and to reject violent religious tyranny.

This seemingly easy choice is complicated by the belief of many Muslims, not entirely unfounded, that they have fared poorly in a Western-run system that espouses dignity and progress, and by the fact that few states in the Muslim world actually offer their citizens either dignity or progress. The greatest weakness in the struggle with Islamic insurgency is not U.S. firepower but the ineptitude and illegitimacy of the very regimes that are meant to be the alternative to religious tyranny—the ones tagged and targeted as Western puppets by jihad. Success thus hinges on improving the performance and accountability of governments in the Muslim world. This is the essence of classical counterinsurgency and should be made the beacon for planning U.S. COIN capabilities. With success in this political contest will come improved security of the United States and its interests.

Understanding the spreading pattern of Islamic violence as having essential elements of insurgency is a first step toward forging a winning strategy and assembling the capabilities needed to carry out that strategy. Since 9/11, the global war on terror (GWOT) has inspired offensive U.S. military campaigns in the Muslim world, amid the very populations whose loyalty is being contested, against enemies who hide and operate in those populations. Of course, the United States should conduct energetic counterterrorist operations to find and eliminate terrorists who would kill Americans, while also enhancing homeland security. However, as a specific strategy, using large-scale military power in the Muslim world to protect Americans at home ignores the impact on and reactions of the people who make their home in the places being attacked and occupied. Indeed, the enemy's own strategy, to quote Abu Bakr Naji, a leading jihadist, has been to "force America to abandon its war against Islam by proxy and force it to attack directly."

Lost in the fog of GWOT is whether it is increasing Muslim hostility and violence. Polling data suggest that it is. Moreover, terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan—places the United States has chosen to wage GWOT—rose from roughly 1,000 in 2004 to 2,500 in 2005

to 4,500 in 2006.¹ If GWOT's aim has been the attrition of terrorists, the result has been the opposite. Also lost is whether the United States has been investing in the right capabilities, which this study addresses.

As a guiding concept, COIN is superior to GWOT because it calls our attention to the underlying contest and the capabilities needed to win it. Interpreting organized Islamic violence as insurgency does not lessen its significance and dangers. On the contrary, this clarification should dispel unwarranted optimism that the United States and its friends will readily and inevitably prevail. Isolated terrorist groups come and go, often abruptly, but the average insurgency lasts more than a decade. Once insurgencies gain full strength, their likelihood of success, empirically, is 50 percent. Even more sobering is that four of the strongest statistical predictors of successful insurgency exist in today's Muslim world:

- populations excluded from politics and estranged from the state
- authoritarian, unresponsive, inept, and corrupt government
- insurgents committed to destroying such government
- significant popular sympathy for insurgents.

Not all violence directed against the political status quo in the Muslim world is energized, much less controlled, by global jihadism. In Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, and to some extent Iraq and Afghanistan, violent opposition to the status quo is rooted in dissatisfaction with the regimes themselves. Where Islamic militancy is at work— Hamas, for instance—the primary goal may remain local and political—a Palestinian state—rather than holy war with the West and its proxies. At the same time, jihadist ideas and agents, homegrown as well as transnational, are increasingly active and influential. Thus, while al Qaeda clearly does not control Hamas, leaders of the latter warn of the danger that the Palestinian cause will be swept up into the

¹ Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorism Database, 2007. As of October 25, 2007: <http://www.tkb.org>.

wider, more radical, insatiable jihad unless Palestinian local demands are met.

Recognizing organized Islamic violence as insurgency, with local and global aspects, also demands that we face up to its scale, breadth, and shades. By one estimate,² of the world's 1.5 billion Muslims, some 250 to 500 million have some sympathy with jihadist ideology. Of these, 200,000 are believed to be combatants in one or another Islamic insurgency. Only a few thousand are terrorists. This means that the number of individuals prepared to fight against U.S. forces in the Muslim world is two orders of magnitude greater than the number of terrorists U.S. forces have been sent there to fight. Sending big armies to fight terrorists in Muslim countries almost certainly increases the number of Muslims who are hostile to the United States and to U.S. forces in particular.

Among the most telling data are that only 1 percent of Iraqis approve of terrorism, while over 50 percent approve of attacks on U.S. troops.³ The problem for the United States, in Iraq and among Muslims generally, has been not only the 1 percent who support terrorists but also the 50 percent who oppose U.S. military presence. Even among Muslims who reject terrorism, large-scale U.S. military presence in Iraq is seen to confirm the terrorists' claim that Islam is under attack. The COIN paradigm exposes and confronts this danger; the GWOT paradigm overlooks and aggravates it.

The advantage of recognizing broad-based Islamic opposition as insurgency is becoming apparent on the ground. By 2007, most U.S. military forces in Iraq were conducting themselves according to counterinsurgency principles. They have shifted from relying on episodic assaults and wholesale manhunts to stressing everyday public safety,

² Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Project on National Security, 2005). As of October 22, 2007: <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/counterinsurgency.pdf>

³ David C. Gompert, *Heads We Win—The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 3* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-168-OSD, 2007). As of October 23, 2007: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP168/)

empowering local tribes and “concerned citizens,” and giving responsibility to local forces, once trained and ready. Consequently, the very jihadists that U.S. forces have sought to eliminate are being isolated and chased off.

Iraq is not yet secure, and U.S. COIN there still suffers from shortfalls in civil capabilities for reconstruction and development. Moreover, the weak and divided Iraqi government is far from winning the trust and cooperation of the majority of Iraqis. Ultimately, only legitimate Iraqi leaders, reliable security forces, and competent government agencies can rid Iraq of the poison of global jihadism and address the grievances of those Iraqis who have been susceptible to it. Still, the tentative gains in security in Iraq validate the belief that COIN is the key to bringing a modicum of stability, hope, and progress to the population, which is the only lasting antidote to Islamic insurgency.

In sum, defining the mission narrowly as attacking terrorists hidden in the Muslim world so that they will not attack America risks increasing religious hatred and violence, and it may add more terrorists than it subtracts. To recognize Islamic violence as insurgency is to admit how expansive and deadly serious it is, how deep its roots go, how long it can last, and how unsure the outcome is. It is also the best way to identify capabilities needed to counter it, which is this study’s main interest.

That full-blown insurgencies succeed as often as they fail suggests how hard COIN can be and how inadequate sheer physical strength can be in deciding outcomes. For every success (e.g., the UK in Malaya and Oman, the United States in El Salvador) there has been defeat (e.g., France in Vietnam and Algeria, the USSR in Afghanistan). From this checkered history come enduring lessons and principles of COIN. Foremost is that there is no substitute for legitimate and able local government. Ordinary people, the contest’s prize, respond mainly to their government’s ability to provide public safety and service. If efforts to earn public support are not timely and sustained, the use of deadly force in COIN may be unavoidable. Yet force can fail if deemed illegitimate, and careless force can push the population into the insurgents’ arms. Foreign military intervention can further stiffen the resolve and widen the appeal of insurgents. In the end, isolating insurgents is usu-

ally more fruitful than killing them. Throughout, all COIN instruments and actions—political, economic, intelligence, police, and military—must fit into a coherent campaign strategy.

While these commandments of classical COIN remain valid, globalization has created new dimensions of insurgency that demand new capabilities for COIN. Ubiquitous communication networks, Internet access, satellite TV, and transportation links permit insurgencies to connect with, learn from, and get help from one another and from stateless extremist movements such as al Qaeda. Groups and persons who are dissatisfied with the nation-states in which they live identify with transnational communities, such as the global Muslim “nation of one billion,” or *Ummah*. Globalization can give insurgents extended reach and access to destructive know-how and materials, enabling them to directly threaten those they blame for the suffering of the people they claim to be defending. The spread of jihadism, the speed with which it can acquire energy in a given country, and the dispersal of inspirational messages, fighters, money, and methods are facilitated by global connectivity and mobility.

At this juncture, analysis of COIN capabilities must not only borrow from the past but also reach into the future. Accordingly, this study revisits insurgency and COIN in the light of globalization, the network revolution, 9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, the spread of jihadism, the injection of religion into local conflicts, and the turmoil and anger roiling the Muslim world. While Islamic insurgency is the U.S. concern now, acquiring the capabilities to counter it should prepare the United States for any insurgencies the future holds (e.g., anti-American extremists in Latin America or neo-Maoist radicals in Asia). This study offers a general framework even as it concentrates on the main threat at hand.

Framing the Problem

For the purpose of identifying capabilities needed for successful COIN, this study uses four taxonomies: types of insurgency, phases of insurgency, aspects of COIN, and layers of COIN capabilities.

Types of Insurgencies

All types of insurgencies have certain common characteristics. They are organized movements to overthrow existing ruling structures by a combination of force and popular appeal. Their grievances, be they political, religious, ethnic, or economic, usually have some resonance in the population. While the traditional definition of insurgency has stressed armed opposition to national governing systems and authorities, with globalization has come the growth of insurgencies that are multinational in identity, reach, and aims.

Both the difference and the relationship between insurgency and terrorism have been widely misunderstood—a confusion sown, most recently, by GWOT. Insurgencies have an alternative vision of how to organize societies, and they use a variety of instruments, ranging from public service to terror, to realize that vision. Terrorism may thus be embedded in and subordinate to insurgency. But terrorism may also be animated by sheer revulsion toward the status quo, without offering or even striving for an alternative. Insurgencies tend to be large and enjoy at least some popular backing, whereas terrorist groups operating on their own may be small and neither have nor seek popular backing. Thus, to question GWOT as strategy, as this and other inquiries into the nature of the threat do, is not to question the need to combat terror but rather to insist that terror motivated by Islamic extremism is embedded in a larger pattern of insurgency that has popular appeal, even if the use of terror does not. Ignoring this inconvenient truth—we wish there were not so many embittered Muslims—precludes the defeat of terrorism without countering the insurgency of which it is a part.

The essential first step, then, is to understand insurgency, both in the classical sense and as it is manifesting itself in the era of globalization. Given how significantly globalization can affect the aims, scope, means, and implications of insurgency, it is useful analytically to distinguish insurgency types as segments along a continuum from least to most “globalized.”

Type I (Local): There continue to be insurgencies that are self-contained in cause, scope, and effects. Colombia is a good example (albeit with wider implications because of the drug trade). There is

no reason to expect globalization to make local insurgencies extinct. Indeed, weak, illegitimate, multiethnic, and synthetic states are more vulnerable to insurgency under conditions of globalization. While globalization seems to have reduced the incidence of purely local insurgencies, they remain the most common type: roughly 60 percent as of 2007.

Type II (Local-International): Insurgents often seek and receive external support—money, arms, expertise, media coverage, fighters, propaganda—as some 35 percent of insurgencies since World War II have done. In the end, however, their outcomes are basically decided by local factors, local insurgents, and the local population. Vietnam provides an example of an insurgency that garnered outside support but was controlled and ultimately decided by nationalists, something the United States did not understand until it was too late. The Muslim insurgency in Thailand, despite jihadist backing and rhetoric, remains essentially a separatist movement that could be satisfied with greater political autonomy.

Type III (Global-Local): A local insurgency receiving outside support can become part of a wider regional or global struggle. In Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, jihadist motives and methods—indigenous as well as foreign—fused with and altered local political (Iraqi Baathist and Pashtun tribal) agendas. When jihadism becomes the main fuel of an insurgency, its flame cannot readily be doused by local accommodation. While only 5 percent of insurgencies since World War II are of this type, with globalization they have become the fastest-growing type, especially in the Muslim world, where religious militancy resonates. Type III insurgencies are distinct but connected, loosely or tightly, to a common agenda, e.g., Islamic opposition to the Christian West and its proxies.

Type III insurgencies are not necessarily Islamic; the potential for them lies in the nexus of local-political violence, transnational fanaticism, and global mobility and connectivity. Yet, it is in Muslim countries with weak or arbitrary governments, disaffected populations, and currents of religious militancy that such potential exists today (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Palestine, Yemen, Indonesia, Somalia, Nigeria). Hezbollah may be approaching this point,

though radical Shiite aims appear less global than those of Sunni-Salafi jihadists. Because Type III insurgencies are so complex and dynamic, they are especially hard to stop.

Type IV (Global): Insurgencies may target not only states but also the nation-state order itself. Such movements predate globalization, e.g., the anarchist and pre-Bolshevik international communist movements of the turn of the 20th century and Che Guevara's attempt to rid Latin America of capitalism and U.S. influence. The more grandiose and ethereal their goals, the less able global insurgents have been to reach critical mass. Unless they concentrate their power in one or several nation-states, they tend to stall.

At the same time, globalization makes diffuse insurgencies more formidable, durable, and deadly by reducing the importance of holding territory and by expanding the options for violence that come with mobility and connectivity. The carnage of New York, Washington, London, and Madrid shows why global insurgents cannot be dismissed as transitory nuisances just because they cannot overthrow the governments of the countries they target. Still, unless they acquire weapons of mass destruction, the capabilities of diffuse insurgencies are limited. Therefore, if jihadists are bent on destroying the nation-state order in the Muslim world, they are bound to take action against vulnerable states of that order by fomenting and commandeering local insurgencies. Because Type III insurgency, not Type IV, is the main path of jihad, the United States must be better prepared for it than it was for Afghanistan and Iraq—and is today.

Challenges of Counterinsurgency

Understand, Shape, Act

Whatever the type of insurgency, countering it requires capabilities to understand it, to shape the human terrain in which it competes, and to act directly against it. Understanding is especially challenging for complex, dynamic insurgencies that blend local-political with global-religious aims and means (Type III), such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Understanding must permeate COIN from top to bottom and from capital to field. Past failures and recent successes in Iraq show how

strongly operational results correlate with the depth of understanding among officers in the field of both the insurgents and the population whose loyalty hangs in the balance. Because Islamic insurgencies are so fluid, COIN demands nonstop learning. Outrage over insurgent atrocities must yield to fierce objectivity about what does and does not work. Because understanding depends on sharing and using information, networking and cognition figure importantly in COIN.

Understanding insurgency sets the stage for shaping the political, material, and psychological contours of the contest for the population's support. The more energetic the effort to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of local government, the less likely it is that insurgency will reach the point at which deadly force is needed. Effective shaping can also inoculate local insurgency against jihadism, since religious extremism may be less compelling when government shows that it can and will address its population's concerns. Yet shaping can be the hardest part of COIN. After all, if conditions were conducive to good governance, there should have been no viable insurgency in the first place. Robust insurgencies imply deep grievances about the competence, fairness, integrity, and inclusiveness of the state. Statistically, the factor most critical to COIN success is able and accountable government. Yet we know from Afghanistan and Iraq that erecting new political systems is harder than smashing old ones.

Unless an insurgency is starved of popular support, forcible action will likely have to be taken in response to its violence. Any government that fails to provide for its citizens' safety will be unworthy in their eyes and that much more vulnerable to insurgency. Whereas shaping must be ambitious and broad, force must be judicious and selective. Treating COIN as just another form of warfare can be a ticket to failure or to success at exorbitant cost. History reveals that insurgencies can be outgunned by COIN military forces yet prevail if they enjoy more popularity than the incompetent, greedy, or brutal governments they seek to oust.

Military force may be needed to protect the population, control territory, protect essential infrastructure, deny sanctuary, and destroy insurgents. Increasingly, however, insurgents are able to survive and function by dispersing among urban populations, making the control

of territory both harder and less useful, the use of deadly force riskier, and the attitude of the population more critical. Though force may be needed, a strategy of attrition is unlikely to work and may make matters worse. In Iraq, from 2004 through 2006, during which time some 80,000 suspected Sunni insurgents were killed or detained, their estimated numbers grew from 5,000 to 30,000, and average casualties per insurgent attack grew from 10 to 60.⁴ Since the United States shifted to COIN strategy in 2007, the scale, extremism, and destructiveness of the Sunni insurgency appear to have abated.

A better indicator of military effectiveness than insurgents slain is the ability of local government to deliver public service (which is still seriously lagging in Iraq and Afghanistan). The best indicator, perhaps, is whether the use of force in COIN is causing citizens to be more likely or less to furnish information on the identity and movements of insurgents: To the extent it makes them less fearful of insurgent violence, they may be more forthcoming; to the extent they are enraged by government violence, they may be less forthcoming.

Timing

Insurgencies gather strength over time, unless they are stopped by effective COIN or burst full-blown out of a cataclysmic event (e.g., war or foreign occupation). Most go through a proto-insurgency stage in which they are small, narrowly based, vulnerable, and incapable of large-scale violence. During this gestation, the most crucial task of COIN is to understand the group, its goals, and its potential to tap popular grievances, lest it be dismissed as a criminal gang or fringe movement. A government that fails to comprehend the potential for insurgency may fail to take steps to raise its standing in the eyes of its citizens and thus divert support from the insurgency. If direct action is needed against proto-insurgency, intelligence and law enforcement should suffice and are generally preferred over military force. Trying to destroy an insurgency by force without or instead of improving government performance often fans the fire and ultimately fails.

⁴ Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorism Database, 2007.

When a young insurgency survives and attracts followers in growing numbers, it may commit more destructive acts to demonstrate its capabilities and the state's weakness and to increase recruitment. If the state then fails to meet the public's needs for safety and other basics, the insurgency may gain momentum, receive global media attention, control swaths of populated territory, damage the economy, obtain external help, and, as we saw in Iraq in 2004, radicalize. Although military action against insurgents may then be unavoidable, shaping the political contest becomes more essential, not less. Of course, civil measures to remedy economic and political problems can become dangerous for those involved as violence increases.

When an insurgency exceeds the means of the state's security services, the fateful question of foreign military intervention arises. The large-scale presence of foreign troops will alter not only the balance of forces but also the balance of legitimacy—now between insurgents and foreign forces—in the public's eyes. Insurgents can then appeal not only to the population's antigovernment sentiment but also to patriotism and hatred of infidels. As we know from Iraq, a state cannot win its citizens' confidence if it depends on foreign troops to provide security or even its own survival. Consequently, when an insurgency reaches the point that only foreign intervention can save the state, the insurgency tends to grow stronger and bolder, and the chances of defeating it decrease rather than increase. This is borne out by historical data, which reveal an inverse relationship between large-scale foreign intervention and successful COIN.

Empirically, the odds of COIN succeeding worsen from one stage to the next. Whereas roughly 1 percent of proto-insurgencies become full insurgencies, 50 percent of full-scale insurgencies since World War II have ended in the defeat or collapse of the government. Thus, by the time all options short of military intervention are exhausted, the odds of success are even at best.

Capabilities

COIN capabilities include territorial control, organizational structures, kinetic force, information networks, and cognitive abilities for planning and making decisions. Habitually, the United States relies mainly

on territorial, organizational, and physical capabilities, as evidenced by its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, its creation of new bureaucracies in Washington, and its bulging investment in new military equipment since 9/11. But in the era of global communications, ubiquitous media, and transnational identity, insurgencies are increasingly skilled on higher planes: information and cognition. Using Western network technology and infrastructure, they can operate and influence effectively while remaining distributed and slippery. This accounts for the growth and dangers of Type III and IV insurgencies. A reasonable hypothesis is that the United States must improve COIN capabilities, especially on the higher—information and cognitive—planes.

Complexity, Uncertainty, and Brutality

Any analysis of COIN capabilities that assumes predictability should be eyed with suspicion. There are, after all, at least four main actors in classical COIN: insurgents, local authorities and their international allies, and a population whose loyalty is in doubt and in play. In Iraq, there are at least twice that number. The complexity of classical COIN is compounded by the effects of globalization and the merging of global and local insurgent goals and means. Insurgents tend to be highly motivated—readier to persevere, commit heinous acts, and die than “regular” troops fighting without necessarily being personally attached to the cause. Lacking the means of states, insurgents must be, and tend to be, resourceful, ingenious, stealthy, and ruthless. Lacking the structures of states, they can be flexible, adaptable, and unruly. Insurgents can bring out the worst in counterinsurgents, making COIN not only difficult but also sometimes brutal.

These conditions help explain why failure is as common as success in COIN, even when the state and its backers hold advantages in troops and money, and why smooth COIN theories and plans often crumble in practice. The United States was not prepared for the growth and radicalization of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency, the resilience of the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the adaptation of both to changes in U.S. strategies and capabilities. Suicide bombing, largely unstoppable, has been especially effective: The grisly results have prevented both the Iraqi and

Afghan governments thus far from gaining the trust and cooperation of their populations.

By building more complete and balanced COIN capabilities, the United States should be more able to counter the type of insurgency it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, ideal outcomes are rare in COIN. Insurgents react in ways that make COIN less effective than expected. No one should assume that the capabilities proposed here will guarantee success: They can only increase the probability of success, if skillfully employed. Unpredictability demands capabilities not only to carry out COIN as planned but also to respond if plans go awry.

Countering Type III Insurgency

A key thesis of this study is that if the United States can develop capabilities adequate to counter complex, dynamic global-local insurgencies—like those in Iraq and Afghanistan—then it should be able to counter other types. Accordingly, requirements are, for the most part, based on our analysis of Type III insurgency.

By infecting local-political insurgency with hyper-violent global-religious extremism, Type III insurgencies can be more volatile, dangerous, and difficult to counter than familiar (Type I and II) ones. Iraq and Afghanistan show how jihadist ideas (e.g., the appeal for holy war) and techniques (e.g., suicide bombing) can alter, worsen, and prolong local insurgency. Today's Type III insurgents exploit global networks and media, ebb and flow across borders, enjoy sanctuary within and funding from Muslim populations, function in both urban and remote settings, learn from global experiences, and pose a credible threat of counterattack virtually anywhere in the world. States that exhibit some of the indicators of such insurgency—shaky political systems, alienated population segments, religious militancy—include Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Palestine, and Lebanon. While Type III insurgency in any one of these states may not be probable, their number and significance should cause enough concern to invest in better COIN capabilities.

Operationally, Type III insurgents are distributed and elusive. Psychologically, they are highly toxic, using religious rage to convert,

with stunning speed, green recruits into suicide-bombing martyrs. Politically, they abhor compromise and cannot be placated by power sharing, autonomy, or other concessions. Mixing religious, patriotic, political, and survival motivations, Type III insurgencies pack a lot of energy. Consequently, the time available for COIN to defuse proto-insurgency and insulate local insurgency from complicating factors—such as the entry of jihadists into Iraq—can be severely compressed, short-circuiting understanding, overtaking shaping, and provoking hasty, possibly clumsy force.

With all types of insurgency, there is a danger that force in COIN can harden the resolve and intensify the violence of insurgents. But Type III Islamic insurgencies are animated by an especially potent story: that the United States and its Christian, Zionist, and local secular accomplices are out to destroy Islam, starting well before 9/11. As a consequence, the use of Western military force amid—they say against—Muslim populations can lend credence to the jihadists' call to resist this latest in a long history of religiously motivated Western assaults against Muslims. Given wide Muslim identification with the *Ummah* and acceptance of the defensive premise of jihad, large-scale U.S. use of force in the Muslim world (under the heading of GWOT) can fuel insurgency even among populations who, for the most part, disavow terror.

The difficulty of large-scale combat operations against Islamic extremists is compounded by insurgents' ability to blend with the population, making every Muslim male a suspect and thus a potential casualty or detainee of COIN. Every noncombatant killed or detainee abused by the forces of the state is an opportunity for insurgents skilled in cognitive warfare. The "paradox of force," whereby insurgency may gain strength from force used against it, is especially acute in Type III Islamic insurgency, and most severe when the force used is Western.

The key in COIN is not to monopolize force but to monopolize *legitimate* force. Among Muslim populations already resentful of Western power, U.S. military forces are presumptively illegitimate, as reflected in polls showing that a majority of Iraqi Arabs believe that

violence against U.S. troops is justifiable.⁵ This legitimacy gap must inform analysis of capabilities required for COIN. In short, the United States needs to reduce its reliance on direct, large-scale U.S. military force in the Muslim world while also becoming more effective in Type III COIN. This implies a strong and pressing need to develop other U.S. COIN capabilities. It also implies that the chief mission of U.S. forces should be to improve and support effective and legitimate indigenous forces.

In line with this analysis of Type III insurgency, borne out by Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States should place priority on

- *civil capabilities*—to serve and compete for the population
- *information and cognitive capabilities*—to outsmart the enemy
- *local security services*—to make force legitimate and effective.

This is not to say that U.S. military forces are either irrelevant to or currently adequate for Type III insurgency, for they are neither. But U.S. military requirements need to be rethought and retooled to reduce reliance on large-scale ground presence, to support civil capabilities, to make more and smarter use of information, to prepare and enable local forces, and to perform critical military tasks that only they can.

In sum, the United States needs a more complete and balanced set of capabilities than it currently has to counter Type III insurgency.

II. Required Capabilities

Civil Capabilities

Although it is widely conceded that the United States is grossly short of civil capabilities for COIN, there is no accepted analysis of the scale and makeup of that shortcoming. Such analysis must include a strategy for civil COIN and an assessment of the skills and numbers of people as well as the funding needed to implement that strategy.

⁵ Gompert, *Heads We Win*.

Three alternative civil COIN strategies have been tried and studied: carrot-and-stick, hearts-and-minds, and transformation. Carrot-and-stick dispenses public services conditionally, rewarding pro-government behavior and punishing pro-insurgency behavior. Facing Type III insurgency, this approach, however tempting tactically, will not convince the majority of the people that their government is genuinely deserving of their confidence and allegiance. Hearts-and-minds, by sharing public services generously, may prove that the government cares and thus earn it wide popular support. However, it will not, in and of itself, make the government more able and worthy.

Transformation, in contrast, goes to the heart of the problem of governance that usually fuels insurgency in the first place. Empirically, insurgencies rarely succeed against capable, responsive, and inclusive governments. However, transformation takes years or even decades, by which time insurgency—especially Type III insurgency—can overpower a state. Therefore, efforts to transform must begin at the proto-insurgency stage or earlier. Insofar as these efforts depend on scarce civil COIN capabilities, the United States will need a good indicators-and-warning (I&W) system to flag countries at risk of insurgency. Also, quick-impact measures, distinct from but consistent with transformation, can help keep insurgencies weak and jihadism from infecting them.

Of the many capabilities a local government needs to perform, those with the greatest payoff in COIN, generally speaking, are

- targeted job training and placement, especially for ex-fighters
- justice systems—efficient yet fair courts, judges, and prisons
- lower education capacity—ample classrooms, books, and teachers.

The U.S. government is weak in these competencies: The federal government is not in the business of job training; it does not have spare judges to supervise creation of foreign justice systems; and its role in U.S. lower education is peripheral.

More generally, the United States has a gaping deficit of deployable civilians with the professional skills required for civil COIN.

Extrapolating from experience in Vietnam and Afghanistan, it would take roughly double the entire current 1,300-person staff of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and double the entire \$22B annual U.S. Overseas Development Assistance budget to provide adequate civil COIN for two medium-sized countries battling Type III insurgency, and that much again to prevent insurgency in another dozen vulnerable countries. Thus, given the potency of such insurgency, the United States could need 5,000 persons and \$40B in annual aid *for COIN alone*.

The estimate for the U.S. civil COIN personnel gap is borne out by the judgment of a senior military commander that 25 percent of U.S. troops in Afghanistan are performing civil COIN.⁶ Assuming that the percentage in Iraq is only half of this, and that civilians are twice as productive as soldiers at civil COIN, this implies a gap of about 15,000 civilians in these two countries. This suggests that the estimated need of 5,000 is if anything low.

By enlisting U.S. allies and multilateral organizations in civil COIN and by developing a good I&W system to establish priorities, this demand could be trimmed by, say, half. Much of this should be targeted on the deficiencies just mentioned: job training, justice, and general education. Given that counting on allies and on I&W both entail risk, anything less in added personnel and funding would leave the United States unprepared to counter severe or multiple Type III insurgencies. This approach would leave the United States with an additional need to mobilize both personnel (e.g., through a civilian reserve) and funds (through emergency appropriations) if future COIN needs are at the level posed by Iraq and Afghanistan combined.

Information Capabilities

Like building stronger civil capabilities, unlocking the promise of information power is crucial to countering Type III insurgency, with or without the large-scale use of U.S. force in the Muslim world. But unlike building ample civil capability, the opportunity for swift prog-

⁶ Interview with author in Afghanistan, 2007.

ress in creating information capabilities for COIN is at hand, ready to be taken.

The sharing and use of information in Afghanistan and Iraq by U.S. forces and agencies, coalition partners, and local security services have been poor relative to (1) what is needed, (2) how well sophisticated (Type III) insurgents use information, and (3) what today's technology allows. Islamist extremists and insurgents are using the Internet, wireless communications, satellite TV, and other Western inventions with more cunning, creativity, and success than COIN forces, at negligible cost. With modest investment, existing network technology and infrastructure can improve not only COIN operational effectiveness but also the competence, responsiveness, and accountability of local government—retaking from insurgents the lead in using information.

Information networking among U.S. forces has gotten better in 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Operation Forces and other U.S. forces now exploit technology more effectively to fuse intelligence from disparate sensors and to pass “actionable” information to quick-response units. But this is an exception that proves the rule: When information power is used correctly, creatively, and ambitiously, better performance follows. Moreover, such sharing remains restrictive: U.S. troops and civilians are not communicating as they could and should; allies have spotty access to valuable information; and local forces and authorities are generally presumed to be untrustworthy and thus denied access. Perhaps most important, the concept of sharing information with, and thereby getting more information from, the population has yet to be broadly adopted.

Information resourcefully gathered, widely shared, and wisely used can engender healthy pluralism and expand the awareness and options of individuals. It can be used to pry apart local insurgency and global jihad, improve operational decisionmaking, and sharpen the precision and effectiveness of force. When seen and treated as a strategic asset, information power can help redefine the struggle with Islamic extremism from one of spiraling violence to one of competing truth, from a self-perpetuating war of attrition to a winnable war of cognition.

The United States and its allies can dominate the digital domain of COIN, but only by embracing the principles by which information is shared and used in society at large. The first step toward this goal is for the U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic establishments to stop treating information as the property of those who originate it and start treating it as a vital resource of those who need to use it. The guiding idea of the information age—that success derives from sharing information, not from controlling it—is as relevant to COIN as it is to any endeavor, civil or military. Because of its complexity and ambiguities, COIN puts greater demands on sharing and using information than regular war does. Yet the mainstream U.S. military establishment has wrongly thought of networking mainly for the latter—as if COIN requires more boots instead of more bytes. A key discovery of this study is that better information gathering, sharing, and use could enhance every aspect of COIN, making the use of force at once less necessary and more effective.

This study generated 160 specific operational requirements for information from the standpoint of a hypothetical junior officer leading a small military unit working with other military, police, intelligence, civilian, local authorities, security services, and citizens. From these data, it was learned that

- COIN users need an exceptionally large volume of exceptionally diverse information
- timeliness of information is usually crucial but must not come at the cost of reliability and relevance
- classifying information and securing networks are often unnecessary and block access, constrict collaboration, and impede operations, thus damaging COIN
- information about the population (identity, location, well-being, attitudes) is as important as information about insurgent forces
- needed information is likelier (90 percent in our analysis) to come from the population and other COIN users than from secret sources and methods (10 percent).

These findings suggest that information networks for COIN should be designed and managed according to three principles—*user dominance*, *inclusiveness*, and *integration*—the opposite of the regime of originator control, exclusion, and compartmentalization that prevails today. The impediments to acquiring and using improved information capabilities for COIN are cultural and bureaucratic, not technological.

Several specific capabilities for acquiring, disseminating, and using information, all technologically available, could improve COIN markedly. Universal cell phone use and linking cell phones to the identity and location of individuals would make government and security services more aware and responsive, as would systems of population registry, census, ID cards, and vetting. Three-dimensional urban mapping and mounted video cameras would permit critical locations and situations to be observed and secured. National “wikis” would promote sharing and understanding of information, attitudes, and needs on the part of the population. Simple protocols would make it easy for information *users* (i.e., those involved in COIN operations) to be more efficient information *providers* without deflecting attention from their missions. Information gathered by means such as these could be disseminated by an “Integrated Counterinsurgency Operating Network” (ICON) for use by U.S., coalition, and local forces, civil providers, local authorities, and the local population. The information in ICON would be shared based on principles of user dominance, inclusiveness, and integration, with security by exception.

We estimate that existing information capabilities would meet 25–50 percent of the 160 COIN information requirements mentioned earlier, whereas ICON would meet an estimated 50–100 percent. Moreover, assuming that the principles of user dominance, inclusiveness, and integration are upheld, the information would be more timely, relevant, and reliable. Reduced information security, if any, would be mitigated by greater operating speed and superior cognitive performance. Such enhancements in the availability and value of information could substantially improve COIN against cyber-savvy Type III insurgents. Again, such enhancements could be made quickly and affordably.

Perceptions and Cognition

COIN could be further improved through smarter use of information in analysis, strategy and planning, and operational problem-solving. Better cognition in COIN and other military endeavors is largely neglected and thus untapped potential. Personnel policies, for recruitment, retention, assignment, education, training, and promotion, should stress the mental abilities that are most precious in COIN: anticipation, learning in action, the ability to blend intuition and reasoning, fast and adaptive decisionmaking, and self-awareness. Command and control should favor decentralized decisionmaking and horizontal collaboration.

The United States and its partners cannot allow insurgents to continue to hold an advantage in using information and cognition to influence popular attitudes. In the struggle for legitimacy, both performance and perceptions matter. With improved information capabilities in vulnerable countries comes the opportunity to conduct more effective information operations (IO). However, efforts by the United States to get out *its* message must yield to an approach more suitable for the contest over the allegiance of Muslim populations. The keys are

- to deemphasize attempts to peddle a pro-American narrative (defending U.S. ideals and policies) in favor of one supporting the local alternative to jihad: responsive government
- to recognize that nonviolent Islam, however radical, is the key to isolating jihadism and therefore must not be described as part of the problem or confused with the enemy
- to offer hard evidence (e.g., from Afghanistan and Iraq) that jihadists have no concept, no plan, and no ability to govern, much less offer Muslims a promising (non-fantasy) future
- to accent the jihadists' own position that the sole purposes of the state are to enforce and protect adherence to puritanical Islamic law, not to serve much less answer to the people.

IO along these lines makes all the more crucial the inclusion of local authorities, groups, and citizens in new information networks, which may be motivated by COIN but can help create information

societies in which truth, freedom of ideas, and the requirement of government to listen are the best antidote for insurgency.

Indigenous Security Capabilities

Reducing reliance on direct, large-scale U.S. military power in the Muslim world, while improving COIN, implies not only improved civil and information capabilities but also more capable local security services. The rise of Type III insurgency makes this emphasis both more important and more challenging. Based on Iraq and Afghanistan, on the need for legitimate force, and on analysis of the (often weak) potential of local states to field and manage security services, the following capabilities are considered to be high priority, both within a typical COIN campaign and for purposes of planning investments:

- *Leadership, institutions, and support structure:* senior uniformed command, management capacity (for police, military, and intelligence services), and logistics (spares and supplies for local forces)
- *Law enforcement:* well-trained and well-led community police and quick-response, light-combat-capable (constabulary) police
- *Intelligence and information:* access to and use of ICON, human intelligence, border security systems, and “low-end” technical surveillance and reconnaissance (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, infrared sensors, and stationary land surveillance devices) and IO
- *Combat forces:* Ground forces for area presence, defensive, and offensive operations, with precision direct fire and short-range indirect fire; and special forces for high-value targets.

Adequate numbers of COIN-trained indigenous ground combat forces are particularly important to handle sophisticated insurgents while reducing reliance on U.S. ground forces. In Type III insurgencies, these must include forces for protracted presence, control, and general public security, complemented by light, fast forces able to respond to tactical warnings and exploit fleeting opportunities using improved sensing and networking. Air-mobile forces are advantageous

but require foreign air-mobility assets and management, which likely exceed local capabilities.

U.S. Security Capabilities

U.S. requirements for capabilities to provide security in COIN fall into three categories. First, the United States needs the competence and capacity to *prepare* indigenous security services to perform effective COIN. Second, it needs forces equipped to *enable* indigenous forces by providing critical support in operations. Third, it needs capabilities to *operate* directly in those tasks only U.S. forces can perform. Judging by U.S. performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, and considering the challenges of Type III insurgency generally, the United States is not adequately capable of preparing or enabling effective local security services.

Obviously, the more capable the United States is in preparing and enabling indigenous forces, the fewer the tasks its own forces must perform. Because of the paradox of force, COIN forces must be both effective and legitimate. Frustrations in Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, making local forces effective should be easier than making foreign (i.e., U.S.) forces legitimate, especially against global-local insurgents who can rally the people to resist and expel foreign “infidels.” The implication is that building and aiding local security forces for COIN must be among the highest priorities of U.S. military missions, which is not so today.

To be more specific, taking account of (1) the strategic and operational problems posed by Type III insurgencies, (2) goals for improving indigenous security capabilities, (3) limitations in indigenous capacity, (4) the challenges of U.S. and local services operating together, (5) U.S. performance in COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan, and (6) the growing advantages afforded by information sharing, this study finds that the United States needs to improve its capabilities for

- *Strengthening local capabilities:* security institution-building; leadership development; improving local IO and human intelligence; training, organizing, and equipping police; training, organizing, and equipping ground forces; networking with local forces

- *Providing operational support*: advanced surveillance systems; border and coastal monitoring; tactical and theater air mobility; professional advisors; protecting civil COIN
- *Selective combat*: Direct action against high-value targets in remote or populated areas; clandestine operations; precision strike.

Also critical is the building of high-quality local constabulary forces—though this is beyond U.S. competence, it is an area in which Italy, France, and Spain excel.

Because efforts to conduct civil COIN and to upgrade local forces may not succeed completely, the United States must hedge by improving the capabilities of its own ground forces for COIN operations. However perilous and dubious the idea of large-scale, protracted U.S. military intervention in the Muslim world may be, it must remain an option. At a minimum, U.S. forces should be capable of responding swiftly and effectively to aid and enable local forces, with the latter providing the bulk of the ground presence. If pressed into direct COIN operations, U.S. ground forces need to be *more skilled, more mobile, less reliant on deadly force, more informed, and more durable* than they are now. Thus, they need (1) more COIN training than they now get, (2) a spectrum of options for nonlethal force, (3) improved (e.g., faster yet more survivable) land mobility, (4) improved information collecting and sharing capabilities, and (5) the ability to carry on COIN for many years. In addition to specific investments in these enhancements, U.S. Army and Marine Corps plans to transform their forces for net-centric operations can be as useful for COIN as for the major combat operations for which they were originally meant.

These priorities differ from DoD's current plan to enlarge U.S. ground forces for COIN. While it is true that U.S. ground forces have been weakened by the ordeal of Iraq, it does not follow that they should be expanded for future COIN. It would be an error to deduce from the experience of U.S. forces in Iraq that the right way to counter Islamic insurgencies generally is to send bigger armies to fight them. To be clear, this study does not address whether U.S. ground forces are large enough at present to meet the totality of U.S. global defense needs. But it does find that large-scale use of U.S. ground forces in the Muslim

world is neither effective against distributed and shadowy insurgents nor welcome by the people among whom those insurgents hide.

History provides no basis for expecting large-scale foreign military intervention to make COIN victorious. Rather, there is a correlation between large-scale foreign military intervention and unsuccessful COIN. The larger the foreign troop presence—France in Algeria, France and the United States in Indochina, the USSR in Afghanistan—the worse the outcome tends to be. Of course, causality is ambiguous: Was large-scale foreign intervention a response to the inability to prevail over insurgency by other means, or did it contribute to failure? Nevertheless, large-scale foreign military involvement is at best unproductive; at worst, it is counterproductive. (Conversely, two of the most clear-cut cases of successful COIN since World War II, Malaya and Oman, involved light but patient foreign military presence, mainly to train and advise local forces.) If large-scale foreign military intervention has failed to produce success in COIN historically, it is if anything even likelier to fail when viewed as an attack on Muslims and their faith.

III. Organizing and Investing

Multilateral Counterinsurgency

The United States will be hard-pressed to create and maintain all the capabilities needed to counter Type III insurgency, especially those for improving the performance of local government and security services. Fortunately, U.S. allies (e.g., NATO and EU members) and international organizations (e.g., the World Bank and UN agencies) have competence and capacity that correspond to U.S. deficiencies, e.g., those needed to

- build indigenous public education, health, and justice systems
- offer targeted job training and placement (e.g., for ex-combatants)
- organize, train, and equip local police and constabulary forces
- reform local security institutions
- monitor and manage borders.

Besides these valuable capabilities, broad multilateral COIN can impart legitimacy and durability to COIN, internationally, at home, and to some extent in the countries facing insurgency. However, planning, assembling, and employing multilateral COIN capabilities involves vexing issues of coalition legal mandate, leadership, political authority, decisionmaking, military command, and information sharing. These issues cannot be resolved in the midst of crisis: Prior political understandings, joint planning, and established processes are needed, which are bound to be technically and diplomatically complex. Moreover, the need for integrated strategy and operations cannot be suspended because COIN involves many nations: It just gets harder. In sum, multilateral COIN is as knotty as it is necessary.

Fortunately, workable institutional options are available, though obstructed by political disputes that can and must be overcome. In particular, the combination of NATO's prowess in preparing and mounting complex security operations, starting in the Balkans, and the EU's potential for civil COIN suggests that cooperation between these two groups, which have largely overlapping membership, could serve as the core for organizing and enhancing multilateral COIN capabilities. NATO could concentrate on capabilities to prepare and enable indigenous security forces and to manage security operations; the EU could complement and cooperate with U.S. civil COIN. (The EU alone does not have the means to meet the military demands of large-scale COIN.) Such an approach is in some respects being tested in Afghanistan, with successes, shortcomings, and lessons to be mined.

While NATO, in cooperation with the EU, has considerable potential to expand and maintain capabilities for multilateral COIN, its direct involvement in campaigns to counter Type III insurgencies is another matter. As this study has found, large-scale use of foreign forces, especially Western forces in the Muslim world, will not necessarily be productive and could be counterproductive. Although intervention by NATO may be somewhat more acceptable locally and internationally than unilateral U.S. military intervention, it still carries the risk of intensifying insurgency in order to resist "the new Crusaders." Moreover, if COIN is successful in preventing full-blown Type III insurgency by improving local government and security forces, heavy

and obtrusive NATO presence would be unnecessary, and a variety of other multilateral instruments—UN, regional organization, ad hoc—would be both adequate and more suitable. Therefore, to be clear, the primary value of NATO and of NATO-EU collaboration in COIN would be in ensuring that more balanced and complete COIN capabilities are available multilaterally, whatever the chosen vehicle for their actual use. Such capabilities would include not only forces but also the means to pursue civil COIN and to expand local capabilities, military and civil. In addition, in those instances in which large-scale foreign intervention is advisable, far better that it be under multilateral auspices than U.S.-only. Thus, in preparation for the worst case, these Western organizations must be prepared to act effectively, not only to serve as a warehouse of capabilities.

While NATO-EU cooperation is key to building balanced and complete multilateral COIN, there are institutional and political obstacles to such cooperation. In particular, France and Turkey are opposed, for different parochial reasons. Overcoming these obstructions and developing a reasonably unified Western answer to Type III insurgency is important for U.S., European, and global security. The deeper issue is whether today's transatlantic schism over the utility of military force against Islamic insurgency is bridgeable. Perhaps an integrated civil-military-developmental approach to COIN could span European and American philosophies on this. If the military and colonial connotations of "counterinsurgency" give Europeans pause, "comprehensive approach"—NATO's current expression of choice—could be a more palatable expression.

Creating a NATO-EU core for multilateral COIN capabilities would require purposeful planning. NATO should produce an analysis of the threat and the security demands of Type III insurgency, drawing on lessons from both Iraq and Afghanistan. The EU and the United States should assess needs for civil capabilities. A new NATO-EU COIN planning cell should integrate and present the results for adoption by NATO and the EU, with members pledging to meet the requirements. Prospective partners other than members of NATO or the EU, e.g., Australia and Japan, would be invited to join in all aspects of analysis, planning, and pledging.

In the event of agreement by NATO and the EU that a major COIN campaign should be launched—perhaps based on a common I&W scheme—coalition leadership should be based on the nature of the campaign, the balance between civil and military COIN, and relative contributions, with NATO, the EU, and the United States the chief candidates. Within an overall campaign construct, military command and control would be integrated, whether under NATO or some other arrangement. In keeping with the principles of inclusiveness and integration, most information would be freely shared via ICON across national and civil-military lines, with specific exceptions.

Given the dangers and demands of global-local insurgency, multilateral COIN, including but not limited to NATO and the EU, is a necessity, not an option. Creating able and legitimate governments and security forces in vulnerable parts of the Muslim world is beyond the means of the United States alone, but not of the United States, its allies, and the international political and economic institutions they manage.

Investment

Provided the United States is committed to organize multilateral COIN, it can in turn target its investment on deficient capabilities that its partners cannot adequately offset, especially:

- *Civil*: job training for ex-fighters; public-education and justice-system capacity-building
- *Indigenous Security Services*: reforming local security and intelligence institutions; organizing, training, equipping, and advising COIN-capable indigenous police and ground-combat forces
- *Military Capabilities*: operations against high-value targets in urban areas; border and other surveillance; nonlethal force
- *Information and Cognition*: integrated, inclusive, user-responsive networking; support for local IO; improved research, analysis, and understanding of insurgencies; improved COIN strategy-setting, planning, shaping campaigns; improved decisionmaking.

Note two salient themes for U.S. COIN investment: capabilities to build local governance and security capacity, and enhancements in the sharing and cognitive use of information.

This study offers an analysis of the annual costs of these investments, assuming matching partner capabilities:

- *Civil*: Bare-bones civil capability to prevent and counter medium-sized insurgencies: \$1–2B for additional people and \$10–15B for additional U.S. foreign aid dedicated to COIN, assuming (1) I&W permits targeting of preventative efforts, (2) a significant fraction of existing aid is directed to COIN, and (3) the United States can mobilize additional resources (e.g., civil reserves) if insurgency poses greater danger than expected.
- *Local Security Services*: Requirements to build, advise, and enable local security institutions and forces for COIN: \$2–3B.
- *U.S. Forces*: Enhancements in key U.S. military capabilities for COIN (e.g., special operations forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; nonlethal force): \$3–4B per year.
- *Information and Cognition*: Developing and/or financing the information capabilities of ICON for use by U.S. and local counter-insurgents in vulnerable countries: \$4–6B.

Thus, a very crude estimate of the cost to give the United States more *complete and balanced* capabilities to conduct COIN is on the order of \$20–30B (or twice that in the absence of multilateral COIN).

While such sums could be raised by increasing federal debt, raising taxes, or cutting domestic or non-COIN national-security expenditures, analysis of such tradeoffs goes beyond this study. However, the costs might also be covered by a shift away from spending on military capabilities that are presently being justified by GWOT but should be rethought in light of experience and objective analysis. For example, annual spending on operations and maintenance of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps has grown by about \$40B (from \$33B to \$74B) since 2001, and Air Force and Navy investment in new military systems has grown by \$27B (from \$71B to \$98B). The expansion of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps will cost an additional \$12B per year.

Broadly speaking, the government and armed services have predicated much of this growth in defense spending on GWOT. To the extent the growth is needed for other reasons, this has not been made sufficiently clear and should be. To the extent the growth is for GWOT, this study's analysis of the requirements to counter Type III Islamic insurgency does not support it. Thus, the \$20–30B cost of providing the United States with the more complete and balanced COIN capabilities suggested here may not necessarily require increased total federal spending.

Organizational Change

A commitment to build complete and balanced COIN capabilities will have organizational implications. Notwithstanding changes since 9/11, notably the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the existing structure has not performed well in COIN. (DHS has virtually nothing to do with COIN, and DNI has not appreciably improved intelligence sharing in actual operations.) Although it would be a mistake to attribute U.S. failures solely to organizational shortcomings—deficient capabilities, planning, and execution are at least as important—it would also be wrong to exempt organizational structure from consideration of how to improve U.S. COIN. After all, organization affects how capabilities are funded, built, maintained, and used.

Of the options this study examined, several deserve closer consideration:

- Assignment of responsibility for maintaining COIN civil expertise to those agencies with the relevant core competencies, e.g., the Departments of State, Justice, Education, and Labor
- In view of such a distributed approach to civil capabilities, formation of a civil agency to guide, challenge, and measure the departments; manage the packaging and delivery of government-wide capabilities; and seed investment to address critical needs until the departments are ready
- Within the Department of Defense, enlargement of the scope of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to serve as the core of

U.S. capability to prepare and enable indigenous forces for COIN and to operate directly in COIN; complemented by (1) surge capacity from the regular armed services revolving around the SOCOM core and (2) a counterpart defense agency to manage acquisition, interagency coordination, and other non-operating tasks.

- At the micro-structural (field) level, the formation of versatile, adjustable, deployable civil-military units for integrated COIN and to provide security for civil measures (akin to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are operating in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Such organizational reforms could improve U.S. performance not only for COIN capabilities, campaigns, and operations but also for post-conflict reconstruction, stability operations, and aid to failed states.

Will the Proposed Capabilities Work?

In no field of conflict is the gap between theory and reality wider than in COIN. Despite having stronger forces, greater resources, and the advantages of governing authority, COIN has clearly succeeded against only one-third of 89 major insurgencies since World War II. Because Type III insurgencies pose greater challenges than traditional types, it has to be asked whether the civil, information, local, and U.S. capabilities proposed here will *really* work.

Perhaps the best evidence of the efficacy of civil COIN is that some of the strongest predictors of insurgent failure—popular antipathy; competent, democratic, and popular government; and social-political inclusiveness—depend heavily on civil COIN. There are also notable cases in which robust civil COIN worked. The Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) program for coordinating civil COIN in Vietnam yielded impressive operational results against Vietcong insurgents. COIN success in the Philippines (1899–1902), Malaya (1948–1960), Oman (1968–1975), and Egypt (1992–1997) has been attributed largely to civil capabilities.

It is harder to show that ambitious use of advanced information capabilities produces success in COIN, for it has never been seriously

tried. The U.S. government has not adopted the requisite principles, practices, skills, reforms, and culture to exploit networking. The military has just begun to employ networking in regular warfare, and preliminary results are demonstrably positive. The potential of information power in COIN has been illuminated by an experience in Northern Iraq in which U.S. officers instituted information-sharing rules akin to those recommended in this report and discovered marked improvement in the timeliness of decisions and action. Also, contacts with U.S. law enforcement reveal that the networking solutions proposed here match the direction they are taking to combat analogous threats.

Capable local security forces are obviously more likely to achieve success than incapable ones. Less obvious is how feasible it is to build capable local forces in the Muslim world. Iraq and Afghanistan have been discouraging, especially in regard to police. Yet there is evidence that local forces are not necessarily weak, corrupt, or brutal. Iraqi-Kurdish forces are of high quality by any standard. Well organized, trained, equipped, supported, and managed by able civilians, they perform ably in cooperating with the (Kurdish) population and in countering sophisticated insurgents. Still, it is hard to dispel all doubt about the feasibility of creating high-quality local security forces, even with better U.S. capabilities to create them.

This doubt underscores the importance of improving U.S. military forces to counter Type III insurgency in the Muslim world, despite the pitfalls of using them. The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the observed transformation of insurgencies—cellular, mobile, and information-savvy—suggests that special forces, mobile forces, precise and nonlethal force, and surveillance will work better than large, heavy, slow ground forces.

Conclusion

The United States cannot be confident of success in countering growing global-local Islamic insurgency with its current capabilities. Its heavy reliance on the use of large-scale military power in the Muslim world will not lead to the comprehensive defeat of this distributed,

elusive, fanatical, and increasingly urban jihadist-insurgent threat, however Iraq and Afghanistan turn out. Success requires the active cooperation of Muslim populations within which jihadist-insurgents operate—cooperation that the large-scale U.S. military occupation in the Muslim world does not engender. The enemy uses U.S. military presence as cognitive ammunition to gain support for resistance. The United States is at risk of being sucked into a whirlpool of growing Muslim hostility and perpetual jihad.

Since 9/11, over four-fifths of the growth in U.S. national-security spending has gone toward buying advanced military equipment and conducting U.S. military operations in the Muslim world. However, much of this equipment is of little or no use in countering this type of insurgency. The United States is not using its national resources effectively against the greatest danger it faces. When the United States has found itself in similar situations in the past—on entering World War II and then the Cold War—it did something about it.

The United States has three strategic options. Continued reliance on large-scale military intervention and occupation to counter insurgency in the Muslim world cannot withstand objective analysis of this type of insurgency. Another option is to disengage from COIN in the Muslim world, concentrating instead on defending the United States proper and its vital interests elsewhere, not unlike the way the United States disengaged from Indo-China after the Vietnam War. The United States discovered that Indo-China was not, after all, the apex of the struggle with Soviet communism, and by disengaging was better able to focus on and prevail in the larger East-West struggle. But today's situation is different. The United States cannot disengage from the reality of Islamic insurgency. It cannot abandon COIN without running grave risks to its interests and friends, to the fate of the Middle East, to global security, to global energy security, and to its own safety. Just as it would be dangerous to escalate the use of U.S. military power in the Muslim world, it would be folly to think that disengagement from that world would mollify the jihadists and end Islamic violence.

If the United States should neither disengage nor rely chiefly on the use of large-scale U.S. military power in the Muslim world, it must build more complete and balanced COIN capabilities and use them

wisely and steadfastly to enable legitimate local partners to win the contest for the Muslim people. This report offers a plan for doing so.

Beyond the danger of Islamic insurgency, implementation of the investments and measures prescribed here would prepare the United States to confront a host of unprecedented national-security challenges in the era of globalization.

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Abbreviations

ACT	Advance Civilian Team; Allied Command Transformation
ARC	Active Response Corps
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
B	billion
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
CA	civil affairs
CAD	computer-aided design
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMPSTAT	computerized statistics
CONOPS	concept of operations
CORDS	Civil Operations Rural Development Support
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoE	U.S. Department of Energy
DoJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DoS	U.S. Department of State
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNI	Director of National Intelligence

EU	European Union
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FY	fiscal year
GIG	Global Information Grid
GPS	Global Positioning System
GWOT	global war on terror
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVT	high-value target
I&W	indicators and warning
ICON	integrated counterinsurgency operating network
IED	improvised explosive device
IFOR	Peace Implementation Force
IO	information operations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT	information technology
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OMA	USAID Office of Military Affairs
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
R&D	research and development
S/CRS	State/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SFOR	Stabilisation Force

SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIM	subscriber information module
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	special operations forces
SRC	Standby Response Corps
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USMC	United States Marine Corps

Defining the Problem

GWOT or COIN?

Worldwide, the number of violent movements aimed at overthrowing existing governments has declined since the Cold War, during which the two superpowers backed insurgencies against each other's proxies as a kind of East-West noncontact sport. Whereas 12 major insurgencies, on average, began every decade between 1950 and 1990, only five have begun since 2000, none of which is the doing of a rival global power.¹ Why then is the U.S. national-security establishment increasingly gripped by the need to conduct effective counterinsurgency (COIN)?² Why have the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps issued a new manual on COIN doctrine?³ Why has the subject suddenly appeared on the curricula of U.S. military schools?⁴ Why have journal

¹ A sharp spike in the 1990s is mainly attributable to effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire.

² This is reflected in the growing reference to insurgency in news, journals, and defense studies.

³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 3-24, and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, December 2006).

⁴ Interviews conducted in July–September 2006 with the personnel at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia, and the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia.

articles on COIN gone up tenfold since 2001?⁵ Why, for that matter, did the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) ask RAND to conduct this comprehensive new study of COIN?

The main reason is that the conflict in Iraq has, belatedly, been diagnosed as an insurgency and, before this diagnosis, had gone badly despite heavy U.S. labors and losses. Although Sunni insurgents cannot gain control of Iraq, neither has the Shia-led regime created by the United States. This raises the question of whether the United States has what it takes, in strategy and capabilities, to succeed against such fierce insurgency in the Muslim world—a question that looms large for the future, no matter what the outcome in Iraq.

At the same time, the Taliban's resurgence and tenacious resistance against NATO forces in Afghanistan, al Qaeda's ability to elude U.S. forces, and the trouble Israel has had in trying to subdue violent extremism in tiny Southern Lebanon (Hezbollah) and tinier Gaza (Hamas) have deepened concern that even the world's finest militaries cannot defeat such enemies.

In these and other insurgencies, in varying degrees, the venom of religious fanaticism has infected local political struggles, making each one more complex and volatile, less containable, and less amenable to peaceful resolution. Each such insurgency has its own character, but all of them feature unrestrained terror and unrequited anger toward the West. Among these insurgencies stretches a web of stateless extremists, the most infamous and formidable being al Qaeda, whose charismatic leaders summon the faithful to jihad and martyrdom operations (suicide terror) against the "New Crusaders" (Western democracies) and their Jewish (Israeli), apostate (secular regimes in the Muslim world), and heretical (Shia) accomplices. The stated goal of this self-proclaimed global jihad is not just to topple this or that government but also to demolish the nation-state order in the Muslim world and build on its rubble a new caliphate of Islamic piety and power.⁶

⁵ For example, *Military Review* articles on COIN have grown from 3 in 2001 to 24 in 2006.

⁶ The term "jihad" has both peaceful and violent meanings: The former, widely used among ordinary Muslims, means struggle for individual betterment; the latter, used by militants

The jihadists' foremost enemy is the nation they blame for enforcing and manipulating the existing order to divide and subjugate Islam: the United States of America. Jihadist terrorists are ready to kill and die in defense of their fundamentalist faith and fellow Muslims. Jihad's geostrategic prize is the Muslim holy lands that lie in the oil-rich Arab heartland. Jihadists' weapon of choice is the suicide bomber, though there is little doubt that they would use weapons of mass destruction if they got them. Their strategy is to incite, join, radicalize, and hijack local insurgencies in the Muslim world, while also mounting terrorist attacks in the West to weaken support for intervention in those insurgencies. It is the dangerous merger of global-religious extremism with local-political conflicts, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond, that has the United States so alarmed, and rightly so.

But is it right to call this "insurgency," defined as a violent movement that vies for popular support against the governing structure? The U.S. Department of State (DoS) thinks so: Its 2006 *Country Reports on Terrorism* refers to a shift "from traditional international terrorism of the late 20th century into a new form of transnational non-state warfare that resembles a form of *global insurgency*" (italics added).⁷ Naturally, in an age when the principal political unit is the nation-state, insurgency is generally considered to be directed against national governments. However, as the control of nation-states is being challenged by subnational, transnational, and global actors, it seems more appropriate to think of insurgency as being directed against governing structures more generally—states as well as systems of states.

The insurgency paradigm seems right on two levels:

- On one level, sub- and transnational Islamic forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria, Kashmir, Somalia, Thailand, Philippines, and elsewhere aim to bring down present

and insurgents, means holy war against infidels who threaten Islam. In this report the term is used with the latter meaning, without derogating from the spiritual, personal, peaceful meaning that many Muslims hold and practice.

⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2007, Chapter 1). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/>.

governing authorities, win independence, or gain autonomy to institute Islamic rule within particular states.

- On another level, global jihadists, mainly of the Sunni-Salafi (extreme fundamentalist) persuasion, want to destroy the governing order in the Muslim world.⁸

Whether jihadists' goals require bringing down every sitting regime in the Muslim world is a question on which the jihadists themselves seem to differ: Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, has been clear that the Egyptian government must go; yet bin Laden, a Saudi, has stressed the need to cleanse the Saudi Kingdom of infidels and apostates rather than necessarily replacing it.⁹ In either case, though, the desired end state is a drastically different political order, subservient not to the West but to fundamentalist Islam.

The aims of militant Shia are less grandiose, though they also transcend individual states. According to researcher Vali Nasr, the goal of Shia militants is to expand Shia power at Sunni and Western expense in the Muslim world.¹⁰ Though defined by sectarianism, this goal does not fit with the idea of global holy war. Yet it does portend efforts, including violent ones, to bring down existing regimes and redraw the governing order in at least part of the Muslim world.

Not all violence directed against the political status quo in the Muslim world is motivated or controlled by jihadism. In Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, and elsewhere, violent opposition to the status quo is rooted in dissatisfaction with the regimes themselves. Even where Islamic militancy is at work— Hamas, for instance—the primary goal may be local and political—a Palestinian state—rather than holy war with the West. At the same time, jihadist ideas and agents, homegrown as well as transnational, are increasingly active and influential. The proliferation of al Qaeda “chapters” in recent years corresponds closely

⁸ RAND researchers were the first to describe the jihad of al Qaeda and its affiliates as “global insurgency.” (Ongoing RAND research.)

⁹ An insight from Steven Simon of the Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁰ Vali R. Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).

to the existence of local insurgencies in the Muslim world that both feed and feed on growing religious radicalization. Thus, while al Qaeda clearly does not control Hamas, leaders of the latter warn of the danger that the Palestinian cause will be swept up into the larger, more radical, insatiable jihad unless Palestinian local demands are met.¹¹ Insurgencies in the Muslim world are distinct but connected, loosely or tightly, to a common idea of opposing the West and its alleged proxies.

Perhaps the most important point is that, on various levels and in various forms, the prize of Islamic militancy is the support of contested populations, the obstacle is the existing political order, and the chosen method is extreme violence—defining characteristics of insurgency.¹² For our part, invoking insurgency as the diagnosis of organized Islamic violence, and thus COIN as the prescription, enlarges the scope of our comprehension and therefore of our response to the general problem of Muslim animosity toward the West and the regimes in the Muslim world allied with it.

Of course, clinical definitions of insurgency matter less than getting real-world treatments right. Whatever it is called, this struggle is at its core a competition for the orientation of Muslims, globally and locally, toward human progress and dignity on the one hand or religious tyranny and violence on the other. Recognition of this is important, for if the aim of jihadists is war between Islam and Christendom, the highest aim of the United States must be to defuse that war, not to wage and win it.

Defusing Islamic insurgencies requires, above all, persuading Muslim populations to choose progress and dignity and to reject religious tyranny and violence. This seemingly easy choice is complicated by the view of many Muslims, not entirely unfounded, that they have fared poorly in a Western-dominated system that espouses progress and dignity, not to mention the fact that few states in the Muslim world actually offer their citizens either progress or dignity. Islamic

¹¹ Author's interview with a prominent Israeli politician and thinker with Hamas contacts.

¹² This basic formula is clear from the writings of Abu Bakr Naji, an influential and articulate jihadist thinker.

insurgency both relies and preys on populations for whom radical religion may fill the void of hope caused by unsatisfactory government.

The idea of competing for the population's support has been central since the conception of COIN in the middle of the 20th century. The 40-year insurgency in Colombia is a traditional case of politically motivated insurgents seeking and needing popular support against the state and its backers, including the United States. In that case, a political system based on exclusion has, unsurprisingly, caused alienation, which has in turn fueled insurgency. Colombia is a reminder that garden-variety insurgencies are still with us and can last for decades. If COIN cannot finish off this familiar and contained sort of political insurgency, how can it stop more complex and sprawling ones that borrow added energy from Islamic fanaticism?

It is not only valid to treat the challenge of Islamic violence as insurgency but also *essential* to do so if we expect to respond effectively. The surge in debate, research, education, and policy utterances about insurgency and COIN within the U.S. national-security community could not be more welcome and timely. A swelling body of literature and discourse argues that the ideas associated with insurgency and COIN are more reflective of current reality, more illuminating of the hard choices that must be made, and more likely to produce effective U.S. capabilities and responses than is the narrower concept they are replacing.

For six years (and counting) since al Qaeda's attack of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has waged a "global war on terror" (GWOT). Apart from the oddity of waging war on a tactic, this expression sidesteps the causes, dynamics, and shades of Islamic militancy, with unfortunate consequences for strategy, resources, and results.¹³ The idea of GWOT has caused the United States to treat all Islamic militancy as if it flowed from a common spring of religious radicalism. It has fixed official U.S. attention on terrorists, with insufficient regard for the hostility that exists among vastly larger numbers of Muslims—hostility that appears to have intensified and spread as a result

¹³ As Francis Fukayama has said, conducting "war on terrorism" is the logical equivalent of conducting "war on submarines"—both are weapons, not enemies.

of U.S. military action in the Muslim world in prosecution of GWOT. And it has skewed resources toward massive growth in spending on traditional military gear compared with modest increases in spending on intelligence, political action, civil assistance, and other nonmilitary means that might curb Islamic militancy more effectively and at less cost and risk.

GWOT has been the banner for large-scale use of U.S. military force in Muslim lands, in the midst of the very populations whose loyalty is being contested. The idea of attacking abroad to defend the American people at home makes no mention of the people who live in the places being attacked. The indelible image of jihadists scheming alone in remote mountain caves is less the reality of Islamic insurgency than is far larger numbers of jihadists moving freely among Muslim populations.

Both the difference and relationship between insurgency and terrorism have been widely misunderstood—a confusion sown, most recently, by GWOT. Not all insurgencies employ terror, and not all terrorists are insurgents. Insurgencies have an alternative vision of how to organize society, and they use various instruments, ranging from public service to terror, to realize that vision. Terrorism may be embedded in and subordinate to insurgency. But terrorism may also exist outside of insurgency, animated by sheer revulsion toward the status quo, without offering or striving for an alternative. Insurgencies tend to be large and enjoy at least some popular backing, whereas terrorist groups operating on their own may be small and neither have nor seek popular backing. Thus, to question GWOT as strategy is not to question the need to combat terror but rather to point out that terror inspired by Islamic extremism is part of a larger pattern of Muslim “resistance” that has significant popular appeal, even if the use of terror does not.¹⁴ This “inconvenient truth”—we wish Muslim populations were not so embittered—means that terrorism cannot be defeated unless the insurgencies in which it is embedded are successfully countered.

Since it was launched in the wake of 9/11, the military offensive at the heart of GWOT has mostly ignored the fact that these Muslim

¹⁴ Ongoing RAND research by Bruce Hoffman et al.

populations are largely unsympathetic to the United States and regard GWOT as aggression. The existence of a “global Muslim community that has a personality in the world arena challenges the U.S. strategic concept of a war on terror that narrowly seeks military outcomes” while ignoring the hostility it may engender in that larger community.¹⁵ Lost in the fog of GWOT is whether using armies to fight terrorists hidden among Muslim populations is spawning more hostility and resistance.¹⁶ The data suggest that it is.¹⁷

The statistical relationship between the elimination of insurgents and the scale of insurgency in Iraq is telling. Figure 1.1 shows that the Sunni armed opposition grew in parallel with the killing and detention of Sunni fighters. Over three years starting in January 2004, the estimated number of fighters grew from 5,000 to 25,000, while the cumulative number of fighters removed was just under 70,000. The number added thus exceeds the number subtracted by 20,000.¹⁸ This is not to say that killing and detaining insurgents necessarily caused the growth—the rise in religious radicalism, onset of sectarian conflict, and prolongation of U.S. occupation were also factors. But it does suggest that a strategy of attrition does not work. Perhaps the insurgency would be even stronger were it not for the numbers killed and detained. But it is no less plausible that actions taken to kill insurgents expand the pool of persons prepared to replace those killed. Significantly, since the United States shifted to COIN strategy in Iraq in 2007, the scale,


¹⁵ John Mackinlay and Alison al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency—A British Perspective: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 5* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-177-OSD, forthcoming). Also see Steve Tatham, *Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion* (London, UK: C. Hurst & Co., 2006).

¹⁶ Conceptually, the term “Long War” avoids the pitfalls of treating terror as the enemy. Like GWOT, however, it places too much stress on the other combatant and not enough on the population in the middle.

¹⁷ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006). As of October 23, 2007: <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253> as of February 18, 2007.

¹⁸ Roughly, the number of insurgents added has covered losses (70,000) and then some (20,000), though this does not take into account released detainees that rejoin the insurgency.

Figure 1.1
Iraq Insurgent Attrition and Strength, 2004–2006




SOURCE: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, Web page. As of October 22, 2007:
<http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx>.

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extremism, and destructiveness of the Sunni insurgency appear to have abated. The most important factor explaining the dampening of insurgency in Iraq is the divergence that finally appeared between Sunnis motivated by local-political grievances and religious extremists bent on a wider holy war.

It is also notable that the severity of violence increased from 2003 through 2006 despite the removal of large numbers of insurgents. Figure 1.2 shows that the number of multiple-casualty insurgent attacks per month increased from about 10 to 60 over those three years. In sum, war of attrition did not prevent substantial growth in either the size or destructiveness of the insurgency, and it could have contributed to both.

Figure 1.2
Multiple-Casualty Attacks over Time



SOURCE: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, 2007.

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
In Afghanistan, a similar pattern (Figure 1.3) of rising attacks, rising fatalities from attacks, and rising fatalities per attack is evident since the initial military victory over the Taliban.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the incidence of what are specifically defined as terrorist attacks grew steadily in the years after the initial invasions (Table 1.1).¹⁹ This trend strongly implies a corresponding growth in the number of persons prepared to commit acts of terror. The growth rate in suicide-terrorist attacks was even greater in Iraq and Afghanistan, which necessarily means a corresponding growth in the number of suicide terrorists because, by definition, there are no repeaters.

Notwithstanding the growing self-destruction of terrorists and destruction of terrorists by U.S. and allied forces, terrorism rose in the very states the United States has waged GWOT. If the goal was attri-

¹⁹ Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorism Database, 2007.

Figure 1.3
Insurgent-Initiated Attacks and Fatalities, 2002–2006



SOURCE: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorism Database, 2007.

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Table 1.1
Terrorist Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan Since U.S. Invasions

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Iraq			145	849	2,344	3,966	818
Afghanistan	0	65	148	146	207	352	59

SOURCE: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorism Database, 2007.

tion, the result was the opposite. Wars are rarely won against adversaries that become stronger, more determined, and more destructive as the conflict proceeds, as the adversary has become in GWOT. Perhaps the U.S. military presence is not the principal cause of this rise; perhaps the rise would be even greater if U.S. troops were not destroying terrorists. Nevertheless, the results of 2003–2006 cannot be interpreted

as successful. Unless this can be explained entirely by bad execution of good strategy, it begs an objective reappraisal of the strategy itself.²⁰

To be clear, this is not to say that finding and eliminating terrorists is unwise or unnecessary. Nor does it mean that effective COIN will end Islamic terrorism. Counterterrorism will remain an important label for a set of essential activities, such as international police cooperation, intelligence exchanges, and homeland defense, that are not part of COIN yet should complement it. COIN can be viewed as an alternative to a particular strategy—militarily attacking radical forces in Muslim countries, amid local Muslim populations, telecast to Muslims worldwide—that at best underestimated and at worst enflamed Islamic opposition to the West and the regimes friendly to it. The growing appreciation on the part of the U.S. military, diplomatic, foreign aid, and research establishments of the existence of multiple, spreading, and connected Islamic insurgencies and thus the need for COIN can help remedy this mistake and allow the United States to act against Islamic violence with less risk of fueling it.²¹ The resurgence of U.S. interest in COIN theory, doctrine, and capabilities is both important and urgent.

The advantage of recognizing broad-based Islamic opposition as insurgency is now becoming apparent. By 2007, most U.S. military forces in Iraq were conducting themselves according to COIN principles. They have shifted from relying on episodic assaults and wholesale manhunts to stressing everyday public safety, empowering local tribes and “concerned citizens,” and giving responsibility to local forces, once trained and ready. Consequently, the very jihadists that U.S. forces sought to eliminate are being isolated and chased off. Iraq is not yet secure, and U.S. COIN in Iraq still suffers from shortfalls in civil capabilities for reconstruction and development. Moreover, the weak and

²⁰ Some of the early enthusiasm for GWOT could not be described as “objective.” The idea of going after those responsible (loosely defined) for 9/11 had and still has subjective appeal in the sense of punishment and retribution. COIN obviously cannot “scratch this itch.” At the same time, the urge for revenge dissipates as years pass.

²¹ The large, government-sponsored public conference on COIN held in 2006 signaled the appreciation of the Departments of State and Defense of the need to understand Islamic violence in such terms.

divided Iraqi government has yet to win the trust and cooperation of the majority of Iraqis. Ultimately, only legitimate Iraqi leaders, reliable security forces, and competent government agencies can rid Iraq of the poison of global jihadism and address the grievances of those Iraqis who have been susceptible to it. Still, the tentative gains in security in Iraq validate the belief that COIN is the key to bringing a modicum of stability, hope, and progress to the population, which is the only lasting antidote to Islamic insurgency.

At issue is not a choice of acronym—GWOT or COIN—but a choice of strategy. What if the United States regarded growing Islamic violence as a pattern of struggles for the soul of a disaffected people being waged by extremists among them against their own states and the power behind those states? Presumably the United States would then direct its attention and more of its resources toward bolstering legitimate, effective, inclusive government in the Muslim world, which would be anathema to the enemy. It might try to divorce local-political conflicts from global jihad rather than treat them as one, which is the jihadists' formula. If the United States were to treat Islamic violence not as terror but as insurgency that uses terror, it might understand its attraction to Muslim youth. The United States might then reconsider the efficacy of large-scale direct use of military force in the Muslim world, which can alienate populations, increase extremist appeal, and swell jihadist ranks.

Clarifying organized Islamic violence against the West and its proxies as insurgency does not lessen either the significance and dangers of such violence or the legitimacy and importance of killing terrorists. Indeed, this clarification should not downgrade but instead improve the effectiveness of counterterrorism.

At the same time, understanding this pattern of violence as insurgency should also deflate optimism that the United States and its friends will prevail any time soon. Terrorist groups come and go, often abruptly, but the average insurgency lasts more than a decade. Once insurgencies gain full strength, their empirical likelihood of success is 50 percent.

Ominously, four of the strongest statistical predictors of successful insurgency—failed COIN—exist in today's Muslim world:

- populations excluded from politics and estranged from the state
- authoritarian, unresponsive, inept, and corrupt government
- strong dedication of insurgents to destroying such government
- significant popular sympathy for insurgents.²²

In sum, treating jihadist-inspired violence as insurgency underscores how deadly serious it is, how deep its root system goes, how long it could last, how dangerous it is when combined with local conflict, and how much cost and sacrifice countering it will likely entail. “War on terrorism” does not merely misstate the challenge; it understates it.

The Globalization of Insurgency and COIN

The need to meet the dangers that Iraq and Afghanistan represent—dangers that will not end with Iraq and Afghanistan—is the most pressing reason to reconsider national strategy and capabilities for COIN. However, beyond this challenge, the conditions and trends called globalization are changing the nature of conflict, from the hegemonic and interstate wars of the 20th century to the struggles of states, strong and weak, with nonstates, substates, and transstates of the 21st. We cannot assume that the complex forms of insurgency we are now seeing will be confined to militant Islam. Violence against national governments and against the nation-state order is shaping up to be a salient feature of this age. Even if the underlying theory of insurgency is not changing, the forms, scope, and consequences are.

Historians like to remind us that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. The checkered history of COIN—it has failed as often as succeeded since World War II—is replete with lessons learned the hard way and principles too often misfiled. Some of those lessons and principles apply in the new era no less than the old:

- There is no substitute for legitimate, effective local government.

²² Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946.

- Ordinary people, the prize of insurgency and COIN, respond mainly to everyday public safety and service, or lack thereof.
- Securing the population, as opposed to killing insurgents, is the principal role of military operations.
- Superior firepower can fail if seen as illegitimate, and injudicious force can fan insurgency and popular support for it.
- All instruments and measures of COIN—political, economic, intelligence, police, and military—must be integrated into a coherent campaign strategy.
- Foreign military intervention cannot save corrupt or incompetent local regimes and can trigger patriotic resistance.
- Isolating insurgents from the population is more efficacious than killing them.

These commandments of COIN remain broadly valid today. Yet globalization has created new dimensions of insurgency that call for new dimensions of COIN.²³ Worldwide communications, Internet penetration, media access (especially satellite TV), and transportation networks permit insurgencies to connect with, learn from, and receive help from one another and from stateless extremist movements. Groups and persons who are dissatisfied with or do not identify with the nation-states in which they reside can more easily form transnational collective identities, such as the worldwide Muslim “nation of one billion people”—the *Ummah*.²⁴ Globalization can also give insurgents strategic reach and access to dangerous know-how and materials, enabling them to strike directly at those they blame for the suffering of the people they claim to be defending. And because of global connec-

²³ A RAND study on lessons learned from past COIN cautions against attempting to “shove round lessons” of the past into “square counterinsurgencies” of the future. Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shukla, *Money in the Bank—Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 4* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-185-OSD, 2007, p. 25). As of October 25, 2007: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP185/.

²⁴ Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass*, translated by William McCants (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 52). As of October 23, 2007: http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2800/Management_of_Savagery.pdf.

tivity, identification, and mobility, an insurgency can have far-reaching ramifications, one of them being the proliferation of insurgencies with similar motives and methods, another being the speed with which local-political insurgencies are radicalized and energized with global themes. As John Mackinlay and Alison al-Baddawy state in their contribution to this study, 21st-century insurgency “exploits international media, new technologies, migration, and all the social and economic consequences of global change . . . [and has] swiftly adapted to the Internet’s characteristics and used it to harness the violent energy that [arises] from ‘global’ communities . . . held together by common grievances and ideologies.”²⁵

If globalization is changing insurgency, so too must COIN change.²⁶ This study revisits capabilities required for COIN in the light of globalization, the information revolution, 9/11, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the diffusion of jihadism, the weakening and failure of many states, the injection of religion into local insurgencies, and the turmoil and anger that roil the Muslim world. While Islamic insurgency is the main U.S. concern now—and the obvious inspiration for this study—acquiring the capabilities to counter it should prepare the United States for whatever insurgencies the future holds (e.g., anti-American/antiglobalization movements in Latin America). Accordingly, this study uses a general framework within which to analyze insurgent threats and how to counter them.

The future will witness insurgencies that may or may not conform to current patterns. COIN capabilities must be effective toward them all, not just the latest one. At the same time, failure to forge strategies and invest in capabilities to counter Islamic insurgencies in particular could result in even greater lasting harm to the security interests of the United States than it has suffered since 9/11. This study does not address insurgency and COIN in the abstract, but is instead intended to identify needs that transcend the most pressing present danger.

²⁵ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

²⁶ In *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, Mackinlay and al-Baddawy observe that insurgencies are closely joined with their environments and thus change along with them, whereas COIN depends on government decisionmaking, which notoriously lags environmental shifts.

The Untidy and Dynamic World of COIN

Any definition of insurgency or COIN that suggests predictability should be eyed with suspicion. Compared to the supposed black-and-white—“with us or against us”—world of GWOT, the real world of COIN is exceedingly complex and untidy: GWOT pits U.S. forces against hard-core terrorists; COIN is conducted amid populations whose loyalty is in doubt and in play. Instead of two actors, there are at least four—insurgents, local authorities and their international allies, and the population. In Iraq, one finds a dozen or so significant actors, not counting neighboring states.²⁷ As we will see, the complexity of classical insurgency and COIN is compounded by the effects of globalization and the merging of global and local insurgent goals and means.

Insurgents tend to be highly committed—readier to endure, persevere, commit heinous acts, and die than most regular troops, who may fight without necessarily being personally devoted to the cause. Lacking the capabilities of a state, insurgents are often more resourceful and ingenious. Free from the structures of a state, they can be highly flexible, adaptable, elusive, and unpredictable. Both those engaged in COIN and the plans they bring with them face uncertain and fluid dangers. Because insurgents are so hardened and ruthless, they can bring out the worst in those conducting COIN, making both insurgency and counterinsurgency not only messy but also nasty.

The riskiness, murkiness, and nastiness of COIN help explain why, empirically, failure is as likely as success, even when the embattled state and its backers, including the United States, hold a stronger hand than the insurgents in terms of firepower and finances.²⁸ The difficulties revealed by the history of COIN are clearly present in Iraq and

²⁷ In *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 2* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG595/3, forthcoming), Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell analyze the interaction of Sunni-nationalist insurgents, Iraqi jihadists, foreign jihadists, Shiite militias, Kurdish separatists, Iraq’s government and its security forces, U.S. and UK forces, and “ordinary” Iraqi citizens. Anti-Turkish Kurdish extremists (PKK) and Iranian agents are also active.

²⁸ The data on insurgency versus COIN success rates are presented in Appendix A.

Afghanistan. The United States did not foresee the growth in strength and radicalism of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, the stamina of the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the level of support from neighboring states (Syria and Pakistan, respectively). The suicide bomber—the insurgents' favorite weapon—has proven virtually unstoppable. The grisly results have prevented both the Iraqi and Afghan governments from gaining the confidence and cooperation of their populations. In each country, the spread of jihadism, the hostility of significant population segments, and the futility of efforts to create effective government have contributed to costly mistakes in using force, identifying suspects, and handling detainees. These problems are not anticipated by the dichotomy of terrorists versus everyone else on which GWOT is predicated.

Whether better U.S. COIN capabilities can fundamentally improve this picture is unclear.²⁹ After all, insurgencies, especially *these*, are not only complex but also dynamic. This study has found that insurgencies enabled by globalization behave as “complex-dynamic systems.”³⁰ They continuously change with the environment and change the environment. Because they are both committed and flexible—dedicated to their cause but not to their form—they adapt to whatever capabilities are arrayed against them, and can therefore be expected to adjust to new and better COIN capabilities. This argues for robust, broad, and versatile COIN capabilities, as opposed to placing all hope in a *deus ex machina*.

By building a more complete and balanced set of COIN capabilities, as this study proposes, the United States will be more able to counter the types of insurgencies it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the right investments, the United States should be able achieve better results at less cost, in both money and lives down the road. However, ideal outcomes are rare in COIN. Implementation often falls short of both plans and capacity. Insurgents react in ways that make capabilities less effective than expected. No one should assume that the capabili-

²⁹ This study's case analyses of Iraq and Afghanistan find that inadequate COIN capabilities are only one factor in explaining lack of success.

³⁰ A term first introduced by Nobel prize-winning economist Herbert Simon in the 1950s to describe elements of reality that are too difficult for human cognition to grasp.

ties proposed here would guarantee success: They can only increase the probability of it, if skillfully employed. Moreover, as we will propose, capabilities must meet two standards: adequate to carry out COIN as planned, and adequate to respond if COIN does not go as planned.

What to Expect from This Report

Written in the light of Iraq and Afghanistan but looking beyond those conflicts, this report is meant to answer three questions:

- What *challenges* are posed by insurgency in the age of globalization?
- What *capabilities* do the United States and its partners need to meet these challenges?
- What *investments and other measures* should the U.S. government take to create these capabilities?

The report is organized accordingly. Part I includes a framework for analysis (Chapter Two) and an examination of what the authors consider the right planning case for insurgency, as just defined, and the COIN requirements posed by that case (Chapter Three).

Part II offers an overview of capabilities to meet these requirements (Chapter Four) and closely examines civil capabilities (Chapter Five), information capabilities (Chapter Six), perception-and-cognition capabilities (Chapter Seven), general security capabilities (Chapter Eight), capabilities of local security force (Chapter Nine), and capabilities of U.S. security services (Chapter Ten).

Part III outlines what the United States must do to create needed capabilities. These include the building of sustained multilateral partnerships for COIN (Chapter Eleven), investments in U.S. capabilities (Chapter Twelve), and organizational changes to set clear responsibilities for planning, creating, and maintaining capabilities (Chapter Thirteen).

The conclusion (Chapter Fourteen) summarizes the report's arguments and recommendations. It then steps back to consider whether the

recommended capabilities will *really* work in the complex and untidy realities of insurgency and COIN. Lastly, it provides a list of specific initial steps for the U.S. government to take along a path rather different than the one it has been on—a path toward a more complete and balanced set of capabilities with which to counter the perplexing and potent insurgencies that Iraq and Afghanistan signify.

Finally, a point on method: The authors have chosen not to limit this report to uncontroversial generalities, indisputable findings, and incontestable proposals. Doing so would not do justice to the larger study on which it is based, which has produced important new ideas contained in related publications and referenced here. One of the findings of this larger study, already noted, is that the phenomenon of insurgency is in the midst of major change, owing largely to the effects of globalization.³¹ Empirical antecedents are possible for some but by no means all of the issues to be addressed or ideas to be explored. Constraining analysis of 21st-century insurgency and COIN by the rules and results of 20th-century insurgency and COIN is futile. The examination of new capabilities for COIN—in some cases, revolutionary capabilities—is necessarily speculative. The need for deductive analysis is, in this instance, as great as that for inductive analysis.

With this in mind, the research and analysis on which this report stands has three legs:

- the literature of traditional insurgency and COIN³²
- the full RAND study of 21st-century COIN on which this report draws
- the best judgment of the authors and their colleagues of the changing nature of insurgency and what it will take to counter it (a list of descriptions of the members of the study team is provided at the back of this volume).

³¹ This stands out especially in the seminal writings of John Mackinlay and David Kilcullen, two leading analysts of 21st-century insurgency and COIN.

³² RAND's prominent role in this literature is recounted in Austin Long, *On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-42-OSD, 2006). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG482/>.

From chapter to chapter, depending on the subject, the weight shifts from leg to leg. The authors indicate throughout the basis for their findings as well as those that require additional research and analysis.

Readers are encouraged to refer to the report's appendixes, which address in depth matters that bear on the report's main analysis: Appendix A presents the results of analysis of the factors affecting COIN outcomes, covering 89 cases since World War II; Appendix B presents a survey of COIN capabilities of prospective U.S. partners and international organizations; Appendix C provides a set of indicators and warnings (I&W) regarding the appearance and growth of insurgencies;³³ and Appendix D presents a description of ground-force tasks in COIN.

³³ Initially prepared in connection with a contributing study on the early stages of insurgency: Daniel Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-178-OSD, 2007). As of October 29, 2007: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178/.

Framing the Problem

A Planning Construct

There is too much flux in the global security environment to predict precisely the requirements for COIN capabilities that future insurgencies will present. Moreover, capabilities last years or even decades, and, while they should be versatile and adaptable, they cannot anticipate exact requirements that far in advance. Yet COIN capabilities must be planned, not just assembled from what is available in reaction to a crisis. The absence of serious U.S. planning for COIN capabilities since the Vietnam War, aggravated by the void of pre-invasion planning for insurgency in Iraq, left the United States at a great disadvantage there. If planning COIN capabilities is crucial but specific future needs are unpredictable, a general planning construct is needed. The one employed here is based on three taxonomies for

1. analyzing challenges posed by different *types of insurgencies*
2. distinguishing among various *aspects of COIN*
3. identifying *capabilities* for all aspects of COIN in view of the challenges.

Types of Insurgency

Insurgencies, by definition, seek to replace an existing order with one that conforms to their political, economic, ideological, or religious vision. They tend to be highly complex, and no two are alike. Many of the ways of classifying them—by size, by region, by duration, by inter-

national significance, by the character of the regime being challenged—are interesting but of limited help in planning COIN capabilities. The one variable that seems especially and increasingly important for COIN in the current age is the extent to which globalization affects the ends, forms, and means of insurgency.

In particular, globalization can provide

- the easy flow of information, technology, ideas, people, substances, and money
- vulnerability of world markets, links, infrastructure, and commons
- the rise of dissatisfied nonterritorial communities that transcend, defy, and weaken national identification
- antipathy toward the values and effects of globalization, especially among its “losers”
- revival of old identities and communities, especially religious ones, kept in check by the nation-state system
- growing viability and capabilities of nonstate actors
- the significance for all states of fragile and failed states
- turbulence and disorientation that come with rapid change
- connectivity and mobility that can be controlled only at great difficulty and cost
- the immediacy and amplification of the impact of actions due to global media, making the “propaganda of the deed” more important than the material effects of the deed.¹

These factors can influence the motivations, scope, actors, tactics, weaponry, and implications of insurgency. Understanding these influences is key to understanding the changing character and challenges of insurgency and generating requirements for effective COIN.

Accordingly, present and future insurgencies can be distributed along a globalization continuum, beginning with discrete local movements to gain control of or separate from particular nation-states and extending all the way to de-territorialized global movements, such as al

¹ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

Qaeda, that seek to destroy the nation-state order in the Muslim world. For the sake of analysis, this continuum has been segmented into four types, from least to most “globalized.” Such segmentation, like many classification schemes, is artificial in that actual insurgencies do not all fit neatly into one or another segment. Moreover, the number of segments (four) is somewhat arbitrary. Lastly, as noted, insurgencies can be distinguished from one another according to many variables (size, region, etc.), not just the degree of globalization. Nonetheless, the types suggested below are useful in considering required COIN capabilities.

It is also useful to think of insurgencies as becoming increasingly *complex*—distributed, multifaceted, and dynamic—as they become more affected by globalization. All else being equal, contained local insurgencies about national political issues are more simple and stable than ones that are subject to global ideological or religious influences and that may migrate and spread. Complex insurgencies, as defined here, obviously place greater demands on COIN capabilities, as the struggle in Iraq clearly shows.

Type I—Local Insurgency

There continue to be insurgencies that are essentially self-contained in cause, conduct, scope, and usually (though not necessarily) effects. An example from U.S. history is the Philippines insurgency of 1899–1902 that the United States faced after the Spanish-American War. The goals of the insurgents were local and circumscribed, there were no outside forces or ideologies at play, and the stakes for international security were minimal. Colombia is a current example, albeit with international implications because of the drug trade.

There is no reason to think that the phenomena associated with globalization will make local insurgencies extinct. Indeed, weak, ineffective, illegitimate, multiethnic, synthetic, porous or young states may be even more vulnerable to insurgency under conditions of globalization, and their vulnerability may be more consequential for others, including the United States. Although the end of the Cold War seems to have reduced the incidence of local insurgencies, they are still the

most common type, making up roughly 60 percent of insurgencies.² The implication is that COIN capabilities cannot ignore stand-alone local insurgencies.

Type II—Local-International Insurgency

Insurgencies will continue to find external support—money, arms, expertise, media attention, fighters, and propaganda—advantageous and, in many cases, indispensable, as have some 35 percent of insurgencies since World War II alone. In the end, however, the course and outcome of this type of insurgency will be decided by local factors, local insurgents, and the local population. Vietnam is a prime example of an insurgency that received outside support but was controlled and ultimately decided locally (assuming one regards the North Vietnamese as local, as the Vietnamese themselves clearly did). Similarly, although the separatist campaigns in Kosovo and Chechnya received external help, at the end of the day they are about breaking the yoke of Serbian and Russian rule, respectively. The Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand (a case analyzed in depth for this study), notwithstanding increased jihadist backing and rhetoric, remains essentially a separatist movement that could well be resolved by gaining greater autonomy.³

The conditions of globalization described above, e.g., economic integration, mobility, and connectivity, obviously make it easier for local insurgents to obtain international support, from near and far, including nonstate religious-extremist support. The United States must assume that any local insurgency has the potential to get outside help and thus become harder to counter. Therefore, COIN must be able to preempt or thwart external aid and influence, keeping local insurgencies local.

² Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946. Judgments regarding what type of insurgency each one was or is have been made by the authors and others on the study team.

³ Ongoing RAND research on the insurgency in the Patani region of Thailand.

Type III—Global-Local Insurgency

There comes a point, often unnoticed, at which a local insurgency receiving international support can become part of a wider regional or global struggle. In Iraq and Afghanistan, jihadist motives and methods entered and altered local political (Sunni Baathist and Pashtun tribal, respectively) agendas. What may start as a localized power struggle can become much more difficult to quell when transnational networks and nonnegotiable causes, such as religion, have entered the equation.

There is no bright line between this type of insurgency and local-international insurgency. The United States misperceived Vietnam as a hot battle in the Cold War, as opposed to the struggle for national liberation and unification it essentially was; by the time the United States understood this and responded accordingly—with balanced, locally focused COIN—it was too late.⁴ As noted earlier, Hamas is still defined mainly by the plight of Palestinians and the rejection of Israel's occupation rather than by a commitment to holy war in which Israel's elimination is merely an intermediate goal. Similarly, insurgency in Algeria is essentially a continuation of deep-seated Islamist opposition to the regime itself, though jihadist messages and methods are becoming more pronounced. Lebanon's Hezbollah exists mainly to mobilize the power and improve the lot of that country's underprivileged Shia; yet it is part of a larger movement aimed at replacing secular rule with Islamist rule.⁵ Hezbollah's tentacles stretch across Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—including the training of Mahdi Army militia there—and could reach into Bahrain and other Persian Gulf states. Although Shia extremists have not declared global jihad, as their Salafist counterparts and enemies have, the toxic cocktail of local-political and global-religious insurgency is not confined to the Sunni sect.

The prospect of contagious transnational religious-extremist ideas infecting local movements, making them even harder to counter than

⁴ Austin Long, in *On "Other War,"* explains that, by the late 1960s, COIN was being effectively pursued in Vietnam, only to end with the U.S. withdrawal and the end of U.S. aid to South Vietnam.

⁵ Beyond the transnational reach of Hezbollah, the apocalyptic pronouncements of Iranian president Ahmadinejad, including references to the return of the Mahdi, seem intended for international, especially pan-Muslim, audiences as well as domestic Iranian ones.

they otherwise are, must be confronted. While less than 5 percent of insurgencies since World War II are of this type, with globalization they have become the most dynamic and threatening type. It may be that local-international insurgencies (Type II) will increasingly slip into global-local ones, especially in the Muslim world, where Islamic militancy has considerable resonance and resources.

Although they have certain similarities and connections, Type III insurgencies are separate—each one shaped by local factors. Just as it is a serious error to overlook the relationship between them and global jihad, treating them as mere local expressions of the latter can result in failures to “divide and counter” them. They tend to start as local-political, but if neglected take on global-religious—i.e., jihadist—properties. (We return to Type III insurgency for a closer look in the next chapter.)

Type IV—Global Insurgency

As we have explained, insurgencies may target not only states but also systems of states. Some such movements preceded globalization: the anarchist movement and pre-Bolshevik international communist movement of the turn of the 20th century—a time of social and political upheaval not unlike today’s—and Che Guevara’s transnational attempt to expel capitalism and U.S. influence from Latin America. Historically, the more grandiose and ethereal the insurgents’ goals, the less able they have been to reach critical mass to take over particular states. Of course, they lacked the advantages of connectivity and mobility that exist today.

The fate of diffuse nonstate insurgencies in previous eras is instructive for the current era: Unless they concentrate their power in one or several nation-states, they sputter and stall. The exceptions that prove the rule are Soviet communism, Castro’s version of Soviet communism, and Maoism: All three took hold in particular states and supported communist movements elsewhere, but in the end they failed to spawn successful insurgency in the wider world (though not for lack of trying). However, globalization makes diffuse violent movements more sustainable and more threatening by reducing the importance of holding territory and by offering global connectivity and mobility. Today’s

global communications systems facilitate instant and wide dissemination of radical ideas as never before, just as today's transportation systems permit insurgents to go virtually anywhere unnoticed.

Globalization also increases the danger of Type IV insurgency by enabling strong bonds to form among members of transnational communities. In the case of the *Ummah*, for many Muslims, these bonds are often stronger than and in direct competition with the bonds between citizen and state.⁶ This makes it easier for jihadists to mobilize opposition to those states and, conversely, harder to mobilize state-based opposition to jihad. Moreover, it contributes to the belief that aggression against the global community *anywhere* warrants retaliation *anywhere*.⁷ A Muslim harmed a continent away can be as provocative as a Muslim harmed a province away. Logistically and politically, the theater of violence of Type IV insurgency is global, and that makes it much harder to stop. For these reasons, as the carnage of attacks in New York, Washington, London, and Madrid shows, global jihadists cannot be dismissed as nuisances just because they have little or no chance of overthrowing governments of the countries they target.⁸ The strategic purpose of their attacks in the West is to undermine support for the Western proxies they target in the Muslim world, the removal of which would in turn cripple the West's ability to dominate Muslims and prevent the creation of pure Islamic society.

At the same time, the capabilities of insurgents that are entirely decoupled from territory are ultimately limited, unless of course insurgents acquire weapons of mass destruction.⁹ Therefore, if jihadists are determined to destroy the nation-state order in the Muslim world, they

⁶ In *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, Mackinlay and al-Baddawy write that "for many Muslims the thrall of the *Ummah* is stronger than [that of] civil society."

⁷ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy attribute this to the advent of global media, especially satellite TV.

⁸ Al Qaeda actually did cause a change of government in Spain as a result of the Madrid bombings, from a Rightist government strongly supportive of GWOT, including the Iraq war, to a Leftist government that offers no such support.

⁹ This study did not examine how to prevent or respond to acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Islamic insurgents. However, its analysis of the sophistication, determination, and extremism of such actors reinforces the need to intensify such work.

are bound to take action in and against vulnerable states of that order, by joining, radicalizing, and if possible, controlling local insurgencies (thereby making them Type III). In the words of Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, “participation in . . . local conflicts allows al Qaeda to expand its networks of influence and gain support among Muslims who sympathize with such resistance movements but who would not otherwise endorse involvement with terrorist groups.”¹⁰

There is evidence in their own writings that Type IV insurgents realize that success depends on Type III insurgency.¹¹ In their view, taking down apostate Western-proxy regimes in the Muslim world, by fomenting or joining local insurgency, is the best way to end the West’s oppression of Islam. Their terrorism in the West and elsewhere—Type IV insurgency—can be seen as subordinate to their strategy of overthrowing targeted regimes, rather than the other way around. In sum, they want to coerce the West into abandoning its regional allies, whereas they want to destroy those regional allies to end Western domination. This confirms the centrality of Type III insurgency and the importance of being better prepared to counter it.

Planning balanced and complete COIN capabilities cannot ignore any type of insurgency. This is borne out by looking at all significant insurgencies (those involving at least 1,000 deaths) since World War II. Figure 2.1 classifies 89 such insurgencies over that time in the judgment of the research team: Type I are shaded blue; Type II, yellow; Type III, green; and Type IV, red.


These data indicate that local (I) and local-international (II) insurgencies persist, but that the incidence of global (IV) and global-local (III) insurgencies is growing as a consequence of globalization of information, transport, identities, methods, and reach.¹² The reduction of local-international insurgencies and the rise of global-local insurgencies suggest that local insurgencies that depend on international

¹⁰ Campbell and Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism*, p. 5.

¹¹ For example, Naji, *The Management of Savagery*.

¹² We have erred on the conservative side by identifying as Type II some Islamic insurgencies that have jihadist influences and Type III characteristics, e.g., Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, and Kashmir.

Figure 2.1
Evolution of the Mix of Insurgency Types



SOURCE: Data based on coding by RAND researchers of insurgencies since 1946.

RAND MG595I2-2.1

support may lose control to the forces supporting them and become more dangerous as a consequence. It is the emergence of Type IV (e.g., global jihad) and Type III (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan) insurgencies that has the U.S. national-security establishment more concerned with COIN than at any time since the Vietnam War. At the same time, because local and local-international insurgencies can be drawn into global movements such as jihad, the United States must be able to counter all types.

Aspects of COIN

Whatever the type of insurgency, countering it requires the ability to *understand* it, to *shape* the human terrain in which it competes, and to *act* directly against it.

Understanding

Though never easy, understanding is especially difficult for insurgencies that blend local-political and global-religious aims and means—complex and volatile insurgencies of the sort raging in Iraq. Understanding involves far more than intelligence estimates prepared in Washington cubicles: It must permeate COIN—top to bottom, center to edge. We know from Iraq that operational effectiveness depends critically on the depth of understanding among junior and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of both the insurgents and the population whose loyalty hangs in the balance.¹³ Such understanding must be as dynamic as insurgency is volatile. This demands constant learning, awareness of what motivates both the insurgency and the population, and fierce objectivity about what does and does not work.

Such understanding, in basic terms, is also important for the U.S. population. The American people expect their government to win wars and eliminate terrorists promptly and thoroughly. But they also

¹³ Presentation at RAND given by Colonel H.R. McMaster (U.S. Army), former commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, August 2006. The 3rd ACR conducted COIN in Tall Afar in Iraq in 2004–2005 with considerable success.

need and deserve to know the nature and sources of the dangers they face. The explanation that insurgents hate freedom and hate America is not enough to sustain long-term domestic support for COIN. Public and congressional comprehension of what an insurgency is, why it exists, why it endangers U.S. interests, how it must be countered, and why quick results are not possible will be essential to sustaining support for building capabilities for COIN, as well as for actual COIN campaigns.

Understanding depends on gaining, sharing, and making sense and use of information. That information must flow throughout U.S. agencies, among international partners, and within local authorities and populations. For this reason, improving information and cognitive capabilities for COIN is as vital as improving physical capabilities, and will figure importantly in this report (Chapters Six and Seven).

Shaping

A nuanced and continuously improving understanding of insurgency sets the stage for successful shaping of the political, material, and psychological environments in which the contest for the population's support is waged (examined in depth in Chapter Five). The more energetic the effort to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of local government, the less likely insurgency will grow to the point at which the use of force is unavoidable. Measures to shore up popular support for the government are more likely to work against fledgling proto-insurgency than full-blown insurgency.¹⁴ Effective shaping may also deny the opportunity for jihadism to radicalize local insurgency.

At the same time, shaping may have to be kept up for years or decades before an insurgency collapses or recedes. On average, successful COIN takes over 10 years; conversely, average insurgents are prepared to fight at least that long to prevail.¹⁵ Efforts to win over the population are more important, not less, when force must be used

¹⁴ Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*.

¹⁵ Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946. See Appendix E.

against insurgents, though such efforts will also be riskier—another reason to begin shaping while insurgency is still young and weak.

Shaping can be the most difficult aspect of COIN for the simple reason that if local political conditions had been conducive to a favorable outcome, there should have been no insurgency in the first place. The very existence of a robust insurgency thus implies that shaping will be an uphill struggle. Insurgencies usually reflect deep and festering grievances. Shaping is so challenging because it requires creating sound governance where it has not existed. Statistically, the most significant factor in explaining the success of COIN is probably the competence and accountability of the threatened government, which implies that shaping, though difficult, is indispensable.¹⁶ As we know from Afghanistan and Iraq, erecting new political systems is harder than knocking down old ones.¹⁷ (For that matter, erecting new political systems is harder than knocking down doors, which is why the use of force may be the tempting path to take.) Providing direct foreign aid to improve the population's welfare may help, but it cannot substitute for offering the population demonstrably able and accountable local government as an alternative to what the insurgents promise. This takes time, which underscores the need for early and sustained shaping.

The history of COIN is littered with failed attempts to shape the political and human terrain. The obstacles to replacing unresponsive authoritarian governments with strong democratic ones are conspicuous in Iraq and Afghanistan: Corruption runs deep and is not eliminated by decree; elections can bring ethnic and sectarian tensions to the surface, compounding violence or, at best, interfering with governance; persons with experience in government or security institutions may be compromised, and uncompromised persons may be clueless; building institutions takes years even under good conditions; meanwhile, poor service and safety may tax the patience and may erode the cooperation

¹⁶ Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946.

¹⁷ The case studies on Iraq and Afghanistan for this project stressed the difficulty of forming effective central governments as a major factor in insurgent success.

of the population. Also, evidence of government failure is more obvious than evidence of its achievement.

The other basic reason to anticipate frustration in shaping is that nation-building and government reform are far easier when security is improving than when insecurity is persistent or worsening. As of fall 2007, Diyala Province (northeast of Baghdad), for instance, is in desperate need of practical rebuilding efforts, which would undoubtedly help earn the cooperation of the population. However, security conditions make such work too dangerous to do.¹⁸ This situation is typical not just of Iraq but of insurgencies in general. Confidence in postwar reconstruction settings, when security is improving, cannot be transferred to confidence in carrying out similar tasks during violent insurgency, when security may be getting worse. Although the purpose of shaping is to avoid the use of force, force may have to be used to create secure conditions for shaping. A critical issue for this study is how to afford protection for civil COIN.

Acting

Unless shaping is a resounding success, which, as just explained, cannot be counted on, forcible action against insurgents will likely be required. If shaping must be ambitious and comprehensive, acts of force against insurgents must be careful and discriminating. Treating COIN as attrition warfare has consistently failed. If COIN were just a form of combat, the superior forces of governments and their supporters would win more often than they do. On average, insurgencies that are outnumbered and outgunned by COIN military forces nevertheless prevail if they enjoy greater popularity than the authoritarian, incompetent, or greedy governments they mean to oust.¹⁹

Given the uninspiring record of trying to defeat insurgents mainly by force, it is important to clarify why force might be used nonetheless. The main reason is that failing to contain or stop insurgent violence

¹⁸ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians," *Washington Post* (February 24, 2007), p. A01.

¹⁹ Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946.

could undermine the people's confidence in their government. But as insurgents increasingly operate and thrive by residing and circulating in urban environments, among the very people COIN forces are meant to protect, the use of force may become less efficacious and more risky. Force may also be warranted if insurgencies pose a threat of international terror. As we well know, global mobility and communications have made the United States and other Western countries vulnerable.

Timing: Understanding, Shaping, and Acting over the Lifetime of Insurgency

The relative importance of these aspects of COIN shifts over the life of the typical insurgency. Unless they are forestalled by effective COIN or emerge fully developed out of some cataclysmic event, such as war or foreign invasion (as with Iraq), insurgencies tend to go through a proto-insurgency stage, in which they are small, narrowly based, vulnerable, and incapable of widespread or large-scale violence.²⁰ Proto-insurgents may be barely noticeable, not seen as having the potential to inspire insurgency, or dismissed as criminals or inconsequential crackpots. Therefore, during proto-insurgency, the most important aspect of COIN is to understand the group, its goals, its ability to tap popular grievances, and its potential. In turn, shaping the proto-insurgency's environment, especially by improving governance in the eyes of the population, may deny it wider support. If direct action is needed, intelligence and law enforcement are preferred. Assuming the availability of high-performance police units, combat forces need not—and, as a rule, should not—be used against proto-insurgents, lest this feed perceptions of state brutality.

If a movement survives this incipient stage, it may become a small-scale insurgency, attracting followers beyond its original cadre in growing numbers. It may be able and determined to commit more daring and destructive acts against the state, not (yet) with a view toward replacing it, but to demonstrate its capabilities, be taken seriously by the population, and recruit. At this point, shaping political and economic conditions to head off popular support for the insurgency is

²⁰ Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*.


imperative. The state must show that it will meet the needs of the population for service and safety, and that it is accountable. As long as the insurgency is still small, action against it can and should remain a police and intelligence responsibility. Once insurgent violence exceeds police capabilities, military force may be needed to preserve security—with the attendant risks of heightened public hostility and validation of insurgent claims.

Failure to understand the danger of insurgency, to shape public sentiment against it, to address government shortcomings, or to use force effectively could lead to major insurgency. Empirically, major insurgencies have substantially better odds than minor ones of seizing or separating from the state, gaining global media attention, controlling large swaths of populated territory, destroying significant economic targets, and obtaining external recognition and resources. Although understanding and shaping remain essential, forceful action against the insurgents by regular military units may be unavoidable. Whether the use of military forces in COIN leads to success, stalemate, or stronger and bolder insurgency depends on the legitimacy and skill of the state and its forces.

If and when an insurgency exceeds the means of the state's security services, perhaps as a result of external support, the fateful question of external intervention arises. This can change not only the balance of forces but also the balance of legitimacy, in the population's eyes, between the insurgency and foreign occupiers needed by the state to survive. The arrival of foreign troops enables insurgents to appeal for patriotic resistance in addition to antigovernment support, and to point out that the government is too weak to survive without foreign backing and control. Governments that must turn to foreign powers for protection may not only be viewed as inadequate but also depicted as puppets.

The aspects and stages of insurgency are depicted in Figure 2.2, with time (typically years) and types of security forces involved on the horizontal axis and level of violence on the vertical. The relative roles of understanding insurgency, shaping conditions, and taking direct action are overlaid.

Figure 2.2
Life-Cycle Model of Insurgency and COIN



RAND MG59512-2.2

As for COIN, this model of the aspects and stages of insurgency illuminates

- the utility of early understanding and vigorous shaping to avoid force
- the need to use force with care when no choice is left
- the need to continue and even expand shaping even when force is used
- the need to treat foreign military intervention as a last resort.

All else being equal, the insurgency grows stronger and the government weaker moving from left to right. The tendency to shift from shaping to force, as opposed to expanding shaping and integrating it with force, may reinforce this trend insofar as government violence affects or sits badly with the population. Time and again, COIN com-

manders are drawn toward relying predominantly on force as insurgents gain strength, only to discover that the insurgents are the main beneficiaries. The exception, of course, is when the insurgency is militarily crushed (along with much else). However, faith in such military solutions is usually misplaced. Empirical data suggest that the probability of an insurgency succeeding climbs dramatically from one stage to the next. One leading expert estimates the probability of a proto-insurgency turning into an outright insurgency at 1 percent—less if properly countered and more if ignored.²¹ In contrast, roughly 50 percent of full-blown insurgencies end in the defeat or collapse of the government. Thus, the historical record indicates that, by the time that options short of foreign military intervention have been exhausted, the chances of such intervention succeeding are no better than even. We will see later that the odds of large-scale foreign military intervention succeeding are actually less than even.

The life-model seems especially important for Islamic insurgencies. If and when all options short of direct U.S. military action fail, there may be *no* good option left, no path to success, no way to avoid large losses in lives, money, security, and U.S. interests. An insurgency can become uncontrollable despite—or perhaps because of—the presence of foreign troops. In the case of local insurgencies, loss of control may result in the replacement of government by the insurgents. In the case of global-local insurgency, loss of control may lead to wider regional conflict, as is the danger in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Chapter One warned that COIN rarely goes as planned or as well as planned. Proto-insurgencies may be more violent than police can handle. External support for insurgents may arrive early and help them to gain strength. Hostilities may make shaping measures prohibitively dangerous, as already noted. Major urban centers, even the national capital, may descend into anarchy. Sectarian violence may erupt. Multiple fronts may form. Local security services may be infiltrated. The population may turn against the foreign power that supports the government. Just when the insurgency is more or less understood, it may shift in character, weapons, targets, location, even aims.

²¹ Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*.

In fact, all these setbacks and surprises, as well as others, have occurred in Iraq. Although better U.S. COIN undoubtedly could have yielded—and is now yielding—better results in Iraq, it is unrealistic to think that defeating insurgency in Iraq would have been quick and easy if only the United States possessed the right capabilities.²² Whatever path and whatever speed an insurgency takes, it may be that the best that COIN can do is to control it enough to prevent the collapse of the state or to contain its spread. Thus, the United States must be able not only to prevent the progress of insurgency but also to have viable options when that progress is not prevented. It needs capabilities to preempt weak insurgencies and capabilities to counter strong ones.

COIN Capabilities

In turn, the final component of the planning construct is a taxonomy for COIN capabilities. Keeping in mind the types of insurgencies that need to be countered, the main aspects of COIN, and the stages of insurgency, capabilities needed range from the material to the virtual. The layers used in this study are territorial, structural, kinetic, informational, and cognitive.

Territorial

The control of territory is a requisite of sovereignty—indeed, its original definition. The ability to control territory in the face of insurgency is essential for providing security for the population, preserving state power, and constricting the adversary. To the extent that an insurgency relies on foreign support, territorial control must include the ability to secure and, if necessary, seal borders, airspace, and coastal waters. Historically, expansive territory, rugged terrain, and remote borders have been the obstacles to control. Increasingly, however, swelling cities, ubiquitous communications, and busy transport links make population concentrations hospitable and useful to insurgents in small cells

²² Pirnie and O'Connell (*Counterinsurgency in Iraq*) place at least as much importance on lack of planning and mistakes of execution as on lack of capabilities.

and, conversely, problematic for COIN forces. As the battle for Iraqi cities shows, the atomization and urbanization of insurgency can make effective territorial control both less feasible and less useful. Considering how diffuse and fluid Type IV insurgency (e.g., global jihad) is, as well as the availability of ungoverned space and under-governed megacities, territorial control no longer assures successful COIN. True, denying insurgents sanctuary within or across a state's borders remains important. But we can see from the Pak-Afghan frontier how daunting this challenge can be.²³

Structural

Whether for making money or for making war, Americans take organizational structure seriously, sometimes to the point of fixation. When things go wrong (e.g., 9/11 and Iraq), the U.S. government often looks to restructuring to make them right. Organizational navel-gazing will not reveal let alone remedy the deficiencies in U.S. COIN capabilities. At the same time, there is a *prima facie* case that the U.S. government is not properly structured for COIN, even though insurgency is arguably the nation's most severe national-security problem. The U.S. military is organized, as well as trained and equipped, chiefly for regular international combat operations. U.S. interagency structures are ill suited for integrated civil-military campaigns. Organizational responsibilities and competencies for such basic COIN functions as local police, intelligence, and military training are undefined and unfocused. Although the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has improved sharing among intelligence agencies, channels in the field between the operating military and civilian and intelligence agencies remain clogged.

Eliminating or moving boundaries among the macrostructures of government can be only partially responsive to the needs of 21st-century COIN. For one thing, such changes often take years to effect, whereas insurgencies now develop rapidly. Reorganization to respond

²³ In his research for this project, Seth Jones questions whether the Taliban and al Qaeda can be subdued unless the Pakistan frontier can be secured, but also whether the frontier can be secured.

to the conditions of 2002 is therefore unlikely to be right for 2007. Moreover, distributed, networked, embedded, and constantly mutating insurgencies, local and global, make the fine structures of COIN more important than the big ones. Small-unit operations, horizontal collaboration across agency lines, free-form interaction with local and other coalition units, and decentralized decisionmaking authority are more important than formal jurisdictions and vertical supervision. Indeed, the success of COIN depends on diminishing reliance on and intrusion of such jurisdictions and supervision on the ground.

While the reflex of government in the face of crisis, including major insurgency, is to centralize, the emerging pattern of insurgency is to decentralize. The traditional solution to the problem of coordinating all instruments of COIN has been to appoint a single civilian “supremo” to direct and integrate the total effort. But this may be impractical for fast-moving multiagency and multinational COIN, especially against an insurgency with global dimensions. The availability of information networks makes possible decentralized yet integrated campaigns and operations, provided traditional hierarchies do not get in the way. Yet U.S. COIN is not organized to take advantage of networking.

Kinetic

The provision of security as part of COIN will usually require the use of physical weaponry, weapon platforms, sensors, and other equipment and material, especially once the insurgency has passed beyond its initial, small, proto-insurgency stage. These means of kinetic effects may dissuade, deter, defend against, and destroy insurgent forces. They may also bolster public confidence and allegiance. At the same time, as noted, lethal and destructive capabilities may be inadequate, inappropriate, and even deleterious in a contest for the sympathy and support of a population. If physical force must be used, it should be precise, discriminating, and proportionate. Similarly, the means by which forces move, defend themselves, and interact with the population should serve the purposes of COIN.

A central issue is who provides the kinetic capabilities for COIN. Foreign, especially U.S., capabilities tend to be more advanced than

local capabilities. But they are also alien to, unfamiliar with, and likely less accepted by the population. As Iraq showed, even when the United States deploys and employs its military power on a large scale, insurgency may persist. In theory, the United States and other foreign forces could apply kinetic power on a scale that could wipe out most insurgencies, as Russia has attempted to do in Chechnya. This, of course, is an exceedingly high-risk approach for the United States because of damage done to the local population, the economy, the legitimacy of the state, and the standing of the United States in the region and world. Even massive application of U.S. military power in COIN may cause insurgency to intensify, move, and spread, a clear danger in the case of Type III insurgency. Therefore, building local security forces with quality, accountability, and leadership, not just firepower, is vital to successful COIN in this age.

Informational

Several factors make information more important than ever in COIN campaigns and operations: the growing complexity and fluidity of insurgency, the access of insurgents to information networks, the importance of learning about the population, the value of integrating all components of COIN, and need to use force wisely and precisely. In understanding, shaping, and operational decisionmaking, information is more valuable in COIN than it is in regular warfare. Those involved in every aspect of COIN must have access to timely, relevant, and reliable data, and they must be able to collaborate across organizational and national boundaries. The declining cost of information technology, the existence of accessible network infrastructure, and the ease of using terminal devices suggest considerable potential to exploit information for greater success in COIN.

Ironically, insurgents are showing greater determination and creativity in using information than is the United States and the local states it supports.²⁴ Local and global insurgents rely on the very information infrastructure (cell phones, the Internet, multimedia) and technology

²⁴ This is spelled out in a separate volume prepared as part of this study: David C. Gompert, *Heads We Win—The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN)*: RAND Counterinsurgency

(access, search, online forums) created by the West and propelled by the markets they abhor. And they often get the better of the United States and its partners in information operations, getting out their message that Islam is under attack and their call to duty. The untapped potential to use information to perform better in COIN is one of the key challenges and opportunities facing the United States.²⁵

Cognitive

Making sense of information to reason, learn, operate collaboratively, and make sound decisions is as important to COIN as are the technical capabilities to gather, process, disseminate, and display that information. While there is a growing recognition of the need to “get smarter” in COIN, there has been little analysis of how to do this.²⁶ There is a need to improve such critical cognitive abilities as anticipation, adaptive decisionmaking, and learning in action. Today’s insurgents, in contrast, specialize in influencing choices. The agents of global jihad, in particular, tailor acts of violence specifically to be effective on the cognitive plane. They rely more on creativity and planning abilities than on the physical properties of their weapons, as evidenced by their success with primitive suicide bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Like the information level, the cognitive level of capabilities has growing importance yet, as well will see, has been habitually neglected in COIN.

This stack of capabilities must equip the United States and its global and local partners to excel in all three main aspects of COIN across all types of insurgency, as Figure 2.3 depicts.


This cube implies a balance among the aspects of COIN and among the levels of COIN capabilities. In fact, no such balance exists.

Study—Paper 3 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-168-OSD, 2007). As of October 23, 2007: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP168/.

²⁵ Martin C. Libicki, David C. Gompert, David R. Frelinger, and Raymond Smith, *Byting Back—Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 1* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-595/1-OSD, 2007). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.1/>.

²⁶ The problem of how to improve cognitive capabilities inspired *Heads We Win* (Gompert) as part of the RAND study on which this report is based.

Figure 2.3
Comprehensive COIN Requirements Framework




RAND MG595/2-2.3

The United States is today oriented mainly toward organizing and using kinetic force in hopes of controlling territory against local insurgents—the lower front right-hand corner of the requirements matrix (shown as a circle). This is an especially bad position from which to counter complex insurgencies that exploit information and meld local-political with global-religious movements and means. By treating the pattern of violent Islamic opposition as a form war, instead of as a contest for a popular support, there has been heavy emphasis and reliance on military capabilities associated with offensive force, territorial control, and enemy attrition. Without investment in understanding and shaping, and without more attention given to sharing and using information, the stack of U.S. COIN capabilities looks more like the pyramid in Figure 2.4.

The priorities among U.S. COIN capabilities depicted by this pyramid are inadequate for traditional insurgencies, much less more com-


Figure 2.4
Priority of Current COIN Capabilities



plex ones that place less stress on territorial control and fixed structures and great stress on using information and influencing thought. Consider again Iraq, where segments of the indigenous Sunni insurgency internalized jihadist motives and methods, making them harder to defeat with traditional military structures, territorial control, and attrition warfare. While the large-scale use of military force may be appropriate in some COIN situations, the more complex the insurgency—especially when the insurgents identify with the jihadist propaganda that the Muslim world is under attack by the West and the Zionists—puts a premium on the judicious and thoughtful use of military force. Thus, U.S. COIN priorities are essentially the *inverse* of the emphasis of emerging insurgent threats, as depicted in Figure 2.5.

Of course, COIN capabilities should not be limited to the United States and states faced with insurgency. Broad-based multilateral COIN, as is present in Afghanistan but missing in Iraq, can add legitimacy, resources, and competence. Apart from the obvious local, interna-

Figure 2.5
Inverse Relationship of COIN and Insurgent Capabilities



RAND MG595/2-2.5

tional, and domestic political benefits of multilateral COIN, a number of critical capabilities exist in greater quantity and, often, higher quality among other countries, groupings, and organizations (e.g., NATO, UN, the World Bank, and the EU) than are at the disposal of the U.S. government. While this holds especially true for the ability to improve local governance, services, infrastructure, and economic performance, it is even true for some security functions, such as developing police forces (a U.S. weak suit). The capabilities matrix shown earlier cannot be filled and rebalanced without multilateral COIN.

The problem with multilateral COIN, as we will see in Chapter Eleven, is that it is very difficult to organize and operate. The United States must pursue peacetime arrangements to develop multilateral resources and plan for their use in a crisis. Once COIN is under way, assuming there is agreement on the threat and need to act, the United States and its partners must harmonize their campaigns and integrate their operations. While these challenges of conducting multilateral COIN must not be underestimated, the availability of information networks offers a way to make it happen, provided that the United States is willing to share far more information with all of its partners than it currently does.

To summarize, COIN capabilities on every level, from controlling territory to making cognitive use of information, may be provided by local government, the United States, and/or multilateral partners and institutions to understand, shape, and act in COIN vis-à-vis four classes of insurgencies. One way to determine which of these capabilities merits investment is to analyze every cell in the framework and then to establish priorities among them—a tedious endeavor that would only raise the question of how priorities should be set.

This study uses a different method. On the basis of analysis of recent COIN experience (especially Iraq and Afghanistan) and the effects of globalization on insurgency, it concentrates on that type which seems to present the greatest challenges of 21st-century insurgency. This study uses Type III—the union of local-political and global-extremist insurgencies—as its planning case. Being the most dangerous and difficult type of insurgency under conditions of globalization, Type III insurgency warrants primary attention in planning capabilities. Moreover, as examined below, it appears to raise all the main problems of local, local-international, and global insurgency—and then some. Accordingly, the bulk of this report deals with capabilities to counter this type of insurgency, returning in Chapter Fourteen to examine whether other types of insurgencies would be adequately addressed by such capabilities.

Countering Type III Insurgency

The Main Threat

The foremost example of global-local insurgency, once again, is the spreading web of organized Islamic violence.¹ Its potency is evident in Iraq and Afghanistan; its potential to expand is clear from North Africa to the archipelagos of Southeast Asia; and its expansiveness has already reached the West.² While recognizing that other Type III insurgencies are possible, the Islamic case can be studied in depth for the sake of developing requirements from which capabilities may be derived. In effect, Type III insurgency is an invention of Islamic extremists in response to the pressures and opportunities of globalization.

Both the writings and actions of global jihadists suggest that Type III insurgency, not Type IV, is their main strategy. The reason they give for this is the belief that the United States is not capable of dominating the Muslim world without local regimes that submit to its

¹ While one can imagine other global-local insurgencies, e.g., violent neo-Maoist or other anti-capitalist movements, so far the connected set of violent Islamist movement makes it a category of one.

² Which current Islamist insurgencies should be classified as Type III, as opposed to Type II, depends on one's assessment of the balance between local and global factors. In this study, we draw heavily on the two cases that seem to fit squarely into our Type III definition: Iraq and Afghanistan. Arguably, current insurgencies in Algeria, Kashmir, and Chechnya come close, though local agendas may still outweigh jihadism. Indonesia, Palestine, Thailand, Nigeria, Philippines, and Somalia, among others, have not been overtaken by or drawn into global jihad, though they could be.

control and do its bidding.³ Therefore, only by attacking these “proxies who rule the Islamic world”⁴ can Muslims defend themselves and ultimately replace the Western-controlled system with a fundamentalist Islamic state. The main chosen method of destroying the states on which the United States depends is to support, radicalize, and unify local insurgencies against the “corrupt” regimes that rule them.⁵ In these local insurgencies, the aim is to convince “a large number of the [the masses] to join the jihad [or at least offer] positive support”⁶ to it. Global terrorism, especially attacks in the West, is subordinate to this strategy, its purpose being to cause either a weakening of American resolve to impose its will on Muslims through local regimes or an American overreaction that will throw coals on the fire of jihad. That the architects of global jihad have, in effect, identified what we call Type III insurgency as their most promising strategy is reason enough for the United States to treat it as the foremost threat and the planning case for COIN capabilities.

Al Qaeda and other agents of jihadism can supply local insurgents with religious inspiration, information links, suicide-terror methods, and propaganda that register with Muslim populations already fuming from injustice and humiliation.⁷ Although al Qaeda is not able to commandeer every insurgency it targets—insurgencies in Palestine, Kashmir, Nigeria, and Thailand, though Islamic, remain essentially local despite jihadist inroads—when local insurgency is drawn into global insurgency, dangers soar and the difficulties of COIN multiply.⁸

³ Naji, *The Management of Savagery*.

⁴ Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, p. 17.

⁵ In *The Management of Savagery*, Naji describes this strategy as of exploiting “groups of vexation” to establish jihadists’ “management of savagery.”

⁶ Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, p. 50.

⁷ Of course, the degree of global “infection” will vary. Arguably, compared to Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, Hamas is less reliant on and manipulated by the ideas and support of Salafist jihad.

⁸ Ongoing RAND research on the Islamic insurgency in the Patani region of southern Thailand suggests that it has not been seriously infected by global jihadism, and thus that

The chemistry by which global and local insurgency alloy is often misunderstood. The two do not necessarily remain as separate elements that can be easily split by exploiting their divergent aims, a traditional stratagem of COIN. The image of two groups—one foreign and religious, the other local and secular—working in tandem but toward different goals can be misleading. Global-religious and local-political impulses can be found in single groups, single cells, and single individuals and can thus become nearly indistinguishable and effectively indivisible.

When the primary fuel of insurgency is spiritual, such that its flame can no longer be doused by local political accommodation, the insurgency can be considered part of the wider movement. Even in Type III insurgencies, local demands may remain prominent. But the addition of religious impulses can both harden those local demands and augment them with global ones that can never be met. It is the merging of global goals and means with local ones in Type III insurgencies that yields something different, more difficult, more energetic, and more dangerous than either.

To recognize this danger is not to say that it is smart COIN strategy to treat all radical Islamist insurgencies as global. Indeed, “de-globalizing” them may be the best approach insofar as there is a greater chance of resolving local-political issues than worldwide (and other-worldly) ones. Ironically, both al Qaeda and the United States have stressed the global aspects of the war in Iraq. By 2007, U.S. interests in Iraq were better served by accentuating the difference between the Sunni political struggle and jihadism.

A 2006 U.S. Marine Corps intelligence report, quoted in the *Washington Post*, described Iraq’s Sunni minority as “increasingly dependent on al Qaeda in Iraq.”⁹ Many Sunni insurgents became patriotic-jihadist—a contradiction in theory but not in practice—not

Islamic insurgencies may remain of the Type I or Type II variety. That same analysis also indicates that this insurgency would be much harder to counter if it did become infected.

⁹ Quoted in Dafna Linzer and Thomas E. Ricks, “Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker,” *Washington Post* (November 28, 2006), p. A1.

one or the other.¹⁰ According to the Marine Corps report, “nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial levels in Anbar Province have disintegrated or been thoroughly corrupted by al Qaeda in Iraq,” which the report says is “*the dominant organization of influence . . . in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni*”¹¹ (italics added). Once the United States shifted to COIN strategy and sought to split local-political from global-religious elements, al Qaeda’s influence began to recede.

In a large swath of Afghanistan and neighboring northwest Pakistan, Pashtun tribal structures and codes stress honor, revenge, hospitality, and fierce hostility to perceived threats. Tribal ways have meshed with fervent Islamic beliefs for a millennium; elders and mullahs alike say there is no contradiction between the two. Yet the balance between these two prerogatives shifts back and forth depending on circumstances. One field analysis of the Pashtun tribal-religious nexus revealed that religious fire tends to burn hottest when these peoples and their lands are under attack. “When a standard is needed to rally the fractious tribes . . . they have tended to hoist the flag of jihad.”¹² In such cases, the insurgent violence intensifies and desperate acts (e.g., suicide bombing) ensue. This tribal-jihadist phenomenon flared in reaction to the Soviet invasion, and it appears to be at work today. Consequently, despite the Taliban’s disastrous rule, some tribal areas are becoming not only more resistant to the U.S.-NATO-Kabul coalition but also re-radicalized.

The Pashtun case, like that of Iraqi Sunnis, reveals the violent energy generated when local (e.g., tribal) and global (e.g., Salafist-jihadist) insurgencies merge. This pattern fits with research showing that suicidal and other terrorism correlate with a sense of desperate, back-to-the-wall defense of a threatened or occupied homeland. The arousal of religious fever in the same groups and same persons that also harbor political animosities may compound the determination to kill

¹⁰ International Crisis Group, *In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency* (Washington, D.C.: International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 50, February 2006).

¹¹ Quoted in Linzer and Ricks, “Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker,” p. A1.

¹² “Honor Among Them: Pushtunwali,” *The Economist* (December 19, 2006)

and the readiness to die.¹³ No act is too extreme, or too supreme, when one's land and one's faith are both in mortal danger.

The mutation from local-political to global-local insurgency takes time—about a year (2004) in Iraq.¹⁴ Just as a proto-insurgency can develop if given the opportunity, local insurgency predisposed toward Islamism can become global-local insurgency if it is either ignored or mishandled by the state. Type III insurgencies do not necessarily start as Type III, but instead form as local insurgents and global extremists find each other, or as the former join the latter.¹⁵ The danger is that local insurgencies can take on global aims and means faster than COIN can defuse or seal off local insurgencies.

The expression “foreign jihadists,” commonly used by U.S. spokesmen regarding Iraq, creates the false impression that all jihadists are foreign, and thus that local insurgents are not caught up in religious extremism. This is a costly mistake, since COIN can only succeed if the purposes of the insurgents are well understood. Infiltration of stateless fighters is not the only or most insidious way that jihadism can enter and exploit local insurgency. The themes and know-

¹³ Research of Robert A. Pape (*Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New York: Random House, 2005) and others indicates that fighters do not engage in suicide terror for the sake of some positive goal, vision, or hope but because they believe their homes, families, communities, and homelands are under attack by stronger powers, leaving them no alternative to suicide terror as a defensive or counteroffensive act.

¹⁴ As late as a year after the 2003 invasion, jihadism in Iraq was still mainly and distinctively foreign, as evidenced by the fact that suicide bombings by Iraqis were rare. As of this writing, most Iraqi insurgent groups have Islamist names and modi operandi.

¹⁵ As explained in Chapter One, the distinction between Type III and Type II (local-international) insurgency is a subtle but significant one. There is nothing new about national insurgencies receiving external state or nonstate support. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese depended vitally on help from Moscow. But they never veered from their objective of national unification, on the attainment of which their revolutionary fever cooled. The Angolan insurgency of Jonas Savimbi received a lot of American aid during the Cold War but not a trace of American ideology. Today, local insurgencies in the Muslim world, including some with a strong Islamist bent, such as Hamas and Patani separatists of southern Thailand, have drawn support from Islamic sources but have not—at least not yet—been drawn into global holy war. If and when they are, the chances for settlement or for satisfying insurgent demands will plummet. Already, Hamas's religious radicalism presents yet another obstacle to permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace.

how of holy war travel electromagnetically at least as well as they do on foot. Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Palestine show how home-grown religious militancy whipped up by local imams mixes with the words and images of jihadism imported via the Internet and satellite TV. Al Qaeda in Iraq became predominantly Iraqi. In 2003–2004, nearly all suicide bombers were non-Iraqi; now they are mostly native sons (and daughters). One reason that the stamina and ferocity of Iraq's Sunni insurgency was underestimated is the belief that jihadism is alien to Iraq. In fact, rekindled religious fire among Iraq's Sunnis, largely extinguished under Saddam, has become the insurgency's main power source, displacing Baathist-Saddamist revanchism (ironically).¹⁶ A critical consideration for the analysis of COIN strategy and capabilities is that U.S. military occupation and action may have contributed to the shift from a purely local-political movement into one committed to widespread holy war.

The potential for Islamic Type III insurgency depends on whether and where the jihadist story of the *Ummah* under attack has local resonance. This helps account for why global jihadism has, so far, gained only limited appeal in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, while it resonates in Arab populations. While certain peoples of Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa harbor anti-Western sentiments, from European colonialism and other perceived past injustices, they do not generally share with Arab Muslims the feeling of being under continual and contemporary assault. The latter are more likely to feel the brunt of the power of the Christian West and the West's Jewish satellite in the Arab world, and they are more likely to place global-religious concerns on par with or above local-political ones. For one thing, the presence—perceived occupation—of Western (and Israeli) military forces in the Arab world is substantially greater than in Southeast Asia and Africa. Moreover, the proximity of Western forces to Muslim holy sites in the Arab world (in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Palestine) is a special source of Islamic outrage and jihadist inspiration.

¹⁶ Among the many ironies of Iraq is the fact that Saddam Hussein had a hand in the resurgence of Islam in Sunni Iraq with his *hamlaimaniya* of the late 1990s, undertaken to harness religious fervor to the interests of the state.

At the same time, jihadists have identified the need to “diversify and widen” insurgencies “against the Crusader-Zionist enemy in every place in the Islamic world . . . so as to disperse the efforts of the alliance of the enemy.”¹⁷ If this stated intention is to be believed, the United States and its partners should anticipate a repetition or even an expansion of the global-local insurgencies they face today. Before the United States invests heavily in complete and balanced capabilities to counter Type III insurgency, the seriousness of the danger needs to be assessed.

With this in mind, yet without presuming to tell the future, it is possible to identify countries and situations where the potential for global-local Islamic insurgency is real.¹⁸ The primary indicators used here to identify the potential for Type III Islamic insurgency are

- current degree of unrest and violence
- state weakness and/or illegitimacy
- level of anti-Western sentiment
- identification with the global Muslim nation
- strength of local insurgency potential.¹⁹

These indicators are consistent with the jihadists’ *own* criteria for selecting countries in which to convert local to global-local insurgency: regime weakness, the availability of ungoverned space, intense Islamic devotion, and distance from the heart of Western power.²⁰

As already noted, Palestine’s Hamas movement combines political and religious motives, though its current agenda is decidedly local.²¹ Although it is certainly not a franchise of global jihad, further radicalization and receptivity to holy-war ideology is possible if paths to polit-

¹⁷ Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, p. 46.

¹⁸ Not included in this assessment of the potential for Type III insurgency is Chechnya, where local insurgencies have already moved in this direction.

¹⁹ The authors thank Daniel Byman, a colleague in this project, for his input on this.

²⁰ Naji, *The Management of Savagery*.

²¹ In *The Management of Savagery*, Abu Bakr Naji, a leading jihadist strategist, describes Hamas as an agent of “vexation” with the potential to join the jihad.

ical progress are blocked.²² With the prospect of a two-state solution looking grim, it is possible that the cause of Palestinian statehood could fuse with that of holy war, which holds that Israel is a creature and feature of Western domination of Islam and so must be exterminated.

Lebanon may already be mutating from a local-political (Christian-Muslim) struggle to one with transnational religious meaning and impact anywhere Hezbollah has potential, including some Persian Gulf states. In addition, seizing on the weakness of the Lebanese state, Sunni terrorists—some Palestinian, some veterans of Iraq—are increasingly asserting themselves. If Lebanon faces a new civil war, it could have jihadist overtones and implications beyond Lebanon, including possible involvement of Israel and Syria.

Large segments of the population of Saudi Arabia are disaffected from Saudi “politics” and identify more with Saudi religion—Wahhabi fundamentalism—than with the Saudi nation-state. Saudi security services have embarked on a draconian COIN campaign that appears to be eradicating a significant number of violent extremists. However, given (1) the centrality of Saudi Arabia in Islam and (2) jihadist hostility to the monarchy, it would be a mistake to think that insurgency there can be simply crushed, any more than it can be co-opted. Moreover, major shocks—e.g., oil markets or terrorism—could precipitate insurgency with both political and jihadist strands. While not as important as Saudi Arabia, Yemen may have a greater potential for Type III insurgency.

The reenergizing of Algerian insurgency, along with al Qaeda’s growing role in it, suggests that local goals have fused with global ones—a hallmark of Type III insurgency. Clearly, the potential exists for successful insurgency in Algeria to spread to Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.²³ With weak and illegitimate governments, local opposition movements, and popular religious feelings, North Africa could become

²² Hamas representatives are known to have warned Israeli interlocutors that refusal to deal with them strengthens the hand of Palestinian jihadists who wait in the wings (based on author’s interview with a leading Israeli analyst).

²³ In *The Management of Savagery*, Naji refers to the vulnerability of Tunisia as an added argument for fomenting jihad in Algeria.

a Type III theater. This would fit the jihadist intention, just noted, to disperse Western efforts to prop up proxies in the Muslim world.

In the non-Arab world, Pakistan has deep weaknesses in governance, radical religious sentiment, civil-society alternatives, and education. It is exposed, within and without, to jihadist elements. If politics turned violent with the passing of current leadership and the absence of democratic options, it is not hard to imagine global-local insurgency developing. Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Somalia, and Nigeria are pregnant with separatist tensions, shaky governance, and Islamic militancy. On the other hand, it is not obvious that significant fractions of their populations have the intensity of resentment toward the West that motivates jihadism among Arab-Muslims and Pakistanis. Bangladesh suffers from political and economic weaknesses that could be exploited by Islamic extremists with jihadist ideas or at least connections, though anti-Western feelings are not strong historically.

While oddsmakers might not assign a high probability of Type III insurgency to any one of these examples, there are enough examples of proto-Type III insurgencies, each with the possibility of dire consequences, to justify a high U.S. priority on the capabilities to counter them.²⁴ Although Americans are understandably concerned mainly with terrorist attacks at home, the greater strategic danger, if jihadist writings are taken at face value, is that of global-local insurgencies in the Muslim world, including in the oil-rich Arab heartland.

One of the cornerstones of traditional COIN is the belief that political settlement on tolerable terms is at least possible, especially if conditioned by responsive government and legitimate force. The appearance and spread of jihadist ideology, techniques, resources, and fighters can make an insurgency more implacable, harder to subdue, and less tempted by compromise than if its agenda is only to reorder local politics. The urge of jihadists to transform the Muslim world is not going to be satisfied through power sharing or agreement with apostate regimes. In Iraq, Salafi militants, regardless of nationality, are

²⁴ Other possible, though not probable, candidates for Type III insurgency are Egypt, Jordan, and several Persian Gulf states.

not interested in a more advantageous political deal for the country's Sunni minority. Iraqi-jihadist aims have included Shia-Sunni sectarian war, failure of the Iraqi state (a former British, now American invention), and creation of a staging area for wider jihad and religious purification. As such sentiments occupy the soul of insurgency, hopes for compromise dim. Thus, countering local insurgency, the earlier the better, is key to preventing global-local insurgency.

COIN Challenges from Type III Insurgencies

The stakes in countering Type III insurgencies go beyond the fate of this or that contested state, even Iraq and Afghanistan. If the United States and its allies oppose global-local Islamic insurgency inadequately or inappropriately—too timidly or too aggressively—the current pattern could spread into widespread religious war, precisely the jihadists' ambition. COIN must be designed to protect U.S. interests from global-local insurgency without stoking it. Again, the goal is not to fight a victorious religious war with insurgent Islam but to safeguard U.S. security and interests without one.

Our British colleagues in this study have argued that success “means a Muslim world that lives more easily with itself, with the other non-Muslim states, and as minority communities within Western states.”²⁵ An American officer engaged in successful COIN in the Philippines against Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic extremist group with al Qaeda links, puts it more simply: “It’s not about how many people we shoot in the face. It’s about how many we get off the battlefield.”²⁶ We agree, but would add that in the pursuit of such an outcome the security of U.S. citizens, interests, and allies must be safeguarded from the insurgents who violently pursue a very different outcome. For the United States

²⁵ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

²⁶ Col. Jim Linder, quoted in Eliza Griswold, “Waging Peace in the Philippines,” *Smithsonian* (December 2006). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/philippines.html>.

to protect itself and its interests while fostering peace with and in the Muslim world is the central problem of COIN today.

While actual experience is limited, Type III insurgencies appear to have numerous advantages that present formidable challenges for COIN. Some are logistical:

- exploitable communications links, media access, transportation systems, and porous, busy borders
- financial backing and austere needs
- sanctuary within Muslim populations in urban terrain.

Some are cognitive:

- widespread Muslim resentment with the political status quo
- global learning, adapting, and sharing of methods
- religious fanaticism and veneration of martyrdom.

Others are operational and structural:

- suicide bombing, an especially destructive and demoralizing weapon
- the option of counterattacking (as they see it) in the West
- flexible organization that adapts to the environment and to COIN
- distributed cells, which reduces vulnerability of the whole.

Because of these advantages, Type III insurgencies appear to have different dynamics and timescales than traditional (Type I or Type II) insurgencies. U.S. strategists were surprised by the way in which resistance by remnants of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and hard-line Baathists turned into a major insurgency within a year (2003 to 2004)—so surprised that they did not acknowledge it as it happened nor respond with COIN until 2007.²⁷ They were just as surprised by

²⁷ Bruce Riedel argues in *Foreign Affairs* ("Al Qaeda Strikes Back," May–June 2007, as of October 23, 2007: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86304/bruce-riedel/al-qaeda-strikes-back.html>) that the invasion of Iraq has played directly into the hands of

the resurgence in 2006 of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and bordering Pakistan, four years after they were thought to be routed. True, the weakness of the host state and hostility toward foreign military presence were factors in both cases. But so was the jihadist appeal that surfaced in Iraq's Sunni heartland and survived the initial Taliban and al Qaeda defeats in Afghanistan. Even where global jihadism is not fully embraced, its extremist messages, suicide weapons, and material support can quickly bring a simmering local insurgency to a boil, as it has in southern Thailand since 2004.²⁸

Again, timing is crucial in COIN. The accelerated development of Type III insurgency and the vulnerability of the state and its allies to being caught off-guard can severely compromise COIN, which is normally reactive and typically takes years to organize. Understanding comes late, the opportunity to shape may be lost, and acting with force is unavoidable yet difficult to do without making matters worse.


Figure 3.1 depicts how this type of insurgency can accelerate when global-religious means and messages are combined with local-political ones. There is little chance to understand such a complex-dynamic insurgency. Shaping measures may be retarded by poor understanding and hasty hostilities, including direct insurgent attacks on reconstruction projects. Harsh or clumsy resort to force can lead to more violence, as the insurgents hope it will. As violence spreads, the chance to improve government service and establish law and order with police and a workable justice system evaporates.²⁹ Even as alternatives to foreign military intervention dwindle, so may the probability of success.

the global jihadists by verifying their claim of U.S. aggression against Islam. This helps to account for al Qaeda's success in prolonging and intensifying the Sunni-based insurgency. The United States clearly did not recognize this danger, even while it was unfolding in 2003–2004.

²⁸ In the case of Southern Thailand, which is not a new front for global jihad, one of the conditions that could cause the local Islamic insurgency to develop into Type III is a direct U.S. role, which could cause both local and global insurgents to partner and become much harder to counter. (Ongoing RAND research on the insurgency in the Patani region of Thailand.)

²⁹ For example, the U.S. reaction to the rapid onset of Type III insurgency in Sunni Iraq in 2003–2004 was heavy force, large-scale sweeps, swollen detention facilities, and abusive interrogations, accompanied by inadequate public safety and the rise of militias elsewhere.

Figure 3.1
Compression of Time for COIN



RAND MG595/2-3.1

Global-local insurgency can achieve high-energy states rapidly and be quite literally overwhelming.

The paramount strategic danger to U.S. interests posed by this type of insurgency is not that it is likely to lead to a new and hostile caliphate. (As explained later, there is no evidence to suggest that the agents of Type III insurgency have any workable ideas, much less competence, for governing.) Rather, the danger is that such insurgency cannot be controlled where it erupts, and that it will destroy countries, peoples, resources, U.S. friends, U.S. interests, global and regional economic development, and hope for a better, safer life for Muslims along the way.³⁰ Again, COIN has been successful only 50 percent of the time since World War II. Everything about the Type III insurgent

³⁰ The other strategic danger, mentioned earlier, is that insurgents, Islamic or otherwise, may acquire weapons of mass destruction. This study does not directly address that danger.

threat, not to mention the struggle to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that the odds of success may not be even that good unless COIN is better prepared. This underscores the need for both a sober assessment of requisite capabilities for successful COIN and an equally sober appreciation of the poor prospects of quick and complete success even with better capabilities.

The intellectual and operational difficulties of countering global-local insurgency lie as much in its unfamiliarity as in its scale and complexity. In the words of our British colleagues in this study: “Our collective military experience and our existing doctrine did not anticipate a campaign so energized by spiritual, global and virtual dimensions.”³¹ Therefore, while the United States should retain enduring tenets of COIN, Type III insurgency calls for an overhaul of COIN strategy and capabilities—not just better COIN, but different COIN.

The Paradox of Force

At the heart of the challenge for COIN, again, is the potential of force both to weaken and strengthen insurgency. Insurgents use force to weaken the state’s ability to function and the population’s confidence in the state’s ability to provide security.³² Most people in an area threatened by an insurgency are probably not strongly motivated by either the insurgent cause or enthusiasm for the government. They want to be neither threatened by insurgents nor exposed to heavy-handed government security forces. But failure to protect the population can make it vulnerable to coercion by the insurgents and thus less confident of and less inclined to cooperate with government authorities and security services (e.g., to provide information on insurgent whereabouts). It can also lead the population to conclude that the insurgents will eventually

³¹ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

³² In Iraq, by attacking police recruiting stations, insurgents directly weaken the government’s ability to provide security.

defeat and destroy the government, making that very outcome more likely.³³

At the same time, the domestic use of force by the state has an inherent potential to weaken its own ultimate bulwark: legitimacy. This is especially the case in countries where state security services have a history of brutalizing the people on behalf of the regime. True, unabashedly brutal force can, in some conditions, crush insurgency, as Russia did in Chechnya and as Saddam Hussein did to various Kurdish and Shia uprisings. But states that use such methods have little or no legitimacy to lose and thus no concern with its loss. For civilized states, the risk of strengthening insurgency by damaging legitimacy is especially high if (1) the insurgency is embedded in the population, (2) the insurgency already enjoys some popular sympathy, (3) force is not used with great care, or (4) foreign troops use force on the state's behalf. Some such potential is inherent in all COIN because of the risk that deadly force and intimidation will so alienate the population that its support for the insurgency rises and that recruiting outpaces losses.³⁴ But this paradox is particularly acute in countering global-local insurgency.

The crux of the problem, in today's context, is that using Western military force in the midst of Muslim populations may lend credence to the jihadist call to resist this latest in what they see as a long history of religiously motivated Western aggression against Islam. Indeed, one of the goals of jihadism is to "force America to abandon its war against Islam by proxy and force it to attack directly so that [Muslims] will see" not only America's true intention but also that opposing America

³³ RAND interviews with Canadian, U.S., NATO, and United Nations officials in Afghanistan in January 2007 made this point abundantly clear. Many Afghans are "sitting on the fence," waiting to see which group—the government or the insurgents—appears to be winning. Additionally, the need for security to permit relief and development work to be done was made abundantly clear by various officials in Afghanistan.

³⁴ The deleterious effects of heavy reliance on force in COIN is evident in such cases as Southern Thailand and the occupied Palestinian territories, just as it was in Algeria, Vietnam (until 1968), and even Malaya until the UK understood the error and adjusted its strategy. (Ongoing RAND research on the insurgency in the Patani region of Thailand.)

is possible.³⁵ Jihadists do not consider 9/11 as the first big attack but rather as the first big *counterattack* on America. In their story, the war can be traced back to the Crusades and, in modern times, to European colonialism, abetted by Zionism, after the defeat of the Ottomans, when the Muslim world was carved up by the West into harmless and defenseless artificialities called nation-states (including Iraq and Lebanon). They consider both the first Gulf War and the American invasion of Iraq as recent battles in the ongoing U.S. campaign to control Muslim holy lands and the oil-rich Arab heartland.

Bruce Hoffman often refers to suicide terrorists as “altruists” prepared to sacrifice themselves for the community with which they identify. Islamic suicide bombers see themselves, and are widely seen, as champions of a community and a faith under attack. However diabolical we find them, the jihadists’ mind-set of is one of personal duty to protect the Muslim nation, Muslim lands, and the Islamic faith, locally and globally.³⁶ They see their terror as legitimate, compulsory, asymmetric *defense*—which may include counteroffense—against an aggressive power.³⁷ Their acts are meant, in turn, to provoke excessive force that will refresh their story and help them recruit fighters, motivate martyrs, and sustain insurgency.

Not all Islamic insurgents are jihadists. Only a small fraction of them, foreign and indigenous, are prepared to commit unrestrained and suicidal violence. But while local secular insurgents may contemplate moderation and accommodation, extreme acts of religious militants and rejectionists, for whom there can be no settlement, can scuttle negotiations and extinguish hope for conciliation. Jihadists in Iraq, for example, were provoked by signs of political progress (e.g., elections) to take more extreme acts, such as killing Shia pilgrims, tribal sheikhs, or

³⁵ Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, p. 24.

³⁶ Pape, *Dying to Win*.

³⁷ The term “aggressive” is frequently used by U.S. leaders to describe the war on terror. Vice President Dick Cheney referred to it as such six times in the month prior to the 2006 U.S. elections.

Sunni insurgents willing to compromise.³⁸ To the extent that an insurgency takes on religious purposes, escalates its violence, and rejects political solutions, there may *seem* to be no alternative other than using military force to crush it.

The jihadist formula of selling the story of Muslims under attack while also provoking attack is brilliant. Because the story has been globalized—spanning the *Ummah*—an attack on Muslims anywhere can both justify global jihad and bolster the commitment of local insurgents continents away. Because they identify with the *Ummah*, local insurgents may see themselves “double-hatted” as global insurgents, and are that much less likely to be placated. Sunni-jihadist insurgents in Iraq are impelled to kill and die to defend not just their acre of Islam but all of Islam. This multiplies the opportunities to intensify Type III insurgency in this or that country based on Western attacks on Islam in *any* country. In turn, it makes the use of force to counter Type III insurgency more hazardous than it is in traditional insurgency. Knowing this, the jihadists welcome attacks on Muslims anywhere, but especially on Muslim soil. The benefits of provoking attacks on the Muslim world outweigh the losses from such attacks.

Under these conditions, *set by the jihadists*, Western force may seem essential in combating global-local insurgency, but actually be instrumental in perpetuating, emboldening, and strengthening it. The proliferation of global media has sharply increased the potential for U.S. forces to invigorate insurgency. “News footage of the one-day brigade raid by U.S. forces [in Iraq] probably boosts the morale of Middle America (sic), but the same clip shown on Al Jazeera has a completely destructive effect in relation to the stated long-term aims of the campaign.”³⁹ This presents a defining problem: how to counter an insurgency that specializes in suicide terror, sneers at settlement, is dispersed among the people, and is adept at using the very force that is directed against it to sustain and replenish itself. U.S. reliance on deadly force

³⁸ Such killings by al Qaeda in Iraq have produced a backlash in the Sunni population, which shows that jihadists can overplay their hand and that the infection of local insurgency with the virus of global extremism is not necessarily irreversible.

³⁹ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

to solve this problem can make enemies of Muslim populations that by and large do not favor terrorism.

The paradox of force in COIN becomes more vexing over the life of an insurgency. The combination of inclusive politics, sound governance, good intelligence, and skilled law enforcement might contain or break proto-insurgency while it still lacks popular sympathy and the means to destroy security. If not, as already noted, rising violence may prompt the state to discard civil COIN in favor of force. If the insurgency persists nevertheless, foreign assistance may be needed to improve local police, justice systems, intelligence, and armed forces. If and as that insurgency expands and becomes more threatening despite such efforts, more and more force may be needed—or seem to be needed—to ensure security, control territory, and defeat the insurgency militarily.

When insurgency becomes uncontained, reaching the point that U.S. or other foreign military intervention is necessary to avoid defeat and save the government, the paradox of force becomes starker still, for insurgents can then appeal for both popular and external support to oppose the foreign occupiers and brand state authorities and forces as collaborators. Moreover, the arrival of foreign forces is a statement of no confidence in the local government that is supposed to be the alternative to insurgency. Finally, unless they are steeped in local conditions from decades of experience, foreign forces are incapable of understanding, much less affecting, the “human terrain” in which COIN must be conducted.⁴⁰ Therefore, although foreign military intervention may seem unavoidable, it may also prove unproductive or even counterproductive. Again, the dilemma this poses is especially acute in the case of greatest concern to the United States: countering Type III insurgency in the Muslim world, where U.S. forces are branded by jihadists and viewed by segments of the population as foreign infidels.

⁴⁰ The exceptions prove the rule. British military and civil personnel were essentially part of the environment in such successful post-colonial COIN campaigns as Malaya and Oman.

Achieving Legitimacy and Security While Reducing Reliance on Deadly Force

Of course, COIN cannot succeed if the state is unwilling or unable to use force. The key to solving the paradox of force inherent in COIN is to maximize the legitimacy of force by reducing reliance on force while enhancing its legitimacy when it must be used. Countering Islamist global-local insurgency, in particular, depends on gaining a *monopoly of legitimate* force for COIN in the eyes of the local and global contested Muslim population. Because Muslim antipathy to Western military intervention is so deep and wide, the challenge of attaining popular legitimacy for the direct, large-scale use of physical force by the United States on Muslim lands is effectively insurmountable. Knowing this, states grappling with Muslim extremists—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand, for example—often do not want U.S. forces involved.⁴¹

Most Iraqis, though not most of Iraq's Sunni Arabs, were relieved when U.S. forces removed Saddam Hussein. But the salutary effects of this achievement quickly dissipated, as Iraqi patriotism, Sunni rejectionism, and Islamist fundamentalism emerged and converged, and the United States lost the legitimacy of force. Polls show that most Iraqis consider U.S. force against civilians to be on a par with the worst jihadist terrorist acts.⁴² A majority of all Iraqis and nearly nine in ten Sunni Arabs consider the use of force against U.S. forces to be a "legitimate form of resistance."⁴³ Although Iraqi insurgents fiercely oppose the security services of the Iraqi government, public opinion is less sympathetic to attacks on those forces than on U.S. forces.

The opposition of Iraq's population to the presence and employment of U.S. troops is not uniform. In many places and instances, U.S.

⁴¹ The case study on Thailand makes clear that U.S. military involvement is not wanted by the Thai government.

⁴² Gompert, *Heads We Win*.

⁴³ It will be instructive to observe the reaction of Southern Lebanese Muslims to the presence of a largely Western (European) peacekeeping force, although that force is present in Lebanon under different terms than U.S. forces are present in Iraq.

forces are seen as the only alternative to violent anarchy. Moreover, while Iraqi citizens express their opposition in polls and demonstrations, their elected representatives have been a good deal more circumspect. Having said this, before taking comfort that U.S. troops are sometimes tolerated and even valued, some facts cannot be ignored:

- Antipathy to U.S. forces is strong among *both* Sunni and Shia Arabs (according to polls), despite the antagonism between them.
- U.S. forces are routinely blamed for not stopping terrorism.
- Mistakes by U.S. forces (e.g., the Haditha killings) are especially prejudicial to COIN.
- Where and when U.S. forces are accepted, it is usually because both understanding and shaping have worked (e.g., in Mosul).⁴⁴
- Hostility to U.S. forces is strongest where insurgent violence is worst.

One of the fallacies of post-9/11 U.S. strategy is the assumption that Muslims' disapproval of terrorism, which is invariably strong, translates into Muslims' approval of the U.S. "war on terrorism." It does not. Poll after poll suggests that Muslims regard GWOT, as demonstrated in Iraq, to be a continuation of Western aggression and oppression. As a consequence, it has not been possible for the United States to gain support for its large-scale military presence and action in the Muslim world as a legitimate and necessary response to terrorism.

On balance, heavy reliance on U.S. forces to counter Type III insurgency in the Muslim world is at best inadequate and at worst counterproductive. As a general approach, the United States must attempt to counter global-local Islamist insurgency with the least possible use of its own military power consistent with preventing the jihadists from wreaking havoc, bringing down states in the Muslim world, and attacking the West.

⁴⁴ The performance of U.S. troops under General David Petraeus in Mosul in 2003–2004 is widely regarded as a model of effective COIN and helps account for the relative tranquility of this fervently Sunni city.

It follows that the key to COIN strategy lies in strengthening alternative capabilities that can provide security, discredit jihadism, and undercut global-local insurgency. The three main alternatives explored in this study are:

- early and sustained use of *civil* (also known as “soft”) instruments of COIN
- competent and legitimate *indigenous* security services
- more and smarter use of *information* (non-kinetic) power.

In terms of the taxonomy of capabilities presented earlier, an emphasis on civil, information, and local means capabilities would imply a general shift from capabilities of direct physical force and control to those more likely to strengthen the standing and performance of the local government and weaken the appeal of the insurgents in the eyes of the population. This shift would conform to the central idea of classical COIN and stand the best chance of containing and eventually smothering Type III insurgency.

COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that all three of these categories have untapped potential. Bluntly put, civil COIN has faltered, local security services have disappointed, and information has not been effectively shared and used. Indeed, a reason for guarded optimism about U.S. COIN, even against global-local insurgency, is that there is so much scope to develop more complete and balanced U.S. capabilities.


If U.S. COIN forces were more complete and balanced, and available in greater quantity and scale than they are today, they would also be more synergistic. The more ambitious and intelligent the United States is in using information in COIN, the more able it will be to understand, act promptly and capably with civil means, and assist local security services. The more prompt and capable the United States is in using civil means, the more likely local security services will be adequate and obviate the need for U.S. deadly force. The greater the access and use of information by local security services, the better they will perform. The better local security services perform, the more the United States can concentrate on civil power and information power

instead of relying chiefly on its military power. Together, they offer a promising formula for greater effectiveness and legitimacy in both governance and operations.

This shift in COIN priorities is depicted in Figure 3.2, which shows the direction in which the United States must move (from A to B) if it is to solve the paradox of force, contain and eventually extinguish Islamic Type III insurgency, and gradually to contribute to state legitimacy in the Muslim world, consistent with its security interests.

The difficulty and importance of countering Type III insurgency, coupled with the uncertainty of success even with improved civil, information, and local capabilities, requires the United States to be able to intervene militarily. Insofar as it must use direct physical force to counter insurgency in the Muslim world, the United States must do so with consummate operational and tactical skill, well-informed deci-

Figure 3.2
Strengthening Capabilities to Reduce Reliance on Deadly Force



sionmaking, discrimination, and precision, accompanied by shaping (e.g., civil) COIN measures to bolster legitimacy. With the sentiments of Muslim populations in mind, it must also strive for the leanest possible military presence, not only in combating local insurgency but also in Muslim lands generally. This study has found that the chief missions of U.S. military forces should be to (1) provide operational support to local forces, (2) find, track, and eliminate “high-value” terrorists and their commanders, and (3) sever global-local insurgent lifelines.⁴⁵ Thus, as the United States shifts from A to B in Figure 3.2, it will reduce the need for muscular force in COIN. At the same time, because there is no assurance that improved non-kinetic capabilities will yield success in the nasty and dynamic realities of Type III insurgency, the option of substantial U.S. force must be preserved. In turn, preserving that option demands improvements in U.S. forces for COIN, to go along with the development of civil, information, and local capabilities.

The worst condition for the United States is when every alternative to large-scale physical U.S. military power is inadequate to prevent insurgency from prevailing and/or damaging perceived important U.S. security interests. This was the case in Vietnam by the mid-1960s, when the Saigon regime was close to defeat; and it was essentially the case in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when there was no Iraqi state at all.

The need to avoid this strategic predicament in Type III insurgencies makes it all the more important to develop and use all three of the alternatives to U.S. force just suggested, increasing the likelihood of success and reducing the need for the fateful decision of whether or not to undertake massive military intervention. Accordingly, Part II of this report analyzes requirements in these categories of COIN capabilities.

Still, the sheer difficulty and unpredictability of COIN, reflected in the historical record and aggravated by the unprecedented challenges of Type III insurgency, demand that the United States be prepared for less than complete success in its efforts to build alternative capabilities. Perhaps the most vexing and consequential dilemma facing the United

⁴⁵ This is not intended to be a specific prescription for Iraq, though the principles on which it is based could inform the way forward there.

States as it considers how to counter Type III insurgency is what to do if nothing short of large U.S. military presence and use of force can turn the tide in favor of COIN in a country of importance. As we will see, building and relying on indigenous security capabilities is essential to reduce dependence on U.S. military power for COIN in the Muslim world. Yet, as we know from Iraq and Afghanistan, there is huge uncertainty associated with the progress and performance of local forces. Therefore, the capabilities of U.S. ground forces for *possible* use against Islamic Type III insurgency must be analyzed, planned, and maintained, even as every effort is made to make such use unnecessary.

Having considered the challenges posed by Type III insurgency, we can return to the question of whether it is a suitable planning case for U.S. COIN capabilities. Even if Type III is the most dangerous and demanding threat, the United States must not find itself incapable of countering the other types of insurgency found in our framework. The method of using such a demanding case to capture the requirements of “lesser included” cases has precedents in U.S. military planning—not always successful ones, as evidenced by the disposition of the U.S. military during the Cold War, until Vietnam, to treat Third-World proxy wars as mini versions of general war with the Soviet Union.

For purposes of preparing capabilities for insurgencies in the 21st century, however, it is reasonable to regard local (Type I) and local-international (Type II) insurgencies as subsets of global-local insurgency. Generally speaking, local insurgencies differ from global-local ones mainly in the fact that they are more susceptible to isolation and accommodation. This does not mean they are easily defeated; but the requirements to counter them are subsumed within the global-local type. Moreover, with the globalization of communications, news media, and transport, local insurgencies may be less likely to remain so as they grow increasingly susceptible to the aims, ideas, fighters, weapons, and methods of global insurgency. The main difference between local-international insurgencies and global-local ones is that the former are complicated by the availability of tangible external support whereas the latter are complicated not only by tangible support but also by the religious fever and sophisticated methods of global insurgent networks.

The different challenges posed by pure global insurgency are taken up later.

With this analysis of the nature and challenges of Type III insurgencies in mind, we can turn to the question of the capabilities required to counter them.

Overview of Capabilities Needed to Counter Type III Insurgency

Because U.S. strategy has stressed direct application of military force, civil, information, and indigenous security capabilities needed for success in countering Type III insurgency are currently deficient. These capabilities receive plenty of declaratory support from the U.S. national-security establishment. For example, the inadequacy of U.S. civil COIN capabilities—other than in the military, ironically—has been a hot topic of debate in the U.S. administration.¹ There is much talk, but less action, about improving information sharing among agencies and with U.S. allies. And the need to improve U.S. capabilities to train local security services has been officially noted.² However, compared to U.S. physical military power, these classes of capabilities are under-resourced and under-utilized, leaving the United States heavily—too heavily, as we see it—dependent on force. If U.S. COIN strategy is to make greater use of these capabilities, U.S. COIN investment must favor them. The ultimate goal is a complete and balanced set of U.S. capabilities for COIN.

This brief chapter's overview of these critical but relatively weak capabilities is followed by chapters detailing each one. Requirements

¹ Karen DeYoung, "Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs: Rice, Pentagon at Odds over Plan," *Washington Post* (February 8, 2007, p. A18).

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006).

are derived from the challenges of Type III insurgency analyzed in the preceding chapter.

Timely Civil COIN

In the heat of hostilities with insurgents, it is easy to lose sight of the fundamental difference between COIN and combat. In combat, outcomes tend to be decided by the relative capabilities of opposing armed forces fighting in the physical dimension. In COIN, the outcomes are decided mainly in the human dimension, by the contested population, and the capabilities of opposing armed forces are only one factor in determining those outcomes. The people will decide whether the state or the insurgents offer a better future, and to a large extent which of the two will be given the chance. Civil COIN provides the population with a preview of that future.

The civil demands of COIN—able and accountable government, inclusive politics, the just rule of law, public safety, broad-based economic development—must be tackled early enough that proto-insurgency can be snuffed out and the need for force avoided. COIN-inspired efforts to improve civil capacity and government performance cost much less than military intervention—tens of billions versus hundreds of billions of dollars to counter major Type III insurgency (as the next chapter will explain). Moreover, offering decent public service, economic development, and political reform does not run the risk of fueling insurgency, as trying to destroy it by sheer force does.

Why, then, do civil capabilities get short shrift in actual U.S. policies and resource allocation? One reason is that the U.S. government tends to come to grips with insurgencies only after they become threatening. Consequently, there is little high-level bureaucratic and congressional interest in civil COIN before a violent insurgency has erupted. Yet, once violence has begun, civil COIN becomes hazardous and difficult. The net result, conspicuous in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that civil COIN is not vigorously pursued when it *could be*, under permissive conditions, and cannot be vigorously pursued when it *must be*, under nonpermissive conditions. The lack of reliable early warning

of the potential for insurgency also works against the opportunity for timely and robust civil COIN.

The second reason is that the U.S. government is not organized or resourced to conduct large-scale civil COIN (or similar endeavors, e.g., post-conflict reconstruction and failed-state nation-building). Neither the State Department nor U.S. federal “domestic” departments are equipped for this, certainly not on a large scale: The former is essentially a diplomatic institution; the latter were not meant to rebuild other states; and neither can dispatch large numbers of civilians involuntarily to dangerous places. In addition to these constraints on capacity for civil COIN, execution is hampered by interagency and international jurisdictional barriers.³

Apart from shortcomings in funding, planning, organization, and execution, the main problem with civil instruments of COIN is that they take a long time to produce material results (though psychological and political effects can precede material ones). Once an insurgency is able to cause an intolerable level of insecurity, civil instruments may complement but not obviate the need for force, which promises (though does not always deliver) faster security. As Campbell and Weitz note, by the time an insurgency has become full-blown, it may be too late for reform.⁴ Because of the intensity of Muslim anger at perceived Western injustices and hostility to West-leaning apostate regimes in the Muslim world, the prospects of quick payoffs from civil instruments are not good. This is particularly true when the regime under the gun lacks both competence and legitimacy, as those targeted by Type III insurgency tend to be.

This timing problem does not argue for neglecting civil instruments, globally or locally. On the contrary, it argues for their urgent implementation, where needed, which depends on having good indicators-and-warnings systems. Because of the potential speed of

³ It is important to note that the bulk of nonmilitary COIN capacity is non-U.S.-government, e.g., EU and European national, international financial institutions, other multinational organizations, and NGOs. The case for multilateralizing nonmilitary COIN is even stronger than the case for multilateralizing military COIN.

⁴ Campbell and Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism*, p. 12.

Type III insurgency, the earlier these instruments are used the more likely they will succeed before insurgent violence necessitates force and conditions become unsafe. When time is lost, as it has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, even effective civil instruments may not obviate the need to use force.

One of the most fundamental of all civil instruments of COIN is the development of inclusive politics and representative government. In long-term strategy toward global-local Islamist insurgency, there is no adequate substitute for accountable and able national governments in the Arab and Muslim worlds. But this is a tall order that will take years or even decades to fill. And to the extent extremists are better organized and prepared than responsible reformers, it is fraught with the risk of electing extremists to government.⁵ The United States and its friends cannot suspend COIN, including forcible COIN, while the greater Middle East undergoes thoroughgoing political transformation without exposing that very transformation to the threat of Islamist insurgency—transformation and jihad each being a mortal threat to the other.

Chapter Five examines in depth the scope, scale, and general content of capabilities for civil COIN in Type III insurgencies.

The Power of Information

Outsmarting Type III insurgency by making better use of information can both improve and reduce the requirement for kinetic force. Whereas firepower may deliver diminishing or even negative returns in COIN, investment in information technologies and associated cognitive capabilities can yield increasing returns, *provided* the United States and its allies exploit advances in user-led information search, access, and collaboration currently sweeping the nonmilitary world. Doing so would make physical force less necessary and, when necessary, more reasoned, measured, exact, and accepted. Because information technologies and infrastructure are propelled by the larger economy, they

⁵ Notable cases of this risk are Algeria in 1992 and Hamas in 2006.

can be acquired promptly, and the costs of applying them should be modest by DoD spending standards.⁶ But this priority must not be restricted to technology. The networks that disseminate information in COIN campaigns and operations must be inclusive, integrated, and user-driven, not exclusive, compartmentalized, and originator-controlled, as they are today.⁷

Beyond the need for more extensive and more open networking, a strategy of better use of information is as much about how and how well our soldiers and other operatives think and decide as it is about how and how much information reaches them. Improved cognition is especially important when using force in the midst of a contested population that jihadists are operating within. This will require changes in how U.S. national-security organizations recruit, train, and retain key personnel and in how such organizations delegate authority in command and control. Just as information can be distributed outward and downward in organizations, authority to make decisions utilizing that information should also be distributed.

The ability to gather, share, and use information is the essence of good intelligence. Yet this ability has generally been lacking for U.S. forces and agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, improvised arrangements in Iraq (detailed later) show that enhanced horizontal sharing of intelligence, unobstructed by organizational and national barriers, can pay sizable operational dividends: integrating civil and military COIN efforts, permitting fast yet sound decisions, and enabling discriminate use of force against high-value insurgent targets.

Networked information can benefit not only U.S. forces but also local forces, as well as the ability of U.S. and local forces to collaborate. In Iraq, for example, as Iraqi forces take more responsibility, their performances will depend on their ability to work in close harmony with

⁶ The problem, of course, lies in the DoD procurement systems and defense-industrial structure. See David C. Gompert and Paul Bracken, *Bringing Defense into the Information Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2006).

⁷ Libicki et al. (*Byting Back*) address this in depth.

U.S. forces, which in turn depends on exchanging information. This assumes a willingness to accept some risk in sharing sensitive but operationally valuable information with the local government and its forces, which those on the front line of COIN operations generally favor even if intelligence bureaucrats generally do not. Equally important is to share information across interagency and international boundaries, without which the vision of coherent COIN is a mirage.

Whether in military operations, civil-military operations, intelligence, or the merging of operations and intelligence, vast improvement in the sharing and use of information and thus in COIN itself is possible because of new networking technologies and organizational innovations driven by and for information users in the nonmilitary world. For this to happen, the penchant of U.S. military and intelligence establishments for controlling information must give way to the principles of effective networking (explained later). Yet, successes in the field have been the exception, not the rule, and have required impatient operators to break rules, circumvent organizational barriers, and evade the network controls that impede information flows. The difficulty of adequately exploiting information power in COIN is not technological, but cultural and institutional—in both operational use and acquisition of information solutions.

Both in access to information and in horizontal collaboration, networking and cognitive capabilities are a *sine qua non* of the entire COIN strategy, especially against Type III insurgency. The common belief that networking is important only in high-intensity expeditionary, force-on-force warfare does not square with careful analysis of the utility of information in COIN. The idea, currently in vogue in some quarters, that COIN requires boots, not bytes, is in our view, erroneous. In fact, bytes enable boots. Yet the United States has barely begun to exploit the information revolution for COIN.

That the use and manipulation of information and cognition are jihadist strengths makes it all the more vital to develop and exploit these domains in U.S. COIN. Again, a complex, unfamiliar, and fluid global-local insurgency that uses information power effectively and economically demands a shift in U.S. emphasis from physical-structural power to information-cognitive power. Radically better but

eminently feasible and affordable information and cognitive capabilities for COIN against Type III insurgency are considered and proposed in Chapters Six and Seven.

Improving Local Forces

Whether police, paramilitary, or military forces are needed for COIN, the best ones to use, generally speaking, are those of the embattled state itself. Global and local Islamic insurgents find it easier to marshal both public and external support to oppose military intervention and occupation by foreign infidels. All else being equal, citizens are typically more inclined to divulge information about insurgents to local officers than American ones. However, indigenous police and military forces are more likely than foreign forces to enjoy legitimacy *only if* (1) the government to which these services answer is seen as legitimate, effective, and independent (i.e., not a U.S. puppet); and (2) the services are trustworthy and competent, specifically in COIN. In any case, local personnel will know customs, language, and sentiments better than foreign ones.

Of indigenous security services, none is more critical than police. By maintaining neighborhood safety and enforcing the rule of law with minimal necessary force, police can be both more effective and more legitimate than combat troops, especially if combined with fair, efficient, and transparent justice and penal systems. Even if they are not enamored with the state itself, Muslims who are concerned about family security, as most surely are, may accept and even cooperate with well-trained, well-led, well-behaved, and even-handed police. In comparison, military force, being inherently clumsier and more lethal, may intimidate more than reassure the population, especially when insurgents are hidden in urban areas, as is often the case in Islamist insurgency. Wrongful arrests and civilian casualties are inevitable when insurgents look like other military-age males. Such mistakes, which increase popular ire and aid insurgent recruiting, are more likely and more deadly when made by military forces than when made by police who abide by rules of engagement designed to minimize violence.

When security has deteriorated to the point that ordinary police are inadequate, it is better to have and call on high-performance, quick-response forces skilled in both policing and light combat than to have no choice but to call in regular military troops. Provided they are well trained, specialized, informed, and mobile, such police units can be not only more legitimate in the view of the public but also more proficient than regular military forces against at least small insurgent concentrations. One way to meet this need is with a kind of armed force virtually unknown in the United States (where regular police suffice), but common in Southern European countries (where there has been a need): constabulary police capable of both law enforcement and low-intensity combat. Regular military forces are inculcated with doctrine, training, and rules of engagement that are often unproductive and sometimes counterproductive in a struggle with insurgents in the midst of a contested population. In any case, the longer the employment of regular military force can be deferred, the better. As of 2007, the failure in Iraq and Afghanistan to develop trustworthy and capable police of any sort has made security increasingly dependent on the use of indigenous army forces or, more likely, U.S. or, in Afghanistan, NATO troops.⁸

Helping local security services to perform effective COIN reduces the need for U.S. military presence and force, the risk of perpetuating insurgency, and U.S. costs and casualties. The principal role of U.S. forces should be to enable the local state to provide security by building high-quality security services and providing critical operational support. By becoming more of a COIN “wholesaler” rather than “retailer,” the United States could assume a smaller military footprint and deny the insurgents unhelpful footage on global media.

In building local forces, the U.S. military and other involved agencies must not lose sight of the importance of designing and preparing them *for COIN*, which was not a U.S. priority when Iraqi police

⁸ Pirnie and Jones, as well as others writing on the subject, give low marks to indigenous police and to U.S. and allied efforts to train them.

and military forces were first developed.⁹ Generally speaking, quality is more important than quantity, especially if the latter can only be achieved by shortening training and lowering standards. True, quantity can provide greater presence; but it cannot substitute for quality if local forces are expected to fight—a lesson learned the hard way in Iraq in April 2004, when Iraqi police, army, and civil-defense corps units failed badly against both Sunni and Shiite militants. Because it takes time to train high-quality forces, especially in countries that have not had such forces, starting early is essential.

The United States is institutionally and technically deficient in capabilities to build local forces suitable for COIN: army, police, and constabulary. It is not clear where in the U.S. military establishment the primary responsibility for developing local forces lies, or whether the military should have such responsibility at all when it comes to local police. Moreover, the military's unit-rotation policy works against continuity and personal relationships, which are vital in developing local counterpart forces.

In sum, the current U.S. strategy of directly attacking global-local Islamist insurgents amid unfriendly Muslim populations to prevent attacks on the America population should be replaced by one that places top priority on improving the trustworthiness and professionalism of the COIN-capable local security forces. Capabilities to improve and enable local security forces are examined in Chapters Eight and Nine.

A Change in Emphasis for U.S. Military Forces

Solving the paradox of force implies a need for certain enhancements and adjustments in U.S. military forces themselves. The military capabilities needed when the United States is weak in civil COIN, when information power is neglected, and when local forces are inadequate

⁹ Instead, Iraq police and national guard were intended to perform largely non-COIN tasks that relieved the United States to fight Sunni insurgents, and the new Iraqi Army was initially designed for external defense.

are not the same as those that are suitable when such conditions have been remedied. The right question for military planning is not what U.S. forces are needed to compensate for a flawed approach to COIN but rather what forces are needed for an approach to COIN that will work, while also hedging if it does not.

In general, we conclude that U.S. forces could be better prepared for COIN by

- improving their ability to organize, train, and equip high-quality COIN-capable indigenous security forces
- improving their ability to enable local forces operationally
- making more effective cognitive use of information
- being able to gain awareness, territorial reach, and leverage without large presence
- having nonlethal force options
- understanding better how to use force in those situations where they are expected to assume the lead in providing security
- understanding civil aspects of COIN and how they are integrated with military aspects
- knowing the ways, mores, hopes, and fears of the population.

The U.S. military needs to specify and build these intangible capabilities in training, leader development, technology application, information operations, and doctrine to make U.S. forces better at COIN, whether in enabling indigenous forces, winning local trust, or conducting direct operations when necessary. The 2006 publication of an up-to-date Army and Marine Corps COIN manual¹⁰ is useful, especially in regard to important intangible qualities for COIN. But it does not address either U.S. deficiencies in building local forces or specific enhancements in U.S. military capabilities to carry out those operational tasks that even good local forces cannot.

If the main contribution of U.S. forces is not to fight insurgents but instead to prepare and help local forces to do so, the primary crite-

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army and USMC, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5.

rior for U.S. military capabilities for COIN is what most enables local security services in operations. With this in mind, the U.S. military should concentrate on functions and capabilities that

- only its forces can perform
- provide high-leverage operating support for local forces
- minimize violence, and images of violence, against Muslims.

Generally speaking, such capabilities are not well represented in the investments of the U.S. armed services, which control virtually all funding for capabilities. U.S. forces are built to fight the nation's wars, but COIN demands U.S. forces that can help local forces fight *their* wars. A strategy of giving primacy to the development and operational support of local forces implies a different direction in U.S. military capabilities for COIN than that of recent years. Although the 2006 DoD *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* hints at such a shift, current programming of funds portends sluggish change at best.

Perhaps the hardest and most consequential problem the United States faces in using physical force against insurgents is to do so without harming the very citizens whose security and support are paramount. The urbanization of insurgency obviously compounds the problem. This suggests that a high priority ought to be placed on being able to distinguish insurgents and noninsurgents—a challenge best met by improving information capabilities. However, because such capabilities cannot be fail-safe, U.S. commanders will often find themselves facing choices of either harming noninsurgents or sparing insurgents. This raises the issue of whether the U.S. military, as well as local forces, could be far more capable than they are now of using *nonlethal* force as a way of managing the paradox of force.

Having said that U.S. forces should be designed for a COIN strategy that emphasizes enhanced civil, information, and indigenous capabilities, it is also necessary to hedge if these capabilities fall short, in general or in a given campaign. Failing to hedge for COIN would be imprudent because Type III insurgency is so challenging, unpredictable, and important to counter. However, as we will explain later, hedging does not mean reverting to reliance on the massing of U.S.

ground forces to defeat Islamic insurgents militarily. If ground forces must be used, they should take full advantage of recent advances in information networking and high-speed mobility, relying as much as possible on local ground forces amid Muslim populations.

Revised priorities for U.S. military capabilities for COIN are developed in Chapter Ten, after having first considered how to improve civil, information, and local security capabilities.

Civil Capabilities

Introduction

When it comes to civil capabilities for COIN, the situation of the United States is, in our judgment, bad but not hopeless. The executive and legislative branches have begun to recognize that the United States needs to help ineffective states improve their political and economic performance.¹ Assisting in post-conflict reconstruction, helping failed states recover, and using foreign assistance to engineer reform are increasingly viewed as important for U.S. global strategy.² The United States has discovered, first in the Balkans and subsequently in Afghanistan and Iraq, that such work is vital to success.³

¹ This is one of the motivations for the policies and associated initiatives called “Transformational Diplomacy” that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has articulated as a core strategy and organizing principle for the State Department.

² This is reflected in DoD’s elevation of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization as a mission of comparable importance to warfighting.

³ In the research community, RAND and others have produced research on the resources and methods required for nation-building. RAND’s nation-building series includes James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003), as of October 30, 2007: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/; James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga R. Timilsina, *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005), as of October 30, 2007: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG304/>; and James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, Santa Monica, Calif.:

Since 9/11, with prolonged struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has shoveled billions of dollars into fixing broken states targeted by Islamic terrorists. Both the Department of Defense (in its most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*) and the Department of State (in creating an office to coordinate this type of work) have thrown a spotlight on the need to invest in nation-building capabilities. The capabilities needed for nation-building are substantially the same as those needed for civil COIN. But in contrast with nation-building, the fact that civil COIN must take place in the midst of, in spite of, and as a way of countering violent insurgency presents special challenges. COIN demands

- investment in sizable permanent capabilities, since reacting ad hoc in the middle of an insurgency will not suffice
- using civil instruments preventively as the ideal way to starve proto-insurgencies of popular support
- civil capabilities that are deployable and employable during hostilities.

With global-local insurgency potentially on the rise, the need for civil COIN capabilities is more urgent than ever. Yet disturbingly little disciplined analysis has been done on the *requirements* for civil COIN, from the perspective of nations facing insurgency or the U.S. government. Although organizations both inside and out of government have listed desirable civil capabilities—economic aid, political reform, improvement of infrastructures and public services—specific needs remain unmeasured, not to mention unmet. Consequently, despite a consensus on the need to close the civil COIN gap, there is no solid foundation for recommending capabilities and investments. This chapter is intended to start building that foundation.

Competition in the Civil Realm

Insurgents and counterinsurgents vie to define a society's political order.⁴ The ultimate outcome of an insurgency is usually a reconstituted political system. If the insurgents fully succeed, they put in place their preferred political form—for example, a theocratic, socialist, or redrawn state. If COIN succeeds, some version of the preexisting political order is perpetuated. Between these extremes lies a range of results: Insurgents may have to compromise their ideals to gain power, or a government may be forced to introduce major reforms to survive an insurgency and avert a new one. In some cases, the final outcome may be a political settlement mixing elements advocated by both insurgents and counterinsurgents.

Consequently, civil instruments are central to COIN strategy. They influence the population's preferences and allegiances and send important signals to external supporters of both the insurgents and the government. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, civil instruments directly embody the political order promoted by the counterinsurgents. They frame the conflict itself and often lay the groundwork for the political settlement that normally ends an insurgency.

But counterinsurgents do not hold exclusive rights to the civil sphere. Insurgent groups also often use civil instruments to win greater popular support and highlight the government's weaknesses.⁵ For example, Hamas's success in Palestine's 2006 parliamentary elections has been partly attributed to its ability to provide social services, including medical care, education, and welfare.⁶ Since the 1980s, social services

⁴ In this context, political order is best understood in its Weberian sense of the distribution of power and subsidiary attributes of society. See Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation* (originally a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblot, Munich). Translation available, as of October 23, 2007, at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Politics_as_a_Vocation. See also Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1968).

⁵ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 3).

⁶ Esther Pan, *Hamas and the Shrinking PA Budget* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 21, 2006). As of October 27, 2007: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10499/>.

have been a pillar of Hezbollah's strategy as well, steadily strengthening the movement.⁷ In insurgency, both sides will use civil strategies to help them prevail in the contest for the population and the ability to define the society's political order.⁸

Nowhere is the importance of civil instruments in COIN more apparent than in the Muslim world, where most governments offer the palest version of a political order that effectively meets the needs and stirs the hopes of their populations, and where the danger of global-local insurgency looms. Just as stark as the choice between religious tyranny and enlightened, responsive governance is the gap between such governance and most existing regimes in the Muslim world. Paradoxically, the more violent insurgency becomes in that vast region, the more pressing the mandate to use civil means to reduce the need for military force.

Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Type III Insurgency

Classical approaches to COIN underscore civil capabilities. Three strategies for using civil capabilities to shape conditions and public loyalties emerge from the literature: carrot-and-stick, hearts-and-minds, and transformation.⁹

Carrot-and-Stick

These strategies aim to shape the incentives available to both the population and insurgents. The essential premise is that if the government can effectively punish bad and reward good behavior, then the popu-

⁷ Melani Cammett, "Habitat for Hezbollah," *Foreign Policy* (July–August 2006), Web exclusive (subscription required). As of November 2, 2007: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3572.

⁸ See for example David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1958).

⁹ For a useful overview of some key sources, see Robert M. Tones, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* (Spring 2004, pp. 16–28). RAND has been a seminal contributor to this literature, dating back to the COIN era of the 1950s–1960s. See Long, *On "Other War."*

lation can be induced to side with the government and eschew links with insurgents. Carrot-and-stick strategies embrace the logic of consequences, seeking to influence the population's practical choices. In such strategies, military and civil instruments often play diametrically opposing roles: Force is used to punish those who do not behave as the government wishes,¹⁰ while civil instruments are used to reward those who do, often by treating them preferentially in politics and in the distribution of financial support, economic development, and other assistance.

One example of a carrot-and-stick strategy is the food-denial program employed by the British in Malaya during the 1950s. Essentially, British forces manipulated access to food as an incentive for the population to support the government. They centralized foodstuffs and distribution in contested areas of Malaya and then provided families in government-aligned villages with rations, which people had to prepare communally, under the watchful eye of government officials. British forces prohibited food from moving outside villages to ensure that as little as possible leaked to insurgents and their supporters. This strategy created a powerful motivation to support the government, while establishing negative incentives for insurgents and their supporters—a classic carrot-and-stick approach.¹¹

Hearts-and-Minds

These strategies set out to win the population's allegiance. The core idea is that if the government can provide the population with the things they want, a bond will form and the population will shun the insurgents. This is the logic of appropriateness: The population comes to identify with the government. Counterinsurgents use civil instruments in hearts-and-minds strategies to assist the population in a manner highly likely to generate affection for the government.¹²

¹⁰ Force is also employed to protect the population, negating the ability of insurgents to impose punishment on populations aligned with the government.

¹¹ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

¹² Long, *On "Other War."*

Improving public education is a common hearts-and-minds strategy. Assuming that the population in question wants education for their children, the government can earn its gratitude by building and running schools. Over time, gratitude may become allegiance and, ultimately, identification with the state. Citizens come increasingly to view support for the insurgents as inappropriate behavior.

Hearts-and-minds strategies are difficult to implement successfully, particularly for external powers such as the United States. When the United States assists a population, the credit often goes to the United States rather than the host nation. While this may have short-term benefits, such as increasing the safety of U.S. forces, it does very little to boost popular allegiance to the host-nation government. Indeed, when the host-nation government is performing poorly in comparison, U.S. assistance may actually discredit the indigenous government. And in highly volatile situations such as Iraq, the perilous security environment may force U.S. contractors and other government agencies to keep such a low profile that insurgents can even take credit for successful development projects.¹³ Consequently, the host-nation government must co-opt and claim ownership of hearts-and-minds strategies.

Transformation

Here the goal is to change the underlying structure of society and governance. The core premise is that such fundamental transformations make insurgency an irrelevant mode of pursuing a grievance. The logic is based on transcendence: Changing the framework in which society addresses grievances makes the conflict obsolete. A common transformation strategy is to reform a society's justice system. A well-functioning justice system enables people to address individual and collective grievances through criminal or civil courts. In this environment, people can seek redress for grievances against the government without using violence—much less insurgency.

Transformation differs substantively from hearts-and-minds. Simply by opening decent schools and providing teachers and books,

¹³ Interview with representative of a USAID contractor in Iraq, Washington, D.C., October 2006.

the government pursuing a hearts-and-minds strategy can show a population that it not only cares about providing this key service but also has the capacity to do so. In contrast, education as part of a transformation strategy involves reform: The government would provide a curriculum that exposes students, for example, to objective reasoning, alternative points of view, and practical knowledge. Here counterinsurgents would go beyond merely satisfying the population that the government can provide a basic service to providing that service in a fashion that paves the way for economic and political progress. The hearts-and-minds approach may help defuse an insurgency under way; transformation may help destroy its breeding ground.

Integrating the Three Strategies to Counter Type III Insurgency

Countering Type III insurgency will require a mix of these three approaches. Weaving them into a single integrated strategy is both a science and an art. The science is essentially public administration—effectively and efficiently delivering public services to designated populations and areas. The art is reconciling the various strategies within the local political context to serve the counterinsurgents’ aims, while out-competing parallel efforts by insurgents.

Insight into the tradeoffs among the three strategies can be gained by viewing them through the lens of Type III insurgency. Early in its growth, when the violence is local-political—the case in Iraq for the first year or so of U.S. occupation—carrot-and-stick may carry the greatest tactical payoff by convincing large segments of the population to withhold support for the insurgents. As the roots of the insurgency take hold—the case of the Palestinians today—hearts-and-minds may become more productive than the manipulative carrot-and-stick. Hard-nosed carrot-and-stick approaches often contradict hearts-and-minds approaches because punishing a portion of the population is tantamount to writing off their allegiance. If the number of people to be punished grows too large, this approach becomes an untenable liability.

If, eventually, global (e.g., jihadist) elements come to dominate an insurgency, carrot-and-stick will likely prove inadequate and hearts-and-minds will be an uphill battle. Here transformation may become the strategy of choice. It may not have the immediate utility of carrot-and-stick or the broad appeal of hearts-and-minds. It demands more patience and probably more resources. But only by building authentically accountable and competent governance, offering the bulk of the population real hope for the future, can counterinsurgents make insurgency a truly bad option. As we have noted, insurgencies nearly always fail against capable and democratic—that is, transformed—governments. The ultimate payoff for the patience and resources required by transformation is a broader and less reversible solution to Type III insurgency: The state permanently reduces the dissatisfaction and frustration that can spark and sustain such violence.

But again, coordinating the three strategies can be challenging. Favoring certain populations through carrot-and-stick and addressing immediate wants and needs through hearts-and-minds may involve incentives and concessions that work against the ultimate goals of transformation. To take one prominent case, coalition forces in Afghanistan have helped regional warlords win popular support at the expense of Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents. This is a classic carrot-and-stick measure in the short run. But it nevertheless undercuts long-term efforts to expand the national (as opposed to tribal) rule of law in Afghanistan and enhance the government's strength and standing.¹⁴ Transformation ultimately stands the greatest chance of permanently bringing down the insurgency and keeping it from reappearing. There is no substitute for transformation as the larger strategy to counter global-local Islamist insurgency, and all other civil strategies should be tributaries to it.¹⁵

¹⁴ Deepa Ollapally, *Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 105, April 2003). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.html>.

¹⁵ Moreover, the United States has abiding interests in improving governance, beyond reducing the danger of insurgency.

Key to remember, though, is that one of the many dangers of global-local insurgency is its ability to develop rapidly, turning what may be a manageable local-political insurgency into an unmanageable eruption of global-religious conflict. The chief disadvantage of transformation is that it takes years, or even generations, to alter a conflict's social and political milieu.¹⁶ Accordingly, although transformation may be the best strategy for the long run, the process has to begin well before the insurgency itself becomes transformed.

Expertise and Resources in Functional Areas

It is perhaps most practical to think of the civil dimension of counterinsurgent strategy along functional lines.¹⁷ We offer a taxonomy of nine functional areas:

- *Political systems*: Establish political systems that are adequately participatory and robust enough to support long-term stability.
- *Government administration*: Effectively carry out policy decisions.
- *Public health*: Deliver an acceptable level of care to the citizenry.

¹⁶ Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Termination* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005).

¹⁷ There appears to be a tradition of inventing a new taxonomy for any major study or operation. The U.S. Army, for example, has identified three "Logical Lines of Operation," including essential services, governance, and economic development (Headquarters, Department of the Army and USMC, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5). A joint study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) advocates four categories: humanitarian assistance, civil administration, democratization and nation-building, and reconstruction and economic development (CSIS and AUSA, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*, Washington, D.C.: CSIS and AUSA, 2002, as of October 22, 2007: <http://www.csis.org/images/stories/pct/framework.pdf>). The U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization utilizes an Essential Tasks Matrix divided into five categories: transitional security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005, as of October 23, 2007: <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm>).

- *Public education*: Deliver an acceptable level of knowledge and skills to the citizenry.
- *Employment*: Create an acceptable number of jobs of desired types.
- *Economic policy*: Sustain an acceptable level of overall prosperity.
- *Banking*: Create and manage currency and financial instruments with acceptable security and efficiency.
- *Transport*: Move goods and people with acceptable security and efficiency.
- *Energy and power*: Deliver electricity and fuels with acceptable predictability, security, efficiency, and environmental protection.

Readers will notice that we have not mentioned the need for fair and efficient justice systems, which are of course indispensable in good governance. Actually, we take up justice systems at length in the discussion of local security capabilities in Chapter Nine. Our reason for this is to stress that the administration and enforcement of law and order must go hand in hand and that police can be neither legitimate nor successful in obtaining the public's cooperation if not embedded within a justice system that warrants public confidence.

Each of the nine functions listed here requires a combination of expertise and physical capital. But societies beset by insurgency often lack this combination in several of these functional areas. In some cases, these gaps are root causes of the insurgency. In all cases, addressing such gaps is the basis of COIN's civil component.

The United States is unevenly capable of carrying out these functions. Its strongest suit is advising on political and economic reform, an area in which U.S. government, government-sponsored foundations, and nongovernmental organizations acquired considerable skill and experience in helping former communist countries reform after 1989. The United States also does well in building transport and other physical infrastructure, mainly by funding contractors. But it has significant weaknesses, which lie mainly in improving public service (education and health), generating employment, and developing the capacity to provide energy and power. Iraq, for example, has made little progress in these areas during the U.S. occupation. Although insurgent violence

and politics fragmented along sectarian and ethnic lines have certainly set back COIN in Iraq, there is no question that poor public service, the scarcity of electricity, and staggering unemployment in key provinces among critical population segments have taken their toll on the effort to win Iraqis' confidence and cooperation.

What lies behind these weaknesses may be inadequate expertise, numbers of personnel, funding, or all three. Foreign powers often confront special challenges in each of these regards. Experts must have not just a command of their specific functional area but also competence in implementing programs under difficult, insurgency-wracked conditions. A deep understanding of local politics and society is also critical, but is a scarce commodity among foreign powers, particularly the U.S. government. Beyond this, civil COIN demands a very special type of individual willing to live as a foreigner in a society wracked by turmoil (often in the face of insurgent threats), design and implement programs to address contentious local problems, ensure that the result conforms to both U.S. and host-nation policy, and frame the entire effort in a manner that casts a favorable light on the host government.

Similarly, available resources must go beyond addressing the existing functional shortfall. They must be enough to empower the local population to sustain the new capacity. Take, for example, creating a public education system. Administrative and pedagogical expertise is only a first step: Also crucial is the know-how to win local buy-in for the schools, arrange a sustainable resource flow to bolster the system, manage and implement construction and material acquisition projects, create programs to train future personnel, and frame the system in a way that generates allegiance to the government.

Coordinated Participation of Multiple Organizations

From the perspective of the U.S. government, a mosaic of participants will contribute to the success of civil COIN. In many cases, dozens or even hundreds may be operating at the same time in a country torn by insurgency. Coordinating their efforts is a major challenge, but it is vital to effectiveness.

The Host Nation

The host nation is the key participant. It is ultimately responsible for achieving and maintaining the desired political order. Host-nation ministries and agencies typically play an important part, from the interior and intelligence ministries to those of finance, education, transport, and trade. The host nation's central bank, provincial and district governments, and local government may also get involved.

Government agencies are not the only players, though. Private companies, associations, political parties, and other organizations will also play a role, as will formal and informal ethnic social groupings. At times, participants will be micro-units as specific as certain neighborhoods or city blocks. This network of participants forms the essential sphere of civil counterinsurgency.

Local citizens are indispensable to the effort. Input from community members is key to generating community buy-in, maximizing impacts, and ensuring sustainability by developing local capacity. A focus on community-driven civil COIN ensures that political and social development takes place at the community level. This, in turn, supports the broader aim of promoting participatory governance.¹⁸ Providing an alternative mechanism for community members to channel their energies, address grievances, and improve their circumstances can do much to undermine the appeal of insurgents.

The U.S. Government

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary civil instrument of the United States, acting through its country missions and assistance programs. In August 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to oversee interagency planning for stabilization and reconstruction activities, which are closely related to civil COIN. The Department of Defense is potentially another key participant, including Army Civil Affairs, Army Corps of Engineers and other engineer-

¹⁸ Ray Salvatore Jennings, *The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks 49, May 2003, p. 33).

ing capabilities, defense agencies, and combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Individual experts from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Justice, Labor, and Treasury may also participate. The Central Intelligence Agency may devote some financial resources for counterinsurgency operations.

Other Governments

Foreign governments also possess expertise across the spectrum of functional areas and have demonstrated varying willingness to deploy these capabilities to states beset with insurgency. European states have particularly strong civil-service institutions, as do Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other developed nations. Many of these governments maintain foreign aid institutions that are much larger, more robust, and more forward-deployed than equivalent U.S. agencies. Their field missions and personnel are therefore better suited to the civil aspects of counterinsurgency. Politically, however, these governments are less likely to become involved in counterinsurgency campaigns (at least beyond the proto-insurgency stage). Where they can be engaged, they often bring vast expertise and capacity.

International Organizations

International organizations have long played a key civil role in peace-keeping and stability operations. Many of these capabilities apply equally to counterinsurgency. The United Nations has field operations in dozens of nations around the world, as well as a deep reservoir of expertise available in staffs in New York and Geneva. The European Union and the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe have played key civil roles in Europe and Africa. The World Bank and the International Monetary Foundation often provide financial and economic expertise to states around the world.¹⁹ Many other organizations are similarly capable of providing international civil servants and field

¹⁹ In line with its primary mission of alleviating poverty, the World Bank is paying increased attention to fragile states emerging from or facing armed conflict (which it terms “Low-Income Countries Under Stress”). This development could involve the World Bank and its resources in addressing conditions that give rise to insurgency, though the World Bank is unlikely, for political reasons, to express its purposes in terms of COIN.

mission expertise. The upshot is that much of the worldwide capability for conducting the civil aspects of counterinsurgency is resident within international organizations. For the most part, the mission of these organizations is not counterinsurgency, and indeed, most would shy away from association with U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgent campaign. Nevertheless, these organizations are present and capable in many states afflicted by insurgency, and counterinsurgency strategy must take their activities into account.

Nongovernmental Organizations

A variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also play a key role in civil aspects of stability operations. Though these organizations are politically neutral, the practical impact of their activities is neither negligible nor necessarily neutral. Like international organizations, they are unlikely to associate themselves with a U.S. counterinsurgency campaign, but an effective counterinsurgent strategy must take their activities into account. Ideally, counterinsurgents will shape their strategy to capitalize on the activities that NGOs are undertaking for their own purposes.

Guiding Principles for Implementing a Strategy

Although this is a study about capabilities, there are some implementation principles concerning civil COIN that can make capabilities more productive.

Coordinate Civil and Military Efforts

A successful counterinsurgency strategy fully integrates civil instruments with the use of force. Such coordination begins with the recognition that the civil instruments will directly define the political order that follows the insurgency.

Conventional wisdom among counterinsurgency scholars, based on historical accounts of the British campaign in Malaya, holds that civil and military efforts must be integrated from the theater level all the way down to the smallest district or village. The British used suc-

cessive layers of civil-military committees for this purpose, headed by a civilian “supremo” for all of Malaya.

It is doubtful, however, that this British approach can be generalized.²⁰ In current U.S. COIN campaigns, the reality is decidedly mixed. In some cases, civil and military coordination is excellent. U.S. operations in Colombia are an example, built on an integrated country team led by the ambassador.²¹ But in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in contrast, there is no integrated chain of command. Instead, coordination between the civil and military sides of COIN has depended on personal relationships. At times, this has produced truly abysmal results.²² Centralized authority has severe drawbacks in countering the widely distributed and fluid opponents driving global-local insurgencies.

Start Early

The civil problems afflicting developing nations are notoriously difficult to remedy. Insurgency only exacerbates the challenge. Decades of development aid and technical assistance often produce only slow and fitful progress.²³ A strategy for civil COIN must take these realities into account. For several reasons, it is best to take action early:

Civil instruments stand the best chance of producing transformational change during the proto-insurgency phase. Given how long it takes to effect real change in a society, counterinsurgents need to apply civil tools preventively or at the first signs of trouble. In this way, their results can be felt during the proto-insurgency stage. Delaying will likely cause their effects to be felt well after the point at which they can do real good.

Civilians will have far more opportunity to involve themselves intensively. The environment is less dangerous in the proto-insurgency stage.

²⁰ Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60*.

²¹ Interview with U.S. Army personnel, April 2006.

²² Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006).

²³ This is primarily because most societies are deeply complex and resistant to rapid change, and the resources available to foster reforms (particularly from the U.S. government) are modest relative to the scale of the society.

This reduces the personal risk a civilian must accept to take full part in the effort.

Civil COIN is much more difficult to pursue successfully once a conflict has escalated. The dearth of security typical of a society engulfed in insurgency makes it harder for civilians to move around and manage programs. Indeed, in some cases, after the insurgency has gained momentum it may be impossible to wage effective civil COIN without a massive military presence to protect civil administrators and advisors. However, the large-scale presence of Western, and particularly U.S., personnel will directly fuel the paradox-of-force characteristic of Type III jihadist insurgency. Though sometimes necessary, a counter-insurgency campaign that requires abundant U.S. troops is clearly not the optimal solution to Type III insurgent challenges. It is far better to involve the United States early and in small doses to prevent global-local insurgency altogether.

Early involvement can forestall the need for the host-nation government or the United States to intervene with force. The fiscal costs of direct military interventions are massive: In Iraq as of 2007, they reach upward of \$1 billion per week to sustain U.S. military operations. If anything, the political costs of large-scale U.S. military involvement are even higher, at home, in the region, and around the world. Given the clear need to avoid such extreme costs, taking civil action early is well worth it.

For all of these reasons, capabilities for civil COIN must include an effective indicators-and-warning (I&W) system that identifies proto-insurgent movements in their early stages. The outline of an I&W system is appended to this report. Even if it enables the United States to avert later military involvement in only a few cases, the system will have more than paid for itself in strategic and fiscal terms. Both the intelligence community and certain regional combatant commanders (notably Central Command) have inchoate systems. Of the two organizations, the intelligence community is more likely to be seen as objective because of its independence from policymaking. It is important for the Congress, public, international organizations, NGOs, and

other consumers of U.S. I&W to trust that the results are not skewed to justify administration policy.²⁴

Manage Expectations

Historical evidence suggests that as they attempt to drum up support and enthusiasm for their activities, organizations involved in civil COIN may make promises they cannot keep or unwittingly create unrealistic expectations among target populations. If expectations reach too high, rapid disillusionment will be the result. Such popular discontent can breed greater support for the insurgents. This occurred in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the former, Iraqis had unrealistically high hopes that the United States would not only remove Saddam Hussein but also make life better more or less at once. When it did not, mainly because of lack of preparation, American “liberators” soon became “occupiers.” In Afghanistan, relief that the Taliban were out of power gave way to disappointment with the U.S.-backed successor government when the Afghan people found that life had not improved. The need to manage expectations is particularly salient for the United States, which is held to the “man on the moon” standard: “It seems unbelievable that a nation that can put a man on the moon cannot restore electricity.”²⁵

Current Efforts

In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to oversee inter-agency planning for such mission. Although the creation of this office is an initial step toward increased civil COIN focus and coordination,

²⁴ In fairness, policymaking components of the U.S. government are capable of producing reports of this sort that are and are perceived as objective. Notable examples are periodic Department of State reports on human rights and terrorism by country.

²⁵ Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (March–April 2006, pp. 49–53).

it has not been accompanied by measures to address the real deficiencies of financial and human resources.

The State Department's concept for staffing stability operations calls for distinct planning, management and coordination, and implementation teams. The Advance Civilian Team (ACT) resembles an expanded Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and draws heavily from practices implemented by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. To populate these teams, S/CRS has developed a three-tiered staffing system. The Readiness Response Corps will be the primary source of staff; it will include Active and Standby components. The Active Response Corps (ARC) is a deployable staff of first-responders to a stabilization, security, transformation, and reconstruction mission, which is eventually to be 250-persons strong. The ability of S/CRS to contribute to stability planning, coordination, and implementation for any given contingency depends on its ability to assign qualified and ready-for-immediate-deployment staff to the three sets of teams. Specific requirements for each team will be determined by both the scale of the operation and the resources available but, depending on the magnitude of the operation and the number of ACTs deployed, the demands could stress the personnel resources of S/CRS. The planning assumption for S/CRS calls for the ability to field teams for two to three operations at any given time, with each operation lasting for five to ten years. Since individual deployments might last about a year, the staff will rotate for any given operation, necessitating a reserve of ready and qualified personnel for follow-on deployment.

There has been talk—e.g., in the 2006 National Security Strategy and the 2007 State of the Union address—but no legislation yet concerning the creation of pools of civilian professionals able and willing to perform civil COIN (or post-conflict reconstruction).

USAID has formed an Office of Military Affairs (OMA). This is to be a single point of contact for aid and military personnel; it pursues joint exercises, training, conferences, personnel exchanges, pre-deployment briefings, and other collaborative efforts. While these are worthwhile activities, this organization's annual budget is \$1 million

(million, not billion!).²⁶ In fairness, there is no pretense that organizational innovations such as S/CRS and OMA would provide adequate people or money needed for serious civil COIN. Indeed, analysis of what would be adequate cannot be found.

Capabilities: How Ready Is the United States to Conduct Civil COIN?

The U.S. government is ill prepared to use civil COIN to counter a Type III insurgency. This was our basic conclusion from (1) performance in Iraq and Afghanistan and (2) an analysis designed to quantify any shortfalls in the government's capabilities.²⁷

A COIN strategy that stresses transformation poses significantly greater demands on civil capabilities than do the alternatives of hearts-and-minds and carrot-and-stick. Short-term improvements in public service and government responsiveness do not require the same level of resources, depth of expertise, breadth of approach, and length of commitment as transformation does. This explains the need for a very ambitious set of U.S. (and multilateral) functions and tools, as well as ample funding and people, when contending with global-local insurgents.

Four concerns stand out:

- No U.S. government agency possesses the culture or support capacity required for such operations. Until this changes, U.S. capabilities will continue to languish.

²⁶ USAID, "Office of Military Affairs" in Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2006). As of October 30, 2007: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/cent_progs/dcha_oma_complete.pdf#search=%22DCHA%2FOMA%22.

²⁷ Given the importance of integrating civil COIN activities into the broader U.S. COIN effort, we focused our analysis on U.S. government employees. We recognize that USAID is increasingly relying on private sector contractors and grantees to implement its foreign assistance programs. But because of the security clearance, cultural, and mandate challenges of using contractors for COIN activities, these resources seem more appropriate for supplementing USAID resources, rather than serving as the primary supply.

- There are not enough deployable U.S. civilian personnel to meet the potential requirements generated by today's dominant models of civil counterinsurgency.
- Overseas Development Assistance resources are inadequate to support the potential requirements of those models.
- Current U.S. capabilities for civil COIN are a fraction of what would be required in several illustrative scenarios under a variety of more or less reasonable assumptions.


Nature of the Quantitative Analysis

We identified 15 countries of concern for global-local insurgency, using publicly available data on political violence and insurgent activity. While we do not necessarily advocate U.S. involvement in these countries, or believe that U.S. involvement is likely in the future, they are useful for comparing the potential requirements for civil COIN with existing capabilities. They are listed in Figure 5.1, along with their current populations.

Two empirical experiences implementing civil COIN strategies set our benchmarks for potential requirements:

- *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*. First established in Afghanistan in 2002, this model involves placing a small civil team and a much larger military team at the provincial level of an insurgency-afflicted country. In Afghanistan in 2007, the United States leads 12 PRTs. Another 12 NATO PRTs are operating in the more secure areas of the country. Each U.S. PRT is authorized an average of 82 personnel, four of whom are civilian U.S. government officials. This is equivalent to one U.S. civilian PRT member per 650,000 Afghan citizens—a very thin presence.
- *Civil Operations and Rural Development Strategy (CORDS)*. CORDS is a program first implemented in 1967 in South Vietnam in which advisory teams were placed at the provincial and district levels. The total number of civilian advisors eventually peaked at more than 1,100. This was equivalent to one U.S. civil-

Figure 5.1
Countries of Potential Concern for Global-Local Insurgency



SOURCES: The “Countries of Potential Concern” were drawn from Appendix A of Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Karl P. Mueller, *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-509-AF, 2006). Population data were drawn from United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2005).

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ian per 14,000 Vietnamese citizens, a vastly smaller ratio than with the PRTs.

The use of PRTs and CORDS for estimating U.S. civil-COIN capability requirements has obvious limitations. This study has not assessed whether either PRTs or CORDS possess all the *specific* capabilities required to satisfy the needs of typical COIN campaigns or of Type III insurgencies used as the study’s planning case, or indeed what those specific capabilities are (other than noting nine functional areas that may need to be addressed). Actual composition depends on

the circumstances of a given COIN campaign, will likely vary widely, and is in any case best left to the government to determine. Nor did we analyze whether the CORDS and PRT programs were adequate in Vietnam and Afghanistan, though we note that CORDS was at least partially successful in Vietnam, while the PRT level of effort appears insufficient thus far in Afghanistan.²⁸ We are not recommending one or the other.²⁹ However, given the paucity of U.S. civil COIN experience, CORDS and PRTs are the most solid cases we have. Moreover, because CORDS in Vietnam was a much larger effort than the PRTs are in Afghanistan, we can use the two cases to bracket the range of aggregate requirements. Thus, solely for purposes of planning total civil capabilities to counter Type III insurgency, it is useful to analyze how many CORDS- or PRT-equivalents the United States must be capable of employing and what that implies for total personnel and funding.

With this caveat in mind, we estimated U.S. requirements to implement both a PRT-type and CORDS-type civil counterinsurgency program in 15 states of concern. The results suggest that the U.S. government is currently incapable of meeting civil COIN requirements in any demanding scenario involving Type III insurgencies. There are three main reasons: lack of the necessary operational culture, insufficient personnel, and inadequate funds.

The Necessary Operational Culture Is Lacking

Because relevant U.S. government agencies and services have never formally been assigned the mission of counterinsurgency, they are unprepared to deploy individual personnel and teams to insurgency environments. They lack the operational culture required for such missions, as well as the planning and support structure to make deployments viable.

The U.S. armed forces, for example, possess extensive capabilities that could be used for civil COIN. The Army Corps of Engineers, Army and Marine Corps combat engineer units, and Army, Air Force,

²⁸ Austin Long on CORDS; Seth Jones on PRTs.

²⁹ We do, however, return in Chapter Thirteen to the question of the composition and organization of PRTs.

and Navy construction engineer units have the skill and know-how to improve physical infrastructure. While their primary mission is to support U.S. forces, they can take on civil tasks as well, from building schools to drilling wells and laying roads. Indeed, these units have played important implementation roles in recent and ongoing COIN operations from the Horn of Africa to the Philippines. Other collateral capabilities include field feeding, water purification, sanitation, transportation and movement control, medical services, communications, and survey and imagery support. The Army's Civil Affairs (CA) Corps is dedicated to civil duties. The expertise of CA personnel spans the entire spectrum of civil functions. But again, its focus befits its primary mission: CA units are meant for combat support. In short, there are no units within the U.S. military that are organized, trained, and equipped to be an independent civil instrument of COIN.

Similarly, numerous civil U.S. federal agencies possess capabilities that could be used for civil COIN. Their personnel bring to the table world-class expertise in an array of functional areas. But they lack experience operating in foreign cultures. They simply are not trained and equipped to apply their know-how in foreign settings very different from the United States. This might be less problematic in some functional areas, such as transportation or energy planning, where the challenges are more technocratic. But it can be particularly vexing for personnel working on fundamental political and economic issues, such as developing new electoral or educational systems. Here the cultural and social context profoundly shapes how to apply classic theories and knowledge. Personnel from certain agencies—USAID and DoS, for example—are more likely to have had some preparation for working in foreign cultures. But they still do not receive the training and preparation required to survive in the extreme threat environment of a global-local insurgency. Nor does the culture of either agency necessarily encourage its staff to assume the personal risk involved.

Like the military units, none of these agencies have ever actually been assigned the mission of civil COIN. The State Department's mission is diplomacy, for example; USAID's mission is development writ large. Even in the S/CRS, the current focus remains on post-conflict situations. In short, while quality functional expertise can be found

within government ranks, there is no agency with the culture to successfully deploy this expertise in a counterinsurgency context. This, in turn, contributes to the lack of people and money.

Current Numbers of Personnel Are Too Low

The U.S. government possesses only a fraction of the personnel required to implement a civil strategy to combat Type III insurgency.

Current Numbers. On the military side, there are currently about 9,000 Civil Affairs personnel in Army National Guard and Reserve units and somewhat fewer than 1,000 in the sole active Army CA battalion. The U.S. Marine Corps also has a small number of Civil Affairs personnel: Roughly 1,800 are deployable at any given time. Given their lack of expertise in longer-term civil implementation and the fact that their status as U.S. military personnel fundamentally shapes their interactions with host nationals and members of the international community, Civil Affairs personnel should be considered at most a stop-gap capability for civil counterinsurgency.

From civilian pools, as of Fiscal Year 2004 a total of 1,300 USAID personnel were stationed overseas in 90 missions. Of these, only Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, and Indonesia were authorized more than 40 personnel. The average mission strength was 14.5 American USAID personnel. S/CRS is not yet fully staffed; the Office's primary personnel resources will be an Active Response Corps comprising 100 diplomatic staff. These individuals will be rapidly deployable and will serve as first responders, providing a surge capacity to quickly fill gaps both on the ground and in Washington. A Standby Response Corps (SRC) of 250 to 350 contractors will supplement that staff.

These Numbers Cannot Satisfy Potential Requirements. These numbers are not sufficient to meet actual needs. Both the PRT and CORDS models create a demand for U.S. civilian personnel that cannot currently be satisfied. The difficulty the State Department has had even maintaining the current limited presence of PRTs in Afghanistan is a case in point.


Recruiting a single, usually junior officer or a recalled retiree for every U.S. PRT represented the limit of DoS's ability to provide staff for what was a cutting-edge effort to develop effective civil-military

cooperation. With little more than a thousand professionals worldwide, USAID was forced to rely on personal services contractors to staff PRTs.³⁰

The results of our analysis tell the same story. We used publicly available data on the number of administrative divisions in each of the 15 countries of concern to estimate the number of U.S. civilians required to provide PRT-equivalent teams to each province-level administrative division. Figure 5.2 summarizes the results.

Figure 5.2

U.S. Civilian Personnel Required to Provide PRT-Equivalent Teams to Each Province



SOURCE: PRT data drawn from Appendix C of *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, USAID, and DoD, June 2006).

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³⁰ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 152, October 2005). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html>.

Even the smaller cases, which happen to be large countries with a small number of provinces, would require a much larger U.S. civilian presence than all but a few current USAID missions. The potential requirements of larger cases, such as Nigeria, dwarf current missions.


A similar analysis for a CORDS-type effort in these countries, equating to roughly one U.S. civilian official per 14,000 citizens, produced the results summarized in Figure 5.3. The data are highly significant, given increasing calls over the past year for adopting a CORDS-style approach to civil counterinsurgency.³¹ Our analysis suggests that a CORDS level of involvement requires far more civilian personnel than currently available. The civil COIN demands of a relatively small country (e.g., Yemen) could barely be met, even if all the USAID personnel currently deployed worldwide were sent to that country. A CORDS-level effort in mid-size countries such as the Philippines and Nigeria would require five to six times as many civilian personnel as USAID currently has deployed worldwide. And in a large country such as Bangladesh or Pakistan, a CORDS-type operation would require twice as many again—an order of magnitude greater civilian capability than USAID currently deploys worldwide.

This estimate of civil COIN requirements is borne out by the amount of time U.S. military personnel currently devote to tasks that are inherently civilian. One senior military officer is of the opinion that 25 percent of U.S. troops in Afghanistan are engaged in civil COIN.³² Assuming the percentage is, say, half that in Iraq, the number of military personnel doing civil COIN in the two countries is about 30,000 (obviously adding to the strain on U.S. ground forces today). Further assuming that civilians are twice as productive as soldiers at civil COIN, this suggests that the United States is short of civilians for COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan by 15,000. By this reasoning, an esti-

³¹ See remarks by government officials at the September 2006 DoS/DoD conference titled "Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a National Framework." DoS and DoD, *Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a National Framework*, conference report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2006). As of October 22, 2007: <http://www.usgcoin.org/events/conference2006/2006ConferenceReport.pdf>.

³² Interview with author in Afghanistan, 2007.

Figure 5.3
Personnel Requirements of a CORDS-Type Involvement



SOURCE: CORDS data drawn from Dale Andrade and James Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (Vol. 86, No. 2, March–April 2006, pp. 9–23).

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mated requirement of 5,000 civilians for these two countries based on the extrapolation from CORDS appears to be conservative.

These results highlight both the impressive personnel requirements of conducting effective civil counterinsurgency against a global-local adversary and the diminutive civil capability currently possessed by the U.S. government.

Fiscal Resources Are Insufficient

U.S. government funding, too, falls far short of what is potentially needed to use civil tools to combat global-local insurgency.

Current Numbers. A few figures provide a rough idea of the U.S. funds currently available for civil COIN. Military Civil Affairs units

have minimal resources, limited to very small grants and donations in kind. In FY2004, USAID directly distributed approximately \$11B in foreign assistance. Another \$11B in foreign assistance originated in other U.S. government agencies, with USAID missions and personnel playing an important role in managing it.³³


Potential Requirements Well Exceed These Figures. Our assessment also indicates that U.S. fiscal resources devoted to programs applicable to civil counterinsurgency are inadequate. During the Vietnam War, the United States provided approximately \$24B in nonmilitary aid to the South Vietnamese government, measured in FY2004 dollars. This was equivalent to \$1,500 per inhabitant of South Vietnam, much of which was administered through CORDS. Figure 5.4 summarizes the equivalent assistance requirements today for current countries of concern.

The red line in the figure marks the total worldwide Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) distributed by U.S. government agencies during FY2005. This totaled approximately \$22B—well above the \$15B average over the previous decade. (Major assistance flows to Iraq and Afghanistan drove the jump.) But even were this entire sum to be allocated to a small country such as Yemen, it would be impossible to reach the \$1,500-per-citizen level reached in South Vietnam.

An important caveat, though, is that the Vietnam number is a total for 13 years, while the red line in the figure denotes a single year's worldwide ODA allocation. To provide a fairer comparison, we assumed that U.S. assistance was spread over five years (essentially dividing each country's estimate by five). The outcome is shown in Figure 5.5. Even distributing the funds over time, the aid flows required to match South Vietnam in the CORDS era would still dwarf available resources. To provide the equivalent assistance today to the Philippines, for example, would require the entire worldwide ODA allocation for a period of five years. Large countries such as Pakistan would take twice that amount.

³³ USAID, *Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2006* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2005). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/>.

Figure 5.4
Vietnam-Equivalent Aid Flows



SOURCE: ODA data drawn from USAID, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Green Book)* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2007).

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Our assessment of potential personnel and fiscal requirements, though approximate, indicates that the U.S. government currently lacks the capability to conduct adequate civil operations in all but the smallest countries afflicted by global-local insurgency. Even in these small cases, the potential requirement to conduct operations in multiple countries would quickly outstrip existing capabilities. Given that civil COIN is essential to success, current U.S. civil COIN capabilities should be expanded as a matter of national priority.


Thinking About Future Capabilities

If current U.S. government civil counterinsurgency capabilities are seriously underdeveloped, how might we think about expanding them? How much is enough? This section illustrates three sizing scenarios.

Illustrative Scenario 1: “The Big One”

This scenario would size U.S. civil counterinsurgency capabilities for a single large-scale, but credible, contingency. It suggests a requirement to conduct a CORDS-equivalent civil counterinsurgency operation in a Pakistan-sized nation. To achieve a CORDS-equivalent level of one U.S. civilian official per 14,000 indigenous citizens, it would be necessary to deploy 12,000 U.S. civilian personnel to the country. To achieve a Vietnam-equivalent level of \$1,500 per citizen in civil assistance, it

Figure 5.5
Assistance Levels for Countries of Concern Based on Vietnam



SOURCE: ODA data drawn from USAID, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Green Book)*.
RAND MG595/2-5.5

would be necessary to allocate \$50B per year to U.S. civil counterinsurgency operations over five years. Scenario 1 would therefore result in a total deployable U.S. civil COIN capability of 12,000 personnel and \$50B per year. This would equate to approximately nine times the current number of deployable U.S. civilian personnel and more than twice the current foreign assistance budget. In the probable event that the United States does not find itself involved in a Pakistan-sized COIN campaign, these personnel and resources could be allocated to preventive COIN and other aid programs around the world.

Illustrative Scenario 2: Two “Mediums”

This scenario would size U.S. civil counterinsurgency capabilities for two medium-scale COIN campaigns. It posits a requirement to conduct a CORDS-equivalent civil counterinsurgency operation in two Afghanistan-sized countries simultaneously. To achieve a CORDS-equivalent level of one U.S. civilian official per 14,000 indigenous citizens in both countries, it would be necessary to deploy approximately 2,000 U.S. civilian personnel to each (for a total simultaneous commitment of 4,000 personnel). To achieve a Vietnam-equivalent level of \$1,500 per citizen in civil assistance, it would be necessary to allocate \$10B per year to U.S. civil counterinsurgency operations in each country over five years. Scenario 2 would therefore result in a total deployable U.S. civil counterinsurgency capability of 4,000 personnel and \$20B per year. This would equate to approximately three times the current number of deployable civilian personnel and a budget equivalent to today’s budget. In the likely event that the United States does not find itself involved in two such operations simultaneously, “excess” personnel and resources could be allocated to preventive counterinsurgency and other assistance programs around the world.

Illustrative Scenario 3: Two “Mediums” Plus Prevention

This scenario would size U.S. civil counterinsurgency capabilities to support two medium-scale contingencies simultaneously as well as PRT-level early/preventive civil COIN against proto-insurgent groups in a dozen more countries. It posits a requirement to conduct a CORDS-equivalent civil counterinsurgency operation in two Afghanistan-sized

countries simultaneously, plus a PRT in each province of 12 more countries, totaling approximately 450 provinces based on the countries of concern assessed above. To achieve a CORDS-equivalent level of one U.S. civilian official per 14,000 indigenous citizens in both medium-sized operations, it would be necessary to deploy approximately 2,000 U.S. civilian personnel to each (for a total simultaneous commitment of 4,000 personnel). To support PRT-equivalent teams in 450 more provinces would require another 1,800 personnel. To achieve a Vietnam-equivalent level of \$1,500 per citizen in the medium-sized operations, it would be necessary to allocate \$10B per year over five years. Providing PRT-equivalent assistance (approximately \$12 million in assistance per U.S. civilian on the ground) to 12 more countries for preventive operations against proto-insurgents would require an additional \$21B. Scenario 3 would therefore result in a total deployable U.S. civil counterinsurgency capability of 6,000 personnel and \$41B per year. This would equate to quadrupling the current number of personnel and doubling today's worldwide budget (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1
Summary of Illustrative Sizing Scenarios

Scenario	Deployed Personnel	Assistance Budget (\$ billions)
Current Capability	1,300	22
Scenario 1: The Big One	12,000	50
Scenario 2: Two Mediums	4,000	20
Scenario 3: Two Mediums + Prevent	6,000	41

With these scenarios in mind, the U.S. government has several options for remedying current shortfalls:

If highly ambitious, build a civil COIN capability sufficient for two medium-sized counterinsurgencies, while actively working to avert or limit insurgency in roughly a dozen more states. This would result in a tripling of U.S. civilian personnel available for deployment to overseas COIN operations and a doubling of the current Overseas Development Assistance budget.

Adopt a strategy of aggressive “preventive COIN” that allocates much more effort to averting or limiting Type III insurgencies. This would make large, direct COIN campaigns much less likely and would require a large but not drastic expansion of deployable U.S. civil personnel and the stabilization of Overseas Development Assistance at current (Iraq- and Afghanistan-included) levels.³⁴

Invest considerable effort in leveraging the civil capabilities of partners, allies, and international and nongovernmental organizations. While such an effort would itself require personnel and resources, it could produce a sizable net reduction in the U.S. capabilities required to conduct preventive or direct civil COIN. (The prospects and some proposals to pursue this, and multilateral COIN in general, are explored in Chapter Eleven.)

Implement a rigorous and objective indicators and warning system. This effort would enable personnel to be assigned appropriately and assistance funds to be invested in prevention.

Success in pursuing these strategies could trim requirements without sacrificing capability. Say, for purposes of illustration, that the combination of (1) finding partners and international organizations to match U.S. civil capabilities and (2) an effective I&W system permitted a focus on (3) preventive civil COIN on, for example, 6 instead of 12 countries of concern. The number of additional U.S. personnel needed would then be roughly 1,300 and the additional foreign assistance about \$9B per year. This equals a 100-percent increase in the number of full-time USAID employees deployed worldwide and a 40 percent increase in U.S. foreign assistance funding. Given that these two assumptions involve considerable risk, anything less in additional personnel and funding would, under the assumptions of this analy-

³⁴ Indeed, one can imagine a fourth scenario involving *only* prevention, which would of course lower the demand for resources significantly. In theory, the investment in preventative civil instruments to help prevent insurgencies or to help defeat proto-insurgencies could be attractive economically and politically. However, given recent experience and the real dangers of future Type III (and other) insurgencies, it could be viewed as risky to plan on no actual insurgencies as a basis for standing U.S. capabilities. That said, whatever capabilities are created and maintained should, as much as possible, be used for prevention.

sis, leave the United States unprepared to counter possible demands of Type III insurgency.

The Security Problem

Even if adequate capabilities for civil COIN are built, using them during hostilities would remain a large problem—for that matter, a *larger* problem. As noted already, performing postwar reconstruction under conditions of improving security is a far cry from making such efforts in the midst of violence, especially if the violence is directed against the very people and projects that seek to implement civil COIN, as often happens. Because reconstruction and transformation are (1) antithetical to insurgency, (2) soft targets, and (3) usually involve foreigners, they are in the crosshairs of insurgents. In Iraq, everything from big energy and electricity infrastructure to small projects around the country has been struck. The natural reaction is to conduct civil COIN where it is safe to do so, which means virtually writing off those areas where it could do the most material and political good. The net effect, in Iraq, has been that civil COIN has been halting and even in decline since 2003–2004, especially where it is most needed (in the Sunni Triangle of Western Iraq and in predominantly Shia cities in Southern Iraq).

Two observations follow from this serious issue. The first is that field-level security of civil COIN personnel and operations must be treated as a major mission of security forces, local and U.S., which it is not at present. We return to this later. The second observation is that shaping may be only partly successful even if the resources and capabilities exist to perform it. This means that force may have to be used not only in the event that shaping fails to stem an insurgency but also to create permissive conditions so that shaping can succeed. Thus, in the messy reality of insurgency, improved civil COIN capabilities *may* but will *not necessarily* reduce reliance on the use of force.

Conclusion

There is no shortcut for the United States to acquire adequate civil resources and tools for COIN. That the U.S. government has taken no significant steps in this direction despite a decade of mounting evidence of the need to do so is not a good omen. To a large extent, failure to build a viable new Iraqi state can be attributed to the lack of U.S. preparedness for this monumental task. Yet even now, the level of civil capabilities in Iraq is tiny compared with what was committed in Vietnam and what is needed in Iraq.

Even if the executive branch and Congress agreed to allocate from the federal budget the tens of billions of dollars necessary to close this gap, it would take years before the right number of the right sorts of people with the right experience and skills would be in place and ready. And then, even when adequate funds and people are available for COIN and related missions, organizational and cultural change will still be needed. Unless the U.S. government is prepared to insist on deploying civilians involuntarily to unpleasant locations threatened by insurgencies, its ability to deliver the needed levels and quality of civil support for COIN will remain a challenge to be met with volunteers.

These facts suggest a need for realistic near- to mid-term objectives, which could then form a platform from which to make even larger changes. The initial commitment could involve a growth, or shift, in funding of, say, \$10B per year—roughly one-tenth of the total cost of the Iraq war—for the purpose of adding skilled and deployable civilians to USAID and DoS, and boosting foreign assistance for countries facing the greatest danger of global-local Islamist insurgency. This amount might be adequate provided that

- an agreed-on system of indicators and warnings (I&W) permits the additional funding to be concentrated in, say, six countries
- the United States succeeds, through NATO, the EU, the UN, and international financial institutions, in getting partner nations and organizations to adopt a similar focus on civil COIN in their overseas assistance programs (see Chapter Eleven)

- NGOs continue to flourish and begin to direct their efforts toward the civil side of COIN
- initiatives to create a civil reserve capability are expanded and enacted
- the Executive Branch, Congress, and ultimately the American people are prepared—politically, materially, and analytically—to surge in the event of another “big one” like Vietnam.

Within such an approach, which functional goals should the additional people and funding be used to achieve? The answer requires a comprehensive look at the challenges of Type III insurgency and the greatest current U.S. deficiencies relative to those challenges. Type III insurgency often develops rapidly—in size, radicalization, intensity, and wanton violence. It appeals to both a population’s political grievances and its longing for faith. It can borrow motivations, methods, and tools from global jihad. It targets states that are already either fragmented, frail, or failed and that, typically, are ineffective and illegitimate. And it calls for no less than the destruction of the existing nation-state order in the Muslim world.

These challenges cry out for countermeasures that have immediate impact (hearts-and-minds), but which can also fundamentally alter a population’s long-term prospects (transformation). People want jobs, schools, and energy. And they want a government able to provide these things, now and in the future. It happens that the U.S. government is not strong in the capabilities needed to create such local capacity. Accordingly, as a rough idea, the United States should target half of the suggested increase in personnel and assistance funding allocated for civil COIN at developing these capabilities, plus justice-system reform.

This strategy would provide the minimum essential civil component to give the United States a more complete and balanced set of capabilities with which to combat the growing danger of Type III Islamist insurgencies, as well as others that come along. Anything less would cast doubt on whether the government understands the true nature and danger of this threat and the role of civil action in countering it.

Information Capabilities

Information as a Strategic Resource

Like building stronger civil capabilities, unlocking the promise of information power is crucial to improving performance against Type III insurgency and reducing reliance on large-scale U.S. physical power in the Muslim world. Unlike building stronger civil capabilities, the opportunity to make major, early progress in creating information capabilities for COIN lies at the doorstep, ready to be utilized.¹

According to our own soldiers, engaging the population, improving public safety, and knowing “the street” depend vitally on timely and reliable information.² Moreover, the exchange of information among the components of COIN campaigns and operations is indispensable for strategic and tactical coherence. Yet, on the whole, the sharing and use of information in Afghanistan and Iraq by U.S. forces and agencies, coalition partners, and local security services have by all accounts (including the authors’ personal observations) been poor relative to (1) what is needed, (2) how well the enemy uses information,

¹ For a related overview of how to tap the potential of information power stability operations and other noncombat operations, we recommend Franklin Kramer, Larry Wentz, and Stuart Starr, *I-Power: The Information Revolution and Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Defense Horizons Paper No. 55, February 2007). It draws many of the same conclusions as *Byting Back*, albeit without the same level of detail.

² Paul T. Stanton, “Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in Transition,” *Military Review* (July–August 2006, pp. 60–70). As of October 31, 2007 <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Stanton.pdf>.

and (3) what technology makes possible. From London to Indonesia, Islamist extremists and insurgents are exploiting the Internet, wireless communications, global media, and other Western inventions with more skill, creativity, and effect than COIN forces. With modest investment, existing network technology and infrastructure can improve not only COIN operational effectiveness, but also the competence, responsiveness, and accountability of local government. The United States and its allies can gain an edge in the information domain, but only by embracing the principles by which information is shared and exploited in the civilian world.

By 2007, information networking among U.S. forces had gotten better in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Operation Forces and other U.S. forces now exploit technology more effectively to fuse intelligence from disparate sensors and to pass “actionable” information to quick-response units. But this is the exception that proves the rule: When information power is used creatively and ambitiously, better performance follows. Moreover, such sharing remains restrictive: U.S. troops and civilians are not communicating as they could and should; allies have spotty access to valuable information; and local forces and authorities are generally presumed to be untrustworthy and thus denied access. And the concept of sharing information with, and thereby getting more information from, the population has yet to be broadly adopted.

Information resourcefully gathered, widely shared, and wisely used is vital for 21st-century COIN.³ It can engender better governance, reduce the need for destructive force, improve decisionmaking, pry apart local and global insurgents, and win the cooperation of the population. More specifically, information can

- prepare all elements involved in COIN to proceed with a common, accurate, and continuously refreshed understanding of complex and dynamic insurgencies

³ This basic point is clear not only from the body of research conducted in the RAND COIN study but also in the 2006 U.S. Army/USMC field manual on COIN (*Counterinsurgency*, FM3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), which observes that the importance of timely and accurate intelligence applies “especially to COIN operations.”

- increase pressure on a government to be accountable to its people and responsive to their needs
- accentuate individualism, offer individuals connections that transcend town, tribe, and sect, and provide alternative narratives to that of religious militancy
- improve the performance and accountability of local security services, facilitate their cooperation with the population, and thus reduce reliance on foreign forces
- reduce the need for heavy, visible presence of foreign military forces
- expose insurgent violence as excessive by both civil and theological standards
- improve knowledge of the whereabouts, movements, identity, and intentions of insurgents
- expand opportunities for citizens to report on insurgents without fear
- neutralize the jihadist-insurgent ability to resonate with aggrieved segments of the population, recruit fighters and martyrs, and regenerate itself
- integrate nonmilitary and military agents and instruments of COIN
- integrate multilateral and foreign-local COIN strategy and operations
- permit decentralized yet integrated decisionmaking and operations, essential to responsive and adaptive COIN.

Strategically, information power can help redefine the struggle with Islamic extremism from one of escalating violence to one of competing truth, from a potentially perpetual war of attrition to a winnable war of cognition.

The first step toward such results is for the U.S. government, especially the military and intelligence establishments, to stop treating information as the property of those who originate it and start treating it as a vital resource of those who need it. The guiding idea of the information revolution—that success derives from sharing information, not

from controlling it—is as applicable to COIN as it is to any endeavor, civil or military.

In that spirit, this chapter first describes user *demand* for information in COIN. It then proposes ways to develop key *sources* of information and sketches a plan to *network* these sources to meet user demand. The analysis, findings, and proposals in this chapter are drawn from the research embodied in the 2007 RAND study, *Byting Back: Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents*, which was undertaken as part of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study on which this report is based. Given that the U.S. military and intelligence establishment have, over two decades, fallen well behind the leading edge in applying the power of the digital age, many of the ideas, findings, and recommendations in *Byting Back* and represented here are exploratory and may seem novel. In fact, none of them would significantly stretch the technology or applications of technology that are already on stream in the wider and largely more advanced commercial world. What may seem far-fetched to the defense expert will likely be viewed as quite feasible by those steeped in information possibilities.

Putting Users First in Setting and Meeting Information Requirements

From the onset of the information age it has been apparent that the best way to define and then meet the needs for information is to rely on those who need it.⁴ In COIN, information *users* are those directly engaged in understanding, shaping, and acting. By users, we mean cog-

⁴ While this proposition nearly goes without saying in the way information and information technology are used in the commercial and civilian worlds, it has been resisted in the military and intelligence worlds. For a deeper analysis of how to overcome the obstacles, at least within DoD, see David C. Gompert, Charles L. Barry, and Alf A. Andreassen, *Extending the User's Reach: Responsive Networking for Integrated Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, February 2006). As of October 30, 2007: http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2024%20Extending%20User%20Reach.pdf.

nitive actors—individual analysts, strategists, and decisionmakers—not large, impersonal task forces and departments. It is, after all, the individual user that is propelling the Internet, which is a good model for the information capabilities and practices that can improve COIN. The universe of needy COIN information users is not exclusively American: It must include partners in multilateral COIN, local security services, local government, and the contested population. Including the information needs of the people in a strategy to increase information power can not only foster their cooperation with COIN, but also create a sense of individuality and connectivity that can weaken the bonds of sect, ethnicity, gang, and militia that threaten society.

Byting Back generated some 160 specific COIN-information requirements from the perspective of a typical junior officer leading a small military unit working with other military, police, intelligence, civilian, local authorities, security services, and citizens.⁵ (These requirements were developed and analyzed by a team that included extensive operational, research, and technological experience in COIN, including irregular warfare, special operations, working with indigenous forces, civil COIN, and coalition operations.) While the setting for this analysis is that of representative COIN security operations, the requirements generated also reflect, to some degree, the information demands of long-term political-economic COIN campaigns involving diplomats, aid providers, law enforcement officers, intelligence analysts, planners, and advisors. The civil side of COIN needs information no less than the military side does, and the sharing of information between the two is crucial for coherence and success.

The information requirements on which this analysis is based are indicative, not exhaustive.⁶ One learns from them, not surprisingly, that COIN demands a very large volume of very diverse information. This information is more eclectic, nuanced, textured, and complicated

⁵ These requirements were initially identified by an individual with extensive experience in special operations of the sort that are conducted as part of COIN.

⁶ To our knowledge, there has to date been no other attempt to compile a large and representative set of information requirements for COIN operations, though we strongly encourage such work.

than the information normally required for regular combat between two armed forces.⁷ The main reason for this is that COIN is conducted in the midst of the very population whose well-being it is trying to improve and loyalty it is trying to earn. Even during security operations, the information needed for COIN is at least as much about the human terrain as it is about physical terrain and hostile forces. In the judgment of the team that compiled the requirements, less than a tenth of the data required would necessarily be secret information gathered by secret methods from secret sources, which puts an entirely different light on the need for blanket network security (an issue to which we will return).

One learns as well from analysis of these requirements that the *timeliness* of COIN information is critical, not only in clearly hostile situations, but also in the ambiguous ones—e.g., when insurgents are mixed with the population—that are common in COIN. Yet, our analysis of requirements indicates that timeliness must not come at the expense of the *quality and reliability* of the information because of the harmful consequences of COIN mistakes, such as those involving innocent victims, wrongful detention, gratuitous intimidation, and wanton humiliation. This demand for fast but good information is more than a general requirement of COIN: Analysis of the 160 information requirements shows that most specific data are, in the team's judgment, needed urgently, without loss of quality or reliability. An obvious example is information about the identity of potentially dangerous persons: If they are terrorists, but confirmation of this is slow, an opportunity may be lost; but if unreliable yet timely information leads to killing nonterrorists, legitimacy can be shattered. When the adversary has both local roots and global reach, as it does in Type III insurgency, the consequences of mistakes are both local and global.

⁷ Information needed for combat is largely concerned with the location, activities, intentions, and capabilities of opposing military forces as well as other targets. This information is needed mainly to permit these forces and targets to be struck. With adequate sensors and communications bandwidth, these requirements are more easily met (though by no means easy) than are requirements for COIN. Even keeping track of friendly forces in combat is easier than in COIN.

The more knowledge COIN operator-users gain from networked information *prior to* operations, the better able they will be to use new information to make reasoned yet timely decisions *during* operations. This means that the information solutions needed to support intense episodes must be seamless with those that support long-term campaigns. COIN is continuous, with security operations lasting a few days woven into the fabric of political contests lasting many years. What is required, therefore, is an integrated network solution that can disaggregate information as needed for individual users, as opposed to many disjointed solutions. An agent of COIN faced with hard, urgent, and risky decisions should not be burdened with having to choose which network to use. The aim should be not only far better networks, but far fewer of them.

Because COIN users often must make wise decisions urgently, they must not be buried in an avalanche of data. Just because information is timely and reliable does not mean it is relevant. The solution to the *relevance* problem is not to filter information before it is made available to users, for this can reduce timeliness. Moreover, the complex and dynamic nature of COIN means that filterers cannot know with fidelity what is and is not relevant to users. The network itself should be able to interpret and direct users' demands and also to anticipate users' needs based on their demand patterns. The technology for such responsiveness now exists, which is why Internet users find it easier to knife through the irrelevant to get what they want.

User primacy means not only immediate access to any relevant information on the network but also the unhindered ability of users to collaborate with other users horizontally as circumstances require. This is especially crucial in COIN, which must be collaborative to succeed but for which collaboration cannot be preplanned. The ability to cross organizational and international boundaries to coordinate action as well as to get information is a *sine qua non*. This requirement for connectivity extends not only across services, agencies and coalition nations, but also to local authorities, security services, and citizens. Apart from enabling active collaboration, the absence of barriers helps to ensure that users get information from the entire pool of users. Analysis of requirements suggests that users are far more likely to

obtain helpful COIN information from other users (nearly 60 percent, in the estimation of the team that generated the requirement) than from secret intelligence sources (as noted, about 10 percent).

The principle of user primacy thus dictates two corollary principles regarding the way information networks are conceived and managed: *inclusiveness* and *integration*. Because the information needs of COIN users are so vast, varied, and unpredictable, network restrictions carry a high cost. An axiom of the information revolution is that the more users a network involves, the greater the utility for every user, the reason being that users are also providers of information. Similarly, the elimination of network barriers helps to assure both better access and better collaboration. The exclusiveness and compartmentalization that characterize most current military and intelligence networks penalize the very users on whom effective COIN relies. Indeed, only inclusive and integrated networks can satisfy the needs of COIN users for information that is both timely and reliable.

The need for integration and inclusiveness, on top of the need for speed, has obvious implications for information security. Anecdotal reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that information sharing and collaboration between U.S. armed forces and other agencies, coalition partners, and local forces are severely hindered by security restrictions. Both efficiency and trust in COIN are casualties of the security fetish. A choice must be made: If securing operational information is deemed more important than informing security operations, the United States should stick with the current policy of compartmentalization, exclusion, and denial. But the price paid is a steep one: disjointed operations, impaired trust, lack of understanding, and delay, not to mention almost certain loss of reciprocal information. One reason the Internet is powerful and popular is that it is not very secure—a tradeoff gladly made by its users. The Internet may not be a perfect model for COIN information sharing, but it can at least help us understand the tradeoff between security and performance.

Intelligence agencies are more comfortable with classified than unclassified networks. “They tend to reflexively stamp information ORCON—Originator Controlled—meaning that no other agency

can access it without explicit permission.”⁸ It is this kind of information hoarding that deprives users and saps the power of information. In one case, according to an intelligence-community reformer, “95 percent of the information put on the unclassified [network] was inaccessible to any other organization,” yet this deficiency “had nothing to do with technology.”⁹ Another intelligence-community reformer says that “‘ORCON’ is slapped on virtually everything.”¹⁰ An assault on ORCON is needed for effective COIN (and other national-security interests); but the forces arrayed against user primacy are formidable.¹¹ The ORCON mentality, or habit, contradicts basic principles of collaboration and access that, if applied in COIN, could make a huge difference in the field and for the nation.

In COIN, at least, the alternative to tight network security is to achieve operational advantage through better, smarter, faster, and fuller cognitive absorption and use of the information. Of the information needed in COIN, the team estimates that roughly 50 percent is about the inhabitants, the conditions in which they live, and the environment in which the insurgency operates, a figure that will come as no surprise to the reader who knows that COIN is fundamentally a struggle for the allegiance of the people. Insurgents may have access to much of this information anyway—virtually all of it if they are so determined. It follows that much of the information important for effective COIN is not damaging if intercepted and therefore often need not be classified. Any harm that may come from insurgents getting information from COIN networks can be mitigated by out-thinking the adversary in using the information and must be weighed against the harm to

⁸ David E. Kaplan and Kevin Whitelaw, “Remaking the U.S. Intelligence Community: Playing Defense,” *U.S. News and World Report* (November 13, 2006). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061103/3dni.intro.htm>.

⁹ Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Chief Information Officer Meyerrose, quoted in Kaplan and Whitelaw, “Remaking the U.S. Intelligence Community.”

¹⁰ DNI Chief of Staff David Shedd, quoted in Kaplan and Whitelaw, “Remaking the U.S. Intelligence Community.”

¹¹ Another restriction of dubious value, in the authors’ view, is the NOFORN (for “no foreign distribution”) designation that is applied to material that could be of significant utility in informing and integrating coalition and local partners.

operations and to U.S. personnel that can result from fragmented, constricted, and tardy information sharing.

To improve the flow of information, and eliminate some of the traditional classification barriers that have in the past slowed the sharing of what is often time-sensitive information, steps will have to be taken to make selective systemic changes. The intelligence community and those who are crafting new information management systems will have to carefully work together to make current and future command and control and information systems that are as user friendly as possible.

Security operations may move so quickly, and information may be so perishable, that even a brief delay between the time that counter-insurgents obtain the information and the time that insurgents obtain the information will reduce its value to the insurgents. In any case, except for indispensable secret information from indispensable secret sources, the risks between operational success and information security should be balanced by operators/users, not by originators.

One of the information walls that must be bulldozed is that separating intelligence from operations—a veritable rampart tenaciously defended by the “keepers” of intelligence. Precisely because information is so vital to COIN, the cost of keeper primacy is huge; yet that is the predilection of intelligence institutions. Faced with such barriers, some impatient and hard-pressed U.S. military officers in northern Iraq took matters into their own hands by creating arrangements whereby intelligence and military organizations share horizontally, including with local counterparts.¹² The resulting improvement in the speed of information has been impressive. This practice should be the norm of COIN information exchange, not a circumvention of standard rules and structures that depends on daring personalities.

Intelligence, narrowly defined, cannot possibly satisfy COIN’s voracious hunger for information. Information sourcing must not be equated with and confined to what secret intelligence sources yield, but must instead be driven by the demands of users for any and all data that may bear on any aspect of either sustained COIN campaigns or epi-

¹² Based on in-depth interviews with officers involved and others that analyzed the case in point.

sodic operations. Indeed, the team that analyzed information requirements for COIN operations found that 90 percent of those requirements can probably be found in two major sources of information: the population and COIN operators/users themselves.¹³

The abundance of information available from, and perhaps only available from, the local population and other COIN information users stands to reason. As General Sir Rupert Smith and others have pointed out, 21st-century COIN is an engagement “amongst the people” as opposed to on a battlefield.¹⁴ The gathering of information from and sharing of information with “the people” is bound to be crucial and should be maximized. As for treating other users as a primary source for COIN information, if those users are themselves immersed in the local environment, as they should be for COIN to succeed, they too will have plentiful information.

Getting Information

This study identified a number of innovations to facilitate the acquisition of information from these two sources within the framework of an integrated, inclusive, user-defined COIN network. In each, the information acquired can not only improve operations but also foster legitimate governance—the two pillars of successful COIN.

Promoting a Cell Phone Society

If one wants to know how people are functioning and interacting on a day-to-day basis, no information flow is as rich as what cell phone systems routinely generate.¹⁵ Every time someone makes a phone call,

¹³ Although this finding may, to some extent, have been affected by the choice of specific requirements, the fact that the requirements were indicative suggests that the finding is generally valid.

¹⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Knopf, 2007).

¹⁵ Although the requirements to build and manage a cell phone system may *seem* beyond the reach of most countries vulnerable to or engulfed in insurgency, we would point out that the investment and technical challenges are declining and are not prohibitive for scores of

some switch (just doing its job) records who is calling whom, where the caller is, and where the called party is. When U.S. troops liberated Iraq in 2003, that country had virtually no cell phones (a communicating population not being a regime priority).¹⁶ Three years later, there were 7 million cell phones, one for every other adult (and growing). The predictable desire of Iraqis to own cell phones could have been, but has not been, used to tilt the information battlefield away from insurgents. The cell phone system has not been neutral. Because insurgents start with little infrastructure of their own, access to cell phones has been a greater boon to them than to COIN forces. From this doleful experience emerge several prescriptions:

1. Encouraging Cell Phone Use. The more people own cell phones, the more value each individual gets from his or hers and the more information the government can wring from the system.¹⁷ Governments can accelerate cell phone use through

- ready access to the electromagnetic spectrum
- eminent domain for the land or building rights for towers and antennae
- subsidies for acquisition of switches
- subsidies or direct bulk purchases for handsets¹⁸
- pricing policies that encourage early sign-up
- free calls to the authorities
- airborne transmission where towers are at especial risk.

underdeveloped countries that have, wisely, chosen to scrap attempts to construct traditional national telephony systems in favor of cellular telephony. Indeed, the spread of cell infrastructure, devices, and use is rapidly bringing communications to segments of the world's population that were, until now, unable to offer telecommunications to more than a small fraction of citizens. The explosion in cell phone capabilities and use in Iraq itself—a struggling, war-wracked country with no prior experience in cell phone use—underlines the potential even in developing countries under stress.

¹⁶ There was a 50,000-phone system in the part of Kurdistan not under Saddam Hussein's control.

¹⁷ À la Metcalfe's Law.

¹⁸ A similar proposal for a bulk purchase of basic cell phones intended for use in Africa persuaded one company to offer a \$50 phone.

2. Associating Cell Phones with Registered Users. Each phone could carry the equivalent of the SIM (subscriber information module) that would be uniquely associated with the person to whom it would be issued when the individual, with proper identification, registers for a phone.¹⁹ (Foreigners who want to use their cell phones in the country would do likewise, using passport information to indicate their status.) The combination of photographs, calling patterns, and transactions could be used to confirm the association of person and phone.²⁰ SIM data would be broadcast automatically by both the calling and receiving cell phones, as part of the digital handshake that allows a call to be set up.

3. Geolocating Cell Phones. New cell phones, built to accommodate emergency 911 service, can geolocate themselves either by reference to transmission towers (accurate to hundreds of meters) or by GPS (Global Positioning System) accurate to 20 meters.²¹ Locations for both sender and receiver can be transmitted when calls are placed and perhaps periodically during the phone call. Because cell phones must actively search for towers, they can also be equipped to broadcast their GPS-based location during such chirps.²² Such geolocation

¹⁹ The existence of the SIM process naturally suggests a similar, albeit mandatory, process for getting a national ID card. An electronic card could help track individuals (especially those without cell phones) past checkpoints such as national borders. However, there is a big difference between registering good people for phones they want, and enforcing the possession of ID cards upon bad people who would prefer to evade detection. Also note that, if the SIM card is a national ID card, it has to be large enough to have a recognizable picture, but small enough to fit into a visible slot on a phone so that it can be shown without having to be removed.

²⁰ Any registration process that seeks to eliminate fraud requires registrars that can resist dishonesty, corruption, bribery, threats, and insurgent sympathies. Depending on particular circumstances, therefore, registration might be better carried out by government authorities or by employees of the phone company.

²¹ GPS signals tend to be somewhat weaker than phone signals, so there will be places (e.g., in trains) when phones can report their position approximately vis-à-vis transmission towers but not more precisely vis-à-vis GPS.

²² One could acquire the location of phones when they are not normally on by programming them to turn themselves on periodically, broadcast their position, and go back to sleep—albeit at a cost to battery life.

features, without which the phones could not work, should discourage insurgents from using the cell phone system. This alone would tilt the playing field in COIN's favor.

4. Improving Government Responsiveness. Although security for anyone generally results from security for everyone, some security services are personalized enough to warrant a warning and protection system that can encourage citizens to bond with their government. Cell phones could issue warnings of dangerous neighborhoods either via alert (when entering it) or via GPS-linked query. The system should also facilitate and verify calls for help.

5. Eyes on the Street. Proliferating cell phones will mean that any given insurgent operation, incident, or crime witnessed by a large number of people can be reported. Phones with built-in cameras can send pictures of the area to authorities, who can then size up the situation, gather evidence of what happened, and maybe even identify insurgents lingering on afterward. GPS capabilities make it difficult for people to deny that they were on the scene, and thus make it harder for them to avoid telling authorities what they saw or heard.

6. Actionable Intelligence. Distinguishing the enemy from the innocent is one of COIN's toughest information challenges, but a record of calls provides one clue. That such phone calls come from known insurgent districts may be another. Patterns of cell phone usage can also be mined. A sudden spike or termination of calls in a suspicious location could hint at an impending operation. Observing the ebb and flow of cell phones, and thus of people, can help in planning operations to avoid civilian casualties.

7. Soldier Communications. U.S. ground forces carry communications gear that, while rugged and cryptographically secure, is expensive, heavy, limited in bandwidth, and rarely apportioned more than one to a squad. A cell phone system can be the primary communications link for such forces,²³ relegating the others to backup. Such phones can also be used by U.S., indigenous, and coalition actors to report incidents and other interesting events to a Web site that stamps

²³ Some high-end commercial cell phones already provide content encryption. Writing switch software to enable the encryption of call-setup information is also straightforward.

such reports by who called in, when they called, and where they were at the time.

8. Forcing Insurgents to Employ Communications Security. Cell phones are increasingly important to and common among today's networked insurgents, and they have little choice but to use the same infrastructure and standards as everyone else. Insurgents will not always be careful about not taking their cell phones out on operations; indeed, they might need them. Those who would plant an IED by the side of the road in the dead of night would face a difficult choice. They could venture out without communications and thus be limited in their ability to react. Or, they could venture out with cell phones, which would periodically announce their location thereby alerting authorities to their appearance late at night by the side of the road.

These capabilities are feasible with existing technology (some of it being driven by the desire of parents to track their teenagers!), but they do require special software. Therefore, the local government, in cooperation with the U.S. government, must be able to insert and control the software, either by retaining the ability to write the necessary modules or by specifying to the cell phone provider what the software must do.²⁴

National Registry-Census, ID Cards, and Vetting

Effective governance depends on knowing the population, demographically and individually.²⁵ Eligibility for government services must be

²⁴ The idea of using cell phones to improve security is not limited to COIN or military operations. The failure of authorities at Virginia Tech to adequately alert students to the possibility of a gunman on the campus during the April 2007 mass shootings has stimulated wide interest in the idea of using cell phones for individual warning and reporting of such dangers. Apart from COIN, the growing reliance on cell phones and ubiquity of cellular switching and transmission infrastructure presents an unprecedented opportunity to engage large populations in such security functions.

²⁵ These ideas are not entirely novel. David Galula, in *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, argued that "control of the population begins with a thorough census. Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card." Even earlier, the USMC's 1940 *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, as of October 30, 2007: http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/sw_manual.asp) argued that local governments facing insurgencies should provide and require identification cards.

fairly and fully established. Enabling persons to identify themselves and one another can contribute to confidence. While these identification methods are not foolproof, they can also help security services to enforce the law and apprehend terrorists with reduced risk of mistake.

The most straightforward way to learn about the citizenry, on a person-by-person basis, is to carry out a combined registry and census. Both are required: A registry answers the *who* but not much about the *what*; a census answers the *what* but, without names, says little about the *who*. In low-wage countries, labor-intensive census-taking is something the United States can easily finance (and train people to do). Such a registry-census has to include who lives where, their sex and ages, and other basic demographic information (birthplace, length of residence, marital status, ethnic, perhaps tribal or religious affiliation). But it should also compile information on the following:

- *Relationships*: Political activity and affiliation tend to be kinship-related in many parts of the world; many insurgents are related to one another or to victims of counterinsurgency operations.
- *Employment*: By aggregation, these data can reveal the economic status of a neighborhood, town, or province.
- *Health*: Knowing the medical conditions and mobility of individuals can help the state plan and deliver emergency and health services.
- *Licenses*: Two of the most important are the driver's license and the gun permit.
- *Incidents data*: Reports on crime and other nonroutine contacts between citizens and authorities can be valuable data on individuals and also in the aggregate.²⁶

The timely screening of candidates for sensitive government positions, military and intelligence personnel, job-training applicants, and other individuals depends on investigating candidates thoroughly yet efficiently. A governmental vetting system can avoid having to choose

²⁶ For instance, the use of COMPSTAT, New York City's master compilation of crime reports, deserves some of the credit for the city's falling crime rate in the 1990s.

between letting the untrustworthy slip through and leaving positions unfilled. Vetting depends on having records and the ability to make positive identification. Nowadays, it is best automated, with computers and biometrics. In any event, a modest investment in experts, record-keeping programs, and databases can prevent serious mistakes that could undercut COIN.

Law-abiding citizens have many reasons to be included in the census, the registry, and the vetting system, and no reasons not to be. Even if the data are incomplete, they will help government understand and serve the population, facilitate law enforcement, reduce uncertainty and risk in security operations, and contribute to inclusive politics.

Three-Dimensional Awareness

A population census can be extended to produce external and internal building data that can be valuable for security. Existing technology could be used to produce and keep updated a three-dimensional model of urban areas in which operations might take place. When aggregated, it can become a national model.²⁷ Rapid mapping of building topographies may be assisted by unmanned aerial systems for the outside and third-generation mapping tools for the insides of buildings not used for habitation.²⁸

Such a model serves various purposes: defining lines of visibility, indicating potential fields of sniper fire, denoting safe or unsafe areas for urban combat or convoy operations, or providing clues as to where insurgents might plant IEDs. When threats can be literally around the corner, it helps to understand at least what the terrain looks like in areas that cannot be directly seen. Knowing a city's layout can help in choosing routes of ingress or egress. A national model may prove helpful to users outside the security domain, from local officials (e.g., fire

²⁷ Although computer-aided design (CAD) programs were invented to facilitate design, they are equally useful in representing existing 3-D objects.

²⁸ Benton Yetman, "GIS and Robotics, Robotic Platforms as Tools for Spatial Data Collection and Consumption," *Directions Magazine* (October 5, 2006). As of October 23, 2007: http://www.directionsmag.com/article.php?article_id=2305&trv=1

and safety, city planning, taxation) to institutions and individuals in the real estate, construction, and repair trades.

Embedded Video

Many of the 160 requirements noted earlier could be satisfied by information from encounters with insurgents or the population. When it comes to collecting information on what really happened, nothing is better than a camera.²⁹ Because the use of weapons constitutes the most critical interactions, equipping weapons with a camera's eye would appear to be a natural fit (like dashboard cameras in police cars). Such cameras could see what the weapon can "see" and where it is pointed. They would run continuously but with some facility to bookmark critical events such as a weapons discharge.

Embedded video cameras would primarily serve to inhibit unwarranted or reckless behavior. Misconduct would be recorded; false accusations of bad behavior could be refuted. This capability could provide a learning tool in both direct instruction and peer-to-peer instruction from sharing the material throughout the network. An occasional but valuable third benefit is that such cameras may video people of interest (e.g., snipers). Indeed, gun-mounted video is far more likely to capture the face of someone shooting at a soldier than a random street camera is, and the embedded camera, being mobile and in the hands of someone prepared to shoot back, would be much harder to disable than a random lamppost camera. Equipping indigenous forces³⁰ with embedded cameras would provide them similar disciplines and learning opportunities.

²⁹ See Jess Maghan, Gregory W. O'Reilly, and Phillip Chong Ho Shon, "Technology, Policing, and Implications of In-Car Videos," *Police Quarterly* (Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 25–42).

³⁰ Equipping indigenous operators requires that they have not only compatible small arms but also a sufficient electrical, electronic, and computer infrastructure (to recharge batteries as well as download and convert video files). If the system is to be judicially credible, indigenous forces would have to exhibit the same discipline about collecting and maintaining records that U.S. forces would be expected to.

National Wiki

Knowledge of the community is a critical requirement for both long-term COIN campaigns and episodic operations. We estimate that some 20 percent of the 160 information requirements demand understanding of the social, political, and economic structure of places where operations would take place. Normally, militaries get the lay of the land by having intelligence operatives look around and ask questions; but the efficacy of this approach is not much greater today than in biblical times. The idea here is to enable the citizens to readily describe their communities to their friends, their government, and the world. Today's technology makes this feasible.

One way to do this would be to organize a national wiki, akin to the Web's Wikipedia, but with a different purpose. Many readers will know that a wiki is an interactive network system that both provides information to and gets its information from its users. The material generated would be neither definitive nor encyclopedic. But it would be a compendium of information on the country, organized by topic, much of it geospatial and thus linkable to a map. People may be persuaded to contribute through a mixture of pride (from providing information) and reward (from getting information). Many contributions will be opinionated, sometime both tolerable and occasionally enlightening. Indeed, if the contributors to the national wiki are sufficiently representative of the population (or at least that part of the population that one would like to hear from), it can be a useful place from which to gather information on what the country thinks about the various parties to the insurgency.³¹ Two problems will have to be addressed to make this work. One is adapting the written format wikis normally come in to an oral one so that the wiki may be accessed by people whose only electronic link is a cell phone.³² The other is having the better articles translated from the local language into English for U.S. operators. Neither problem is insurmountable.

³¹ General experience suggests that use of the Internet and wikis, once widely available, is broadly representative.

³² The iPhone, introduced by Steven Jobs at MacWorld 2007, shows that devices are getting closer to the point where reading and writing is practical.

It is a short jump from a national wiki as a way for everyone, including U.S. forces, to learn about a nation's communities to a national wiki as a way for the people to talk to their society and their government. It could be a vehicle for people to complain about public services and for the government to state how it is responding. Between near-universal cell phone use and access to a national wiki, it is possible for the population of a country confronted with insurgency to improve its knowledge, confidence, trust, and cooperation, likely to the advantage of government and the disadvantage of insurgents.

Enabling Information Users to Be Productive Information Providers

As mentioned earlier, much of the information needed by users in COIN could come from other users. Depending on conditions, some information might be furnished during operations, as long as formulating and transmitting it would not be a distraction. Of course, information could be provided systematically after an operation, as some already is. By providing easy protocols for information submission, collation, and storage, and for disseminating information to those who need it, the network itself can relieve much of the burden on information user-providers. If a small-unit commander notices exceptionally good performance by local police under fire, or a type of weapon not seen before, or an unusual traffic flow—each a datum of potential use to someone, somewhere, sometime—submitting the information should be made as easy as typing this sentence. To some extent, this process has started with systems such as the U.S. Army's Company-Command forums, which began as an informal vehicle for junior officers to share their experiences and lessons learned with their peers. This is standard fare for Internet programs that rely on users for information. In COIN, users should be given a way of tagging the reliability and sensitivity of what they provide.


COIN's appetite for information is insatiable, and much that is wanted cannot easily be gotten from any one source. However, with measures such as those proposed here—depicted in Figure 6.1—along with standard intelligence collection, the supply of useful information could be vastly increased, improving operational effectiveness and government legitimacy.

Beyond their utility in COIN operations, many of these capabilities can foster such helpful societal norms as connectedness, individual identity, and participation.³³ Such systems would naturally facilitate and accompany progress toward more open and inclusive politics, free speech, and a well-informed citizenry. Many can also be important components of more responsive and accountable governance. Giving people a voice is helped by their being counted and asked after, as well as through their ability to summon the government via cell phone or express themselves via a national wiki. Ironically, many of these capabilities, essential for counterinsurgency, are hardest to implement once an insurgency has acquired a head of steam (e.g., by making it difficult to conduct a census). Thus, for greatest effectiveness they should be implemented *before* that takes place.

There is always a danger that improving communication capabilities of any sort, including modern networking, can deepen existing divisions by enabling the like-minded to reinforce each other's beliefs and to scheme and work against those who do not share them. This could include insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others determined to threaten states and societies. There is no getting around the fact that networking can divide as easily as unify. However, this will happen and is happening anyway because of the spread of information infrastructure, access, and use. Other than retarding this spread, which is what Saddam Hussein tried to do, the best approach is to take measures to ensure that this spread works to the advantage of legitimate governments, the populations they are supposed to serve, and U.S. interests. In sum, because the use of information networks will and should expand in any case, U.S. COIN-information strategy must be to exploit it better than the enemy does.

³³ To mention two: Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Technologies of Freedom* (New York: Belknap Press, 1983) and Peter Huber, *Orwell's Revenge* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

Figure 6.1
Systems and Sources of Information



RAND MG595/2-6.1

ICON

The benefits from information power presuppose that the demand and supply of information are adequately linked, which is not remotely the case today. A critical need, therefore, is for an *integrated counter-insurgency operating network* or “ICON.” Based on the principles of user primacy, inclusiveness, and integration, ICON should be designed to meet user needs for timeliness, quality, and relevance, with appropriate but not obsessive concern for security. ICON should permit unobstructed access, sharing, and collaboration, except by deliberate intervention by higher command, e.g., for security reasons. Tagging of information regarding its reliability, quality, and security would be standard. Relevance would be achieved through a dialogue between users and ICON.

Thanks to decades of vendors competing to please customers and gain market share, users in the economy and society at large can communicate and thus collaborate with virtually whomever they wish. Search programs, based on algorithms that reflect usage patterns, ensure that users are pointed to the information they need. Web sites and blogs permit users to spread their views. The lack of control and security inherent in such systems carries risks, but may be a price worth paying for the economies and improved knowledge that users—individuals, enterprises, and society—gain. Because COIN users demand a great deal of diverse information, most of it coming from the population and other users, ICON must and can employ the technologies and tenets of openness and sharing that propel the information revolution.

Again, various insurgent groups are already exploiting information technologies cleverly and resourcefully. There is always the danger that smart insurgents will also attempt to capitalize on the flow of information that will be available in a more open, less secure architecture. Indeed, insurgents might attempt to deliberately place false information into coalition networks.

For maximum effectiveness, ICON should embody several “ICONic” principles:

1. User Primacy, Inclusiveness, and Integration. An obligation to satisfy users’ operational needs for access and collaboration should be the first governing principle in the design, capabilities, and rules of ICON, just as users’ demands have guided the Internet revolution. From this the principles of inclusiveness and integration follow—the former because the more users in a network the greater the value to each user, and the latter because internal barriers defeat user-to-user collaboration.

2. Indigenization. COIN is for local states and their security services to win or lose. The more information they have, the more likely they will win. Beyond that, visible failure to share information with indigenous forces signals low confidence in them; it erodes coalition cohesion. Finally, working with U.S. information is one way to educate indigenous forces as to how U.S. forces think about warfare; more subtly, it is one vehicle (among many) to convey how a professional military should act. That Iraqi authorities and security forces are denied

large amounts of valuable but secret information impairs not only their performance but also their attitude toward U.S. forces.


There should be one network, integrated and inclusive, that hosts U.S. and indigenous forces, as well as other coalition forces. Anyone on the network should be able to send messages to anyone else on the network and call on the same (multilingual) tools. If the indigenous forces cannot afford the network, the United States should not stint in this matter. Because of the declining cost of devices and the ease of use, equipping and training the Iraqi Army to use ICON would cost a small fraction of what is being spent to build that army today.

The network should be open to the outside world for message exchange and external Web surfing, but with whatever content filters are required to maintain information security.³⁴ Figure 6.2 provides a depiction of who should be able to access what information; perhaps needless to add, it puts ICON in the middle. Less obviously, “need to know,” which recurs throughout this figure, means exactly that: whatever is required for operators—be they from the United States, coalition partners, or the indigenous country—to do their job.

3. Post Before Processing. Value-added services (e.g., analysis, commentary, display) should be available on ICON, but they should not be mandatory. In other words, information should become available to operators as soon as it has been received. It should not wait until it has been thoroughly analyzed, and it should not even wait until it has been fully validated (unless raw information points too obviously to sensitive sources and methods). Should users feel uncomfortable with dealing with raw information, they can await further verification and analysis. The principle of posting before processing speaks to the conduct of intelligence collection. If collectors were obligated to post information when they get it, then they would run on shorter cycles with more immediate feedback. In essence, they would be closer to the customer, but also further from their own hierarchy since they would no longer be so dependent on higher-level approval to get material out the door.

³⁴ Some accommodation needs to be made for the great majority of indigenous warfighters unlikely to be literate in English.

Figure 6.2
Participation in ICON and Related Systems



RAND MG595/2-6.2

4. Rank Information by Quality and Relevance. Inaccurate and irrelevant information is the bane of the user; nothing so drives them from using information systems. It might therefore be a useful service for ICON to have a facility by which accurate and relevant information could be noted as such so that it may float to the top of the user's mental in-box. Two methods form a rather rough-and-ready guide to accuracy and relevance. One is the tendency of people to pass interesting articles around to their friends. The other is the often-exploited ability to append comments to news items and blogs. At this juncture, these informal methods may be the best reliable state of the art, and therefore ICON should make it easy to use these two methods (and also experiment with generating and displaying some eyeballs-on-page metric) and see how far they take operators. Getting further entails research and development.

5. Audit, Audit, Audit. Although experience in Vietnam and Iraq suggest that the ranks of indigenous forces may contain rogue operators and even insurgents, using security rules to keep information from all indigenous forces so as to keep information from the wrong people puts the cart before the horse. The real problem is the presence of such people in the first place. A combination of relatively free access and clever auditing may address this fundamental problem. For this task, ICON would do well to employ techniques such as monitoring for abnormal usage (the first method is to do as credit card companies do—make note of what normal usage is and investigate deviations from that norm), emplacing taggants (differentiate certain documents by who requests them and then see where they end up), establishing “honey-pots” (information of the sort that a rogue operator may react to in a different manner than a loyal operator might), and keeping an eye on individuals (identified as interesting within ICON and thus possible targets).

At the end of the day, what matters is whether COIN operations and campaigns would be improved by this capability. A network based on ICONic principles could

- help the leader of a small combat unit make an informed and sound decision regarding the use of force in a community whose population could become either pro- or anti-insurgency
- allow military and police officers to decide whether a particular situation calls for law enforcement or, instead, deadly force
- permit aid providers to alert security forces to impending danger
- enable information gleaned by one unit in one town to inform the operations of another unit in another town without delay
- permit a U.S. military unit to coordinate ad hoc with local police
- rapidly synthesize information from an operating unit with intelligence data and furnish relevant results to other operating units
- inform views of the mix of insurgents and noninsurgents in a given location
- identify and provide connectivity to local leadership that may offer advice on how to handle a particular problem

- receive and screen citizen reporting on insurgent identification and movements.

The power of ICON lies in wide participation, ease of access, absence of barriers, continuous all-source updating, sensing of user needs, and unimpeded intake of the latest search and collaborative tools. With such power, ICON would have value beyond the enhancement of information available to those engaged in COIN operations. It would have utility as a tool for the training and orientation of military and other personnel preparing to deploy to join COIN. It would also help condition and continuously remind security forces that COIN is not just another form of warfare but a broader campaign to win over a population. Last but not least, ICON would promote unity of effort by furnishing a common body of information, a way to communicate strategy and clarify responsibilities, and the means to harmonize operations across agency and national boundaries.

Hand in hand with being user-driven, inclusive, and integrated, ICON must be dynamic and adaptable. As COIN campaigns evolve, ICON must accommodate new users without technical or administrative hiccups. New search and collaborative services should be introduced smoothly. As handheld terminals continue to improve—e.g., with laptops and cell phones merging—ICON should facilitate their access. The security implications of such openness will raise eyebrows. However, given the nature of COIN—a contest for the people—neither the operational nor strategic potential of information can be realized by sharply constricting participation and access.

Networks are not constructed the way traditional military systems are—indeed, they need not and should not be. New weapon platforms, for instance, are designed, produced, and placed into service at some (usually late!) “IOC” (initial operating capability date). When the military attempts to build its networks that way, costs climb, schedules slip, and technology has already moved on by the time the project is finished. Networks grow and keep growing—in scale, services, accessibility, and sophistication—typically in response to changing and increasing user demands. In keeping with this natural and efficient process, ICON is not something that would be kept in production

until ready to be erected in full. ICON can and should emerge in small increments, and it need not have a complete set of features (much less the same set of features everywhere) for it to be useful. Elements of ICON could be put in place and service today. The significance of this is that some of the capacity and benefits of ICON can be introduced in many countries under varying conditions, ranging from full-blown insurgency to the earliest stirrings of trouble. As the principal sponsor, and sometime financier, of ICON, the United States could use an I&W system to determine priorities. (Development and implementation issues are addressed below.)

By the same token, ICON will need to be managed, not controlled. Network management should consist of only essential services: technical help, standards, updating for new systems and applications, and the facility for security blocks. Although ICON will be used by all who are involved in COIN (as well as some interlopers), its core development and specific aspects of its operation—some parts of code, for example—should be managed by the United States. Unlike traditional military and intelligence networks, managing ICON does not mean controlling the information that courses through it or to the users who have access to it. This implies a radical cultural shift in the U.S. security establishment.

ICON is one of the most important contributions the United States can make to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of COIN. But ICON would not be a possession of the United States or anyone else. It is more a set of services than a system, providing capabilities to all involved in a COIN campaign—international and local, civil and military. ICON is not something to be dismantled by the United States when it departs. The service should remain as a capability for the local government, its security forces, and the people to whom it answers. Even when the embers of insurgency have died out, the society's ability to share information and collaborate can contribute to both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state, thus depriving any future insurgency of the alienation that it needs to grow.

The ability to integrate U.S. information with the local government and its forces will be influenced to some extent by the level of technology of those forces. In some cases, local security and intelli-

gence organizations may have the technical ability to exchange information with U.S. forces. In other cases, such as Afghanistan today, the level of technology of the local security forces is so poor that extraordinary measures, such as the insertion of U.S. liaison personnel with the local security organizations, may be needed.³⁵

How Much Difference Would ICON Make?

As a very crude indication of what difference ICON (along with associated data-gathering capabilities) would make, the assessment team estimates that 60 to 100 percent of the 160 information requirements identified could be available to COIN users if these capabilities were available, compared with 25 to 50 percent with existing capabilities.³⁶ Of course, these estimates understate the value of ICON because many more COIN users would have access to the additional information, thanks to the principles of inclusiveness and integration. To illustrate, if ICON disseminates twice as much useful information to twice as many decisionmakers—crossing military-intelligence, civil-military, international, and U.S.-local lines—the value in terms of informed decisions *and* coherent strategy, thus in terms of improved COIN performance, could be immense.

Such estimates aside, it is clear that it will take a network substantially better and different than those in use today to begin to satisfy the broad and complex information demands of COIN. Taking further into account enhancements in timeliness, reliability, and relevance promised by ICON, this improvement in the availability of useful information could have a profound effect on performance in the course of COIN campaigns and operations.

There is no way to calculate the lives spared, dollars saved, attacks averted, or insurgents killed or captured if information were truly

³⁵ Interviews with U.S., NATO, and Canadian forces in Afghanistan, January 2007.

³⁶ To be clear, this is no accident. The features of ICON prescribed in this chapter are predicated on the need to satisfy the identified information requirements. But this does not diminish the significance of the results.

treated as a strategic resource in COIN and applied along the lines of ICON. But the potential of information networking to produce major gains should come as no surprise. In nonmilitary and other military applications, information technology (IT) generally yields impressive returns on investment, improvements in cost-effectiveness, and gains in productivity (including that of the U.S. economy as a whole), especially when based on the open principles proposed here for ICON. Moreover, the costs of the technical means of ingesting, storing, processing, and distributing information are declining at astounding rates.³⁷ If nothing else, this suggests that IT for COIN, like IT for other endeavors, should become more economical over time, in sharp contrast to physical military capabilities.

An ICONic Vignette

To get a feel for the benefits of increased effectiveness of and reliance on information power in COIN, imagine two cases, both involving a small U.S. military unit operating in a hostile environment in a Muslim country faced with fierce insurgency—one without and one with ICON.

In the first case, the unit is asked to respond to a call to back up local police who have come under fire in a district not controlled by insurgents but reputed to harbor them. The police in question are suspected of being infiltrated by members of a militia that is a mortal enemy of the insurgents. The unit commander has to consider both the possibility of a trap by the insurgents, in which they hope to kill U.S. troops, or the possibility of a trap by militia members who hope to precipitate a U.S. assault on this neighborhood. With the need to act promptly, the commander, using current information systems, seeks but is unable to get answers to the following important questions:

³⁷ Over the past 20 years, IT performance per dollar has increased from 50 percent annually for processing to 500 percent for storage.

- Which U.S. unit last operated in this district, who is the commander, and how can we make contact?
- Which U.S. unit last operated with this local police unit, who is the commander, and how can we make contact?
- Is the commander of the local police unit a militia member?
- When were insurgents last known to be in this district and in numbers?
- Are there any high-value insurgents in the district, and if so, who are they?
- Where do the sympathies of civil and tribal leaders of the district lie?
- Where do the sympathies of the inhabitants lie? What percentage of the district's inhabitants voted in the last election, and which way did they vote?
- What are the chief grievances of the inhabitants? Safety? Other? Has the government been responsive or have the people lost faith in it?
- At what times of the day are the streets on the map filled with people, making entry, egress, and use of force difficult and dangerous?
- Is it a common insurgent tactic to fire on police to draw in U.S. troops?
- What is the history of suicide bombings, IEDs, and other weapons and tactics here?
- Can we establish direct and fast collaboration with nearby ground forces or gunships if necessary?

Unable to get answers, the commander considers his options: (1) do not respond to the local police call for support; (2) go into the district at high speed in armored vehicles and strike with maximum force at the source of the fire; (3) send in a reconnaissance team to get information, make an assessment, and report, and (4) ask brigade headquarters for orders. Options (1) and (2) are rejected. Option (4) is tempting, but the commander already knows that headquarters does not know more than he does, so it is merely a "pass the buck" option that would cause delay. So the reconnaissance team is sent in and returns in two

hours to report large casualties among the police, disappearance of the insurgents, and a growing mob of angry citizens demanding that their government provide protection.

In the case with ICON, the unit commander communicates continuously by instant messaging with the police chief, who is also on ICON. He locates and communicates with an officer from a unit with recent experience in this town and is told that this police unit and commander are known for their reliability, that the insurgents in this district include jihadists, and that the citizens are terrified (and uncooperative). He learns that the last unit to operate here established especially good relations with a tribal sheikh who offered to hand over insurgents if they returned, provided that U.S. forces, not just the local police, would back him up. He is able to establish a cell phone teleconference with the other officer, the police chief, and the sheikh, who tells him where the insurgents are, how many there are, and how they are armed. But the sheikh also warns him that any innocent deaths or property damage could turn the population hostile to the government. The unit commander is told that the streets are empty, permitting easy movement. At the commander's urging, the sheikh calls on people living near the insurgent cell's stronghold to leave. The unit is sent in immediately and, operating via ICON with the police, is able to isolate and pin down the insurgents. Some of these communications are picked up by insurgents who have hacked into ICON, but they already knew most of the information itself and in any case could not use any of it within the limited time available. Instead of a firefight, the unit waits for the insurgents to surrender or try to escape; nearly all are killed or captured within 24 hours.

Meanwhile, the commander informs nearby USAID and NGO aid-providers that they can and should enter the district immediately to address the needs of the people, thus gaining better cooperation should the insurgents return. He also asks the local State Department representative to urge the U.S. embassy to propose to the local government that it also move into the void with improved public services. The commander files an electronic report providing details of and lessons from the operation, which will be collated and made available via ICON to all who stand to gain from this information.

The reader will not be faulted for taking this vignette with a grain of salt. Still, it does seem that ICON could make a difference in the real, risky, murky world of COIN, especially at the critical nexus where COIN, population, and insurgency interact—surely enough of difference to warrant further analysis of architecture, features, feasibility, and implementation.

Feasibility and Implementation

Plans to develop the COIN-information capabilities described above should take into account progress already made and resources already committed. Unfortunately, there has been little progress, scant resources, and no commitment:

- Desultory attempts are being made to develop biometric-based ID cards in Iraq.
- The U.S. military in Iraq carries out something called “census ops,” but these fall well short of an actual census.
- Even less effort has been made in Afghanistan.
- No concerted effort has been undertaken to promote universal cell phone use in Iraq (though phones are proliferating anyway), much less to use the cell phone system to collect information for use in COIN.
- There is no concerted effort to develop and use information networks to increase government knowledge of and response to the needs of the population.
- Application of 3-D technology has been limited and only for U.S. forces.
- Embedded video equipment is being introduced, but on nothing like the scale recommended here. Nothing resembling ICON exists.
- U.S. networks are not open to local authorities and forces, and classified ones are not open to most coalition partners.

If there is a silver lining to such indifference to COIN information capabilities, it is that the potential for improvement is accordingly great.

Just as important, the possibility of exploiting this potential is at hand. ICON and the information-gathering capabilities described here can be activated with existing infrastructure and technology:

- a Global Information Grid (GIG), as conceived and used by DoD³⁸
- the Internet
- cellular switching, transmission, and devices
- wireless media
- portable access devices
- search tools
- collaboration tools
- tools to sense user need, interest, and relevance
- access in heterogeneous environments
- information collection, storing, processing, and retrieval
- personal identification methods.

As for individual proficiency, nearly all COIN users—U.S. and other—either possess or can quickly acquire requisite skills to utilize the services these technologies and infrastructure offer. The swift, global spread of the Internet has proven that humans are quickly learning how to use networked information as a utility, in the sense that using it requires no knowledge of why or how it works. In addition, prices of access—devices, media, and services—are declining rapidly because of wider economic forces. Costly, time-consuming research and development (R&D), investment, and training are not needed for ICON. Future enhancements and needed skills will be available from general markets and usage.

The Internet was conceived, but it was not engineered as such: It grew out of clusters of researchers, entrepreneurs, and network buffs

³⁸ The GIG includes transmission, switching/routing systems, links, satellites, GPS, and other information infrastructure.

who developed it even as they exploited it. As this process unfolded, the Internet became still more useful, attracting more users and thus more contributors to its power. The network designed itself according to a set of rules determined largely by what users wanted. The same users mercilessly spurned what was not useful, e.g., many “dot-com” ideas. Will such a market mechanism work for ICON?

The answer is yes—to some extent, though not entirely. To the extent that insurgencies continue to demand that governments and their international supporters (1) strive to increase their effectiveness and legitimacy and (2) understand the importance of information power to these ends, there will be a demand for ICONic capabilities. This demand will attract providers, infrastructure, and technology—up to a point. It cannot be assumed that governments and populations facing insurgency will have sufficient resources and skills to connect. Therefore, foreign-aid resources may be needed to finance host-nation participation (training and devices). Additionally, some special, non-Internet, ICONic features are not likely to be readily developed according to user demands, especially the ability to secure what truly must be secured as and when needed. Special-purpose R&D, engineering, and application will be needed. In addition, some system of standards and process of certification will be needed.

Can the U.S. government create ICON? The record is not encouraging. Reliance on normal government procurement processes would guarantee that ICONic capabilities are not delivered, at least not soon. The simple idea of getting various U.S. forces to use compatible radios—a 20th-century device—has taken a decade and billions of dollars.³⁹ Information users have little say in the design and acquisition of DoD information networks. Out of frustration, users and the combatant commands that represent them have taken matters into their own hands—buying and jury-rigging solutions. Throughout all of this, there has been an irrepressible trend among military users toward reliance on the Internet itself. Meanwhile, DoD has relied mainly on traditional defense contractors (“lead systems integrators”) to buy and

³⁹ This Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) has become the poster child for cumbersome, slow, rigid, and costly DoD IT-acquisition programs.

assemble information solutions, in part because leading IT firms are deterred by red tape from entering the defense market.

If the U.S. government does not act or if it acts according to existing procedures, ICON and the other capabilities proposed here will not be available soon enough or broadly enough to combat the growing threat of complex-dynamic insurgency. The wisest first step the government could take to realize ICON is to call together COIN information users and technology providers (the real ones!) in a free-form discussion of how to proceed. For now, the authors would encourage the government to think of a limited but critical role in convening users and providers, suggesting standards, and engaging foreign partners. It should also conduct selective R&D, mainly by DoD, on important specific capabilities, e.g.:

- the integration of the various desiderata of the cell phone system into a coherent software suite
- the integration of commercial video cameras into helmets, rifles, and other gear
- methods of porting the wiki model to cell phones
- improved indexing and categorization of incidents, observations, and other material relevant to counterinsurgency
- automated relevance and quality ranking methods
- improved techniques for auditing computer usage for signs of suspicious activity.

It is apparent that users' information needs for COIN are broader and more textured than those for warfare. It is also clear that they cannot and need not be met by secret intelligence methods and sources, and that they demand, above all, access to information possessed by the population and other users. This, in turn, implies that the principles of inclusiveness and integration—principles that have energized the larger network revolution—must be applied to COIN information networking. It further implies that the tight controls and constrictions that usually apply to secret information need not and should not apply generally to information networking for COIN. Following such guidelines will make it easier to meet users' needs for the timely, reliable,

and relevant information so crucial for COIN. Because the network principles and capabilities we propose here for COIN are in line with those of the larger network revolution, the technologies, infrastructure, and skills needed to grow and use them are available, economical, and continuously improving, which means that our proposals are feasible and affordable.

Perception and Cognition

Influencing Opinion

Recall the observation made early in this report that, as one moves from the territorial, structural, and physical levels of capabilities through the informational level to the cognitive level, Type III insurgents tend to become stronger while those trying to counter them, including the U.S. government, become weaker. The preceding chapter offers recommendations to make COIN more competitive on the information battlefield. This chapter considers how COIN can outperform insurgents on the ultimate level: how humans think and what they perceive.¹

In the struggle for legitimacy, both performance and perception matter—government performance in serving the public, and public perception that its future lies with the government. The influencing of perceptions with information—formerly “propaganda,” now “public diplomacy,” “strategic communications,” or “information operations” (IO)—the term we will use here—is an especially important aspect of COIN against an adversary sophisticated in precisely that function. After all, it is not the organizational structure, physical capabilities, or communications equipment of global-local insurgents that have defied COIN, it is their ability to influence perceptions, stir passions, and

¹ This analysis is drawn in part from ongoing RAND work on how to use information warfare to weaken the enemy (Farhana Ali, *The Power of the Message: How to Use Information Warfare to Weaken the Enemy*, Santa Monica: Calif.: RAND Corporation, unpublished manuscript).

harness motivations. Indeed, the adversary is setting the terms of competition on this crucial plane.

The measures suggested in the previous chapter to tilt the information plane in COIN's favor would be a good start. Generally speaking, the greater the information capabilities of the state, its international supporters, and its population, the greater the potential for winning the battle of perceptions, though the capabilities themselves do not assure victory. Thus, creation of ICON and related capabilities would afford a better chance to win the so-called war of ideas.

While perception and cognition have always been important in insurgency and COIN, they will be critical in the future. The heightened significance of the "virtual dimension," as Mackinlay and al-Baddawy call it, "is that without the Internet, video camera, mobile phone, blogger, Web site, and satellite TV station, a concerned population that is globally dispersed could not be engaged and its [violent] energy would not be mobilized."² Yet these same developments present unprecedented opportunities for the agents of COIN, provided that they understand that their advantages in the IT domain assure them of no advantages in the domains of perception and cognition. Countering Type III (and Type IV) insurgency demands a strategic effort to seize this vital ground, for the new insurgents are already mounting such an effort.

At the same time, seizing this ground will not in and of itself deliver success in the contest for a population's allegiance. In an open information society, state incompetence, corruption, and abuse cannot be concealed or "spun" by government. An autocratic regime may have some success in doing so, for a while at least, or may simply ignore public perceptions and wishes. Insurgencies are, on average, more likely to succeed against autocratic regimes than democratic ones, which suggests that attempting to fight insurgency by denying or manipulating information is a losing strategy.³ However, inclusive and representative government—the sort *worthy* of U.S. backing in COIN—has to

² Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

³ Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946. See Appendix A.

answer for its flaws and mistakes. A government must earn public support in order to overcome insurgency, and it must deserve public support in order to earn it. It follows that a government must be both effective and accountable—to an informed public—in order to overcome insurgency. It follows that the basis of IO (not counting disinformation to confuse the enemy) must be truthful. Moreover, influence through information must be a two-way street, with government receiving as well as transmitting. Only then will efforts to affect perceptions in COIN succeed in the long term.

The objective of IO should *not* be to convince the population to become fond of America or to embrace its policies, its ideals, or its way of life. We cannot realistically expect populations in the Muslim world to embrace *our* post-9/11 narrative—our right to strike back, the spreading of democracy and secular government, the insistence on freedom of religion, and so on. Our narrative cannot drown out the militant call to defend Islam from the new Crusaders. Our advocacy of democracy cannot eclipse the Islamist demand for justice. Our insistence that we mean well cannot erase images of humiliated Muslims. Nor can we count on the rejection of terrorism by most Muslims to sell our policies in the Muslim world, including the use of force. The United States has been waging the battle of perception as if the contested populations must choose whether to side with the insurgents and jihadists or else to side with the Americans—famously expressed as “either with us or against us.” As with COIN as a whole, COIN IO is *not about us*.

Rather, the narrative of legitimate, effective, fair, and inclusive local government must be the one with which IO is aligned. The local narrative is very different from the narrative of the United States, and not always easy on American ears. It may, for example, appeal to the public to fight insurgency in order to end foreign occupation. It may have what the West might consider objectionable religious content. But the goal of COIN in a particular context is to overcome violent efforts to overturn legitimate government, not to bring about a harmony of global values. Rather than U.S. officials trying to get the local government “on message,” they should be concerned with getting on—

and just as crucial, doing nothing to undermine—that government’s message.

It is important here to distinguish between using IO to help a state counter insurgency and using it to reduce the number of terrorists. Only a small percentage of people holding what we tend to consider radical Islamist views become terrorists. One estimate is that, out of the 1.5 billion Muslims in the world, 250 million to 500 million sympathize with jihadist ideology, 50,000 to 200,000 join jihadist groups, and only several thousand commit acts of terrorism. Therefore, “weakening popular support for terrorists might not have much immediate influence on terrorist recruitment.”⁴ Moreover, large numbers of Islamic fighters are evidently prepared to attack U.S. military forces that are dispatched to the Muslim world to attack small numbers of Islamic terrorists. As noted already, turning Muslim disapproval of terrorism into support for U.S. occupation ignores the fact that many Muslims do not accept the rationale for GWOT. However, turning a population against the terrorism committed by Islamic insurgents can help turn them toward their government. The United States may not benefit directly from any reduction in terrorists, but it would benefit greatly, albeit indirectly, from better COIN.

IO must, of course, not only offer a convincing story on behalf of the government but also discredit the insurgency’s story. A parallel RAND study of cognitive strategy in COIN makes a case for isolating Islamist insurgents from the local and global Muslim community on behavioral, rather than religious, grounds.⁵ There is little to be gained and much to be lost by trying to combat religious fundamentalism or radicalism, which are based on beliefs which the United States should not presume to challenge and can little affect. Jihadist slaughtering of innocents and other Muslims, on the other hand, is the point at which the wedge between the population and violent jihad should be driven. This is a message that must come from Muslims. Indeed, the most persuasive voices are conservative antiviolence clerics. Therefore, IO

⁴ Richard Clarke, quoted in Campbell and Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism*, p. 28.

⁵ Gompert, *Heads We Win*.

that attacks Islamic beliefs or equates those beliefs with violent jihad is counterproductive, in effect blurring the very distinction between Islamic fundamentalists and killers. Just as IO has suffered from trying to convince Muslim populations to admire America, it has suffered from tarring as extremists the very nonviolent, but radical, Islamic scholars who have the greatest credibility in making the case that no genuine Islamic belief condones terrorism. In addition, local-centric IO should hammer away at the fact that terrorists have provoked the wrath of the West and must be dealt with by Muslims to avoid or end foreign interference and force.

A compelling but underused argument, easily proven, is that jihadists cannot, indeed do not, govern. Given the chance, they make a mess of it. The goal of a new caliphate, from which Western practices and apostate rulers would be expunged, is more utopian than practical—pure “nonsense” according to world-leading analyst Olivier Roy.⁶ Jihadists have no practicable scheme or competence for organizing and governing a nation-state, let alone a vast caliphate.

There is abundant and vivid evidence to share with Muslim populations that extremist-theocratic government leads to misery. One reason why COIN is more accepted by Afghans than Iraqis is that the former have actually experienced the performance of the Taliban in running the country, a performance that would be risible if it were not so tragic. Some Iraqis experienced a preview of the effects of Salafi administration: It took Islamic insurgents mere weeks to turn Fallujah, a vibrant city of 300,000 in Western Iraq, into a dysfunctional, garbage-strewn ghost town. Once in charge, the insurgents concerned themselves with cutting off hands and heads rather than turning on water. Ordinary citizens of Fallujah, having experienced life under Salafist Islamic rule, are said not to want it again.⁷

Muslim populations everywhere should see that Fallujah under the Salafists is a microcosm of the jihadist alternative to accountable and capable government, pluralistic politics, and religious tolerance.

⁶ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London, UK: Hurst, 2004).

⁷ Discussions with Iraqis and Iraq veterans, 2004–2006.

The jihadists' own description of their desired end state (however unrealistic) should cause Muslims, however devout, to cringe.⁸ As Mary Habeck notes, "The jihadis . . . have very specific and yet maddeningly vague ideas about the caliphate, which to them is the only correct form of governance for a Muslim. . . . As to institutions, it needs only two: an army and an institution to promote virtue and prevent vice." The sole purposes of the state are to protect the community of believers and to ensure that everyone follows the jihadist version of sharia.⁹

Lee Harris argues that jihadism is what can be called a "fantasy ideology"—a belief system based on personal or collective fantasies, symbols, images, and romantic quests that are ultimately inconsistent with how humans function and societies work. The problem with fantasy ideologies—whether jihadism or Marxism or National Socialism—is that they can become "the most terrible scourge[s] to afflict the human race."¹⁰ One wonders whether it has really registered with Muslims that the appeal being made by jihadists, quite apart from the violence on which it depends, is a pathway to not only intolerance but also incompetence.¹¹

Finally, IO should be aimed at distinguishing between the local-political insurgent agenda and jihadist motivations, the latter being far more insatiable than the former. This may require expressing a willingness to address the local-political insurgent agenda with the proviso that links to global-religious extremists be severed. All these mes-

⁸ A detailed description of the requirements of governance can be found in Naji, *The Management of Savagery*. These requirements boil down to providing security, providing food and medical treatment, imposing sharia law and "sharia science," spying, and preparing to expand the attack against the enemies of the *Ummah*.

⁹ Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 2006). As of October 23, 2007: <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20061117.habeck.knowingtheenemy.html>.

¹⁰ Lee Harris, "Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology," *Policy Review* (No. 114, August–September 2002).

¹¹ This line of argument may seem to be contradicted by the reality that Hamas and Hezbollah have provided better public service at the neighborhood level than the governing authorities they oppose (the Palestinian Authority and Lebanese government, respectively). But these two movements, though Islamist, do not share the jihadist view that the purpose of the state is purely to protect believers and enforce puritanical Islam.

sages would be more effectively delivered if the United States helped states under threat of insurgency to communicate with their societies, to enable members of society to communicate easily with one another, to increase the information, knowledge, and truth available to society, and to encourage individuals to think for themselves.

While the message for countering Type III Islamic insurgency must, of course, be tailored for specific times, places, conditions, and populations, the core elements of generic approach to Muslim audiences could include

- evidence (not mere talking points) that local government is trying (harder) to understand citizens' conditions, hopes, and fears and is working to address them
- clear distinction between strict Islam and terrorism
- encouragement of the nonviolent pursuit of religious beliefs, however radical, as well as societal and political remedies
- authoritative interpretation of sacred texts condemning killing of innocents, other Muslims, and self
- discrediting of violence of all sorts
- clarification of the jihadists' own vision for the future, in which the state provides nothing but enforcement of the most radical and intolerant version of Islam
- information about the consequences of actual jihadist administration, including the reactions of those who have had the misfortune of experiencing it
- data about Muslim-on-Muslim terrorism and other violence
- the argument that jihadists are making it more, not less, likely that Western military force will be exerted in the Muslim world—that terrorism will make Muslims not more but less safe
- assurance that sharing information with the government will produce more, not less, security.

Such content, properly tailored and delivered *by local sources*, may help individuals opt for a future of progress and dignity while rejecting one of violent, intolerant tyranny. Of course, the content only

has meaning and impact if a future of progress and dignity is in fact available.

Similarly, no capability or program to target the population with information can substitute for the salutary effects of enabling the population to learn and spread the truth and to communicate with whom-ever they wish. This is a surer way than propaganda to foster civil society, competing associations, free thought, and confidence in a better state and better future. A single idea unifies this study's proposals to strengthen individual identity and to enable government to hear and answer citizens' needs and to earn their confidence. It can be summed up in the words of James Madison: "To give information to the people is the most certain and legitimate engine of government." U.S. COIN agencies must not lose sight of the goal of an informed population served by legitimate government.

From Information Power to Brain Power

The issue of affecting perceptions brings us to the final aspect of information power: how to achieve stronger *cognition*—comprehending, reasoning, and decisionmaking—in 21st-century counterinsurgency.¹² Different than IT, cognition is what occurs "between the ears" after receiving information. It is as crucial to COIN as physical capabilities, organizational structures, and territorial control, especially against shrewd, distributed insurgents. Moreover, of all types of military operations, COIN presents particularly severe cognitive challenges, including the difficulties of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants, the ambivalence of the population, the threat of terror, the risks of making mistakes in the use of force, and the need to reach out to and work with the population even though it may contain insurgents. "Counterinsurgency is a thinking-man's game."¹³

¹² The analysis and recommendations of this section are based heavily on Gompert, *Heads We Win*, a RAND Occasional Paper that is part of the larger COIN study.

¹³ David Ignatius, "Fighting Smarter in Iraq," *Washington Post* (March 17, 2006, p. A19).

Leaders of the global jihad are charismatic and gifted at strategy and unifying ideology. They skillfully portrayed the U.S. occupation of Iraq as the latest attack on the global *Ummah* and Islamic faith. From this comes the call to jihad and martyrdom in defense of Islam. Their ability to tell and sell this story of Islam under attack is the “primary energy source” of the global Islamic insurgency.¹⁴ It enables the jihad to turn disgruntled Muslims into radical Islamists and move radicals to choose violence and martyrdom.

This ability to generate intense motivation based on an individual duty to defend fellow Muslims and Islam must be treated as a real *capability* of jihad—a resonant cognitive frequency that induces people to commit horrendous acts out of moral conviction. Strategically, this capability enables the enemy to refill its ranks, perpetuate itself, recover from temporary reversals, and infect local insurgencies in the Muslim world. The COIN capabilities needed to break this jihadist cognitive capability are also cognitive.

Cognitive Capabilities for COIN

Countering Type III insurgency demands smarter COIN, not just at headquarters but also among the soldiers, police, intelligence agents, and diplomats on the front lines. Better cognitive abilities must not be confined to “the few” at the center, but instead spread across “the many” in the field, who must, in turn, have unobstructed access to information, the authority to act, and the chance to collaborate without having to go through higher authority. This holds equally for the abilities to understand insurgency, shape the conditions in which it functions, and act directly against it.

Understanding jihad requires empirical and innovative research, sensitivity to the psychology of the insurgency and Muslim populations, vigorous debate in and out of government, and continuous reflection. It also requires advanced analytical tools, an American specialty. Yet, in Iraq, U.S. analysts involved in planning “did not appreciate

¹⁴ Term from Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

how Iraq's highly turbulent history would diminish the prospects for a new democratic order" and "failed to understand how U.S. occupation would appear to Arab Iraqis of both sects."¹⁵ Such shortcomings, which contributed importantly to the lack of U.S. success in COIN in Iraq, suggest systemic deficiencies in understanding the new and complex phenomena of Type III insurgency. Launching a grand interagency study of jihad would not be fruitful, especially if the findings are negotiated and then frozen for bureaucratic convenience. Against an insurgency as smart as jihad, the effort to understand must be free of the assumptions, constraints, and buzzwords of current policy. Analysis should be interdisciplinary and international.

Shaping is done largely in the cognitive dimension: earning public confidence, isolating insurgents, and breaking the cycle of radicalization and regeneration. Yet, a U.S. ideological assault on Islamic fundamentalism cannot keep Muslims from becoming radicals and radicals from becoming terrorists any more than reliance on force can. Trying to build local support for COIN or isolate jihadists from other Muslims on ideological or religious grounds is unlikely to bear fruit and may exacerbate Western-Muslim misunderstanding. Where the jihadist argument is weakest is in its theological justification for killing innocents and Muslims and its advocacy of suicide. Provided that it is challenged by respected Islamic scholars, this weakness can be exploited to undermine Muslim public support for jihadists, impede recruitment of new ones, and dissuade suicide terror. Establishing the illegitimacy of jihadist violence is more likely to succeed at acceptable cost than is trying to wipe out all jihadists. Careless COIN violence, indiscriminant arrests, nonjudicial detention, and abusive interrogation can de-legitimize the governing power, excuse jihadist terrorism, and spawn new martyrs.

Hand in hand with influencing perceptions, successful shaping also demands excellence in crafting strategy and plans for COIN, in general as well as for specific campaigns and operations. This demands effective cognition, obviously. Two of the most important lessons from Iraq are that the United States needs to "improve its ability to develop

¹⁵ Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

strategy and to modify it as events unfold” and to “develop a planning process that embraces all [relevant] departments of the government.”¹⁶ Building these vital capabilities will require more than better bureaucratic performance: It will take greater investment in the cognitive abilities of personnel responsible for COIN strategy and plans.

In COIN *operations*, intuition must be integrated with reasoning into a “battle-wise” decisionmaking ability. Intuition alone may not be reliable in unfamiliar situations, and reasoning can be accelerated by networked information. Four cognitive abilities are particularly important in operations: anticipation, opportunism, decision speed, and learning in action. These abilities can be put to good use through *rapid-adaptive* decisionmaking, whereby intuition provides initial direction, creating the opportunity to gather information, learn, and reason—all at high speed. With such cognition, COIN can gain an operational *time-information* edge over global insurgency—using time to gain information, using information to gain time, and thus acting in a timely yet informed fashion. COIN does not now enjoy this advantage over Type III insurgency. Rather, it is slow to act when lacking complete information, or else may produce unwanted results (e.g., civilian deaths) if forced to act in haste.

Calling for “smarter COIN” without policies and programs to accomplish it is like expecting a classroom of students to attain better test scores by exhorting them to think harder. In COIN, as in the classroom, it will take homework. Apart from investments in networking, displays, chat rooms, videoconferencing, and the like—these only allow better use of information, they do not assure it—the key to improved cognitive performance is to be found in personnel policies: recruitment, retention, promotion, selection, assignment, training, and education. In all these areas, if the United States is to improve the cognitive abilities of those on whom it counts for COIN, it must engage the personnel offices in DoD, the State Department, and the intelli-

¹⁶ Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*. Pirnie and O’Connell argue that U.S. planning for Iraq would have been inadequate even had no resistance to U.S. occupation occurred, citing in particular the absence of plans to build an entirely new government practically from scratch.

gence community to specify needs, raise and tune standards, and use incentives (including pay and promotion) to attract, keep, and develop individuals up to the challenge.¹⁷

In addition, the argument for decentralizing decisionmaking authority in parallel with distributing information—from capitals and headquarters to those on the operational “edge”—is as strong for COIN as it is for regular combat.¹⁸

Conclusion

The network revolution has enabled enterprises and individuals to perform better and to improve their competitive position *provided* that they are willing to change how they organize and operate. The United States and its friends find themselves facing an adversary who is exploiting the power of information strategically, ingeniously, and virtually without cost. Globally and locally, Islamic insurgents have adapted far better than COIN to exploit the advantages of networking. Everything we know about competition in the information age suggests that such adaptation is a reliable leading indicator of success—more so than scale, resources, or technical sophistication. The United States is not merely missing an opportunity in failing to adapt to exploit information: It is running the risk of losing.

In all aspects of COIN, U.S. technology and resources must be subordinated to the tasks of building effective and accountable local governments and convincing individuals within contested populations

¹⁷ Concrete proposals along these lines are found in Gompert, *Heads We Win*, and summarized in the final chapter of this report.

¹⁸ The general case for decentralization of authority is especially well made in David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, *Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age* (Washington, D.C.: Command and Control Research Program, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2003). The case for doing so to bolster and exploit cognitive abilities is made in David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins, *Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, July 2006, as of October 23, 2007: <http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/battlewise.htm>). The case for doing so in COIN is made in Gompert, *Heads We Win*.

to ally their interests with those governments. The power of information and networking is crucial to this strategy. Although the United States should play a supporting role in local insurgency, it must play the leading role in unleashing this power.

General Security Capabilities

Rethinking Basic Requirements

To find, as this study does, that the United States relies too much on large-scale military power to counter Type III insurgencies in the Muslim world is not to suggest a de-emphasis on providing security. A government that cannot provide for its population's safety—curb violence, prevent kidnappings and extortion, control “the street”—is a government that cannot be saved from insurgency no matter what civil and information capabilities are at its disposal. Conversely, the creation of a safe environment that includes public understanding of necessary and legitimate uses of force is essential if the government is going to have the chance to make political, economic, and institutional reforms to address festering problems on which insurgencies feed.

The need for security has a bearing on the ability of a government to conduct needed improvements in infrastructure, create jobs, improve education, and conduct elections. Insurgents know that aid organizations (governmental and NGOs) cannot conduct such activities if the security environment is too dangerous. They target civil COIN projects and personnel to convince the population that the government cannot provide for its needs.¹

While security is vital, who provides it also matters. The new states in Iraq and Afghanistan rely for their security and even for their survival on precisely the large-scale U.S. military power that may feed

¹ Interviews with U.S., British, Canadian, and UN officials in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, January 2007.

Islamic insurgency instead of starving it. A state cannot win its citizens' confidence if it must rely on foreign troops to provide for their security, especially if those foreign troops can be called infidels. In a contest for the population's allegiance, it is at least as important that force be legitimate as that it be effective. Difficult though it may be to make indigenous forces more effective, this is an inherently easier task than making foreign ones more legitimate.

The capabilities of all security forces—local, international, and the United States—must meet this dual standard of effectiveness and legitimacy, without which COIN cannot succeed. The aims of the effort to improve security capabilities for COIN, broadly stated, should be to *make local forces more capable and U.S. forces more legitimate*. Effectiveness must take into account that global-local insurgents tend to be distributed, networked, mobile, hidden in population centers, fanatical, and fearless. Legitimacy must take into account how the population will react to the use of force. The more vicious and wanton Islamic insurgents are, like those in Iraq, the better it is to counter them with forces that are just the opposite: more discriminating than deadly, more intelligent than intimidating, more agile than aggressive, and more reassuring than frightening to the general public. To fight jihadists with brute force is to play *our role in their script*.

These considerations argue for all COIN forces to have certain general qualities:

- strong and numerous enough to provide control and security for the population
- well-trained, led, and disciplined
- capable of precise, graduated, and nonlethal effects
- rapidly mobile
- structured to operate in small units
- interoperable with other COIN forces
- able to gain the cooperation of the local population
- able to operate with civil agencies
- designed to exploit networking.

In this chapter, we lay out the key security capabilities required to conduct COIN successfully, without regard to who provides them. These capabilities are not intended to be used as inputs to a fixed equation that will guarantee success in every instance of COIN but are instead meant to highlight key capability areas, needed especially but not exclusively to counter Type III insurgencies.

Chapters Nine and Ten discuss the respective roles and capabilities of local states and the United States. As Iraq and Afghanistan show, local and U.S. security forces are not readily interchangeable once a COIN campaign begins: On the one hand, local forces rarely can approach the technical capabilities and proficiency of American forces; on the other, U.S. forces cannot match the awareness and legitimacy of competent local ones. At the same time, the capabilities of local and U.S. COIN forces cannot be considered independently any more than they can operate independently. Together they must satisfy the total security need by complementing and cooperating with one another. Although the exact parts to be played by local and U.S. security forces will vary from one COIN campaign to another, it is useful to have a general scheme that indicates what local and U.S. forces ought to be *prepared* to do. This is especially important because the United States must have the capabilities needed to prepare local forces to play the roles generally expected of them.

The method of analysis used in this and the two subsequent chapters warrants some explanation. Because actual COIN conditions vary so greatly, it is difficult to generalize based on how specific security capabilities contributed to specific outcomes. As noted, what works in some circumstances may not work in others. Attempting to isolate the empirical effects of certain capabilities in complex settings and then to derive results from many such settings is at best exceedingly difficult and at worst misleading. This problem of empirical confidence is aggravated by the fact that insurgency and COIN are undergoing major changes as a consequence of globalization and the emergence of Type III insurgency. Therefore, for purposes of this report, a team was assem-

bled consisting of four persons of diverse and extensive operational and research experiences.² Members provided independent views on key core, local, and U.S. capabilities, which were then synthesized. These views were informed by the case studies and other research conducted in the RAND Counterinsurgency Study, knowledge of the literature, and direct experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results, as noted, may not apply in every COIN campaign, past or future. However, they are offered as indicative of where general emphasis should be placed in the development of capabilities for the future, including U.S. capabilities, local capabilities, and U.S. capabilities to create local capabilities. They are, in sum, no more or less than the considered judgments of the team and should be taken as such.

Finally, on method, the capabilities included here include all those that bear more or less directly on the provision of security—thus, not only security forces but also intelligence services, the so-called power ministries that guide and support forces, and even the courts and corrections systems without which security services may be neither legitimate nor effective. We do not include capabilities, such as those explored in Chapter Five, which may address sources of insecurity but not the manifestations of it.

Core Security Capabilities

There are, of course, differences among providing security to the population (e.g., not letting insurgents terrorize the population or take control of particular areas), securing key facilities and infrastructure (e.g., energy production and distribution, factories, bridges), and providing security for the government (e.g., officials, judges, politicians, and local leaders). Each task will require a specialized approach based on the norms of the threatened nation, the severity of the insurgent threat, and the capability of the security forces, both local and foreign. In Iraq,

² In addition to the principal authors of this report, the team included Seth Jones and Edward O'Connell (the former with extensive experience in Afghanistan and the latter with extensive experience in Iraq). Members of the team provided independent views that were then synthesized.

for example, insurgents have targeted oil pipelines and electricity grids. Protecting such infrastructure is a different type of security task than providing safety at crowded market places or religious centers. The prevalence of terrorism in insurgencies that fall under jihadist or other fanatical ideologies makes all these tasks harder and more dangerous.

As stressed throughout this report, the use of force, especially by foreign military units operating within a threatened country, carries with it the risk that it will further the cause of the insurgents, adding recruits to their ranks and legitimacy to their cause. To the extent modern technology, especially IT, makes possible, capabilities should take advantage of precision, timely and reliable networked information, nonlethal options, clear communications and close collaboration, and advanced cognition. Though local forces will not be as advanced as U.S. forces, neither should they be backward or deprived of suitable technology.

With these thoughts in mind, the following general capabilities, ranging from management capacity to combat forces, are deemed important for the provision of security. The order begins with security-governance capabilities and ends with capabilities to deliver deadly forces; it does not imply priority.

Institutional Management Capacity

Security forces cannot be capable unless the institutional structures that give them direction, authority, and support are capable. This is painfully apparent from Iraq, though the United States did not need that experience to appreciate the importance of management. Institutional capability, or the lack thereof, has both political and practical significance.³ The ultimate responsibility for the competence and conduct of security forces lies with and is an essential requirement of government—preferably civilian government exercising civilian control. Filling this need with uniformed officers, while unavoidable under

³ A detailed analysis of the effort at security-sector reform in Iraq can be found in Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-365-OSD, 2005). As of October 31, 2007: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG365/>.

some circumstances, is an expedient that comes at the expense of political accountability. Thus, in the context of an insurgency, the very effectiveness and legitimacy of a government and its security services are only as good as the civilians in ministries and agencies that direct and support those services: ministries of defense, interior, justice, and foreign affairs; a national intelligence agency; interministerial coordination mechanisms; and the civilian chain of command.

At the practical level, institutional capability is critical for planning, guiding, and funding the training, equipping, structuring, and employment of police and military forces. Although different countries will have widely varying levels of expertise and experience in this area, it is fair to say that some countries of concern will have institutions that are frail, incompetent, corrupt, politicized, or militarized. Depending on the level of ability of the local government, there may be a need for other nations to, at least temporarily, provide some of the civilian management required to create and sustain the capabilities required for the COIN effort. But this is no substitute for indigenous capability, which is fundamental to sovereign responsibility and legitimacy.

The institutional requisites for effective security forces include not only adequate numbers of professionals but also the practices, systems, and principles in accordance with which they function. Iraq is but the latest case in which indigenous security institutions have been incompetent, politicized, opaque to the population (and often the United States), and corrupt. The doleful performance of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, including the operation of death squads, plainly shows how flawed institutions preclude security, regardless of the capabilities of the forces they control. Similarly, the failure of the new Iraqi state to form an effective national intelligence service, despite having a huge domestic intelligence service under Saddam Hussein, reveals that local governments may view intelligence as an instrument of state oppression rather than one for enabling public security.⁴

The longer foreign authorities perform these functions for lack of local capabilities, the more difficult it may be to create effective local

⁴ Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

ones.⁵ This makes it all the more important that the United States be prepared in advance, and to some extent permanently, to build and reform local security institutions capable of assuming responsibility promptly.⁶ (More on this later.)

Uniformed Command and Leadership

The various forces, services, and agencies participating in the security function in COIN require operational direction linked to ultimate political authority. This capability applies not only to the exercise of command but also to the leaders needed to effectively command and control security organizations. This includes the need to train local military and police leaders from noncommissioned officers up to the general officer/executive level. As the individuals in the national chain of command gain expertise, they can plan and control ever more sophisticated operations.

Command and control in COIN can be more difficult than in a conventional military operation. Specifically, there is a need for very close coordination between police and military forces, both of which require timely access to intelligence. In some COIN circumstances, military units may be called on to support the police,⁷ which implies a nontraditional command relationship for military forces. Because military units may be dispersed in relatively small units across a wide geographic area, command and control could be more difficult and require greater empowerment of junior officers than is the case in conventional military operations.

There will also be a need to coordinate security activities with other agencies working to improve the capability and legitimacy of the local government. This will require security forces to integrate their

⁵ This was the experience in Iraq with regard to recreating the ministry of defense and the intelligence service after a year of control by U.S. authorities. (Rathmell et al., *Developing Iraq's Security Sector*.)

⁶ The United States had virtually no such capability for Iraq. The team was created from scratch, mainly from persons not in government, and depended heavily on UK, Australian, Italian, and other non-American capacity, which is also limited.

⁷ This is the case today in Northern Ireland, where the British Army units are explicitly in support of the local police.

activities with those of other agencies to a far greater extent than is normally required in conventional combat operations. Therefore, the command and control of security forces will have to be conducive to greater integration.

While it is very important that local security forces gain the capability to command their own organizations as quickly as possible, there may be some situations in which foreign command is required for a period of time. This will be especially true in the case of commanding sophisticated joint operations in which the integration of air-land-naval and police activities is required. While some local forces may be able to perform sophisticated command functions from the outset, in some cases foreign command may be required to coordinate complex operations. This presents a difficult and potentially dangerous situation of two command systems operating in the same areas at the same time. Yet, segmentation of command by operating area may come at the expense of effectiveness in countering networked and mobile insurgents.

An essential element of command and control in COIN is the need for unity of effort. COIN is a multidisciplinary, interagency, and coalition effort. There is a particularly critical need for unity of effort among the agencies involved in providing security (police, intelligence, military). It is also needed among the wider collection of agencies (including nongovernmental agencies, to the extent possible) participating in the overall COIN effort. In Iraq, achieving unity of effort has proven difficult. There are Iraqi military and police units operating in the same geographic areas as U.S. forces, plus the additional complication of forces from several other nations operating in several Iraqi provinces. Such unity of effort cannot be imposed by centralized control, especially not against distributed and dynamic insurgency. It must be achieved through a combination of distributed decisionmaking authority, free-form horizontal collaboration, information sharing, and clear and common goals and strategy.

Logistics

While all security forces have logistical needs, these needs are greater for forces that must be prepared for combat. Typically, in the early

stages of an insurgency, few if any combat operations may be taking place; therefore, the logistics burden of early COIN may be minimal. But as an insurgency worsens and the military assumes a greater role, the logistics burden could grow appreciably.

Logistical requirements include providing pay, food, fuel, parts, and ammunition; performing maintenance and repair beyond what frontline police and troops are capable of; and managing the materiel, flows, facilities, and processes that make for responsive logistics. For sophisticated equipment maintenance and repair, foreign personnel (including contractors) may have to provide that function for extended periods until local organizations are able to take over the role. To meet logistics needs, adequate infrastructure (depots, transport, maintenance shops, etc.) is needed. The extent and nature of the infrastructure will vary depending on scale and operational needs.

Delivery of supplies to support COIN efforts in remote areas could be difficult. Aerial delivery may in some situations be better and safer than traditional ground-vehicular supply. Because COIN is often a coalition effort, a complicating factor may be the fact that several national logistics systems may be operating simultaneously, with relatively little interoperability. For example, the weapons, aircraft, and vehicles of the local forces may be very different from the systems of the foreign forces (U.S. and other) that have come to the assistance of the threatened nation. This issue will become more significant as foreign forces become increasingly involved.

IO Capabilities and Competence

To the maximum extent possible, the local government, the United States, and other foreign nations assisting the threatened government should present a coordinated message to influence the perceptions of the population and other audiences (as discussed in Chapter Seven). This presents a major challenge insofar as the local government wants to use IO at the expense of its local enemies—possibly including political opponents who are not involved in the insurgency—whereas the United States will want to use IO at the expense of its global (e.g., jihadist) enemies. Nevertheless, since the local government and its security organizations will normally be far more familiar with the pop-

ulation and have a better understanding of what messages will and will not resonate with the people, the role of the local authorities in crafting the information campaign will be essential. There may be aspects of IO in which foreign forces can provide key capabilities to the local government. Communications systems and assistance in disseminating the message to the population and even a wider, possibly global, audience are examples.

Information operations in COIN have two components: informing and influencing. Local governments and those nations seeking to help them must have effective plans to inform the populace of the intention of major elements of COIN-related policy to quickly thwart speculation and potential unrest. For example, if the severity of the insurgency requires more intrusive search-and-seizure policies, they should be explained to the population.

The medium is often as important as the message. In Iraq, the U.S. tried to influence the population with paper fliers and Western-style media efforts. This was not effective with key segments of the population, e.g., ordinary Sunnis and poor urban Shia. The local and allied governments must craft mechanisms and media that work with the population, including using methods appropriate for the culture.

Justice Systems

Part of a local government's legitimacy rests in the state's justice and correction systems. Without an adequate and efficient justice system, lawbreakers will be either put back on the street or incarcerated without due process, perhaps indefinitely. Without a fair and transparent justice system, insurgents will find it easier to convince segments of the population that the state's purpose is oppression, not law. Without a justice system that is *both* effective and fair, it will be difficult to gain the active, crucial cooperation from most of the population in providing security, e.g., in working with the police. "Success in defeating insurgent movements requires not only that the police be strong and numerous, but that the laws they enforce be suited for counterinsurgency. Thus, legal reform is a vital early step in COIN."⁸ In sum, a

⁸ Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*, p. ix.

sound justice system is just as important to security as police and military force.

According to the former U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, the Afghan government is “extraordinarily weak” in the administration of justice. The lack of courts and correction systems, and insufficient U.S. and international support in these areas, is contributing to a “potentially irretrievable loss of government legitimacy” of the government.⁹

The components of an adequate justice system include courts, able and trustworthy judges and other court officers, efficient processes for investigation, trial and appeal, proper detention processes, adequate and decent penal facilities, security of justice personnel and facilities, and education of law enforcement officers in law, not just enforcement. While this must be a capability of local government, the United States and other nations must be able to provide assistance. This includes training and educating local officials, information systems to enable the development of an effective justice system, and safety for judicial officials. The development and implementation of an effective justice system will usually be heavily based on local customs and norms. Therefore, for foreigners to be able to provide useful assistance, an appropriate level of understanding of local religious, political, ethnic, tribal, and other factors will be essential. The development of a justice system could be a daunting task, especially when none exists from which to build. Additionally, there could be important cultural barriers to overcome. For example, the nation in need of assistance might require a religious-based justice system be implemented. It is likely that there will be few lawyers and legal experts in the United States who are familiar with, or have much sympathy for, such a system.

Police and Law Enforcement

Closely linked with justice systems are police and law enforcement capabilities. Local police provide the first line of defense in COIN. In combination, more competent governance, an effective justice system,

⁹ Ann Scott Tyson, “General Warns of Peril in Afghanistan,” *Washington Post* (February 14, 2007, p. A15).

timely and accurate intelligence, and efficient police and law enforcement are the key capabilities to defeat an insurgency early. Local police, in particular, live with the community and tend to remain in local areas, unlike military units that, in many countries, are recruited throughout the nation and move frequently, which in turn inhibits their ability to develop intimate knowledge of local conditions. The police tend to be permanently located in specific areas. They have the opportunity to learn who the “bad actors” are in a region—including which groups may be politically motivated terrorists as opposed to common criminals. They are “typically far better suited to defeating small groups because they know the communities well and are trained to use force discriminately.”¹⁰ A complicating factor might be the reality that the local police may be corrupt or have mixed loyalties, or both.

By “local police,” we mean not only those indigenous to the country facing insurgency but also, under most circumstances, those local to the province, city, even neighborhood. All else being equal, the advantages of using police who know the immediate human terrain are obvious: They can empathize with community concerns and habits, they can develop contacts and foster cooperation, and they know where to look, who to trust, how to interpret facts, and how to distinguish between insurgents and bystanders. But there can also be disadvantages: mixed loyalties, grudges and even scores to settle, and threats against families. In addition, police quality may suffer if limited to local persons or controlled by local authorities. The standard way to avoid the disadvantages while gaining the advantages is to have national standards, policies, and general oversight. Results to date in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that this formula is hard to implement in practice, especially if there are political tensions between national and local governance.

In most circumstances, there should be some existing local police capability on which greater capacity can be built. In the worst case, the United States or some other coalition member may have to temporarily provide basic police functions until sufficient local capacity is built up, as was done following the Balkan wars of the 1990s. But the experience

¹⁰ Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*, p. ix.

in Iraq has shown that U.S. military forces may be ill prepared to monitor, train, and manage indigenous police, in contrast with building and cooperating with indigenous military units, whose tactics, techniques, and procedures may be more familiar to them.¹¹

Constabulary Police

In a country seriously threatened by insurgency, the ability of local police forces to perform normal, non-threatening neighborhood law enforcement and public safety functions will likely not suffice. But given the importance of winning the population's trust and support, it is important to have options short of calling in combat troops. In such countries, the simple two-tiered (police-and-military) model to which the United States is accustomed will not work. Instead, there is a need for sophisticated paramilitary internal-security forces organized, trained, and equipped to function either as police or as combat units, or as a hybrid of the two in tricky circumstances.

Ordinarily, it is best to create such capabilities as a branch of the police, as opposed to an independent third force or part of the military. The strongest argument for this is the need for such forces to work seamlessly with regular police. For example, regular police who happen on a suspected insurgent hideout may need combat-capable constabulary as backup or even to conduct the operation, given the prospect of serious resistance. This is not to imply that such high-end police need the ability to fight large pitched battles.

The Italian Carabinieri, the French Gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil are possible models. These organizations are composed of policemen but are capable of military-like actions in situations in which local police lack the training, firepower, and other specialized equipment to overcome heavy insurgent resistance. In these models, paramilitary police are able to function with regular police, with regular military forces, and on their own. In the Balkans in the 1990s, for

¹¹ Because of the lack of adequate civilian policy trainers and advisors in Iraq, in 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed his military commanders to carry out this mission in Baghdad and throughout the country. The results have been not been good. In Western Iraq, polls indicate that the population is more supportive and trusting of insurgents than of district police. Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

example, the *Carabinieri* and military police units from other nations, operating under *Carabinieri* control, were able to diffuse difficult, riot situations with minimal use of force, backing up less well-armed local police. The paramilitary nature of these constabulary units provided them the option of quickly transitioning to the use of more force if the need arose.¹²

Technical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The ability to locate and monitor insurgents is essential—and difficult. Whereas conventional enemy military forces can be identified by their uniforms and equipment and are usually concentrated in large numbers and large units, insurgents usually wear civilian clothes, operate in small teams, do not normally use large identifiable pieces of military equipment, and often hide in the civilian community. While these difficulties limit the utility of many existing technical sensors, such as airborne systems designed to support regular combat operations, new capabilities that offer persistent and close surveillance in cluttered environments would complement human intelligence (see below), especially if controlled by or directly accessible to operating units.

The ISR capabilities referred to here apply mostly to technical systems such as electronics surveillance, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and remote sensors. Data produced by signals intelligence (SIGINT), as well as ground and airborne sensors, require rapid processing, analysis, and dissemination to appropriate agencies. A major challenge may be how data produced by one component (U.S., other coalition forces, local security organizations) are rapidly shared with the others (see Chapter Six).

Technical ISR systems differ considerably in terms of cost and sophistication. Long-range UAVs with sophisticated sensor packages and satellites, for example, are costly systems that few nations can afford. Other UAVs are less capable, but also less expensive, depending on the type of sensor system they use. Robotic vehicles can carry an increasing variety and number of sensors but are still expensive, ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to several million each.

¹² RAND interviews with personnel from the Italian *Carabinieri*, Rome, July 2005.

Stationary electro-optical or infrared sensors are less expensive, but are limited in their coverage areas compared with mobile systems. On average, though, the costs of ISR, like the costs of IT generally, are coming down, which lowers one of the obstacles to local ISR capabilities.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, technical intelligence systems have displayed both strengths and weaknesses. Many of the overhead ISR systems were originally designed to locate and track conventional enemy military units. They have been useful in searching for suspected insurgent concentrations and helping patrol routes but are limited in their ability to determine who in a given location is an insurgent versus an innocent civilian. Similarly, technical SIGINT systems have been useful in monitoring insurgent use of cell phones and other means of communication but are much less applicable when the enemy communicates via other means such as meetings and messengers.

Human Intelligence

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is also essential in COIN. In the COIN context, it is akin to police investigative work. In the United States, for example, the major police departments that are confronted with a gang problem rely heavily on their version of HUMINT. Informants, interviews, tips, and other techniques are used in an attempt to penetrate the gangs and determine what their next moves will be. In many COIN situations, U.S. or other coalition forces may have a better SIGINT capability than that of the local force. In most cases, however, the HUMINT capability of the local security organizations will be better than that of foreign forces because it is highly dependent on knowledge of the language, culture, local customs, and of personal, family, and tribal relationships. Indeed, U.S. and other foreign forces conducting COIN should depend on local security services for most of their HUMINT. An important consideration that must be resolved in COIN is how local forces will share their generally superior HUMINT with foreign forces and agencies. This has been an issue

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and was a factor in earlier COIN operations such as Vietnam.¹³

Border Security

Historical analysis of past insurgencies clearly shows that if insurgents have cross-border sanctuary, the task of counterinsurgent forces is much more difficult. The capability to secure borders is therefore very important. The details of what types of specific forces and systems would be needed to secure a particular border vary considerably depending on factors such as the length of the border, the terrain in the border regions, the density of population in the border area, and the normal amount of cross-border traffic that takes place.

Preventing the movement of insurgency fighters and supplies across borders must be seen in context. Most borders—including the Syria-Iraq and Iran-Iraq borders—are crossed constantly by streams of traders, migrants, pilgrims, and other visitors. Sealing borders may do more damage to legitimate activity, even important activity, than to insurgent capabilities.¹⁴ Moreover, crossing points are or should be managed by customs and immigration personnel, backed up by lightly armed border guards. While these people do not have the mobility, firepower, or scale to stop significant insurgent cross-border movements, forces used for that purpose must fit into the larger scheme of border management. The goal is not to isolate a country, but to isolate the insurgents within it.

Sensor and computing technology are of growing utility in border security, whether in managing regular crossing points or in monitoring other border segments. Therefore, some combination of personnel-intensive and technical systems will probably be required to provide surveillance and checkpoints along border regions. Airborne surveillance can be important, and it need not require the advanced systems

¹³ RAND interviews with U.S., Canadian, and NATO personnel, Afghanistan, January, 2007.

¹⁴ As early as 2004, Iraqi ministries resisted constricting cross-border movement out of concern for economic harm, at first to the chagrin of U.S. commanders. More recently, U.S. commanders have acknowledged the downside of closing the borders.

that only the United States can provide. Indeed, the best argument for a light, local air force may be border patrol.

Coastal Security

Depending on the nation, the capability to monitor and police coastal water traffic can be critical. In the Vietnam War, for example, waterways (especially rivers) were key pathways for the movement of insurgent supplies and personnel. The experience in Iraq has included the movement of arms and IEDs along the country's estuaries and rivers. Most countries with the potential for Type III insurgency have shorelines (Afghanistan being an exception). Therefore, providing "green-water" (near-coastal) and "brown-water" (riverine) security capabilities—e.g., surveillance, patrol, interception, boarding, lethal action—is likely to become increasingly important.

Yet securing a coastline, territorial waters, harbors and ports, and rivers is difficult and expensive. Most countries lack the resources, competence, or both to do this against determined and clever adversaries. While the U.S. Navy can establish control of the "blue water" (high seas), it does not have the numbers of assets to provide coastal security everywhere that there could be insurgent activity; nor can the U.S. Coast Guard fill this need, given its domestic mission.

As a general guideline, coastal security should combine manpower-intensive, low-tech systems (e.g., patrol boats) with technology-intensive monitoring of small-boat and merchant-ship traffic, surveillance, and command-and-control systems.

Tactical Air Mobility

Security forces involved in COIN will often need air mobility. Since insurgents usually have the tactical initiative (i.e., they decide when and where to strike), COIN forces need mobility to respond quickly. Additionally, intelligence systems might pick up insurgent moves (especially those of key insurgent leaders) that require rapid response because they are probably fleeting opportunities. Finally, by permitting forces to respond rapidly to warnings, to surprise insurgents, and to cover expanses of territory without requiring stationary positioning, tactical air mobility provides an operational alternative, or at least a

complement, to the large-scale, widespread presence of slow-moving forces.

When joined with advanced information networks, light air-mobile forces can have a much smaller footprint than larger and heavier land forces. The choice between presence and mobility—which tends to translate into choice between heavy (necessary for force protection) versus light (for speed)—is not merely an operational one. The politics of COIN should determine whether it is better for the population to constantly see large numbers of military troops or to not see them but know they are available promptly and decisively when needed.

Public perceptions aside, the extent to which COIN air-mobility capabilities are needed will depend on the severity of the insurgency, the expansiveness and ruggedness of the terrain, the availability of information (for warning), and the ability of the insurgents to threaten air operations. If the insurgents have large numbers of man-portable air defense missiles, they could severely threaten low-altitude air-transport missions. This was precisely what happened to the Soviet forces engaged in fighting the Afghan *mujahideen* in the 1980s. The Soviets had become highly dependent on helicopters for reconnaissance, fire support, and transport, seeing the helicopter as a means of quickly moving forces over long distances. When the U.S. provided the insurgents with Stinger shoulder-fired missiles in 1986, the Soviets' use of helicopters quickly became a far more dangerous proposition, and the Soviet COIN effort was seriously compromised.

Long-Range Air Mobility

Whereas tactical air mobility enables the movement of security forces within, say, 100 miles or less, there could be a need for long-range air mobility to transport units and supplies over greater distances, in large amounts, on short notice. For example, during an upsurge of violence in Kosovo in 2004, the NATO command wanted to transport Italian *Carabinieri* units quickly from Bosnia to the threatened area. Intra-theater air transport was required to perform the move, which took place over several hundred kilometers. Similarly, in Afghanistan the distances are considerable, and the rapid long-distance redeployment of security forces could be beyond the ability of short-range tactical air

transport. In Iraq, to mitigate the effects of attacks on ground convoy, more long-haul logistics efforts were shifted to air transports.

Long-range air mobility may also be needed to deploy and sustain foreign troops, if local ones cannot counter insurgents alone. Given the distances and paucity of modern air strips in parts of the world where Type III Islamic insurgency may occur, such “strategic lift” should be able to fly long distances and use short runways (as the U.S. C-17, but few other aircrafts, can do).

Specialized Forces for High-Value Targets (HVTs)

There are differences in the capabilities and methods of conventional, general-purpose units and special operations forces (SOF). SOF—Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, commandos, and covert-action teams—normally have more training in irregular warfare techniques, operate in very small groups, and are well suited for specific tasks such as direct action strikes and reconnaissance in hostile territory. Such forces have considerable applicability in COIN.

These specialized forces provide the capability to conduct military tasks for which conventional forces and police are not appropriate or capable. Specific tasks for which these forces are more appropriate than regular police and regular military forces include high-risk reconnaissance, counterterrorist operations, hostage-rescue raids, and direct action against high-value targets (e.g., insurgent command and control). This could include clandestine cross-border actions against insurgent sanctuary areas.

This capability could be located either within military forces, as it is within the U.S. military today, or within constabulary police units, which the United States does not have. In some cases, this type of capability may be appropriate in both organizations. This could involve Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units within the constabulary for HVT operations within a nation’s borders, while also having a similar capability within the nation’s armed forces for attacks against insurgent concentrations or leaders outside the country.

Precision Strike

Often equated with “smart bombs,” precision strike is more generally the capability to locate and destroy targets with high accuracy. This capability can be very important in COIN, where collateral damage and civilian casualties must be kept to a minimum. For example, when coalition forces located Saddam Hussein’s two sons, they surrounded the building they were hiding in deep within a residential area and struck it with precision wire-guided antitank missiles before storming it. Being able to strike the building precisely was vital to minimizing any damage to nearby homes.

Often, precision strike will have to be conducted within tight time frames, because in many situations targets will be fleeing, thus requiring short sensor-decider-shooter timelines. Precision strike can be conducted by surface-to-surface (e.g., cannon- or rocket-delivered munitions), air-to-surface (e.g., precision munitions delivered by helicopters, UAVs, or fixed-wing aircraft), or ship-to-shore means (e.g., Tomahawk missiles launched from surface ships or submarines). In some cases, it can be conducted from land locations or ships outside the main COIN operating areas. This may prove beneficial in reducing the resentment of the local population that results from the intrusiveness of large bases on local soil. It can also be beneficial in tying down base security units that might be better used in police efforts supporting mainline COIN tasks.

The cost of precision-strike systems varies enormously. For example, some direct-fire wire-guided weapons cost a few thousand dollars and would be within the means of most (but not all) nations threatened by insurgency. Other systems, such as missiles or the aircraft required to carry air-delivered precision weapons, are hugely expensive: Many tens of millions of dollars are needed to obtain even a modest amount of the capability. In general, thanks to off-board guidance (e.g., GPS), the cost of precision strike is coming down, and larger arsenals are becoming affordable.

Ground Combat

Ground combat forces are required when insurgents have become so strong that police and constabulary forces are no longer sufficient to

provide security. The use of such forces is probably the most sensitive aspect of COIN. If they are local ground forces, they may evoke fears of oppression among the populace, which was the case throughout the Shi'ite areas of Iraq. If they are foreign ground forces, they may be viewed as occupiers—worse, infidel occupiers, which has been the case throughout the Sunni areas of Iraq and the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. The way that ground forces conduct themselves is therefore critical, which underscores the importance of the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps manual. While this study, being about capabilities, has not addressed issues of doctrine, conduct, and tactics, it does endorse the idea of intensive COIN training for any forces, U.S. or indigenous, that are to be used.

In COIN, as in any type of operation, requirements for ground-combat capabilities should be derived from missions. In Iraq, generally speaking, the capabilities were those designed and maintained by the United States to fight major conventional wars—"you go to war with the army you have,"¹⁵ said then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, famously—including the invasion of Iraq. They were then given the mission of COIN. Even U.S. ground forces, arguably the world's best, are not versatile enough to be given a new and very different mission than those for which they had been organized, trained, and equipped.

With this experience fresh, we suggest four missions within the overall mission of COIN:

- *defensive security operations* to prevent insurgents from establishing control of specific areas
- *defense of key locations* such as government facilities and buildings or key economic sites (e.g., power stations)
- *quick-reaction operations* by military units to rapidly come to the assistance of and reinforce police units that suddenly find themselves in a particularly threatening situation

¹⁵ Donald Rumsfeld, remarks at a meeting with U.S. soldiers in Camp Buehring, Kuwait, December 8, 2004.

- *offensive operations* such as sweeps of specific areas to seize insurgent weapons caches, destroy insurgent sanctuaries, or reclaim areas that have fallen under insurgent control. Offensive patrols, for example, can be used to deter insurgents from taking actions such as emplacing explosive devices—a major problem in Iraq.

The scale of ground-combat requirements is, of course, a very important issue. Numbers will depend on the particular insurgency. One should be wary of formulae that link ground-force size to square miles or population. In the case of a nationwide insurgency such as Vietnam, literally hundreds of thousands of police and troops were required for the attempt to secure hundreds of villages, dozens of cities, and other key infrastructure. In other cases, particularly when an insurgency is still small and limited, the actual numbers of forces could be relatively small. Basing COIN force-size requirements on the number of insurgents is another method of uneven value, especially as insurgents become more cellular, networked, and distributed. Other factors—use of information, mobility, cooperation of the populace (one way or the other), quality of friendly and opposing forces, concepts of operation, tactics—can have big effects (which underscores the importance of investing in the factors). Empirically, COIN forces that outnumber insurgents by at least 3:1 are roughly three times more likely to prevail than those that match insurgents 1:1, all else being equal.¹⁶ Yet, in Iraq, total U.S. and Iraqi security forces have consistently been ten times the size of estimated insurgent forces.¹⁷

In considering requirements for ground-force capabilities, we would stress two basic factors—one mainly operational, the other mainly political. Operationally, forces must be of sufficient size to deny the insurgents the ability to intimidate the population, gain control of important territory, and attack targets on which the state depends to function. The exploitation of information collection and dissemination—along

¹⁶ Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946.

¹⁷ Ranging between 2003 and 2007 from roughly 200,000 versus 5,000 to 300,000 versus 30,000.

the lines of ICON—combined with the availability of high-quality forces and tactical air mobility may reduce the need for large numbers of ground forces. Politically, some populations in which COIN is under way will be amenable to large and visible ground-force presence, whereas others may react better if ground forces are not routinely present but instead appear when and as needed. These operational and political tradeoffs are shown in simple terms in Figure 8.1.

This matrix indicates that two sets of conditions (in the upper-left and lower-right quadrants) are fairly clear, whereas the other two sets (lower-left and upper-right) are ambiguous and call for approaches that mix the large-presence and fast-response solutions.

In Type III insurgencies, the insurgents are likely to be distributed, cellular, and mobile, which suggests an advantage for light mobile forces exploiting advanced information networking. Politically, however, the population may or may not want a large military presence in its midst (where insurgents and jihadists may be active). Insurgen-

Figure 8.1
Ground-Force Options

		Political conditions	
		Population needs reassurance of military presence	Population is averse to military presence
Operational conditions	Large-unit, mechanized presence	Large-unit, mechanized presence	Mixed solution
	Networked mobile insurgency	Mixed solution	Small-unit, fast-response on warning

cies in the Muslim world, which feed on popular hostility to Western forces, will tend to fall in the lower two quadrants of the matrix. It follows that the ideal ground-force formula for countering such insurgencies, generally speaking, is one of large and visibly present indigenous ground forces and small, light, quick-response foreign forces. This of course assumes that capable indigenous ground forces are available, which has not been the case in either Iraq or Afghanistan. (We return below to the question of the mix of indigenous and U.S. ground forces to counter Type III insurgency.)

The Relationship of Local and Foreign Capabilities

Conducting successful security operations and campaigns against full-scale insurgencies may require all the capabilities just listed, especially if multiple insurgencies erupt (as is currently the case). Ideally, the local government and its security forces should provide the bulk of those capabilities. However, given that the local government is threatened by an insurgency in the first place, it is probably weak in at least some of them. In that case, the capabilities have to be provided by the local government in conjunction with nations attempting to assist it, notably the United States.


Figure 8.2 depicts a simple model used by the assessment team to judge the appropriate relationship between local and foreign forces. In any of the capabilities that were listed earlier in the chapter, local forces will begin at some level, perhaps with no meaningful capability. Capabilities that require significant capital investment or technical sophistication may be beyond the means of the threatened nation for a long time. In those cases, foreign forces or agencies will have to deliver the capability.¹⁸ For instance, foreign forces may have to satisfy the requirement for logistics, but local forces will pick up responsibilities for this as they gain competencies and resources, leaving foreign forces with a shrinking and increasingly specialized logistics role.

¹⁸ The fact that foreign and local forces will operate side-by-side for some time imposes additional requirements for command, information sharing, and interoperability.

Ideally, the local security services can provide all of the required security capabilities, but that is often not the case. Although the overarching goal of U.S. assistance should be to prepare local forces to assume as much of the security burden as possible, as soon as possible, some capabilities should be prioritized over others, as illustrated by curves in Figure 8.2. Primary priorities for the United States fall within the upper, lightest-gray portion of the figure; secondary priorities in the middle portion of the figure; and lowest-priority capabilities in the bottom, darkest-gray portion.

It follows that the United States or other foreign supporters must be capable of making up the difference between the local capabilities and the total requirement. Of course, the specifics of the insurgency at hand should determine which capabilities the local government should strive to acquire and at what rate. In most cases, especially in insurgencies in the Muslim world, the local government should take the lead

Figure 8.2
Relationship Between Local and U.S. Capabilities



in those areas where large-scale, visible presence and direct application of force are needed. Providing security to a population, securing key facilities and infrastructure, and providing security for government personnel are all very different security needs. In Iraq, for example, insurgents have targeted oil pipelines and electricity grids. Protecting such infrastructure is a different security task than providing safety at a crowded marketplace or religious center. These and other specific tasks will require a specialized approach based on the norms of the threatened nation, the severity of the insurgent threat, and the capability of local and foreign security forces. In Type III insurgencies in particular, the prevalence of terrorism makes security tasks harder and more dangerous. The speed with which insurgencies can develop and change tactics, targets, and weapons will affect the nature of needed COIN security capabilities, the division of labor between local and foreign forces, and the flexibility and adaptability of those forces.

As a final note, the required scale and capabilities of security forces will be different in a context of robust civil and information capabilities than in a context of weak ones. For example, to the extent that civil COIN succeeds, the need for heavy and lethal forces can be reduced. If the population is disposed to cooperate with the government, the combination of competent police and specialized forces suitable for surgical operations against pockets of insurgents should be sufficient and preferred. Large and heavy forces may be necessary only if the government has little support and its forces, consequently, are operating in the dark. A population more satisfied with its government's performance will offer more tactical intelligence, which can in turn allow light, fleet, small forces to succeed. If the local justice system has been reformed, police will be more respected, accepted, and effective, which may reduce the need for military force.

Similarly, the availability of adequate information networks for operations and communication with the population can enable forces to operate with greater confidence, accuracy, and speed, which in turn affects the capabilities those forces need. Thus, as civil and information COIN capabilities improve, the types of U.S. ground-combat force that have proven problematic in Iraq can be replaced by types more suitable and sustainable in a lengthy struggle for the trust and loy-

alty of the contested population, as well as more effective operationally against an elusive and distributed enemy.

This model implies *in general*

- that COIN campaigns and specific operations will generally involve a mix of local and U.S. (or other foreign) security capabilities
- that local and U.S. services must be able to function well together (thus, to share information and collaborate via networks along the lines presented in Chapter Six)
- that U.S. capabilities to improve the capabilities of and shift responsibilities to local security services are of fundamental importance
- that the United States can and must focus on those capabilities only it can provide, at least while local capabilities are being formed, and should plan its investments accordingly.

Local Security Capabilities

Factors Affecting Local Capability

Having identified general requirements for COIN security capabilities, it remains to be considered which of these requirements can and should be satisfied by indigenous means or by the United States. This is, of course, a critical matter, given that COIN is, after all, a contest for the political support of the population. As a general judgment of this study, we believe that whatever *can* be performed sufficiently by indigenous forces and services *should*, with some exceptions, be performed by them. This in turn raises another critical matter: the capability of the United States to produce indigenous sufficiency, where desirable.

Not all local security capabilities are of equal importance. The local government, the United States, and other international supporters should use what might seem an obvious frame of reference to determine priorities: the requirement to provide security against insurgent violence. But this requirement has not been a constant beacon showing the way for building security capabilities in Iraq. Instead, considerable resources have been committed to capabilities of little utility in COIN.¹

Certain local capabilities may be wanted as soon as possible, but take years to build, depending on the starting conditions. This is the case with the new Iraqi Army. Other capabilities, such as the low-

¹ The building of the low-skilled, poorly armed, barely trained Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in 2003–2004 is an example. The delay, during that same period, in building high-performance police units capable of COIN is an example of a high priority overlooked.

skilled Iraqi National Guard, could be built quickly, but are, in the larger scheme of things, low priorities. Still others, though feasible, may not be desirable for a local state to possess; Iraqi combat aircraft are an example. For a capability to be built urgently, it must be both desirable and feasible to do so.

The team considered a number of factors in judging whether and how quickly a government threatened by insurgency should and can gain a certain security capability. These include

- timing of foreign involvement
- strength of the insurgents
- cultural sensitivities
- economic conditions
- capacity of the local forces
- capacity of the local government.

Although these factors vary widely across COIN campaigns, it is possible to make some generalizations for the purpose of identifying priorities for local capabilities and thus for U.S. capabilities to build and complement local capabilities.

Timing

When does the United States become involved in a counterinsurgency effort? Since enemy strength will almost always start out low at the beginning of an insurgency (the proto-insurgency phase), it makes a significant difference whether the United States becomes involved in year one or years later. In the early stages, when the insurgency is still weak and vulnerable, the insurgents may be having difficulty in organizing, garnering popular support, and equipping their forces. In such cases, the United States may be able to focus on training local military and police units, as well as providing key equipment and operational support, e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). In this early phase, the United States can probably minimize its involvement, especially its physical presence in the threatened nation.

Over time, as the risks and costs of countering the insurgency increase, this will affect the amount—and type—of U.S. capabilities

that must be brought to bear. Historically, U.S. involvement in the insurgency in El Salvador in the 1980s and Vietnam in the 1960s provides examples of the effect of different timing of U.S. involvement in an insurgency. In the case of El Salvador, the United States became involved while the insurgency was still fairly weak, allowing it to provide important assistance to the local government while minimizing its direct involvement. In the case of Vietnam, in contrast, the United States started assisting the South Vietnamese government after the insurgency had already reached major proportions. In that case the size and nature of U.S. assistance, including of course massive military involvement, was profoundly different than in the El Salvador example.

Insurgent Strength

How advanced and robust is the insurgency? Strength can be measured by such variables as the amount of territory controlled by the insurgents, level of popular support, number of insurgents, type of weapons used, and level of violence and destruction. The strength of insurgents can affect the required indigenous COIN capabilities. For example, when insurgents are well equipped with rocket-propelled grenades and artillery, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, they may overwhelm local police and increase the need for and role of local or foreign (U.S.) military forces. If the insurgents have sanctuary in a neighboring state, it will increase the need for developing border security capabilities.

Cultural Sensitivities. Cultural sensitivities, such as local attitudes toward U.S. involvement, can affect the type and amount of U.S. capabilities that can be brought to bear to assist the local government in its campaign against the insurgents. These sensitivities can vary widely among countries, including among Muslim countries. In Afghanistan, for example, roughly 65 percent of Afghans had a favorable view of the U.S. government and 67 percent had a favorable view of the U.S. military after the removal of the Taliban.² In several other countries, such

² Asia Foundation, *Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections* (Kabul, Afghanistan: Asia Foundation, 2004). For other polls, see ABC News, *ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan* (New York: ABC News, 2005, as of October 23, 2007:

as Pakistan and Indonesia, public opinion polls indicate high levels of anti-Americanism.³ In countries where there is significant hostility to the United States, indirect support, rather than direct action, may be desirable—for example, U.S. provision of key ISR and intelligence data to the local security forces. The U.S. military may also need to focus on rapidly building up local capabilities in key areas, since it will have a limited (if any) ability to support with direct action if the security situation deteriorates.

Economic Conditions. Local economic conditions can affect COIN capabilities in several ways. First, they may affect what the threatened government can afford. Insurgencies frequently occur in countries with a low gross domestic product, low per capita income, poor education systems, and limited technological capacity. Many of these countries cannot afford to buy or repair technologically advanced weapons, platforms, or equipment. In countries where COIN requires such capabilities as precision strike, high-tech border security, and surveillance and reconnaissance, the United States may have to buy, operate, or repair these capabilities itself. Second, local economic conditions can affect the speed of building local security capacity. Local security forces that have little experience with modern military capabilities will, in general, take longer to be trained than forces of more advanced nations. This is especially true in areas where literacy rates are low, since literacy rates are often correlated with levels of economic development.

Initial Condition of Local Forces. The level of capability of local military and police forces when the United States becomes engaged is an important factor. How much training do police and security forces have at that point? How competent are they in performing COIN missions in particular? Answers to these questions can significantly affect

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/PollVault/story?id=1363276>); Morgan Courtney, Hugh Ridell, John Ewers, Rebecca Linder, and Craig Cohen, *In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005); and International Republican Institute, *Afghanistan: Election Day Survey* (Kabul, Afghanistan: International Republican Institute, October 9, 2004).

³ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006). As of October 23, 2007: <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253>.

how quickly it will take to make them the primary fighting forces, how priorities should be set, and what type of assistance they need. Key measurements of the capacity of local military units are their performance in

- defensive missions to protect the population and key national infrastructure
- securing borders
- conducting offensive combat operations against insurgent strongholds
- establishing order during major events, such as elections (protecting counting houses and routes civilians will take to polling places)
- using levels of force appropriate to the circumstances
- level of discipline of the military (Does it treat civilians fairly or does it use too much coercion?).

Police units can be judged on their ability to

- conduct patrols
- conduct investigations
- establish order during riots and demonstrations
- establish order during major events, such as elections (protecting polling places and ballot boxes)
- provide high-end police support (e.g., constabulary police).

Insurgents are better able to survive and prosper if the security forces they oppose are relatively weak, considered illegitimate by major segments of the population, badly financed and equipped, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, or poorly informed about events at the local level.

In some cases, the local government may rely on regional militia and paramilitary forces to conduct a significant part of the war (for example, the dependence of the current Afghan government on the forces of regional warlords), since they may have more firepower to use against well-armed insurgent forces than government forces have. The

degree to which the local government may depend on such forces will also influence the types of capabilities that the United States will have to bring to bear on the situation.

Initial Condition of the Local Government

The capacity and legitimacy of the local government itself is another important factor. How competent is the government in providing essential services to the population? How much popular support and legitimacy does it enjoy? Answers to these questions can significantly affect the amount of time it will take to build capacity in such areas as the justice system. International assistance can help build strong institutions in certain areas, such as central banking, which are isolated from society and responsive to the application of external technocratic expertise. But rule-of-law institutions are much less easily strengthened by the application of external assistance. These institutions have high transaction volumes, are much more deeply embedded in the societal fabric, form important elements of the state's basis of legitimacy, and are heavily influenced by the cultural norms and values that shape institutions in any society. Consequently, the absence of rule of law at the outset of U.S. involvement creates enormous challenges and may take a long time to improve.

The United States will inevitably encounter a host of challenges. When dealing with a weak and illegitimate government, it may have to deal with powerful regional militias or criminal organizations that have usurped state functions and control territory. It may also have to devote valuable resources to building the central government's capacity just so that it can function and implement policies. Poor governance may indicate disorganization, weakness, or incompetence—creating a window of opportunity for insurgents to win popular support.

Corruption among the security forces and in the government can be a particularly invidious challenge. Corruption can undermine popular support for the government and increase support for insurgents. It hampers economic growth, disproportionately burdens the poor, undermines the rule of law, and damages government legitimacy. It has a supply side (those who give bribes) and a demand side (public officials who take them). At its core, corruption is the misuse of entrusted power

for private gain. It can involve high-level officials with discretionary authority over government policies or lower-level officials who make decisions about enforcing (or not enforcing) regulations. Accountable political leadership cannot develop in a corrupt climate, because corruption undermines a people's trust in the political system, security forces, and political leadership, while stunting economic growth.

Priorities for Local Security Capabilities

Table 9.1 offers the judgments of the assessment team concerning when in the course of COIN campaign key COIN capabilities are generally needed by a local government, recognizing that priorities for any given case must be based on the particular circumstances. These judgments can, in turn, provide the United States with a sense of what capabilities it needs to (1) assist local states in building their own, (2) provide directly until local security services are capable, and (3) make available to support and enable local capabilities operationally.

Entries in the “Local Government Need” column mean the following:

- **Early:** The local security forces need to develop or strengthen this capability as quickly as possible.
- **Medium:** While foreign agencies can provide the capability for a limited period, the local government cannot afford to wait long (i.e., years) before being able to perform this function with its own resources.
- **Late:** The local government can wait a fairly extended period before it can provide this capability for itself.
- **Never:** This capability may never be within the means of the host nation to acquire, the host nation does not need such a capability, or it is undesirable.

The terms “early,” “medium,” and “late” are relative. We offer no specific number of months or years here, because each situation will vary. In general, “late” probably means it will be some years before the

indigenous government can provide this capability. Again, these are best judgments of the assessment team for the purpose of identifying requirements, not hard and fast certainties, much less prescriptions for any given COIN campaign.

To be clear, we are not prescribing that certain local capabilities judged to be needed early will *always* be needed early. Instead, we are saying that, in general, it is better that they be preformed by local security services as soon as possible, and therefore that it is important for the United States to have adequate permanent capabilities needed to build these local ones. All else being equal, if it is less important that local services assume certain other capabilities (e.g., “late”), it is less important for the United States to be able to build those.

The capabilities in Table 9.1 are presented in the same order as the general categories of the preceding chapter (thus, not in order of priority).

Table 9.1
Local Security Capabilities Requirements

Capability	Local Government Need	Comment
Institutional management capacity	Early/Medium	The ability of the local government to train, equip, and employ its intelligence, police, and military assets. It implies trained junior, middle-level, and senior leaders in those areas. For some functions, the nation needs to acquire management capacity as early as possible. For other areas, such as management of new equipment being processed into the local police and military, a combination of local and foreign management capacity may be appropriate for an extended period.
Command and leadership	Early/Medium	Key to the control of the COIN effort. Depending on the specific command and control function, the local forces could need it early (basic ability to control security forces and plan simple operations) or mid-term (ability to plan and conduct large, sophisticated operations).

Table 9.1—Continued

Capability	Local Government Need	Comment
Logistics	Early/Medium	Certain COIN-related logistics functions (such as meeting the basic logistics needs of the police and military) will be essential early capabilities for the local government. Adequate infrastructure is needed to perform most logistics functions. Some logistics functions, such as more advanced maintenance of sophisticated, foreign-supplied equipment, can evolve over a longer period.
Information operations	Early	This is an essential capability for the threatened government, which must be able to assess and counter, and ideally stay ahead of the message of the insurgents. As with HUMINT, the capability of the local authorities in this area will probably be more important than the IO capability of the foreign forces assisting, since the local government has a better understanding of its people.
Justice system	Early	An essential element in creating government legitimacy that must be established or strengthened as soon as possible.
Local police and law enforcement	Early	Similar to the justice system, this is a key capability for local governments.
Constabulary police forces	Early	“High-end” paramilitary police to supplement local police in particularly challenging situations.
ISR (technical)	Medium/Late/ Never	ISR systems vary considerably in cost and type. Some ISR systems could be obtained and integrated into local forces with relative ease. Examples of limited capacity systems include relatively low-cost UAVs, some infrared sensors, and stationary surveillance devices. Others may be so complex and expensive that foreign agencies have to provide the capability for long periods. Some may never be within the means of the local government.
Human intelligence	Early	An area where the local security and intelligence agencies will probably have a considerable advantage over foreign forces, because they will have a much better knowledge of the language, customs, and personalities involved. Establishing or strengthening this capability as early as possible may be key to the success of the local government’s counterinsurgency effort.

Table 9.1—Continued

Capability	Local Government Need	Comment
Border security	Early/Medium	Manpower-intensive border patrol units should be an early priority. More technically intensive monitoring devices can be provided by foreign forces for longer periods.
Coastal security	Early/Medium/ Never	Assuming that the threatened nation has a coastline or large rivers, some coastal patrol capability is needed as early as possible to limit insurgent use of waterways. Other, far offshore (“blue water”) capabilities could come much later or possibly never be needed by the local government.
Tactical air mobility	Early/Medium	Important enabling capability that will enhance the in-country mobility of local security forces. Poor countries will have significant difficulty affording the required components.
Long-range air mobility	Late	Not an essential capability in most cases. Foreign forces can provide this capability, if it is needed, with relatively little intrusive presence in the host nation.
Specialized forces for high-value targets	Early	Significant amounts of training required to produce high-quality units. Specialized tasks include direct action against HVTs and special reconnaissance. Military and/or constabulary forces could have this capability.
Precision strike	Early/Late	Cost and specific nature of this capability can vary considerably. Less costly (generally surface-to-surface) systems may be easily obtainable by local security agencies. Foreign forces can provide the more costly and sophisticated elements of this capability while maintaining a generally limited presence.
Ground combat	Early	A military function that contributes to government legitimacy and reduces possible resentment against foreign forces. Requires the ability to conduct defensive and offensive operations including a quick reaction capability to rapidly reinforce police forces.

This suggests that the following local capabilities, by virtue of being needed early, should be treated as priorities by the United States as it considers its own capabilities needed to achieve indigenous sufficiency:

- institutional management capacity
- command and leadership
- logistics
- information operations
- justice system
- local police and law enforcement
- constabulary police forces
- low-cost technical ISR
- human intelligence
- border security
- special forces for high-value targets
- precision strike (direct fire and short-range indirect fire)
- ground forces.

This is a formidable list. This follows from the general theme of the study that local security services ought to bear the bulk of the responsibility for COIN, especially in the case of Type III insurgency in the Muslim world. The length of the list also underscores how challenging it will be for the United States to commit itself to building local security forces capable of countering Type III insurgency while reducing reliance on the direct use of large-scale U.S. forces in the Muslim world. A basic finding of this study is that the United States must give no less attention to its capabilities to create indigenous security forces, services, and institutions than it does to the capabilities it needs to conduct COIN operations itself. At the same time, given these heavy demands for local security capabilities and the fact that meeting those demands is not entirely within the control of the United States, the United States must be prepared for disappointment in the form of local capabilities that are insufficient. This is an especially important consideration in light of the dangers and difficulties posed by Type III insurgencies. It begs consideration of how reality—in places such as

Iraq and Afghanistan—may frustrate even the best-laid preparations of the United States to build indigenous security capabilities.

Real-World Obstacles

It is safe to assume for planning that states that are vulnerable to insurgency do not have capable and accountable security forces and institutions. They tend to manifest from some combination of incompetence, political interference, corruption, involvement in business, bloated senior-officer corps, deprived enlisted personnel, weak noncommissioned officers, little regulation, and tenuous (at best) civilian control. Saddam Hussein's army had 12,000 general officers, vast numbers of under-trained and ill-treated soldiers, and a defense ministry stocked with Baath party hacks. His police force and intelligence services were even worse. From Algeria to Vietnam to Afghanistan (during the Soviet occupation and now), local forces are one of the weakest links in the chain of COIN capabilities. If they were well led, disciplined, and skilled in the first place, insurgency might not have developed.

It must also be said that the disappointments and delays in preparing Iraqi security forces have not been for lack of effort or investment. It is undeniable that the United States did not prepare adequately before the invasion for the wholesale rebuilding of Iraqi security forces, and also lost critical months in 2003 before ramping up the effort. Yet, by early 2004, battalions of the "New Iraqi Army" were emerging from unit training, and police were being retrained and returned to the field in large numbers, albeit with sharply abbreviated training. Training course and camps abounded, in and outside the country. As of 2007, billions have been spent on equipment. Hundreds of senior Iraqi officers and ministry officials have been handpicked and sent to school. That the results have been so discouraging is only partly attributable to U.S. mistakes and inadequate capabilities—the rest can be blamed on poor raw material.

Making matters worse, the sort of patient and thorough security-sector transformation that can yield good results during secure conditions is extremely difficult to effect during insurgency. New military

and police units are no sooner done with basic training than they are sent out to engage fanatical, sophisticated, battle-seasoned insurgents.

Yet, expectations of the qualities, capabilities, and contributions of local police and military forces must be raised if the United States is going to counter Type III Islamic insurgency with less reliance on using its own forces on a large scale in the Muslim world. As with efforts to improve the performance and standing of local government with civil COIN, efforts to build local security services cannot be cavalier. Moreover, as it considers its own needs for COIN security forces, the United States cannot assume that all mission and tasks assigned to local forces will be carried out effectively, no matter how much it has invested in helping those local forces.

Again, the complexity of COIN reality demands that the United States not underestimate the difficulty in developing local forces it can rely on, the capabilities the United States will need to develop local forces, or the possibility that local forces will be unable to provide security.

U.S. Security Capabilities

Building for Success; Hedging Against Disappointment

Early on, this study introduced an organizing idea for improving U.S. COIN capabilities: By building stronger civil, information, and indigenous security capabilities, the United States could become both more effective in COIN and less reliant on large-scale use of U.S. military force against Type III insurgency. It also suggested that the availability of these other capabilities would not only *reduce* but also *alter* the need for U.S. military and other security capabilities. U.S. force requirements are different if the United States has complete and balanced COIN capabilities than if it does not. In the preceding chapter, it was recommended that building local security forces, within our general model, deserves greater attention within overall U.S. security capabilities. Having offered proposals for improving civil, information, and indigenous security capabilities (Chapters Five through Nine), while highlighting the particular difficulties of building indigenous security capabilities, we can now consider needed U.S. security capabilities.

The first half of this chapter details such needs in the case of *successful* U.S. efforts to build civil, information, and indigenous security capabilities. At the same time, the United States cannot bank on full success in building and fielding the capabilities proposed in preceding chapters, especially in light of the complexity and uncertainty of insurgency and COIN. Consequently, unless one adopts the view that countering Type III insurgency is nonessential—an imprudent view, by our analysis—there is a need to hedge against the possibility that reliance on the use of U.S. military power in the Muslim world cannot

be reduced. Notwithstanding U.S. efforts, civil COIN (shaping) might be sharply limited by violent security conditions; and attempts to form capable local security forces may falter. Both are serious enough possibilities that the United States must spread its bets. Accordingly, the second half of this chapter suggests requirements for U.S. military capabilities in case U.S. efforts to develop complementary COIN capabilities are not entirely successful. Even in that case, however, it is important to heed the finding that the use of large-scale U.S. military power for COIN in the Muslim world is fraught with risk. Thus, the first half of the chapter deals with *what is desirable*, and the second half deals with *what may be necessary*.

A visual depiction might help. Recall Figure 3.2, which illustrated the recommended general strategy for improving COIN while reducing reliance of direct U.S. physical force. Figure 10.1 shows a revised version of this illustration. Circle A represents U.S. military requirements absent an effort to build complete and balanced U.S. COIN capabilities, and circle B represents U.S. military capabilities on the assumption such efforts are taken and succeed. Circle C represents U.S. military requirements on the assumption that efforts to build complete and balanced COIN capabilities are only partly successful. The first half of this chapter addresses requirements in circle B; the second half addresses those in circle C.


Building for Success

Three U.S. Missions: Prepare, Enable, Operate

If investments in local governance and security capabilities are promising, the United States could and should shift from the role of COIN “retailer” to that of COIN “wholesaler.”¹ As such, it would need to optimize between two objectives: (1) operational effectiveness and (2) indigenization of security responsibilities. These two objectives will

¹ For any readers unfamiliar or uncomfortable with these commercial terms, retailers compete directly in the marketplace of consumers, whereas wholesalers provide retailers with the wherewithal to compete. Thus, a COIN retailer is engaged directly with insurgents and the population, whereas a COIN wholesaler enables the retailer to succeed.

Figure 10.1
U.S. Security Capabilities Under Different Assumptions



be in tension insofar as counting on local forces compromises operational effectiveness—precisely the pattern that has dogged COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan. Optimization therefore demands strong U.S. capabilities for organizing, training, equipping, advising, and otherwise supporting local security services. Yet the extreme difficulty experienced in attempting to build and support Iraqi security forces suggests that the United States has inadequate capabilities for this critical mission.² This suggests a new principle: The ability of U.S. forces to build and support indigenous forces for COIN must be treated as important as is their ability to conduct operations themselves. This way of view-

² The importance of effective foreign training and advisory capabilities is underscored as well in Rabasa et al., *Money in the Bank*, a 2007 RAND study that examines six COIN cases other than Afghanistan and Iraq.

ing priorities is unnatural for U.S. military forces, the culture of which is based predominantly on the objective of operational superiority over opposing conventional military forces.³

It follows that the U.S. security forces will have three conceptually distinct COIN responsibilities—in principle, none more important than the others:

- to *prepare* (organize, train, equip) local security services for COIN
- to *enable* those security services in action
- to *operate* directly in missions that local security services are not able to perform.

Depending on local COIN capabilities, the United States might have to take on all three responsibilities simultaneously in a given campaign: for example, training the local army in COIN, enabling local police with technical intelligence, and performing direct special operations. Empirically, as noted, local security forces tend to be one of the weakest links in the COIN chain. To the extent they remain so, U.S. forces will have to play a correspondingly wide direct role to ensure operational effectiveness—again, the story of Iraq and Afghanistan. Conversely, greater and better U.S. efforts to build local security capabilities and to then assist them in operations would allow the United States to concentrate its forces on critical niches.

Each of these three roles implies certain generic requirements.

Preparing Local Security Capabilities. The United States must be able to provide adequate numbers of professional personnel to organize, train, and equip local security services. Some of these personnel must be from within DoD, while others may be from other U.S. agencies or contractors. Examples include the following:

³ Although this chapter explicitly deals with U.S. capabilities, many of its findings could also apply to U.S. allies and others that seek to help local states counter insurgency. See Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, for a discussion of the internal culture of the U.S. military.

- Foreign-area specialists familiar with the culture, language, and history of the region. These personnel should be capable of understanding the local insurgents, the population, and their local counterparts.
- Planners—professionals experienced and schooled in COIN doctrine and methods, in how forces should conduct themselves, and in how security operations should be integrated with other aspects of COIN.
- Training and technical personnel to develop specific individuals and unit skills and to integrate equipment into local security organizations.

U.S. personnel and organizations involved in preparing local security services must be available to work with local counterparts for extended periods of time.⁴ Years of effort may be required to bring local security agencies and forces up to par, and there is ample evidence that continuity of planners, trainers, and advisors is important. This suggests that individuals may need to be assigned, as individuals, for years rather than rotated with units every year or less.

Enabling Local Security Services. Enabling can be thought of as operating with and thus improving the performance of local security services while also keeping them in the forefront, especially in combat. For example, the government might have a sufficient number of ground combat troops with which to counter insurgents but no ability to transport them by air, thus constraining their tactical responsiveness and utility. Similarly, local police and military forces may be adequate in numbers but have little if any technical ISR capability, such as UAVs, to support their operations. In those cases, the United States could provide capabilities to improve performance. The insertion into local services of professional advisors, who may also serve as liaison officers, may be as important as technical support. Such advisors should have

⁴ Reflecting on the Iraq experience, Pirnie and O'Donnell (*Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*) specifically recommend (1) “personnel policies to assure retention of skilled personnel in the host country in positions that demand close personal interaction with indigenous people” and (2) “legislation to enhance the quality and length of service of U.S. civilian personnel in the host country.”

the same language, cultural, functional, and continuity requirements as trainers.

Operating Directly. U.S. forces may have to perform essential security missions and tasks that local services cannot (unless allied forces are available to do so). Whatever their missions, U.S. forces must be specifically prepared (i.e., trained and equipped) for COIN operations, which are different than regular combat. In the case of U.S. conventional forces before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the vast majority of the prewar preparation of those units was for conventional combat operations. This had been the case within the U.S. military since the end of the Vietnam War. While some individuals had experience in the peace-enforcement operations in the Balkans from 1996 to 2001, there was, with the notable exception of the SOF, little in the way of preparation for what is known as “irregular warfare” within the U.S. military. The regular units and personnel initially dispatched to Iraq had virtually no preparation for the COIN that would come.

In COIN, U.S. forces will also normally be operating alongside local police and military forces.⁵ They will therefore have to coordinate their actions with the local forces to a much greater extent than is usually the case in conventional operations. The need for such coordination and interoperability is not reduced but rather increased as indigenous forces become better prepared and take more responsibility for direct operations. There is, in particular, no need for collaboration between U.S. forces and police in regular combat operations, as there is in COIN. The need to coordinate may require significantly different command relationships. In some situations, the military might find itself supporting the police.⁶

⁵ This is usually not the case, even in multilateral operations, in which national sectors are normally established and few forces from other nations tend to enter the sector of another nation, as was the pattern in World War II, the Korean War, and the first Persian Gulf War.

⁶ This has been the case in Northern Ireland for many years. Because the police in Northern Ireland have the best intelligence and investigative capability to locate Irish Republican Army terrorists, they dictate operations. British Army units rotate throughout Northern Ireland in support of police activities and conform to the needs of the police.

The requirement for such coordination recalls a general theme of this study: exploiting the largely untapped potential of networked information to enhance COIN by providing timely access to reliable and relevant information and to facilitate horizontal cooperation across agency and national boundaries. Just as U.S. forces can perform better in COIN than they have in Iraq by having better access and making better use of information, inclusive and integrated networking (e.g., ICON) is one of the keys to enabling U.S. and local forces to operate well together. Absent such connectivity, U.S.-local cooperation must be pre-scripted, which is entirely inadequate in the fluid conditions of COIN, especially against distributed and elusive insurgents.

Overall, the coherence of efforts and resources to provide security in COIN demands that U.S. capabilities for conducting direct operations reflect parallel efforts to prepare and enable local forces. This implies that U.S. forces will have selective COIN operational roles that fill critical gaps, complement local forces, and provide temporary capabilities as local forces are being prepared. The U.S. military is not accustomed to planning its capabilities in this way; American armed forces are used to being retailers, not wholesalers, of military power.⁷ The approach to COIN capabilities prescribed involves a different way of thinking—one that optimizes total resources to maximize security against global-local Islamic insurgency.

Requirements for Preparing, Enabling, and Operating

With this prepare-enable-operate framework in mind, Table 10.1 summarizes the team's judgments concerning likely demands on the United States in each of the categories of the general security capabilities (introduced in Chapter Eight).⁸ They take into account the sorts of challenges posed by Type III insurgents (e.g., as revealed in

⁷ During the Cold War, the U.S. military did plan on the basis of assumptions about what its NATO allies would provide for the defense of Western Europe. But this is the exception that proves the rule that U.S. defense planning is based on the prudent assumption that substantial international help will not be available.

⁸ Again, these are generic, as basic capabilities must be. The capabilities called on for a given COIN campaign depend on the specific insurgency and the strengths and weaknesses of the local government that the United States is trying to assist.

Table 10.1
U.S. COIN Security Requirements

Capability	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Institutional management capacity	Training of key local personnel, construction of infrastructure, providing equipment.	Mentoring and advising local personnel as they become more competent.	Performing functions such as integration of sophisticated new security equipment into the local security organizations.
Command and leadership	Training military and police leaders from noncommissioned officers to generals/executives.	Providing advice and liaison.	Commanding local security forces when local leadership is not sufficient to the task, such as in the coordination of sophisticated joint operations.
Logistics	Training local personnel, providing equipment, building infrastructure.	Assisting and advising local authorities on how to manage their system. Providing specialists to manage particularly sophisticated functions.	Providing the logistics needs, including transportation and supplies, of local security forces. Even when local forces become generally competent in this area, certain aspects of the logistics system, such as aircraft maintenance, may require U.S. operation longer than others.
Information operations	Training local personnel in how to conduct polling and other IO-related techniques.	Providing advice and materials to assist the local government in getting its message to the population.	Creating and disseminating messages to the population.
Justice system	Creating the capability in the local government: Providing training for judges and law enforcement personnel, helping build infrastructure.	Advising; providing facilities.	Administering justice when no local capability exists, such as in Kosovo in late 1999 following the withdrawal of Serb forces.

Table 10.1—Continued

Capability	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Local police and law enforcement	Training of local police. Building infrastructure such as police stations, jails, etc. Providing required law enforcement equipment.	Auditing and helping evaluate the performance of local police. Providing U.S. intelligence to local police organizations.	Filling gaps in local capabilities with foreign police officers.
Constabulary police forces	Providing training, infrastructure, and equipment.	Providing advisors and auditors. Providing U.S. intelligence.	No equivalent U.S. counterpart. Other nations (e.g., Italy, France, Spain) could provide the function.
ISR (technical)	Training for the lower-cost tech systems that are within the means of local organizations.	Maintaining, assisting, and advising on the employment of these systems.	Operating sophisticated systems, such as large airborne and spaced-based sensors.
Human intelligence	Training on how to evaluate and integrate HUMINT into operations. Reform of local intelligence agencies as needed.	Advising.	Establishing and operating local agents.
Border security	Training local customs and border police. Provision of surveillance equipment.	Advising and providing intelligence or other data from selected U.S. ISR systems.	Conducting the border security functions beyond indigenous capability, including monitoring and checkpoints.
Coastal security	Training and provision of patrol craft, radar, communications, and other equipment.	Augmenting local patrol with advanced maritime surveillance.	Performing “blue water” maritime patrol and intercept function.
Tactical air mobility	Training local aviation personnel, providing rotary-wing aircraft and associated equipment to local security forces.	Advising local aviation organizations once they are operational; providing continuing maintenance and other ground support.	Providing aircraft, pilots, and full ground support for extended periods of time because of the high cost of this capability.
Long-range air mobility	No local capability desired or feasible.	No local capability desired or feasible.	Providing the capability for local and other forces for the duration.

Table 10.1—Continued

Capability	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Specialized forces for high-value targets	Training and provision of key equipment.	Embedded advising and providing link to U.S. ISR, airlift, and precision-strike capabilities.	Conducting special operations against targets of interest to the United States, irrespective of local capabilities.
Precision strike	Training and providing inexpensive short-range and direct-fire precision weapons.	Providing link from local forces to U.S. precision-strike assets. For example, air liaison teams to control air and missile strikes on behalf of local security forces.	Providing all air and missile precision-strike capabilities.
Ground combat	Training, equipping, and organizing for COIN operations, to include individual training, unit training, provision of platforms and weapons, and imparting COIN doctrine.	Embedded advising at every level.	Filling gaps until local ground forces can function more or less independently.

Iraq and Afghanistan); the political and/or operational advantages, where appropriate, of having and relying on indigenous capabilities; the advantages, in some cases, of relying on U.S. capabilities; desirable divisions of labor and the need for the United States to support indigenous forces in operations; and functions that must be performed within COIN missions.

As an example, the importance in COIN of high-quality senior military leaders and command organizations is clear. The larger goal of expanding indigenous security responsibilities cannot be accomplished without these capabilities, yet the local government and military cannot be counted on to have brilliant generals and well-oiled commands in waiting. We also judge that creating leaders and commands should not be delayed as an insurgency gains strength. Therefore, it is important for the United States to have in being the ability to *prepare* these local capabilities and to *enable* them (e.g., with advice) in operations as they gain experience. As this is achieved, the requirement of the U.S. mili-

tary to *operate* directly in this function (i.e., commanding indigenous forces) should decline, which is why prepare and enable capabilities are key for the United States in this example. Similar reasoning is applied for each capability.

Obviously, some of the requirements just listed are more important than others. Considering especially the challenges posed by Type III insurgency generically and as encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, we judge the U.S. security capabilities shown in Table 10.2—to pre-

Table 10.2
Critical U.S. COIN Security Requirements

Capability	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Security institutions	Critical		
Command and leadership	Critical		
Logistics	Critical	Critical	
IO	Critical	Critical	
Justice system	Critical		
Police	Critical	Critical	
ISR		Critical	Critical
HUMINT	Critical	Critical	
Border security	Critical	Critical	
Coastal security	Critical	Critical	
Tactical air mobility		Critical	Critical
Long-range air mobility			Critical
Special operations		Critical	Critical
Precision strike		Critical	Critical
Ground combat	Critical	Critical	

NOTE: As already discussed, the United States has no experience or competence in preparing, assisting, or operating constabulary forces, so it is excluded here.

pare indigenous capabilities, enable indigenous forces in operations, and operate directly—to be especially important.

Deficient U.S. Capabilities

That this could make for a rather long list should be no surprise. It is a consequence of the exceedingly demanding nature of Type III insurgency—witness Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States is currently more capable of meeting some of these important requirements than others. Taking into account (1) existing U.S. capabilities and (2) how well, where relevant, these capabilities were utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan, the relatively short list presented in Table 10.3 is considered by the team to summarize U.S. capabilities that are particularly in need of improvement through investment or other measures:⁹

For example, we have established already that preparing and enabling indigenous police is critically important. We also know that the U.S. State Department, which has formal responsibility for this function, is inadequately staffed to handle it in a Type III insurgency (much less more than one). Yet it can be observed in Iraq that the U.S. military does not have all the abilities to perform professional police training, nor has it demonstrated in Iraq the ability to work with local police as well as it works with local military forces. Therefore, we are inclined to list the capabilities to prepare and enable police to be deficient and in need of attention. In another example, we have not seen fit to include precision strike as a deficiency because the United States has significant existing capabilities to meet this requirement in COIN, and Iraq and Afghanistan have not revealed a serious shortcoming.¹⁰

⁹ In addition to these priorities, the Iraq COIN case study (Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*) recommends the development of “survivable air platforms with gunship-like characteristics . . . to support COIN operations . . . [with] long endurance, fine-grained sensing under all light conditions, precise engagement with ordnance suitable for point targets, and robust communications with terminal attack controllers.” Whether and how such a capability should be developed goes beyond this analysis but certainly deserves further study.

¹⁰ The ability to equip and train indigenous forces for the use of precision weapons is also desirable, but given all the other deficiencies, we have chosen not to list this as a priority.

Table 10.3
Deficient U.S. COIN Capabilities

Capability	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Security institutions	Deficient		
Command and leadership	Deficient		
IO	Deficient	Deficient	
Justice system	Deficient		
Police	Deficient	Deficient	
HUMINT	Deficient	Deficient	
Border security	Deficient	Deficient	
Special operations		Deficient	Deficient
Ground combat	Deficient	Deficient	

As we have stressed throughout, such specific judgments are not meant to be the last word: They could and should be challenged and analyzed in greater depth.

These U.S. deficiencies can be clustered and summarized as follows:

Strengthening Local Security Institutions and Command and Leadership. Iraq and Afghanistan have overwhelmed U.S. government capabilities to create sound security institutions: defense ministries, interior ministries, justice ministries, intelligence services, and national-security policymaking machinery. Only a handful of experienced U.S. professionals, joined by a handful of experienced allied professionals, were available to design, reform, stand up, and advise Iraqi institutions under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003–2004, and the numbers have actually declined since then. A related requirement is to select and prepare local officers to assume senior command, without which the alternatives are weak command chains or, in effect, U.S. command of local forces. These capabilities are too critical to depend on NGOs or contractors. The number of people needed is small (fewer than 100); the quality must be exceptional. Retired officials or senior officers are very suitable.

Building and Assisting Local IO. As covered at length in Chapter Seven, against Type III insurgency it is more important—not to say easier—to foster the cooperation of the population based on IO in favor of local government than in favor of the United States and its policies. This requirement is not being met. From this perspective, too much of current IO and strategic communication is oriented toward “getting out our (i.e., U.S.) message” rather than crediting the performance and reforms of the responsible state. This is less a deficiency in capability than of a misdirection of capability, based on an institutional misunderstanding of the nature of insurgency. It could be addressed at modest cost by reorientation of effort, development of expertise, and creation of channels to prepare and enable local IO.

Building Justice and Police Capacity. The United States is weak in all aspects of helping weakened and embattled states to build capabilities to administer and enforce justice: court systems, corrections systems, police, and constabularies and other specialized police. The U.S. federal government has dismayingly insufficient means to help nations form fair and efficient courts, train and appoint judges, develop and manage proper detention processes and facilities, and build humane and secure penal systems. The U.S. government estimated that Iraq needed at least 1,500 new (untarnished) judges, but as of late 2007 has been able to train fewer than half that number.¹¹ Improving the capability to build local justice systems will take a sizable cadre of experienced and available justice professionals and a corpus of knowledge and practices.

As noted in Table 10.3, local police training is an equally serious U.S. deficiency, as the generally dismal performance of police in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown. The expedient of using soldiers to train police tends to produce unsatisfactory results. It is impractical to keep sufficient numbers of police trainers on the federal payroll. To meet what is likely to be a large demand in COIN campaigns, a system for surging by drawing from state and municipal police departments throughout the United States is needed, as is a federal capability to maintain standards and manage the surge system.

¹¹ Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

Developing HUMINT Capabilities. The surprise attacks of 9/11 and flawed intelligence about Iraq illuminated acute U.S. weaknesses in HUMINT. In COIN, it is more important and more cost-effective for the United States to create local capacity to develop and manage reliable HUMINT than it is for U.S. agencies to find and manage agents directly (though the latter obviously has its place). The United States has very limited professional capability to create sound foreign intelligence services and to work through those services to build the vast HUMINT capacity needed for effective COIN. In Iraq, this was attempted mainly by agents with operational as opposed to institutional experience, and the results have been poor.

Assisting in Border Security. The capability to secure and manage borders is both labor-intensive and information-intensive. It is also a critical capability. Examination of past insurgencies and the current experience in Iraq and Afghanistan show that if insurgents can easily move across borders, utilizing nearby sanctuary in neighboring nations, the COIN challenge becomes far more difficult. Training border guards is not a trivial undertaking, given the pervasiveness of corruption in managing the passage of people, goods, and currency and the collection of fees and tariffs. The United States needs a core capability for training local border-security forces. With local states providing the manpower, the United States should provide complementary information systems. The networking capabilities proposed in Chapter Six, especially ICON and national registry, can contribute substantially, as could data systems already available. These could be augmented by advanced sensors such as

- abundant low-cost UAVs
- overhead sensors borne by light aircraft or aerostats
- robotic ground vehicles with sensors to survey areas too dangerous for a permanent presence by small numbers of personnel
- sensing devices for manned border crossing checkpoints, including improved ways to detect explosives and weapons that insurgents or their sympathizers are attempting to smuggle across the border.

Specialized Operations Against High-Value Targets. The quality of U.S. SOF is beyond question. But the overall capability of U.S. SOF falls short of the demands of Type III insurgency, as is implied by the emphasis on expanding this capability in the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Many enemy fighters in global-local insurgencies are distributed, cellular, hidden in remote or urban terrain, networked, mobile, fanatical, fearless, and increasingly seasoned. Neither indigenous forces nor conventional U.S. ground forces can be expected to perform adequately in covert and surgical operations against the most sophisticated and important of these enemies. “Even with the planned expansion of Army SOF, their total number will be too small to meet all the demands . . . and they should be employed as little as possible for tasks that conventional Army and Marine forces could also perform.”¹² Apart from numbers of high-quality SOF combat personnel, the following capabilities could be improved:¹³

- SOF combat support, such as intelligence personnel
- sensors and weapons for urban operations
- enhanced-range special weapons
- advisory expertise
- world-class language-training facilities.

Building and Advising Local Ground-Combat Forces. If the United States is to be able to counter Type III insurgency, the U.S. military must have a permanent capability to organize, train, and equip large indigenous ground forces *for COIN*. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military had to assemble ad hoc training teams from both the active and reserve elements of the Army and Marine Corps (along with contractors) to train the local forces. Much of the training was so basic or generic that it did not prepare these forces for the complexities, ambiguities, and sensitivities of COIN. Although SOF are well

¹² Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

¹³ U.S. SOF are programmed to grow at about the maximum rate consistent with realistic recruiting results. This rate could be increased, without lowering standards, by offering substantially better special-operations pay to expand recruiting and improve retention.

suited for this mission, the sheer magnitude of the task was beyond their ability, especially given the increasing reorientation of SOF to direct action and special reconnaissance. Prior to the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps did not include standing organizations with the mission to train local forces, much less in large numbers for COIN.

While the use of private contractors should not be excluded, the function is too vital to U.S. national security to outsource. Moreover, the results of using private contractors to train indigenous ground-combat forces in current insurgencies has been decidedly unimpressive. If the U.S. military does not have this capability, the United States will be left to choose between two bad options when circumstances demand the use of ground forces: an inadequate response from indigenous forces, or the insertion of U.S. ground forces, which may also prove inadequate for military success and may worsen the insurgency.

The capability to prepare large indigenous ground forces for COIN should be extended to include an advisory capability to enable such forces in operations. While the United States has a long history—some good, some bad—in placing advisors with indigenous forces, it has had to scramble to do this in Iraq.¹⁴ There should be a structured advisory capability to guide local commanders at every level, continue on-the-job training of troops, provide intelligence liaison, ensure network access, coordinate fire support, and continually monitor, measure, and report performance.

Hedging Against Disappointment

As already noted, the United States must be prepared to counter Type III insurgency whether or not its efforts to shape the political terrain, improve local governance, and build local security capabilities are successful. The most critical issue this raises is that of the capabilities of U.S. ground-combat forces. Let's be clear: Because of the paradox of forces in COIN, any decision to use U.S. ground forces in substantial

¹⁴ Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

numbers to counter insurgents in the Muslim world should be taken with profound awareness of the possibility that it might be unproductive or counterproductive. To conclude that all measures short of introducing U.S. ground forces have failed is not necessarily to conclude that U.S. ground forces should be introduced, given doubts about the wisdom of large-scale U.S. military intervention as a way to counter Islamic violence. But that does not mean that the United States can afford not to possess the option.

The experience in Afghanistan is relevant here. When the Taliban was overthrown and a new government established in 2002, there were no Afghan state security forces available except for those of various warlords who had loosely allied with the United States in the effort to defeat the Taliban. When the Taliban began to rebound in late 2004 and early 2005, there were inadequate numbers of adequately trained and equipped Afghan forces to provide security for key areas, which remains the case as of late 2007. That the Taliban bounced back faster than Afghan security forces have been built underscores the inadequacy of U.S. and allied capabilities to build local security forces, as already discussed. Nonetheless, because the United States and its allies consider it imperative not to abandon Afghanistan to global-local Islamic insurgents, their forces have to try to provide security. U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan understand the importance of putting “an Afghan face on the COIN effort.” Although history gives little reason for faith that foreign forces can secure all of Afghanistan, under the circumstances the United States and its allies believe they have little choice.¹⁵

Although the United States should have better capabilities to build indigenous forces in the future than it has had in Afghanistan or Iraq—along the lines this study recommends—there is no assurance that indigenous forces will develop as planned even then. The reason for this is that the deficiency in U.S. capabilities to build security forces is not the only reason that such forces do not get built. Local factors not entirely within U.S. control—including mixed loyalties, ethnic or sectarian tensions, fear of insurgents, sympathy for

¹⁵ Interviews with U.S. and NATO officials in Afghanistan, January 2007.

insurgents, distrust of the government, and corruption—impede the development of good forces, notwithstanding U.S. efforts to make them good.

Herein lies the rub. Simply put, if shaping (i.e., civil COIN) and policing fail and ground forces are needed, yet local ground forces are ineffective or untrustworthy, the United States must be able to use its own ground forces effectively.

The question, then, is where the U.S. Army and Marine Corps should concentrate their efforts and investments to improve their effectiveness in direct COIN operations. We have chosen not to tackle this problem by evaluating what the services themselves are contemplating to improve COIN effectiveness but instead to come at it afresh.¹⁶

Broadly speaking, given the nature of COIN—a lengthy struggle with irregular forces for the allegiance of a contested population—ground forces face different challenges and tighter constraints than they do in regular combat. Insurgents increasingly favor urban areas in which to operate and hide, though remote and rugged terrain may also be used. Insurgents are determined and patient, causing campaigns to last many years (compared with the few weeks that most recent state-to-state wars have taken). Typically, COIN missions should be carried out with minimum essential force. Close collaboration with local authorities and forces is not just an option: It is a necessity. The trust and cooperation of the population is essential, yet hard to gain and easy to lose. COIN forces are at risk less from combat than from terrorist attacks.

To contribute to successful COIN in the face of these challenges and constraints, ground forces must be able to carry out a number of tasks. The following list, while not exhaustive, is indicative of what they must be able to do.

¹⁶ Our main reason not to use current U.S. military programs to address deficiencies as the point of departure for analysis of requirements is the need to break free from GWOT as an organizing principle and instead to derive requirements from an understanding of the problems posed by Type III insurgency.

1. Create security for civil COIN and local governance:

- Know local culture.
- Communicate in local language.
- Develop sources of information.
- Collaborate with civil COIN providers.
- Protect civil COIN providers and projects.

2. Protect the civilian population:

- Protect religious celebrations.
- Stop sectarian violence.
- Secure communal centers and public gatherings.
- Respond to suicide bombing.
- Conduct dismounted patrols.
- Reduce risks to dismounted patrols.
- Coordinate with community leaders and local authorities.
- Inform the public of operations.
- Dispose of unexploded ordnance.

3. Reinforce law and order:

- Respond to requests for support from police.
- Elicit crime tips from population.
- Disperse mobs, manage demonstrations, and control riots.
- Interdict illicit traffic.
- Operate traffic control points.
- Suppress death squads.
- Disband and demobilize militias.
- Detain threatening persons.

4. Protect key infrastructure, leadership, and other assets:

- Secure pipelines, refineries, and grids.
- Secure airports and seaports.
- Secure government centers.
- Control weapons and munitions.
- Secure bases of operation.
- Protect civilian leaders.
- Protect security force recruiting and training centers.

5. Control territory and borders:

- Patrol and clear urban areas.
- Patrol and clear remote and rugged areas.
- Isolate and search insurgent strongholds.
- Keep border areas under surveillance.
- Respond to warnings.
- Reduce risks to vehicular patrols.
- Maintain access to and cooperation of the population.

6. Contain and defeat insurgent forces:

- Develop intelligence on and assessment of insurgents.
- Find, track, kill, or capture insurgents.
- Disrupt sources of funding, supply, and other support.
- Respond quickly to insurgent threats.
- Conduct raids.
- Minimize collateral damage.
- Prevent civilian casualties.

Specifying particular pieces of equipment and tactics needed for each of these tasks goes well below the level of detail intended in this study and, in any case, is not a valid way to plan capabilities.¹⁷ However, we offer several prescriptions for investment in and improve-

¹⁷ Capability requirements should not be stated in a way that prejudices how those requirements could be met, lest competing and changing ideas be overlooked.

ment of U.S. ground-force performance in COIN if thrust into such situations in the future. These prescriptions are based on three factors: (1) analysis of the nature and challenges of Type III COIN (from Part I), (2) problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and (3) our understanding of current capabilities of U.S. ground forces. We do not mean to suggest that these prescriptions are not already receiving attention within the services. Nor do we exclude that other ideas for improvement are worthy of consideration. Type III insurgency is a relatively new phenomenon posing severe and unfamiliar challenges especially for ground forces trying to counter them. There is no monopoly here or within the military establishment on all the answers to these challenges.

Our overall judgment, in a nutshell, is that U.S. ground forces must be *better trained, more mobile, less reliant on deadly force, better informed, and more durable* than they now are. This formula suggests requirements for (1) more and superior COIN training and education, (2) more options for nonlethal force, (3) swifter land mobility, (4) improved use of networked information, and (5) the ability to carry on COIN for many years.

Training and Education

The requirement to secure and sway the population is obviously central to successful COIN. This takes great care and wisdom with regard to when, why, where, with what, and against whom force is used. It also demands as complete an understanding as possible of local language, customs, dress, routines, hopes, and fears. U.S. troops, like most other foreign troops, are at a distinct disadvantage in COIN ground operations because they do not understand local conditions, attitudes, and behavior. If they must be used, the gold standard should be British forces conducting COIN in familiar (typically colonial) settings, where they are largely accepted as “part of the furniture.”¹⁸ While this is an unattainable standard (even for UK forces in many places), it is an important reminder that the more attuned U.S. troops are to the local “human terrain” the less likely they will fail or make matters worse.

¹⁸ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

Therefore, U.S. conventional ground forces earmarked for a COIN campaign should receive extensive training in COIN generally and in the specific environment. Army and Marine units should have access to a joint COIN training facility that will prepare them to conduct security operations in which interaction with the local population will be continual and critical. Such a training facility should be a permanent establishment within the U.S. military. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, could provide an excellent venue for such a center. On the assumption that COIN is a long-term challenge (as this study suggests), advanced education in COIN concepts and methods is also essential. Already the service intermediate and senior-level staff colleges are attempting to increase the percentage of their curriculum devoted to this area. More should be done for the junior officers and NCOs who often have to bear much of the actual burden in COIN, since it is they who tend to have the most direct interaction with the local populations and security personnel.¹⁹

Nonlethal Force Options

When the need arises to apply force in COIN, it is often not possible to distinguish insurgents from noninsurgents—which is precisely what insurgents want. Enemy fighters often mingle with the population, from which position they can incite or take hostile action. This presents an ambiguous situation to security forces, in which the binary choice of using lethal force or not is too restrictive. One of the solutions is nonlethal or scaleable-effect weapons. It could be of great benefit in COIN to have a continuum of responses, spanning the range from warning to extreme discomfort to disabling pain to incapacitation to lethal force. Maximum payoff would come from the troops being able to move from one phase to another promptly. Nonlethal and scaleable alternatives can work synergistically with methods to distinguish insurgents from noncombatants, such as through warning and identification systems, as well as precision weapons. Nonlethal and

¹⁹ RAND visits to the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the USMC University at Quantico, Virginia, and the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, June–August, 2006.

scaleable-effect weapons have not been a high priority for U.S. ground forces, preoccupied as they have been with force-on-force combat missions. Options must encompass not only technical innovations but also concept of operations (CONOPS), training, and the cognitive skill of commanders. There is no stronger case for developing nonlethal technologies than COIN.

Land Mobility

Even while recognizing the importance of countering Type III insurgency, it is unlikely—and is not recommended by this study—for the United States to maintain for COIN separate ground forces from the Army and Marine Corps units that are maintained for major combat operations. Therefore, it would be helpful if the equipment of the units were as dual-capable as possible and that COIN requirements were weighed in the choice of equipment. For example, the Army could purchase a greater number of its wheeled, medium-weight Stryker vehicles for its units. The Stryker has, by most accounts, performed well in Iraq, especially when fitted with RPG-defeating side armor. It is also a quieter and less intimidating vehicle compared to tracked armored fighting vehicles such as main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

Inclusive, Integrated, User-Based Networks for Sharing and Collaboration

Given Type III insurgents' distributed nature, tendency to hide in the population, and elusiveness, on top of the COIN need for timely and reliable information, another important need is the networking of U.S. ground forces with one another, other U.S. forces and intelligence, and local services. Such networking is inadequate at present. This significant deficiency reinforces the recommendations spelled out in Chapter Six, which are based on detailed information requirements that may arise in carrying out the sorts of tasks just described.

Sustainable Ground Operations

Of the 89 major insurgencies since World War II, the average duration is roughly a decade. Current insurgencies in which U.S. ground forces are involved—Iraq and Afghanistan—have already lasted five

years and could easily last another five. Of course, in those cases in which U.S. ground forces must operate because of the inadequacy of local ground forces, the United States will presumably be doing all it can to prepare local forces to take over, with U.S. forces shifting to support and enabling roles. Nevertheless, in the worst case, U.S. efforts to build capable local forces will not be fruitful and the United States will conclude that its own forces must continue to operate. Depending on the scale of the operation and other worldwide requirements, both active and reserve forces may have to respond. This argues for giving reserves at least some preparation for COIN.

In sum, these improvements would make U.S. ground forces more effective if called on to operate directly in COIN: more skilled, mobile, flexible, informed, and durable. Appendix D provides a scorecard of how the six tasks described above depend on these improvements.

U.S. Ground Forces—Better or Bigger?


Even after identifying needed enhancements such as these five, two questions linger:

1. What *scale* of ground forces must the United States be prepared to commit to COIN campaigns?
2. What *type* of U.S. ground forces should the United States stress for COIN?

To establish a context, it is worth taking a look at the role and results of foreign military forces in COIN empirically. Figures 10.2 and 10.3 show the relationship between foreign ground-force involvement and COIN outcomes in a number of notable cases since World War II.²⁰ (Cases in which foreign military presence was not relevant are not included.) Foreign military presence is measured at its peak—in one chart in absolute terms, in the other chart in proportion to the


²⁰ Both figures are based on information collected by Martin Libicki on insurgencies since 1946 as well as historical population data from “Population Statistics,” Web page, 2006. As of November 2, 2007: <http://www.populstat.info/> (accessed May 7, 2007).

Figure 10.2
Degree of Insurgent Success Versus Total Number of Soldiers



RAND MG595/2-10.2

Figure 10.3
Degree of Insurgent Success Versus Peak Number of Soldiers per 1,000 People



RAND MG595/2-10.3

local population. The degree of success of COIN is a judgment made by the project team (represented in Appendix A).²¹

These cases suggest that there is no empirical basis for expecting successful COIN in conjunction with large-scale foreign military intervention.²² If anything, there is a negative correlation between large-scale foreign military intervention and successful COIN. The larger the foreign troop presence—France in Algeria, France and the United States in Vietnam, the USSR in Afghanistan—the more clearly negative the outcome.

Of course, causality is ambiguous: Was large-scale foreign intervention a response to the inability of local forces to prevail over insurgency, or did intervention contribute to failure? In some cases, foreign forces intervened when insurgency was in the process of overwhelming local capabilities. Although it is impossible to know what would have happened in any of these cases if foreign forces had not intervened on a large scale, it seems unlikely that insurgencies in Algeria (France), Indochina (France and the United States), and Afghanistan (USSR) would have expired in the absence of those foreign interventions.

Iraq presents a more complicated picture. The new Iraqi state had virtually no forces of its own with which to counter an insurgency that appeared and then grew faster than Iraqi forces could grow. There was no practical alternative to U.S. forces to fulfill the state's responsibility to provide security—indeed, without U.S. forces, the state would not likely have survived. At the same time, the U.S. occupation clearly

²¹ It could be argued that U.S. COIN in Vietnam was not so much a failure as a prelude to North Vietnamese invasion after U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, it could be argued that COIN was beginning to succeed in Algeria when the French electorate decided it had had enough. Both cases, however, are assessed as COIN failures in Rabasa et al., *Money in the Bank*.

²² There are other cases that may seem not to conform to this pattern. Most notable is Russia's second response to insurgency in Chechnya, which involved nearly one Russian soldier for every ten people. However, this response was far more barbaric than most advanced countries, certainly including the United States, would contemplate. In addition, there are many cases of unsuccessful COIN that involved no foreign forces (e.g., in Southern Thailand and Colombia), which merely indicates that the large-scale presence of foreign forces is not a necessary condition for unsuccessful COIN. Yet other examples can be cited in which very light foreign forces contributed importantly to at least partial success, as in El Salvador in the 1980s.

fueled both patriotic and jihadist opposition. Although the Sunni insurgency may have begun receding in 2007, the so-called “Tribal Awakening” has had more to do with this than U.S. forces have.

Could it be that large foreign military investments have not produced success because they have not been large enough? Perhaps the curves in the above figures that suggest declining COIN success as the scale of foreign intervention increases would turn upward if the scale of intervention were even greater. This seems like a dubious theory, unsupported by the facts of any of history’s major COIN cases—and especially dubious as a basis for planning capabilities, for if applied it would argue for bigger and bigger armies for COIN intervention at the expense of the civil, information, and local capabilities recommended here.

Thus we conclude that, at best, large-scale foreign military involvement is generally unproductive; at worst, it is counterproductive. Conversely, two of the most clear-cut cases of successful COIN since World War II—Malaya and Oman—involved light foreign military presence, mainly to train and advise local forces.

From the outset of this study, we have cautioned that empirical lessons about insurgency and COIN must be seasoned with analysis of the changes wrought by globalization, especially the rise of Type III insurgency, such as the Islamic violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. On the question of foreign ground forces, the new phenomena of insurgency actually reinforce empirical analysis. If large-scale foreign military intervention has been historically unproductive in COIN, it is probably even more questionable and riskier against Islamic Type III insurgency. In such conditions, invasion and occupation are sure to be portrayed as an attack by powerful infidels on Muslim lands, on the *Ummah*, and on Islam—the constant theme of jihad. The Soviets got a taste of this in Afghanistan, and it clearly resonates with a significant percentage of the people living in those parts of Iraq where U.S. troops are concentrated. Although it could be argued that the United States needed larger ground forces in Iraq at certain critical junctures, a larger analysis suggests a need for caution regarding large-scale ground forces as an efficacious way to counter insurgents in the Muslim world, even if other means are not adequate. We are wary, as well, about any lesson

from Iraq that when U.S. ground forces are to be used for COIN in the Muslim world, the bigger the better, for both history and the nature of Type III insurgency suggest otherwise.

The question of U.S. ground-force requirements for COIN also raises the issue of this type of force. All else being equal, the better informed and more mobile forces are, the less important mass is in enabling them to carry out their missions. This would tend to argue for the sorts of forces included in Army and Marine “transformation” plans: forces that are networked, lighter, faster, precise, operating in smaller units, and able to respond quickly on warning. Moreover, such forces are more responsive to challenges posed by the distributed, elusive, and cunning adversary of Type III insurgency. On the other hand, classical COIN, confirmed by lessons from Iraq, stresses the value of constant contact with the population, calming presence, deterrence, awareness, personal familiarity, and continuity. Yet these are not effects normally associated with mobile, networked forces. Thus, at this level of generality, it cannot be said what types of ground forces are best.

Resolving this tension depends on understanding what the ground forces are expected to *do*. Recall the six key tasks suggested earlier:

1. Create security for civil COIN and local governance.
2. Protect the civilian population.
3. Reinforce law and order.
4. Protect key infrastructure, leadership, and other assets.
5. Control territory and borders.
6. Contain and defeat insurgent forces.

In some respects, these tasks call for fast, light, networked forces, e.g., to respond to attacks that police and local forces cannot handle, to pounce on fleeting insurgents, or to gain control of contested locations or gaps in border security. Yet in other respects, they call for more classical COIN, e.g., to maintain close and continuous contact with civil COIN agencies and local authorities, to gain the confidence of the population, and to hold areas from which insurgents have been chased.

On balance, our general conclusion is that Type III insurgency demands a *mix* of “presence” forces and “response” forces—the former to provide general safety, reassurance, and confidence, and the latter to defeat the most threatening insurgent elements and acts. The argument for the former is rooted in the lessons of historical COIN; the argument for the latter is rooted in the fact that insurgents have changed and the argument that foreign, especially non-Muslim, military presence may be exploited by insurgents. Ideally, local security forces, if available in sufficient numbers and of adequate quality, should perform the large presence role in villages, towns, cities, and the countryside. Meanwhile, foreign ground forces should be used for specialized missions to supplement local forces, performing missions such as quick reaction that may be beyond the ability of the local police and army, at least initially.

If local forces can provide adequate armed presence, the United States can then concentrate on providing response forces.²³ Such a division of labor capitalizes on natural local and U.S. advantages, respectively: large numbers of local forces of adequate quality and familiarity to provide presence, and high-performance U.S. forces that leverage technology, knowledge, and speed when called on to support local ground forces.

In the worst case, when indigenous ground are not available in sufficient numbers and quality for Type III COIN, the United States may have to provide virtually the entire capability. In this case, the United States could require a full mix of forces, from infantry to heavy forces with large armored vehicles, to perform most or even all missions.²⁴ This has been the case in Iraq, where the insurgency developed much faster than the Iraqi Army. However, given the pitfalls of using large U.S. ground forces to combat insurgents in Muslim countries, it would be a grave error for the United States to conclude from

²³ This has been an elusive goal of the U.S. command in Iraq since 2003. The problem has been that Iraqi security forces have been inadequate for the functions associated with direct presence, thereby forcing U.S. forces to play this uncomfortable role, with ambiguous effects.

²⁴ Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

Iraq and Afghanistan that its most serious deficiency is that of insufficient ground forces for COIN. The United States should reduce, not increase, its reliance on large-scale military power against a threat that demands complete and balanced U.S. capabilities

In any case, we find that forces with the types of capabilities that the Army and Marine Corps are developing as part of transformation, even though not originally conceived as a response to the needs of COIN, have an important place in COIN. In other words, the Type III insurgent threat is not an argument for de-emphasizing transformation.

Conclusion

The United States is critically deficient in its ability to prepare and enable critical local security capabilities: institutions, leadership, justice system, police, intelligence, IO, border security, and ground forces. In the event that U.S. ground forces are called on to operate directly, they should have better training, mobility, information, nonlethal options, and long-term endurance.

Such capabilities represent different priorities than those that have been driving U.S. defense spending in recent years. This is not because existing priorities have been predicated on a different threat, but rather because the capabilities needed to counter that threat have not, in our view, been rigorously analyzed. This is itself a consequence of the failure to understand the threat with objectivity and through constant learning. The problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. military services have, since 9/11, justified many of their investment requirements as being needed to conduct combat against terrorists. The substantial growth in defense spending during this period has rewarded dubious claims that this or that program can help win GWOT, at the expense of actual *analysis* that relates capabilities to the operational demands of countering the threat of Islamic insurgency.

U.S. force transformation began in earnest right after 9/11. While transformation had been studied and debated throughout the 1990s—beginning in the wake of the Gulf War—it took 9/11 to provide the

political impetus and increased funding for the investment required to transform U.S. forces.²⁵ The argument made at the time was that the new, nonstate security threats manifested that day showed that the sorts of heavy legacy platforms and large structures on which the U.S. military relied were not sufficient and that fast, light, networked forces, prepared for increasingly integrated joint operations, were needed to serve U.S. security interests. This point of view was vindicated by the decisive success of U.S. forces in toppling the Taliban and Baathist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Having now become bogged down in COIN in both countries, the U.S. military and its civilian leaders are less sure than they were in 2001–2003 that transformation is the way to go, especially if Iraq and Afghanistan are a preview of conflicts to come. As U.S. ground forces have been stretched and strained, mainly because of Iraq, the impulse now is to drop or defer other priorities and *instead*, given limited budgets, to expand the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The nature of Type III insurgency and the requirements to counter it suggest that abandonment of ground-force transformation would be a mistake.

²⁵ A “procurement holiday” was in effect during much of the 1990s, and what modernization did occur could more accurately be described as re-capitalization or incremental upgrading. As an indicator of the tentative commitment to transformation, the share of DoD spending that went for C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) went down during these years (and started to climb only recently). The leap in defense spending in the response to 9/11 provided much greater resources for investment and thus in transformation.

Multilateral Counterinsurgency

The Case for Multilateral COIN

Countering a large Type III insurgency can overwhelm the capabilities of any single country—even the United States, whose global responsibilities put many demands on its resources. The United States cannot be confident of being able to counter full-blown complex insurgencies, or multiple simultaneous ones, without substantial contributions from capable and concerned countries and the international organizations it helps to sustain and manage. Afghanistan shows that even a multilateral coalition may be hard-pressed to counter Type III insurgency, just as Iraq reveals that the absence of such a coalition is a huge handicap.¹ Indeed, one of the most important lessons from Iraq is that the United States must “place a high priority on building coalitions with like-minded countries to conduct COIN.”²

Political and strategic arguments for multilateral COIN are obvious: Broad-based participation can enhance global legitimacy, promote acceptance by the contested population, help each participant sustain domestic political support, and heighten insurgents’ sense of isolation

¹ U.S. government spokesmen assert that there is in fact a coalition active in Iraq. In fact, only the UK has had significant forces; the UN, World Bank, and other international organizations have been conspicuously absent; NATO has only a cameo role; and the “coalition” is shrinking numerically. Iraq represents a near-total non-coalition COIN campaign.

² Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

and futility.³ In this chapter, we concentrate instead on the *operational and material* benefits of multilateral COIN—the opportunity to draw on the competencies and resources of a large coalition of states and international organizations.⁴ Our conclusion is that multilateral COIN is not merely advantageous but essential.

Yet developing this capability presents multiple challenges. Multilateral COIN could be hard to organize, could tax the time—and patience—of policymakers in the midst of crisis, and could confuse and compromise missions and operations. Accordingly, we deal here less with *whether* to prepare for conducting COIN with partners than with *how* to do so. The ultimate question about multilateral COIN—Is it worth it?—depends on how it is planned and executed.

The following analysis of multilateral COIN capabilities requires two caveats. First, as this report has stressed throughout, the ideal approach to COIN is to build up and reform local government and security services to gain the population's support and thus to avoid the pitfalls of heavy and obtrusive foreign presence. Just as the United States should work to reduce its reliance on direct use of large military forces for COIN in such unfriendly settings as the Muslim world, so should multilateral coalitions, especially if led by the United States or other Western powers. Although broad coalitions can enjoy at least somewhat greater international and local legitimacy than unilateral U.S. intervention can, the more fundamental point is that heavy foreign intervention may be unproductive and even counterproductive, even if multilateral. Thus, the light, focused, and skilled enabling role prescribed here for the United States is right for multilateral COIN as well. Having said this, whether the foreign role is light or necessarily heavy, it is far better than not to have a coalition perform it.

The second caveat is that any coalition—its composition, leadership, structure, and responsibilities—must be shaped to fit the circumstances of a given insurgent threat and COIN requirement. There are

³ In the British view, “a force’s legitimacy is derived from its international personality” (Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*).

⁴ The chapter will not directly address the involvement of nongovernmental organizations, which raise different though also important issues.

numerous combinations and permutations of countries and organizations, especially for preventive measures. The roles and relationships of the United States, other capable countries, the EU, the UN proper, UN-family agencies, the World Bank, and other organizations should vary depending on what is most suitable, which is mainly a function of what the local population, government, and neighboring states would accept. But the purpose of this study is to generate requirements for COIN *capabilities*, not to write plans for contingencies. In keeping with that purpose, the questions addressed in this chapter are: What multilateral capabilities are needed, and where should they be built and maintained? When it comes to which nations and organizations should respond and who should take the lead in response to a given demand, rigidity is to be avoided—indeed, flexibility and sensitivity are paramount. But therein lies one of the challenges of multilateral COIN, namely, how to create solid capabilities while taking a fluid approach to action. Taking flexibility so far that multilateral COIN capabilities are maintained ad hoc, not programmed and prepared systematically by competent international groupings and institutions, could leave a coalition without the means to succeed. Conversely, by proposing the building of capabilities for this or that multilateral institution, we do not mean to suggest that actual intervention should be prejudged. Retaining flexibility for contingencies while setting and meeting agreed goals for capabilities will not be easy, but it is essential.

The Content of Multilateral COIN Capabilities

Important civil and military COIN capabilities needed to complement and build capabilities of the local state are summarized in Table 11.1. The United States has ample capacity and quality in several categories: air mobility, air strike, ISR, and backbone network. But in no other category does the United States have adequate capabilities to be confident of countering large-scale Type III insurgency. As discussed in Chapters Five and Ten, in some categories—building public health, education, and justice systems; police training; intelligence-service reform; and security-institution reform—experience in Iraq and Afghanistan sug-

Table 11.1
U.S. and U.S. Partner Ability to Provide Needed COIN Capabilities

Category	Needed Capabilities	U.S. Has Capability	U.S. and/or Its Partners Have Capability
Civilian state-building and development	Political systems and reform	√	√
	Government administration	√	√
	Public health service		√
	Public education		√
	Employment impact		√
	Economic policymaking	√	√
	Banking system	√	√
	Direct financial support		√
	Transport and distribution (including food and water)		√
	Energy infrastructure		√
Security forces	Command authority	√	√
	Institution-building and management		√
	Logistics	√	√
	Information operations		
	Justice system		√
	Police, law enforcement, public safety		√
	Constabulary		√
	Human intelligence		
	Border security		√
	Coastal security	√	√
	Local ground combat forces		
	Technical ISR	√	√
	Tactical air mobility	√	√
	High-value direct action		
	Precision strike	√	√
	Long-range air mobility	√	√

Table 11.1—Continued

Category	Needed Capabilities	U.S. Has Capability	U.S. and/or Its Partners Have Capability
Information and cognition	Infrastructure	✓	✓
	Collection	✓	✓
	Access	✓	✓
	Research and analysis		
	Strategy and planning		
	Operational decisionmaking		

NOTES: The list of needed capabilities used in this table was prepared by the research team. Other such lists have been prepared by S/CRS, the Center for Strategic and International Security, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Note that foreign ground-combat forces have not been included because of our core judgment that local ground-combat forces have greater legitimacy than foreign ones, especially for urban operations in the Muslim world. Organizing, training, and equipping local military forces of sufficient quality and size is therefore an essential foreign contribution (as noted in the table). But although foreign ground-combat capabilities are not a high priority, the possibility of needing to call on them cannot be ruled out. A program to develop multilateral COIN cannot ignore this.

gests that the United States is seriously deficient. While such deficiencies could eventually be remedied if the United States made them a high national priority and committed the necessary resources, the prudent assumption is that they will persist.⁵

Looking only at the capabilities in which the United States is currently deficient, a survey done for this study revealed that U.S. allies, potential COIN partners, and international institutions have significant competence and capacity, as indicated in Table 11.1.⁶ For example,

⁵ There is, of course, no way to *know* what will be needed in future COIN and therefore what U.S. capabilities will and will not be sufficient. The capabilities that the United States lacks reflect especially the experience in Iraq. The security capabilities for which the United States is deficient are the same as those judged to be deficient in Chapter Ten. The information and cognition deficiencies are those mentioned in Chapter Seven.

⁶ We have included advanced democratic countries and the main international political and financial institutions. There is also considerable capacity among countries less likely to participate in COIN, e.g., China.

Germany, which provides about \$8B in foreign aid to some 70 countries annually, is especially strong in public health and education. Sweden has major programs in the development of inclusive political systems. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway are all capable in foreign infrastructure development. And the UN and the EU have agencies and well-resourced programs in all aspects of state-building and development.⁷ This is not to say that these capabilities are readily available for a strategy of countering Type III insurgency as conceived by the United States. There are other claimants, including foreign aid recipients that are not facing insurgency. The paucity of allied contributions to COIN in Iraq is discouraging, though the special controversy surrounding the U.S. invasion partly explains this. In Afghanistan, NATO, other partners, and international organizations have been very active, providing an estimated 50-percent share of total support. We are not suggesting that COIN partners and international organizations can or would eliminate deficiencies in U.S. capabilities, but we do suggest that the picture looks much more promising with than without them.

Even taking allied capacity into account, COIN capabilities are inadequate in a number of areas (still red), including:

- *Information and cognitive functions:* The United States and its allies have underestimated the importance of rigorous analysis, thoughtful strategy, and timely yet reasoned decisionmaking—abilities especially needed for successful COIN. They have not mastered the art of information operations, especially against the voices of violent Islamic movements.
- *Specialized, high-performance forces for COIN:* These include SOF, constabulary police, and other forces that may participate in high-speed, exacting, lethal, and possibly covert operations. While the United States and its allies have high-quality capabilities of this sort, they do not have nearly enough to cope with the spreading threat and build local capabilities.

⁷ An overview of capabilities of prospective U.S. COIN partners and relevant international organizations are detailed in Appendix B.

- *Human intelligence:* The United States and its allies are weak in both human intelligence and the ability to help local partners manage human intelligence.

On the whole, though, allies, potential partners, and international institutions possess many of the competencies and resources critical for COIN that the U.S. government has in short supply. As one would expect, they are especially well endowed in *civil* capabilities crucial to COIN, a U.S. weakness detailed in Chapter Five.

It is important to note that allied capabilities are not concentrated in one or two partners but rather are spread over numerous states and organizations. The largest U.S. partners—the UK, France, Germany, and Japan—each have assistance budgets of \$8–10B, about a third of the U.S. assistance budget. After them, another dozen countries are in the \$2–4B range—combined, this is roughly equivalent to the U.S. budget. No single UN agency or international financial institution dominates the market for assistance (aside from loaning money). The largest source of assistance of possible value in COIN is the EU, with over \$40B (of which the UK, France, and Germany, as noted, account for nearly two-thirds). Although only a fraction of these resources might be targeted to end active insurgencies, a larger fraction might help prevent insurgencies, especially with a good system of indicators and warnings. In any case, on the civil side, potential international capacity in areas of specific value to COIN exceeds U.S. capacity.

Several policy implications follow:

- First, at a minimum, the allocation of the resources and efforts of international partners with potential value to COIN should reflect concerns and analysis about where dangers of insurgency exist.
- Second, it is useful and, under some circumstances, imperative for the United States to undertake COIN campaigns with partners, *from the outset*, to satisfy critical needs, especially regarding civil capabilities.
- Third, because capabilities are not concentrated, having a large coalition is a prerequisite for having a robust one. This consider-

ation must be weighed against the difficulties of mounting and managing COIN, which tend to be in proportion to coalition size.

- Fourth, it is essential for the United States and its partners to jointly plan and develop capabilities, including where they are deficient multilaterally.

The tremendous value of multilateral COIN raises important and difficult questions regarding coalition leadership, decisionmaking, political authority, legality and legitimacy, strategic direction, military command, resource commitment, functional coordination, information sharing, and solidarity. These issues cannot be deferred until a dangerous insurgency demands a multilateral reaction. Given the importance of acting promptly on early warning that an insurgency is brewing, ad hoc collaboration will not work. Moreover, multilateral capacity must be planned and managed no less than national capacity, although it is harder to do. The time to discover that even the United States and its partners together do not have adequate capability in, say, local security institution-building is not when an important state with weak security institutions is unable to contain an insurgency. Prior consultation, analysis, planning, and understanding are vital. Accordingly, the next section of this chapter suggests measures to improve multilateral COIN capabilities, plans, and decisionmaking, after which we will turn to how multilateral COIN campaigns and operations should be conducted.

Preparing for Multilateral COIN

Neither the United States nor its partners (even the UK and France) have much experience with multilateral COIN. In only 10 of 89 significant insurgencies between 1946 and 2006 was more than one foreign state involved in COIN, and in most of them that involvement was modest

and rather slipshod.⁸ At heart, it is no different from unilateral COIN: It similarly demands integrated, multifaceted civil-military strategies that call on many capabilities of national security and nation-building. Although the particular configuration of those capabilities will vary according to the type and stage of a given insurgency, all of them must be maintained. Preparing for multilateral COIN should, naturally, be done by those who might participate. Other than the country or countries⁹ under direct threat of insurgency, potential COIN partners of the United States fall into three categories:¹⁰

- NATO allies, most of which are also members of the European Union (EU), which is of interest mainly for its nonmilitary COIN activities¹¹

⁸ Data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946.

⁹ While the local or target country is no doubt the most important “partner” in COIN for the United States—presuming that it is ready and willing to defend itself, which may not always be true and which may not thereby invalidate the U.S. interest in countering insurgency in its own interest—this chapter deals only with external actors. In part, that is because the development of standby COIN capabilities cannot foresee which country or countries will be the locus of employment for those capabilities. Nevertheless, where there is a possibility of insurgency, as well as with routine military-military and similar relationships, applying some of the methodology outlined here to anticipatory cooperation with particular countries can be worthwhile. Furthermore, some of the COIN efforts in the civilian arena can be considered prophylactic—e.g., promoting good governance and advancing economic, political, and social development can be means for preempting the potential emergence of insurgencies. Indeed, in perhaps no other area of international security can it more truly be said that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”

¹⁰ Of course, the capabilities identified here could also be used by other countries, without U.S. engagement. In particular, this could include COIN actions undertaken by the EU, in the context of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The methods and mechanisms of preparing for possible COIN operations could do double duty, just as the preparation of NATO and EU forces for other potential operations does double duty, given that, for the European members of the EU and NATO, essentially the same forces would be involved.

¹¹ The qualification “mainly” is not designed here to denigrate or rule out potential EU COIN activities of a military nature—a continuing political debate between NATO and the EU—but rather to indicate comparative advantage from the U.S. point of view.

- other allies and frequent partners—e.g., Japan, South Korea, Australia, members of NATO's Partnership for Peace
- ad hoc partners, which could include a wide range of countries, e.g., members of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, India, Latin American countries, and even China. (There are also some Arab/Islamic countries with relevant specific capabilities—not to mention financial resources in some cases—that might be drawn on in appropriate circumstances.)

This categorization suggests a potential hierarchy of COIN partners in terms of several criteria: (1) shared concern about the gathering strength of Islamic insurgency, (2) predisposition toward cooperation with the United States in COIN, (3) resources and competence in important COIN capabilities categories, (4) sympathetic predisposition to making such capabilities available when called for by insurgent threats and/or partners' requests, (5) willingness to participate in multilateral planning, training, and exercising of COIN-related capabilities, (6) willingness to incorporate COIN into national-security doctrine, and (7) willingness to consider predelegation of decisionmaking authority.

With some notable exceptions (e.g., Australia and South Korea), the states that meet these criteria are members of NATO. As a permanent security alliance, NATO has institutional structures, experience, processes, and common assets that could be helpful in multilateral COIN preparations, even if not all the allies are likely to be major contributors. A NATO role in enhancing and maintaining multilateral COIN capabilities would not imply an obligation on any or all of its members to engage in COIN operations. While decisions of the North Atlantic Council confer strong political commitment, all NATO operations so far have actually been, in the language of international relations, coalitions of the willing and able.¹² Increasingly, NATO plan-

¹² There is an added consideration regarding NATO. In some countries (or regions) facing insurgencies, NATO might not be welcome or its involvement might promote more political opposition than the good it is able to do. However, if this were true of NATO, it would also likely be true of the United States, as well, perhaps even more so. In any case, the composi-

ning and operations have included formal (nonmember) partners, e.g., Sweden and Finland.

As with all aspects of COIN, this hierarchy of prospective partners has to be approached flexibly. For example, while many NATO countries are, in general, more likely to support U.S. COIN objectives than other countries, this may not always be true. For example, Australian and South Korean forces are more involved than most NATO allies in NATO-led operation in Afghanistan. But there is no other multilateral security organization with remotely comparable strength, and none in which the role of the United States is so comfortable for its members, including the United States. Including its formal and informal partners, NATO's members and organizations possess most of the capabilities needed for effective COIN, as outlined above.

As stressed above, it is important not to confuse the questions of where to organize, build, and maintain multilateral security capabilities on a continuing basis with how to assemble a coalition in response to a given insurgent challenge. NATO is quite suitable for the former and may or may not be suitable for the latter. It is unclear what would be more provocative to Muslim populations, the United States acting alone or the United States leading the West's principal military alliance. Other informal coalitions and international organizations may suffice and in fact be more suitable in many or even most COIN campaigns, especially if the insurgency in question has not gotten out of control. The advantage of NATO is its ability to mount large, complex, nonpermissive multilateral operations—precisely the sort we would prefer to avoid but cannot be sure of avoiding. The main advantages of NATO lie not in its political acceptability in countries beset by insurgency but in the capacity of its members and in its proven institutional competence for planning, building, and maintaining multilaterally military capabilities of the Atlantic.

There is another reason to look to NATO to develop and, if necessary, employ capabilities for COIN. Throughout its history, NATO has concentrated its attention on the principal security threat facing

tion, leadership, and political profile of any given COIN campaign must be decided on the basis of its circumstances.

its members. For 50 years, that was the Warsaw Pact. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism, it was instability in the former communist world, especially the Balkans. After 9/11, it was to rid Afghanistan of al Qaeda and the Taliban. It is not only natural but also important for NATO to confront the challenge of Islamist insurgency, if not in conducting COIN operations than certainly in building the capabilities to do so.

Although NATO is above all a military alliance, listing it and its members as preferred COIN partners should not imply that military instruments are more important than nonmilitary ones. As this report has indicated, it can and should be the reverse, in many circumstances: Civil activities are more important than military. Therefore, in tandem with an enhanced role in planning and maintaining capabilities for multilateral COIN, NATO would need to collaborate with other organizations with complementary nonmilitary competence and resources. Based on the analysis of what countries can deliver key capabilities to supplement and complement those of the United States, the EU is an obvious candidate for partnership in multilateral COIN. Accordingly, this chapter will develop in some detail the idea of NATO-EU partnership in building comprehensive capabilities for COIN.

Whatever the exact organizational responsibilities, preparations for multilateral COIN must include the following elements:

- generally accepted definitions of the potential nature of insurgencies, the demands posed by insurgencies, and the requirements of COIN
- processes for identifying resources, capabilities, and competences to meet these requirements (these will no doubt be somewhat different in each instance, but there will be some common approaches and requirements that can serve as a basic template for preparations)
- general understandings concerning the availability of these capabilities, contingent on national decisions in the event
- commitments to improve capabilities
- cooperative training, evaluation, and exercise programs to enhance interoperability

- mechanisms for coordinating military and nonmilitary measures and organizations
- processes for planning, including investment and operational planning
- political decisionmaking, coordination, control, and review. Shared logistical arrangements
- financial arrangements (“pay as you go” versus collective cost-sharing)
- enhancement of capabilities to organize, train, and equip local security forces.

The NATO-EU Model

Once again, the capacity to prepare capabilities for multilateral COIN exists predominantly in the institutions of the European and North American democracies: NATO and the EU. NATO is already acquiring considerable experience in developing capacities, practices, and processes for conducting COIN and COIN-like operations within its sphere of functional competence. Its operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (Peace Implementation Force [IFOR], Peace Stabilisation Force [SFOR], and Kosovo Force [KFOR]) were not technically COIN, since they were established and conducted in the context of peace agreements or other politically grounded understandings. Nevertheless, many of the functions undertaken by NATO-led forces in these cases were similar to those undertaken in NATO’s one ongoing COIN operation (in Afghanistan), including interactions with nonmilitary instruments and institutions. In addition, the NATO Response Force (NRF) is organized, equipped, and trained according to models of employment that could have COIN applications or at least could provide enabling capabilities to local forces.¹³

At the same time, NATO is inadequate, by nature and structure, to take on all major responsibilities in COIN, especially those in non-

¹³ Similar developments should be taking place for the EU Battle Groups, successors to the original High Level Task Force, that are to be in operation by 2010.

military, e.g., governance and economic, realms. Of course, NATO forces in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have undertaken a number of these tasks, including through civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). Perhaps most obvious are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. But even where these are reasonably effective, NATO does not have the functional scope to maintain and manage the full range of COIN capabilities. Indeed, in Afghanistan, NATO's limitations in this regard are a handicap. It may thus succeed there in its military mission and yet fail in the overall COIN mission.

That is where the EU would come in. This does not have to imply a stark division of labor between NATO, as a military organization, and the EU, as a civil organization—a concept that has consistently caused political problems both within the Alliance and with the EU. But it does hold out the possibility that the EU can assume major responsibilities for which it has considerable capacity—especially though not exclusively in civil aspects of COIN—as a valid and equal partner of NATO. Neither institution would need to violate its sense of uniqueness, autonomy, and reserved authority. Ideally, both NATO and the EU could work out a “table of effectiveness” (capabilities and processes with regard to a range of possible COIN scenarios), without prejudicing who would do what in the event. The aim would be to create the option of NATO and the EU collaborating in a complex and demanding COIN campaign.¹⁴

Of course, this implies that both organizations accept the imperatives of collaboration in regard to situations that could require COIN. This should be possible for the simple reason that most members of each organization are also members of the other. Yet, as of late 2007, two allies—France and Turkey—are resisting such NATO-EU cooperation for reasons that have nothing to do with the threat of insurgency: France is fearful of opening up the EU to NATO and thus American influence and of compromising EU independence; Turkey

¹⁴ In NATO parlance, this is sometimes referred to “Berlin-plus in reverse.” That refers to the 2003 NATO-EU agreement whereby NATO may transfer “assets”—primarily scarce items like strategic and tactical lift—to the ESDP. Berlin-plus in reverse would be the role of the EU in providing NATO with civilian capabilities.

is using the issue to assert its displeasure with its nonmembership and Cyprus's membership in the EU. While this report is hardly the place to examine possible diplomatic solutions to these two obstacles, new ideas to this end are in play.¹⁵ If the United States and major NATO allies that are also EU members, such as the UK, Germany, and Italy, were determined to effect NATO-EU cooperation, and if the problem were addressed by leaders, the diplomatic logjam could be cleared.

With NATO-EU political understanding, the following steps could and should be taken:

- Task Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with performing COIN lessons-learned from Afghanistan in terms of potential COIN operations, sharing the results with the EU.
- Based on these lessons, task ACT with preparing lists of what capabilities would be required—civilian and military—for effective COIN, along with potential sources of these requirements.
- Seek NATO agreement within the EU to undertake a parallel effort.
- Coordinate the two processes and combine their results.
- Build and maintain a common table of effectiveness for both institutions, including a thorough list of (real and potential) national caveats, potentially restrictive procedures (e.g., the need for parliamentary approval of particular activities, in addition to overall mission approval), and backup countries and capabilities.
- Conduct joint considerations of potential threats and challenges, the nature of COIN, and the ways in which it could be both decided and conducted, including control mechanisms with which both institutions would be comfortable.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Kramer, Franklin D. and Simon Serfaty, *Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1, 2007, as of November 2, 2007: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/csis_euroatlantic_feb07.pdf) and Burwell, Frances G., David C. Gompert, Leslie S. Lebl, Jan M. Lodal, and Walter B. Slocombe, *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture* (Washington, D.C., Atlantic Council, March 2006, as of October 22, 2007: http://www.acus.org/docs/0603-Transatlantic_Transformation.pdf).

- Resolve impediments, both within NATO and as between it and the EU, including intelligence sharing.
- Undertake joint training and exercises.
- Associate other countries with this process—e.g., through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogues, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and through special mechanisms with partners from beyond the NATO sphere.

The Non-NATO Model

Use of NATO in collaboration with the EU should be the preferred option for the United States in developing multilateral capabilities for COIN operations. But fostering the arrangements outlined here, either within NATO or between it and the EU, may not prove possible. Moreover, as noted, there will surely be circumstances in which NATO, with or without the EU, will be unnecessary and/or unsuitable as the lead organization in COIN: unnecessary because the scale and severity of an insurgency does not demand NATO intervention; unsuitable because of possible hostile reactions in the Muslim world.

In cases for which NATO is either unnecessary or unsuitable—hopefully, the majority of cases, since that would indicate success in defusing insurgencies before they get out of hand—a variety of multilateral configurations are available, as already mentioned. Decisions on the appropriate configuration should be taken in light of prevailing circumstances. Of course, what cannot be left to case-by-case decisions are the planning, building, and maintaining of capabilities. This has two implications: First, if NATO is to figure importantly in meeting requirements for multilateral COIN capabilities, it must in principle be prepared—meaning that its members must be prepared—to make these capabilities available to whatever coalition is to take action. For example, if the UN is to play a leading role in a given embattled country but needs supplementary capabilities, NATO should be prepared to provide them. Second, because NATO may be unnecessary or unsuitable for the majority of COIN efforts in which there is U.S. interest, the United States should work with other organizations (e.g., the UN

and regional security organizations) to ensure that adequate civil and security capabilities are available.

This need for flexibility suggests that the United States should create its own process, similar to that outlined above for NATO, for planning, enabling, and mounting multilateral COIN. This should be organized within the U.S. government on an interagency basis, with DoD working with those civilian agencies with competence both for assembling nonmilitary instruments of COIN operations and for making practical arrangements with other governments for potential joint operations.

Thus, regardless of whether NATO, in league with the EU, develops strong COIN capabilities, the United States needs to develop the following knowledge on multilateral COIN:

- the various requirements for COIN, in all the relevant categories of capabilities
- U.S. shortfalls that call for partnerships with other countries (or political circumstances where partnerships would be warranted)
- a table of effectives, both military and civilian, generically and scenario-determined, for potential COIN operations
- potential capabilities of different potential partner countries, along with assessment of quality of capabilities and ancillary requirements, such as lift and logistics
- qualification of these potential capabilities in regard to understood or projected caveats or other limitations, whether general or scenario-dependent
- backup capabilities from other partners
- assessment of other potential limitations of particular partners
- motivational arrangements and U.S. support requirements for logistics, deployment, integration of instruments, C4ISR, planning, joint headquarters, etc.
- methodologies for building and sustaining relationships with partner countries (and their constituent institutions); command arrangements; influence; and decision-sharing
- financial considerations (i.e., who pays?).

This work would provide the United States with a sense of what could be available from other countries in terms of the learned requirements for COIN operations of different natures; the process of determining, as much as possible in advance, what could be done should the need for COIN operations arise; and the development of packages of organizational capabilities to make possible the engagement of partners in U.S.-led COIN operations in the event such is required.

While such knowledge is useful in any case, it would be much more so if discussed with and even agreed on by prospective partner countries and international organizations. The lack of involvement of prospective partners would reduce the completeness and validity of information about capabilities. More important, only multilateral preparations can provide any confidence that capabilities can be employed effectively together, may be expanded and improved, and may be available. And most important, it will take multilateral preparations to create the shared perspective, the mutual confidence, and the sense of common purpose that will be vital to produce a cohesive and effective response when the United States and its partners are faced with the demands and dangers of actual COIN operations. In sum, while the United States should look principally to NATO (and NATO-EU cooperation) to prepare multilateral COIN capabilities, it should not rely exclusively on this option.

Conducting Multilateral COIN

The preparations just outlined are necessary but not sufficient to ensure that multilateral capabilities are employed effectively and coherently in actual COIN campaigns. Broad prior understandings and principles about the theory, doctrine, and performance of COIN can avoid confusion and help ensure that the whole of multilateral COIN is greater than the sum of the parts. While the discussion that follows is premised on large-scale, demanding, multilateral civil-military COIN, lesser cases can be approached under similar, if simpler, ways. Thus, while the NATO-EU model is assumed for purposes of analyzing the

conduct of multilateral COIN, the findings apply broadly to different sorts of coalitions.

Apart from lending international and possibly local legitimacy, multilateral COIN should be organized to contribute to every aspect of a campaign: understanding insurgency; shaping political conditions to earn the population's cooperation; and taking direct action, in support of local forces, to provide security for that population. The insurgency and the contested populations should see that a unified coalition, representing the international community in composition and mandate, is committed to supporting and improving the state under attack. Unity is as important strategically as it is operationally. This is apparent from the shortcomings of multilateral COIN in Iraq and its limited success in Afghanistan.

Multilateral COIN is far more than a coalition military endeavor. While partners may commit military forces, their involvement may be more valuable in building legitimate and effective government, from decent public health and education to sturdy national infrastructure to market-based growth to law enforcement and justice to general administration and open political systems. The Iraq experience notwithstanding, the United States and the local state combined will usually have ample military capabilities and marked superiority in firepower; if not, non-U.S. participation will almost certainly not make up the difference. This is not true of nonmilitary resources and competence. If the United States had it to do over again in Iraq, it presumably would place a higher priority on multilateral support in building a state able to serve the Iraqi people than on getting more foreign troops. Of course, it is doubtful the United States could in any case have obtained such multilateral support, given the disputed decision to invade Iraq and the ensuing dangers on the ground.

The need for nonmilitary as well as military participation affects not only the composition of a multilateral coalition but also how it is organized and operates. Because COIN must be conducted as an integrated political-economic-military campaign, multilateral COIN must function across both agency and national lines—a tall order that requires unprecedented international cooperation under severe condi-

tions, possibly for many years. A coalition that crumbles in the course of COIN is no better than no coalition at all.

As one would expect, most of the nonmilitary capabilities needed for COIN reside within international assistance agencies of advanced democratic countries: members of NATO and the EU, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and several others. There are also considerable multilateral capabilities and experience within the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the EU Directorate General for Development, the World Bank, and other development banks and international financial institutions. Some such institutions, as well as some such states, may not be able or willing to sign on to the entire COIN strategy and enterprise, limiting themselves to specific development or humanitarian sectors and functions, which may contribute to COIN. Nevertheless, their involvement adds to the complexity of operations.

On the military side as well, the advanced democracies, many of them NATO or bilateral allies of the United States, possess considerable capability, though not so great in proportion to U.S. military capabilities as is the case for nonmilitary COIN capabilities. But this is not to say that any of these capabilities have been prepared for COIN, let alone for multilateral COIN.

The institutional approach we suggest to prepare for multilateral COIN is, naturally, the point of departure for actual campaigns. That approach capitalizes on the advantages of NATO, but it also recognizes its limitations, in membership, nonmilitary capabilities, and possibly political legitimacy. Therefore, it calls for robust cooperation between NATO and at least two complementary institutions, the EU and the UN. While this architecture may or may not be suitable and would in any case have to be specifically configured for campaign circumstances, it is better to regard it as a baseline for planning than simply to assume that every multilateral COIN campaign will be entirely *ad hoc*.

There will be a need to coordinate military actions with political and economic efforts, military operations with intelligence operations, police work with both military and intelligence operations, and the efforts of U.S. agencies with those of local authorities. Achieving such unity of effort is both harder and more crucial in this context. The potential for disarray and indecision multiplies. But the benefits of

multilateral COIN, in resources, experience, competence, and legitimacy, are too great to let the difficulty of achieving unity be used as an excuse to dismiss it. The United States underestimated the value, and may have overestimated the problems, of a genuinely multilateral approach in Iraq. In Afghanistan, despite the flare-up of insurgency and persistence of governance problems, the roles of partners, NATO, the EU, and other organizations are a significant plus for the Afghan government and the United States.

Multilateral COIN Campaign Models

Much has been made of U.S. unilateralism in connection with Iraq. But this appears to be an exception, especially in view of the failure of the United States, acting more or less alone, to overcome insurgency and build a new state in Iraq. The Balkan and Afghanistan experiences suggest that the United States is prepared, even prefers, to work through NATO (and with the EU, UN, and other organizations), even at the expense of its unambiguous control. It has shown no such readiness to play a major role under a UN-commanded campaign, though it appreciates the advantage of a political-legal UN mandate and the rather loose oversight that goes with it. We will assume here that any insurgency difficult and dangerous enough to require a large U.S. role would not be managed by the UN, but by NATO.

Recall the caveats early in this chapter regarding NATO as the principal instrument for multilateral COIN. Insurgencies that are countered early and skillfully should not require large-scale Western military intervention. The same defects and dangers associated with major use of force by the United States also apply, more or less, to NATO. It would be far better to improve and rely on local security services and multilateral development organizations to prevent insurgencies from reaching the point where only NATO military intervention becomes the only multilateral option. As explained above, NATO can play a central part in planning, building, and maintaining COIN capabilities without necessarily taking responsibility for intervention and operations. At the same time, large-scale force for COIN cannot

be excluded. In such circumstances, moreover, the case for the United States to seek allied participation is especially strong, given the greater burdens and risks to be borne. Therefore, while NATO is not the only or favored multilateral option for COIN, it is crucial for the United States to work with its allies to ensure effective preparations and operations.

While the use of NATO for COIN clarifies certain formalities of collaboration, especially the decisionmaking role of NATO's North Atlantic Council and the use of NATO command and control, the respective responsibilities of NATO and the United States (presumably the largest contributor) add a further complication. Are U.S. forces, as well as those operating closely with them, under U.S. military and political control or that of NATO? Afghanistan has been a useful laboratory in that the United States has shown increased flexibility about non-U.S. control, especially when it places a high value on allied participation.

One approach to the problem of effecting multilateral COIN collaboration is to reduce the need for it by assigning different geographic sectors to different lead countries. This has been used in peace operations and nation-building in the Balkans, Iraq, and elsewhere, and it has its advantages, up to a point. However, it is important not to ignore the main reasons why participants may prefer a geographic division of labor. First, it is a way of de-conflicting authority and activities. Second, it provides latitude for non-uniform objectives, strategies, and methods. In essence, the purpose of such compartmentalization is to simplify COIN, not strengthen it.

Splintering COIN geographically may create a sense of order by sidestepping coordination problems, but it does not optimize total effort and total resources in COIN. It can lead to fiefdoms, the pursuit of varied and sometimes divergent agendas, and unhelpful privileged relationships between the lead nation and locals. Geographic segregation may create vulnerabilities against insurgents who are networked, mobile, and able to shift their weight. Apart from security operations, efforts to organize, train, and equip local forces, a major mission of COIN, must conform to national standards, as must efforts to improve governance, public service, and national infrastructure. In any case, only a few participating countries can be given sector leadership roles;

the rest must be integrated. In sum, assigning geographic sectors in COIN is not ideal and does not obviate the need to collaborate.

Whether or not geographic sectors are assigned, reliance on NATO to manage demanding COIN operations has its merits, especially as the United States becomes more comfortable loosening its control in order to gain partners. However, NATO is competent only in military and closely related security aspects of COIN. If NATO does not exert control over the civilian aspects of COIN, who does? There can be no standard solution to this: It depends on the nature of the endeavor, the demand for resources and competence, and the contributions of various countries and organizations. Options include a lead country, a lead international agency, the EU, or an ad hoc oversight group. While coordination to improve local capabilities is important, it does not require the same command unity and clarity as military operations do. In any case, it is important to reach broad agreement on how multilateral COIN would be conducted.

Because civilian aspects of COIN must be harmonized with military aspects, this raises the question of who has overall control. A tenet of COIN, established by the British half a century ago, is that there must be a single “supremo”—a civilian COIN overlord to ensure unity of effort and subordination of military operations to political strategy. This simple idea becomes very complicated, perhaps even infeasible, in the case of multilateral COIN. Moreover, against Type III insurgencies, with their transnational and, in some cases, global aspects, a supremo within one country cannot know, let alone manage, what happens elsewhere. Finally, it is not clear how any foreign official can manage a COIN operation while still looking to the local government to accept ultimate responsibility for winning the support of its own population. For all of these reasons, the supremo solution is no longer viable.

Inevitably, overall management of multilateral COIN will have to fall on a group representing the participants, chaired by the leading participant and/or the local government. This might seem a poor substitute for a supremo, but for the fact that the best response to decentralized and flexible insurgency is decentralized and flexible COIN. In the new model, coherence and coordination depend on the flow of

information and horizontal collaboration unimpeded by vertical controls, agency compartments, or national barriers. Thanks to existing network technologies, COIN can be distributed, multifaceted, and multilateral and still be integrated operationally, with higher authorities providing strategic direction.

Collaboration can and should take place in the field among professionals with a like sense of purpose, mutual respect, trust, openness, and common information networks. Attempts to exercise tight institutional or national control over such unruly, but productive, activity can do more harm than good.

Functions, Principles, and Options

Given these ideas, and with the need for flexibility in mind, we suggest the following principles for the conduct of multilateral COIN (regardless of the international institutions involved):

- International unity of effort is as important as interagency unity of effort.
- The goal must be operational integration, not de-confliction; the key to achieving such integration is to remove barriers at all levels, which requires “letting go.”
- In such a model, common goals and general direction are essential and can only come from broad agreement and genuine unity at the top.
- For harmony, results, and legitimacy, participants must have a say in general direction in proportion to the contributions they make and the risks they take.
- The wisdom of the coalition, based on various experiences and perspectives, should be actively sought.
- To foster horizontal collaboration across national lines, any actor or agency from one country should be able to operate with any actor or agency from another.
- Comparative advantages among participants should be recognized and exploited.

- Information sharing must be unobstructed, inclusive, and integrated, with information restrictions the exception rather than the rule.
- Decisionmaking rules should be agreed on, and decisions should be transparent.
- In practice, collaboration, coordination, and interoperability must occur on at least the following functions for multilateral COIN to work.
 - political oversight and accountability
 - strategy-setting and policymaking
 - agreement on campaign goals, missions, constraints, rules, and metrics
 - command of and cooperation among military forces
 - cooperation among all security services, including military and police
 - intelligence gathering and sharing among nations¹⁶
 - reconstruction and development programs
 - political interaction with local government
 - civilian functional coordination with, help for, and advice to local agencies
 - capacity-building for local security services
 - interaction with the population
 - dissemination of information.

The following measures would put the above principles into practice.

Political Authority, Strategy-Setting, and Policymaking

- A crisp decision is needed on the original and continuing chain of multilateral political authority, be it the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council, or an ad hoc coalition with an acknowledged leader.

¹⁶ A subject taken up in a companion RAND COIN volume on information capabilities and sharing—Libicki et al., *Byting Back*.

- For COIN campaigns that are especially demanding and dangerous, a UN Security Council mandate to NATO or a coalition is preferred over UN control.
- National positions on goals, strategy, and policy should be openly aired in the agreed on forum rather than permitted to fester, damage cooperation, and cause national interference with operations.

Campaign Oversight

- A standing oversight group should be stood up in the COIN theater and chaired by the senior representative of the lead institution or country. When NATO has that lead, a high representative of the North Atlantic Council should be designated (e.g., from the lead country).
- Objectives, metrics, collective missions, country assignments, rules, and constraints should be agreed and altered only by agreement.
- Progress should be monitored collectively.

Command, Control, and Collaboration in Security Operations

- To the extent that combined (as opposed to sector by sector) security operations are called for, command and control should be integrated multinationally, either under NATO or ad hoc (as in Multi-National Force–Iraq).
- Any unit must be able to collaborate horizontally with any other unit, regardless of nationality.
- Rules of engagement should be uniform and appropriate.
- National concerns about the missions and use of forces should be expressed in the high-level political and campaign oversight group.

Local Cooperation

- The local government and its security services should be treated as a full-fledged member of the COIN coalition—indeed, no COIN operation can succeed without a full role and cooperation of the host government.
- The prerogatives of sovereign should be adjusted by agreement and as necessary to ensure COIN success.
- Programs to build local security services should be standardized and coordinated, perhaps with a lead country for each local service.
- Reconstruction, humanitarian, and development programs should be coordinated at every level.

Information

- An integration counterinsurgency operating network (ICON) should be established and managed under the principles of user primacy, inclusiveness, and integration.
- Information sharing should be promoted with a view toward providing all participants, including local authorities and services, with timely, reliable, and relevant information.

The principles and practical measures laid out here may strike some readers as excessively collectivist and insufficient to guarantee clear and decisive leadership. This might be a fair concern if COIN were conducted according to a tightly controlled, centralized mode. But we know that mode will not work against distributed, elusive, embedded, and dynamic insurgencies such as those we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant. Thus, a distributed approach to COIN, in which integration is provided by networking instead of by “stovepiping,” lends itself to collaborative, multilateral COIN.

Is it messy? Absolutely—but that is a reflection of the nature of insurgency in the 21st century. Is it essential? Absolutely—for COIN has become exceedingly demanding, and it will take the strengths of many countries and organizations to succeed.

Politics

The measures recommended in this chapter presuppose that allied governments will sign up to joint preparations and employment of capabilities for COIN provided they are satisfied that analysis of the threat warrants it. Veterans of diplomacy, especially of U.S.-European relations, know that it is not that simple. There is a strong undercurrent of European public opinion—more on the Continent than in the UK—that force is not the way to counter the Islamic threat. In some quarters, this sentiment argues for greater attention to foreign aid and other forms of active engagement to get at the root causes; in other quarters, it argues for “fortress Europe”: restricted immigration and de facto domestic segregation. In both quarters, it causes European publics to favor keeping a safe distance from the United States and what they regard as its militaristic policies. In this political environment, most European governments will be wary about any new undertaking that implies being drawn closer to a U.S. approach that has gone badly in Iraq and is not going especially well in Afghanistan (where many allies are involved).

In this context, it needs to be noted that to Europeans, “counterinsurgency” has a definite connotation: colonial or post-colonial military suppression of resistance or independence movements, e.g., Algeria and Vietnam—often both bloody and unsuccessful. To Americans, COIN connotes a balanced approach to building governments more deserving of their citizens’ support, which may require military action to provide public safety. So defined, COIN is much closer than GWOT to what Europeans favor.

COIN, as outlined in this report, could be a compromise, or bridge, between Europeans’ (soft) preference for civil engagement and Americans’ reliance on force. However, it may not be seen that way in Europe. Words matter as much in politics and diplomacy as in any endeavor. Therefore, the U.S. government should adopt terminology, at least for diplomatic purposes, which would resonate better in Europe,

e.g., a “comprehensive approach” to Islamic insurgency and other new security dangers.¹⁷

Semantics aside, those Europeans with little faith in the use of force, of which there are many, should think hard before declining a U.S. invitation to confront, as partners, the challenge of Islamic violent extremism along the lines of this study. While our conclusion is that it is important *strategically* for the United States to reduce reliance on large-scale use of force in the Muslim world, it would also be opportune *politically* to do so. Europeans, by and large, should be pleased with a reduction in the U.S. government’s reliance on the use of force. But they should understand that such a reduction depends in part on their own willingness to contribute to complete and balanced capabilities for COIN.

¹⁷ The term “comprehensive approach” has considerable support among NATO allies and is now in use in NATO deliberations.

Investment Priorities

The Need to Invest

Much has been made of U.S. mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan: dangers not foreseen, preparations not made, opportunities missed, bad decisions made, international support not sought, and so on. Yet, it would be wrong to think that the United States would have readily succeeded were it not for its mistakes. The United States does not have enough of the right capabilities to contain, weaken, and ultimately overcome complex dynamic (Type III) insurgencies of the kind in Iraq and Afghanistan—the kind the United States is likely to face in the future, whether or not it succeeds in these two conflicts.

A root cause of this deficit has been a failure of investment. Military capabilities are a case in point. The first sentence of the 2006 DoD *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR) reads: “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.”¹ Yet the current DoD “program of record,” based on that QDR, leaves the United States with incomplete and imbalanced capabilities with which to prosecute this “long war.” Major threats, crises, or wars usually precipitate changes in national defense capabilities—e.g., the airplane, the tank, radar, atomic weapons. Not this one. Except for a small increase in the proportion of the DoD budget for special operations forces (from roughly 1 percent to 2 percent), there has been no substantial change in military investment priorities since 9/11. Moreover, despite the knowledge that civil capabilities are as important to COIN as military capabilities,

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006*, p. v.

growth in State Department spending has been dwarfed by growth in DoD spending.

If Islamic insurgency is the gravest threat to the United States and its interests in the near to middle term, and if countering this insurgency requires a broad and balanced array of capabilities, the grim implication is that the United States is ill equipped to counter the gravest threat it faces. Therefore, it must invest to correct its COIN deficiencies and imbalances. Because the deficiencies are significant, in civil and indigenous capabilities especially, this will take time. It is impossible to say whether the capabilities we recommend can help produce success in Iraq and Afghanistan specifically, for these conflicts are now operating according to their own logic and pace. But this is no reason to build such capabilities leisurely. Just the opposite.

This presents a particular problem in that entities, from small companies to superpowers, tend not to focus their time, resources, and energy on long-term investments when they are in “crisis mode.” If such a tendency holds true, the United States will not begin to enhance and balance its COIN capabilities until the dust settles (figuratively and literally) in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would be a huge mistake, for the high energy state of Type III Islamic insurgency permits no delay. Sunni insurgency and Shiite militancy both flared in a matter of months in Iraq in early 2004. The resurgence of the Taliban in 2006 was equally sudden. Hezbollah’s rocket threat to Israel also developed rapidly. Because Islamic insurgency does not rely on complex weapons, platforms, and bureaucratic structures, its capabilities can form in a fraction of the time it takes nation-states, including the United States.

In Part I, a case was made on strategic and operational grounds for significantly reducing the reliance on large-scale U.S. military power in the Muslim world. Part II explored several categories of capabilities for COIN that would work toward that end:

- civil COIN instruments to undermine the appeal of insurgents
- COIN-oriented information power, based on the principles that prevail in the world at large
- competent, legitimate, and appropriate local security capabilities.

Pursuing these alternative priorities would in turn help to shift the current U.S. emphasis on large, lethal combat forces to one of enabling capabilities, e.g., training, advising, mobility, and surveillance, with U.S. ground forces to be used as a last resort, if at all.

Of the three, the ambitious application of *information power* in COIN could be done fairly quickly, because the necessary infrastructure and technology largely exist and are being constantly improved by the larger market. New information services and products appear constantly and spread quickly. Government investment can be modest and targeted. Indeed, the role of government should be measured, to avoid strangling this information power in red tape. If the government applies information power according to the commercial (Internet) model, improvements in COIN could come quickly. But if it approaches this as if it were buying a new generation of artillery, U.S. COIN will continue to suffer from the curse of closed networks and compartmentalized information.

Setting Investment Priorities

In COIN as in other endeavors, investment may entail the commitment of money, time, people, political capital, or other scarce resources to create sustained improvement in capabilities, performance, and results—i.e., returns on investment. It may take the form of R&D, procurement, training, or other measures. Generally, the case for a given investment is based on three judgments:

- recognizing the deficiency of existing capabilities to meet future needs
- understanding how capabilities and results can improve by committing resources
- designing investment to yield a maximum return for the resources committed.

Thus, if a particular capability needed for COIN is judged to be inadequate at present, resources should be committed to that invest-

ment which is expected to have the greatest return in COIN results. Of course, this assumes that the U.S. government has no more rewarding or pressing things to do with its resources—such as homeland defense or energy alternatives or public education—than to invest in improved COIN. While analyzing such grand tradeoffs goes beyond the scope of this report, it would seem that meeting the dangers of insurgency, especially Type III insurgency, is among the top national priorities.

As part of the process of considering investment, it is important to note that the United States is not alone in needing to counter insurgency in this day and age. Despite differences over the decision to invade Iraq, the United States and its allies mostly agree that the challenge of Islamic violent extremism must be met *somehow*, as NATO's substantial COIN campaign in Afghanistan shows. True, many European allies favor nonmilitary over military COIN. However, as Chapter Five shows, this is the area where the United States is weakest. In turn, Chapter Eleven indicates that combined capabilities of the United States and its allies offer a much fuller and more balanced basis for conducting COIN than those of the United States alone. Very roughly speaking, there is as much non-U.S. capacity among other advanced democracies and international organizations as there is U.S. capacity for COIN—less for military capabilities, more for civil ones.² Moreover, the United States is not the only actor that could and should invest to improve COIN capabilities: The EU has comparable economic and human capital. While the United States may not wish to forgo certain capabilities in the hope that allies will provide them, it should use its influence to encourage others to beef up in those categories (mentioned in Chapter Eleven) where they have greater capacity or competence. Some major U.S. deficiencies—in police and constabulary training, public-service restoration, and security-sector reform, for example—could be substantially reduced by taking a multilateral approach. For this reason, the analysis of investment that follows takes into account what allies might contribute.

² As already noted, how much non-U.S. capacity would be available to prevent and counter Islamic insurgency depends on how convincingly the United States can make the case and whether key institutions, especially NATO and the EU, can be effectively engaged.

A final point about analytic method. Investment analysis is relatively straightforward in the commercial world, where expected returns (typically, future cash flow) are weighed against the cost of investment (typically, the cost of capital) as the way of deciding on and among investments. For obvious reasons, investment analysis is less straightforward in the public world, where neither future cash-flow nor the cost-of-capital measures are meaningful.³ Consequently, investments in the sorts of capabilities recommended in Part II are based on judgments, not calculations—judgments based on perceived importance, expected deficiency, and cost (though, again, cost is not the constraint in national security that it is in business). Along this line, our specific method was to solicit independent recommendations from the members of the study team regarding the investment priority to be placed on the capabilities identified in Part II.

Tables 12.1 through 12.4 present the results. The categories used are civil, security, information, and cognitive (structural change being covered in the next chapter). Each need identified was assessed in terms of (1) its importance, (2) current U.S. capacity to satisfy the need, and (3) current capacity to satisfy the need taking allies into account. Judgments of the importance of capabilities are expressed simply as 1 (high) and 2 (moderate). Judgments of current capacity are expressed from 1 (very limited) to 5 (abundant).⁴ From these assessments, U.S. investment priorities are derived, expressed as high, medium, and low. Thus, the combination of high importance and limited current capability implies high investment priority; no matter how important the capability, if the United States (alone or with partners) has an abundance of capabilities, the priority is low.

³ True, the cost of capital for the U.S. government is the interest rate on its Treasury bonds. However, in national security, the U.S. government will not hesitate to borrow, whatever that rate is.

⁴ These assessments were compiled from the independent judgments of ten persons with COIN experience.

Table 12.1
Civil Capabilities

Capability	Importance	U.S. Only	U.S. + Partners	Investment Priority
Political transformation	1	4	5	low
Government administration	1	3	4	low
Public health	2	2	3	medium
Public education	1	1	3	high
Employment impact	1	1	3	high
Economic policymaking	2	4	5	low
Banking system	2	3	4	low
Direct financial support	1	3	4	low
Transportation and distribution (including food and water)	1	3	4	low
Energy	1	2	3	medium

Table 12.2
Security Capabilities

Capability	Importance	U.S. Only	U.S. + Partners	Investment Priority
Command authority	1	4	4	low
Institution-management capacity	1	2	2	high
Logistics	2	3	3	low
Information operations	1	2	2	high
Justice system	1	1	1	high
Police, law enforcement, public safety	1	1	3	high
Constabulary	1	1	3	high
Quick reaction force forces ^a	1	2	3	medium
Human intelligence	2	1	1	high
Border security	1	2	3	medium
Coastal security	1	3	4	low

Table 12.2—Continued

Capability	Importance	U.S. Only	U.S. + Partners	Investment Priority
Ground-combat force-building	1	2	2	high
Technical ISR	1	3	3	medium
Tactical air mobility	2	2	2	medium
High-value direct action (e.g., special forces)	1	2	2	high
Long-range air mobility	2	5	5	low
Precision strike	1	5	5	low

^a The category of ground-combat forces would include investments in capabilities to prepare and enable local ground combat forces as well as improvements in U.S. ground-force training, mobility, nonlethal options, information networking, and long-term endurance.

**Table 12.3
Information Capabilities**

Capability	Importance	U.S. Only	U.S. + Partners	Investment Priority
Collection	1	2	2	high
Access	1	2	2	high
Infrastructure	1	4	4	low

**Table 12.4
Cognitive Capabilities**

Capability	Importance	U.S. Only	U.S. + Partners	Investment Priority
Research, analysis, understanding	1	1	3	high
Strategy, planning, shaping	1	2	2	high
Operation decisionmaking	1	1	1	high

Overall, then, assuming it is prepared to rely to some extent on the availability of allied capabilities for COIN, the United States should put highest priority on investing in capabilities to

- expand local employment selectively
- expand public education capacity
- reform security institutions, management, and leadership
- build indigenous justice systems
- organize, train, equip, and advise local police
- support effective local IO
- develop HUMINT capacity
- ground-combat forces (as defined)
- high-value direct action
- expand information collection
- improve information access
- improve insurgency research, analysis, and understanding
- improve COIN strategy, planning, operations and decisionmaking.

This list of high priorities gets longer if the United States were to disregard or fail to exploit multilateral capacity in its effort to create a complete and balanced set of COIN capabilities. In that case, the United States would also have to include among its high-priority investments the capabilities to strengthen local-government administration; public health, energy, sanitation, water, distribution, and transport; border security; constabulary police; and quick-response military forces. Conversely, if the United States is able to achieve multilateral agreement to pool and improve multilateral COIN capabilities (per Chapter Eleven), it could reduce substantially what would otherwise be a very hefty total requirement to invest in civil COIN instruments (per Chapter Five). At the same time, it should not be completely dependent on its partners for these capabilities.

Planning High-Priority Investments

Based on the preceding analysis, the following section details the high-priority investments the United States should undertake to strengthen capabilities for COIN, taking into account multilateral potential.

Building Indigenous Justice Systems. The aim here is not to operate or orchestrate other states' justice systems but to help build them. Attempting to help a state build a justice system—courts, judges, prisons, prosecution and defense, appeals, criminal and civil law—requires the involvement of practitioners and experts. There is no surplus of such persons, especially active practitioners. Retired judges and attorneys could provide a source, though not one that could be counted on to meet such a need urgently and in a dangerous environment. The United States would be hard-pressed—in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been hard-pressed—to assemble sufficient justice-system talent to meet this need in major or simultaneous insurgencies. Moreover, because justice systems vary from society to society, it is better to draw from a variety of models. This suggests that the capability for justice-system capacity-building should be institutionalized on a multilateral basis. The existence of mechanisms for international legal and judicial cooperation could facilitate this. But it would have to be recognized as a high priority and focused, funded, and maintained accordingly.

Creating Local Employment. The idea that the state should create jobs (beyond those required to carry out necessary government functions) has been increasingly out of fashion in the United States since World War II. Even in Western Europe, the idea has been discredited and policies associated with it are fading. In ex-communist countries, unemployment has been reduced mainly by private investment. However, it is unrealistic to rely on growth in private investment in countries threatened by insurgency. There is no accepted model or body of analysis that supports job creation by a state under tranquil conditions, much less during conflict. The best approach in the context of COIN is one of selective employment expansion: targeting particularly susceptible population segments (e.g., ex-soldiers, militia, insurgents) in particular locations. This is done by instituting targeted job train-

ing and preferential placement programs.⁵ This has been tried in some parts of Iraq, where ex-combatants have been given job training as part of choosing civilian life over militias, insurgency, or crime.⁶ Unfortunately, the United States has not had the capability to do this on a scale that would give more than a small fraction of ex-combatants a new job and a new future. The capability to do this must be multilateral, with the EU providing much of the expertise and capacity. The UNDP also has capabilities for retraining and reintegrating disarmed fighters. Advanced analysis and the development of promising models are important, especially for launching targeted employment programs rapidly.

Operational Decisionmaking. This affects every participant in COIN: U.S., local, and multilateral partners; military, police, intelligence, and civil agencies; headquarters and units, large and small. It is fair to say, from the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, that none of these is functioning satisfactorily. All too often, interest in improving decisionmaking gets sidetracked into discussion of gadgets or procedures. In fact, this is about people and their cognitive abilities, which never seems to get sufficient attention. IT can help, but it cannot compensate for inadequate thinking, analysis, and problem-solving in urgent, unfamiliar, complex, and dangerous circumstances. Awareness of the need to improve cognition and operational decisionmaking has increased somewhat of late, such as in the U.S. Army's National Training Center and in the literature.⁷ However, U.S. and other military and civil agencies engaged in COIN are generally not exploiting the advantage they have in information networking. Investment should take the form of education, training, and steps to sharpen education and training to improve decisionmaking.⁸ This should be identified

⁵ This, of course, is a security measure, with no real economic justification. (See discussion in Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*.)

⁶ Unfortunately, it has not worked well or quickly enough. The United States has failed to back up with adequate resources the agreements reached in 2004 for the reintegration of militia fighters. As a result, most of them have not reintegrated and are still fighters.

⁷ This is detailed in Gompert, *Heads We Win*. See also Gompert et al., *Battle-Wise*.

⁸ Gompert, *Heads We Win*.

as a major priority for the armed services, joint commands, personnel departments, and the professional military education system.

Human Intelligence Capability. The United States intelligence services cannot possibly provide adequate HUMINT capacity within another country faced with large internal threats, much less more than one such embattled country. But it can help build local capacity for this, while focusing itself on high-value targets (e.g., key jihadists and foreign supporters of insurgency). Locally, most human intelligence is gathered by police, especially if they have earned the population's cooperation. This can be augmented by indigenous national intelligence services, provided they are directed to work closely with police. It is not clear that U.S. foreign-intelligence arms—notably, the CIA—can or should have the ability to build up the means of other countries to conduct what is for these countries *domestic* human intelligence. Moreover, as the chapter on information capabilities indicates, traditional reliance on secret sources is not the best way to get information about the insurgency or the population. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence should be directed to form a capability for this purpose. British MI5, other European national agencies, and Interpol have some such capability, which suggests that this too should be multilateral.⁹

Security Institution-Building. The United States and its foreign partners can provide control, direction, administration, and support of local security services only up to a point. These are inherently sovereign functions and must be done and done well by the states in question, though they are likely to need a great deal of help in reforming their institutions or building new ones. There is actually some capability and experience among the United States and its NATO allies in this field from their work to reform the security institutions of the former Soviet bloc, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the capability cannot simply be shifted to a Muslim setting. Moreover, experience suggests that it can take a decade or more to turn corrupt, bloated,

⁹ Any effort to expand multilateral intelligence cooperation must reckon with the need to limit access to information about sources and methods, both human and technical. However, this should not be a constraint in the case of this particular recommendation, which is aimed at improving the institutional ability to form and manage proper human intelligence services, not at operations.

and ineffective security institutions into “clean, lean, and able” ones. One lesson from Iraq is that immense and complex security institutions, such as the Pentagon and the CIA, make poor models for those in weak states. Some U.S. partners, e.g., Australia, the Scandinavians, and the Central Europeans themselves, offer better models.¹⁰ Another lesson is that a strong and sustained advisory role is essential. If Iraq’s Interior Ministry had had more U.S. advisors in the critical period after the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, it may not have fallen so easily into the clutches of the Badr Corps militia.¹¹ For reasons of capacity and breadth of experience, a multilateral effort is essential. One approach that merits consideration is to have NATO take the lead among its members and others to create a robust capability for security-sector reform.

Police and Law-Enforcement Institution-Building. There is no substitute for local, community-oriented police, especially when competing with insurgents for the political and practical support of the population. The United States has a vast reservoir and rich experience in local law enforcement. It exists in municipal and state police departments, large and small, in the population of retired police, and throughout the military-reserve population. The question is how to find, enhance, maintain, package, and deliver capacity-building capabilities. If this is not done, the burden will fall again and again on the U.S. military; quite apart from whether it can handle that burden, the U.S. military does not have the institutional competence to create foreign police forces, as experience in Iraq shows. This is largely an organizational issue, and thus is addressed in the next chapter. But there must be a federal core capability. The Department of State may not be the best place: It is, after all, an institution that does diplomacy, not policy training. If the U.S. Department of Justice is to be expected to maintain a core capability for building justice systems, law enforcement might be connected to it. Of course, multilateral collaboration is essential.

¹⁰ The Iraq Ministry of Defense was designed on the British model.

¹¹ It was during this period that the Interior Minister began appointing fellow Badr Corps commanders to key senior and mid-level positions.

Special Forces for High-Value Targets. One of the many distinguishing qualities of SOF is that they readily adapt to new threats and missions, partly because of their entrepreneurial, antidoctrinal culture, partly because they are by their nature very versatile, and partly because they are not tied to, or held back by, large and complex platforms and weapons systems. Of the numerous missions SOF perform, two are especially relevant to countering global-local insurgency: training and advising of local forces, which is also known as foreign internal defense (FID); and conducting high-risk, often covert, operations against terrorists and other high-value targets. The first of these missions is addressed elsewhere. The second of these missions is increasingly important in eliminating the most dangerous of the jihadist-insurgent elements—leaders, cells, key operatives—arrayed against states of interest and the United States itself. Moreover, it is unrealistic, perhaps even inadvisable, for the United States to build such elite forces among its local partners, which suggests that the United States (along with a few advanced allies) will have to provide most of such forces for direct operations.¹² Consequently, we judge this to be a capability that deserves even greater investment than it currently receives. The post-9/11 history of U.S. SOF is an odd one. From 2001 to 2002, DoD spending on SOF jumped from about \$5B to \$7B. Then, inexplicably—given the dazzling success of SOF in Afghanistan—it settled back to \$6.5B for several years (a mere 1.5 percent of U.S. defense spending). This desultory commitment to SOF, involving only 1 percent of the total post-9/11 increase in U.S. defense spending, came to an end with the 2006 QDR, which recognized, at last, that no U.S. military capability has greater potential to take on the worst and most sophisticated jihadists—certainly none for the money. Spending of SOF has increased by 20 percent in 2006–2007. Even with this increase, U.S. SOF for direct action (and their other missions) are stretched thin, as are allied SOF.¹³

¹² Elite forces in developing countries are often misused for political ends.

¹³ See David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, *Creating a NATO Special Operations Force* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Defense Horizons Paper No. 52, March 2006). As of November 2, 2007: http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/defense_horizons/DH_52.pdf.

While there is little disagreement with this assessment, the reason more resources are not being directed toward expanding SOF is that qualified personnel cannot be recruited and trained quickly enough, and standards should not be lowered. In addition to the specific enhancements of U.S. SOF mentioned in Chapter Ten, consideration should be given to increasing financial incentives to increase recruitment and retention.

Ground-Combat Forces. American ground forces are second to none in the world. But they are not the best model on which to build ground forces for countries faced with insurgency, for a simple reason: U.S. ground forces are not intended to conduct internal security operations amid the population. For a year or more, as the Sunni insurgency grew in scale and intensity, the United States was training the new Iraqi Army mainly for external defense.¹⁴ The use of a country's military to quell domestic insecurity should not be taken lightly, but it is precisely for that reason that indigenous ground-combat forces must be trained for the complexities and nuances of COIN. However great the need for trainers, regular ground forces of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are not suitable for this. The following chapter addresses structural options for foreign military training. Whatever the organizational arrangement, there must be a significant investment to create the capability to develop local forces for COIN. The capability is justified not only for full-blown insurgencies but also to help prepare local forces to deal properly with proto-insurgency. Of course, a multilateral approach is indispensable. Again, NATO could organize its members and others to do this collaboratively.

Information Collection, Dissemination, Access, and Collaboration. These capabilities are spelled out in detail in Chapter Six. The key is to capitalize on the technologies, infrastructure, and services available in the world market. Investment should *not* go toward networks that compartmentalize and deny information, are controlled by the originators rather than the users of information, and that exclude

¹⁴ The poor response of several Iraqi Army battalions during the crisis of April 2004 is largely attributed to the fact that the officers were not prepared for action amid the Iraqi population.

multilateral and local partners. The capabilities of ICON and data-gathering systems should be promoted, not procured and managed, by the U.S. government. Foreign assistance should be directed toward enabling local forces, authorities, and citizens to gain access to and proficiency in new information networks. Generally speaking, U.S. assistance to help create information societies is an excellent way to build antibodies to insurgency.

Information Operations. One of this study's most important conclusions about influencing perceptions and attitudes is that the effort to do so must be aligned with the goal of earning popular support for the local government, not for the United States. This is not to say that the U.S. military and civilian agencies engaged in COIN should ignore IO; there are many circumstances in which they need to affect the information domain. Moreover, as a general proposition, the United States should continue to try to win acceptance of its policies worldwide. But the thrust of IO should be to build the case for local government. The fundamental choice for populations whose allegiance is pursued by insurgents is whether instead to back a government that they view as competent, legitimate, independent, and *theirs*. One of the keys to that end is to create an information society, in which the message of insurgency—for that matter, also that of the government—must compete in a marketplace of ideas, opinions, and facts. Whatever can be done with technology, advice, and techniques to give local authorities the capability to improve their *message* ought to be the priority for COIN. Such guidance should be issued to all involved in COIN.

Analysis. Every participant in COIN—U.S., partner, local—must excel in understanding insurgency, which is always important in COIN but especially important in countering global-local insurgency. This is chiefly a question of having the right people and then developing their skills and facilitating their collaboration. Cognitive profiles for COIN personnel should be developed, and the government should develop plans to compete vigorously with the private economy to attract people matching these profiles. Personnel policies should be tailored to strengthen COIN cognitive abilities in recruitment, performance evaluation, promotion, assignment, and retention strategies. Professional education should address the sorts of problems and choices

that arise in COIN analysis, strategy, and operations, including the globalization of insurgency, the path some Muslims travel to suicide terrorism, and Islamic perspectives, values, and grievances. Training techniques should integrate intuition with reasoning, develop key cognitive abilities, and practice rapid-adaptive decisionmaking under stress and uncertainty. Experts on insurgency, Islam, and Muslim populations should be paired with military, police, and intelligence operators. Latitude for criticism of existing views and for unfettered research and analysis on jihad should be created within military, policy, and intelligence institutions. The personnel departments of military, intelligence, legal, and other national-security organizations should be brought into COIN capability-building.

Constabulary. Although not a *U.S.* investment priority, it is critical that the capability to build indigenous constabulary police force be available. Countries facing insurgency generally need internal security forces that are capable of policing action as well as light combat, thus permitting regular police to concentrate on community immersion while also raising the threshold for domestic intervention by the military. Like other police forces, there is no good substitute for local ones. The organization, training, and equipping of such forces must be nuanced and different from that required for police and military forces. The United States does not maintain forces tailored to put down organized domestic violence because it has had no such violence to speak of for 150 years. When there is a need, it relies on the National Guard or elite law-enforcement units. As noted, there are countries that excel in this capability—Spain with its *Guardia Civil* and Italy with its *Carabinieri*.¹⁵ It would be much easier to leave this to them than for the United States to attempt to build a capability for which it has no national need, tradition, or doctrine.

¹⁵ In fact, Italy has led the creation of a special international training center for such forces. The Italians have the lead for both NATO and the European Union to develop police doctrine. RAND interviews with personnel from the Italian *Carabinieri*, Rome, July 2005.

Investing for an Uncertain Future

The United States needs to be prepared to counter whatever insurgency its national interests and global responsibilities demand. Accordingly, the presumption that capabilities sufficient to counter Type III insurgency would suffice across the spectrum of types of possible future insurgencies deserves careful examination. To the extent that it is not true, other capabilities and investments may be indicated for other forms of insurgency.

We argued in Chapters Two and Three that as a class, purely local insurgencies (Type I), as well as those receiving external support (Type II), present no major challenges not encompassed by Type III insurgencies. On the whole, the capabilities needed to counter global-local insurgency subsume those needed to counter local insurgency. But global jihad or other stateless, distributed, violent movements (Type IV insurgency) could present somewhat different strategic and operational challenges than Type III insurgency. In particular, the development of local security services is not so easily achieved or adequate when the adversary is scattered among many states and ungoverned territories. Enhancing the legitimacy and performance of particular states in the Muslim world may impede but will not end the jihadist movement. Because global jihad exists both within and beyond the context of local insurgency, it can survive effective local COIN campaigns or avoid unpromising insurgencies. The defeat of Islamic insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan would hurt but not eradicate global jihad. It would look elsewhere for local opportunities—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, to name a few. Jihad can also function in its pure global form—distributed, lacking a center of gravity and critical nodes, operating in small and expendable units, recruiting and striking anywhere; its aim not to seize this or that state but to attack the powers that allegedly menace Muslims, starting with America and Europe.

Against such a purely stateless threat, *global collaboration* is essential, more so than against Type III insurgency. In the latter, it may suffice for the United States, its democratic partners, and key international organizations to partner in support of local states facing insurgency. Help from bordering states is invaluable. Severing ties—physical,

financial, informational, and inspirational—between local and global is important, as is early and concerted action against proto-insurgencies. In the case of Type IV insurgency, the case for global cooperation is even stronger than in that of Type III. This is because global insurgents can be dangerous not only through their involvement in local insurgencies, as we know from attacks in New York, Washington, London, Madrid, Bali, and Amman. And they can operate virtually anywhere in the interstices of the international system.

In this regard, the international instruments that the United States has worked to create to combat global terrorist groups, starting with al Qaeda, are as important as ever, even though they are not especially relevant to COIN against global-local insurgency. This includes global intelligence, investigative, and enforcement partnerships, multilateral or bilateral. It also includes tracking and interrupting flows of dangerous materials, money, and individuals. The unfortunate lumping together of the conflict in Iraq with GWOT has muddled the understanding of both COIN and terrorism and how to address them. The heavy reliance of the United States on the use of large-scale conventional military power on Muslim soil, especially Iraq, has made it harder to pool the efforts of all states concerned about global jihad and its terror. It follows that a U.S. COIN approach that gives greater emphasis to the capabilities proposed in this study—civil, local, and informational-cognitive—would help overcome worldwide skepticism about U.S. understanding and strategy, especially its heavy reliance on use of force on Muslim lands. This would improve the prospects for global cooperation against a global menace.

Finally, because future insurgencies may vary greatly in character, size, and challenges presented, U.S. COIN capabilities must be versatile, flexible, and adaptable—versatile so that the same forces can be used in a wide range of circumstances; flexible so that they can be used differently; and adaptable so that they can evolve as needs do, without having to be discarded and replaced. COIN capabilities should also be able to contribute to meeting other national-security demands. In general, they should be broadly applicable in COIN and readily adapted to new circumstances as well as non-COIN missions, such as post-conflict reconstruction, restoration of failed states, and the transformation of nations.

Costs

The investments suggested here amount to some significant new priorities:

- personnel and foreign assistance that enable the civil side of COIN
- improved exploitation of information power and brain power
- capabilities to build, strengthen, and enable local security forces
- refinements in U.S. military capabilities for direct operations.


This is depicted in Figure 12.1 according to the original concept of enhancing those capabilities that can improve COIN while reducing reliance on the large-scale direct use of U.S. military forces. If current U.S. capabilities are not suitable and sufficient for effective COIN, it is necessary to invest—along the four axes shown—in U.S. capabilities that are suitable and sufficient, or “complete and balanced.” In addition to indicating the sorts of investments that deserve resources, it is necessary to consider the level of resources they need.

The costs indicated here are only crude estimates.¹⁶ They are not broken down by specific functions and investments but rather aggregated according to broad capabilities needed.

As explained in Chapter Five, the United States has neither the people nor the foreign assistance funding to provide adequately for the *civil capabilities* for COIN (not including police, law enforcement, public safety, and justice systems). A capability to prevent several proto-insurgencies from becoming full-blown insurgencies while also coun-

¹⁶ Cost estimates make use of different sources and methods. In the case of civil COIN personnel, they are drawn from (1) typical costs of U.S. civilians operating abroad and (2) independent estimates from Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*. Costs of additional Overseas Development Assistance are based on the analysis of needs in Chapter Five. Costs of U.S. capacity (mainly people) to organize, train, equip, and advise local security forces come from judgments of the numbers of individuals required full-time and the cost per deployed individual. Cost of ICON, other information capabilities, and enhanced training and other measures for cognitive effectiveness are taken from a separate RAND study (Libicki et al., *Byting Back*). Costs of enhancements in U.S. capabilities are based on recent increases in budgeting for SOF and rough estimates of R&D for improved ISR and nonlethal capabilities.

Figure 12.1
Investing in Complete and Balanced COIN



RAND MG595/2-12.1

tering at least one significant insurgency would require on the order of another 5,000–10,000 people. U.S. partners might be persuaded to maintain half of this capacity, leaving the United States with a requirement for 2,500–5,000 additional people (in USAID, State, and other government departments). For such U.S. people to be not only paid but also trained, deployed, and operating could cost on the order of \$1–2B annually.¹⁷ Of course, this number could be higher if the government had to increase salaries to attract and keep them.

In addition, even if the entire current annual U.S. foreign (non-military) assistance budget (roughly \$25B) were dedicated to COIN, it would not be enough to provide the economic, technical, and political

¹⁷ Costs per person are consistent with those calculated in Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*.

capacity-building needed to ensure the effectiveness, legitimacy, and survival of a major state faced with a large Type III insurgency. Of course, the most cost-effective (and least dangerous) way to use foreign assistance to counter insurgency is to target potential or proto-insurgencies. This is significantly less costly per country, but it requires addressing the potential of insurgency in more countries, thus the need to have a good system of warnings and indicators (a very good investment!). In addition, as already discussed, U.S. allies and international organizations might be convinced to direct a fraction of non-U.S. assistance (roughly \$90B) to prevent or counter insurgency.¹⁸ Again, a reasonable split between the United States and its partners might be, say, 50-50. Lastly, the United States has the option of surging to meet extraordinary needs, as it faced in Vietnam and now Iraq. Arguably, it need not maintain such capabilities permanently. Taking these factors into account, and assuming that a significant fraction of existing aid level is directed toward COIN, a 25 to 50 percent increase in annual U.S. foreign assistance spending—roughly \$10–15B—is needed to build local governance, public service, economic capacity, and infrastructure. These increases should be concentrated on building educational capacity and targeted job-training and placement programs.

Creating dramatically better *information capabilities* for COIN need not involve dramatically increased costs. The key, as noted in Chapter Six, is to take full advantage of existing technology, existing network infrastructure, and commercial products and services, which are becoming less and less expensive. ICON would require some R&D (presumably sponsored by DoD). The combined costs of developing, maintaining, and updating the information capabilities of ICON of use in a number of countries could be \$1–2B annually. Direct U.S. costs to equip its civil and military personnel to use ICON could be another \$1–2B. Another major cost of information capabilities is to fund the expansion of information access—cell phones, laptops, and other personal devices—in chosen countries. As we all know, these costs-per-device are coming down. The United States has much to gain from fostering and even financing the creation of information societies,

¹⁸ Total non-U.S. foreign aid is roughly three times total U.S. foreign aid.

not only to reduce conditions that give rise to insurgency but also to promote good (and pro-U.S.) government. Although this requirement is essentially open-ended, another \$2B in foreign assistance would go a long way.¹⁹

The next priority is to enhance those capabilities that are essential to build, advise, and otherwise enable local security services, including justice and corrections systems, police and law enforcement, public safety, and military services. Estimates for these functions in Iraq and a variety of other post-conflict settings indicate that it could take a standing capability of roughly 5,000 trainers and advisors, of which, say, half might be U.S. This could cost the United States \$2–3B annually to pay, train, deploy, and operate.

Lastly, certain specialized military capabilities are of growing value in COIN—even more so if the responsibility for ground-force operations is shifted to local forces. The most important are SOF and technical ISR (e.g., for border monitoring), and nonlethal and scalable-effect weapons. An increase in funding for these capabilities could amount to another \$3–4B per year.

Thus, a very crude estimate of what it would cost to give the United States a more complete and balanced set of capabilities to conduct COIN—especially but not exclusively against Islamic insurgency—is in the range of \$20–30B, with the higher number being in the case in which the capabilities of partners is more heavily discounted. (This underscores the importance of multilateral COIN.)

While such sums could be raised by increasing federal debt, raising taxes, or cutting domestic or non-COIN national-security expenditures, such tradeoffs go beyond this study. However, the costs might also be covered by a shift away from spending on capabilities that have been justified by GWOT but should be rethought in light of recent experience and objective analysis. Annual spending on operations and maintenance of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps has grown by about \$40B (from \$33B to \$74B) since 2001, and Air Force and Navy investment in new military systems has grown by \$27B (from \$71B to \$98B). The proposed expansion of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps would

¹⁹ This increase would be in addition to that proposed for civil COIN assistance.

cost an additional \$12B per year. Perhaps spending at these levels is needed for reasons other than COIN; if so, DoD should make this clear. But to the extent that the justification for such towering DoD costs is COIN, this study finds that the most senior U.S. deficiencies at present are not in military capabilities and that reliance on military capabilities should be reduced. If spending on military capabilities for COIN could be contained somewhat, the \$20–30B cost of providing the United States with more complete and balanced COIN capabilities might not require an increase in overall federal spending.

We cannot put a figure on savings in the defense budget as a result of reducing the nation's reliance on the large-scale use of military power in COIN. But we strongly encourage the government to think along these lines as it considers how to fund the shift in capabilities recommended here.

Conclusion

This study shows what the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have already implied: The United States will need to make substantial investments to have a complete and balanced set of capabilities to counter Type III insurgency. These investments span the civil and military aspects of COIN. They are largely meant to improve the ability of the United States to enable legitimate and effective local governance and public service, including security. They also give long-overdue attention to the promise of information technology, properly used, and to the brainpower needed to succeed in COIN. To the extent that the United States can obtain the commitment of partners to collaborate in COIN and to enhance their own capabilities, the demand on the United States can be reduced in certain areas.

Organization: Unsettled Structures for Unsettled Times

Organizational Issues in Perspective

Although organizing for effective COIN was not an explicit aspect of this study's purpose, the need to address it became obvious in the course of it. Accordingly, this chapter presents preliminary ideas for further analysis.

Recall that organizational structure is one of the layers in the capabilities framework presented early in this report. While reorganization is no cure-all, neither can it be ignored. A commitment to building complete and balanced COIN capabilities will have organizational implications. Given the nature and seriousness of Type III insurgency and the breadth of effort needed for successful COIN, these implications may be quite significant, including but also going beyond the way U.S. armed forces are organized.

Notwithstanding organizational innovations in the U.S. national-security apparatus since 9/11, notably the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the existing structure has not performed adequately in COIN. DHS has virtually nothing to do with COIN; the formation of DNI, per se, has not appreciably improved the sharing of intelligence in actual COIN operations; and neither structure goes to the heart of U.S. COIN inadequacies. It would be a mistake to attribute U.S. shortcomings entirely to organizational defects, lack of capabilities and errors in policy and execution being at least as important. But it would also be a mistake to exempt organizational structure

from consideration of how to improve U.S. effectiveness. Because organizational structure affects how capabilities are planned, built, managed, and used, reorganization must be “on the table.” And because capabilities are to some extent a reflection of organization, the greater the necessary COIN capability enhancements are, the greater the organizational implications.

This chapter starts with a brief review of the significance of organizational structures and of some of the issues associated with reorganization, including a discussion of how COIN fits into the current national-security apparatus. It then addresses specific organizational implications of remedying the capability weaknesses already identified in this report. It then examines macro-structural options for organizing the U.S. government for COIN, both at the overall federal level and in particular within the Department of Defense, given the special complexities of military aspects of COIN. Finally, it looks at how best to organize in the field during COIN campaigns.

The U.S. government is a vast bureaucracy. Whatever the wishes of a particular political administration, the government’s ability to perform its missions, including to acquire and maintain capabilities needed to perform its missions, depends heavily on how it is organized. COIN, especially against Type III insurgencies, is as complicated as any mission the government must perform, involving (when done right) numerous departments and agencies in integrated strategies and operations. At the same time, these government organizations all have important non-COIN responsibilities, which COIN-motivated changes in organizational structure may affect, positively or negatively. Given the multiple missions of government and its components, analysis of organizational change needs to consider potential effects—direct and indirect, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term.¹

¹ It is important to note at the outset that, absent a single-purpose organization focused on this problem area, counterinsurgency is only one of many possible functions an organization is called upon to perform on a routine basis. Consequently, the structures of many organizations are dictated by a host of other factors that may appear non-adaptive in terms of meeting the demands of counterinsurgency. Also, structures of organizations are frequently relatively fixed once established, in part because of the costs of change in terms of potential negative

A useful reference point for considering COIN organization is the experience of the U.S. military in the decades since the Vietnam War.² The military's post-Vietnam emphasis was overwhelmingly on preparation for conventional operations against the armed forces of another nation-state, first the Soviet Union and then rogue nations such as (ironically) Iraq. From the mid-1970s until 2002, the training, doctrine, and modernization programs of the armed services were overwhelmingly oriented toward that mission. With the exception of SOF, little attention was paid to "irregular" operations, including COIN. This preoccupation with conventional combat operations had major organizational implications for the U.S. military. Its structures and organizations (Army divisions, Navy Carrier Battle Groups, Air Force fighter wings, and Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigades) were designed and equipped primarily for decisive expeditionary combat against the armed forces of enemy nations. The elaborate training and logistics infrastructures that prepared and supported the combat forces were also focused on major combat operations. Just as the fixation with the mission of defeating enemy military forces reinforced organization, organization reinforced the doctrines, priorities, culture, education, and capabilities that correspond to that mission. To the extent that counterinsurgency was considered, it was relegated to the world of SOF, where it coexisted with a raft of other missions such as special reconnaissance, covert action, hostage rescue, training of foreign forces, and other missions outside the organizational mainstream.³

In the aftermath of 9/11, with the exception of the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military has spent most of its time in one or another form of irregular operation. Predictably, its institutional instinct in these operations has been more on destroying enemy forces than on

impacts on other missions, and in part because of bureaucratic inertia created by the amalgamation of personal and organizational interests associated with extant structures.

² See Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1986) for a particularly relevant discussion of how bureaucratic elements interfered with counterinsurgency operations.

³ The loss of institutional and doctrinal interest in COIN in the U.S. military is described in Austin Long, *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, unpublished manuscript).

such other COIN functions as serving the population and strengthening local capabilities. The 40-day major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom played to the organizational strengths of the U.S. military. Post-invasion operations, which have now lasted over 1,500 days, have been much more awkward for U.S. forces. Designed for major combat, it is no mystery why existing military organizations were not ready for COIN, either structurally or in capabilities, which tend to reflect organization.

Of course, it is not only the U.S. military that is not organized for COIN. This study has confirmed the basic tenet that COIN is an interagency challenge, all the more so against the type of insurgency encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Insurgencies are almost never defeated by military means alone, nor by an intervening power without the advantage of at least the seeds of capable and legitimate local government. Yet, even while the U.S. military has been organized predominantly for major combat against other military forces, the Department of State and USAID, now part of State, have in recent decades been organized to conduct post-Cold War diplomacy and to furnish development assistance in support of that diplomacy. Neither one is organized to turn vulnerable states into effective ones. In sum, the organizational implications of improving U.S. COIN capabilities include but also go well beyond the military and the rest of DoD—implications for particular bureaucracies and for the government as a whole.⁴

⁴ The United States is not alone in the inadequacy of governmental organization to plan and conduct COIN. Most other advanced democratic states—the natural partners of the United States in COIN—suffer to one degree or another from stove-piped ministerial structure, with defense and foreign affairs being separate. The United Kingdom is perhaps best prepared organizationally. It has a strong cabinet-committee and interministerial coordination system, as well as a mechanism known as the Global Fund, in which foreign policy, defense policy, and foreign assistance programs are integrated. This enables the UK to focus resources and manage policy in line with national, as opposed to ministerial, priorities.

Capability Gaps and Organizational Implications

At a minimum, organizational structure must facilitate formation of high-priority capabilities in adequate scale and quality to permit more effective COIN:

- *Justice systems:* The U.S. government lacks the ability to quickly assemble, deploy, fund, and support training and advisory teams to help states form able and fair courts, corrections, and related capabilities.
- *Police and law enforcement:* Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the current U.S. capability to rebuild or enhance local police forces is limited. This is another area in which the U.S. government has had to contract for the service or rely on partners and international organizations, which are not always available, as we know from Iraq.
- *Civil employment-impact programs:* Even though the United States has a Department of Labor, it does not provide these services for the United States, much less for other nations. Nor are U.S. foreign-assistance programs geared toward targeted, or general, employment impact.
- *Public education capacity-building:* The U.S. government has essentially nothing to do with creating schools, hiring teachers, and buying books, nor with managing mass public education. This has not been a major focus of U.S. foreign assistance.
- *Security institution-management capacity:* The U.S. generally has to outsource this function (as was done in the Balkans in the 1990s), perform it ad hoc (as it has done in Iraq and Afghanistan), or rely on its embassies. Other countries (Australia and the UK) are organized to do this, albeit on a small scale. For example, the British military has long assigned officers directly to foreign military forces to provide expertise and, at times, actual command.
- *Military forces:*
 - *Indigenous ground forces:* As this is being written, the U.S. military is still searching ad hoc for a workable organizational for-

mula for organizing, training, equipping, and advising indigenous forces specifically for COIN.

- *U.S. ground forces*: By design or default, the U.S. military has been using for COIN standard forces organized, trained, and equipped for regular combat operations. Indeed, the units that initially entered Iraq were specifically designed, equipped, and trained for conventional combat operations. While the units and personnel have shown considerable ability to make on-site changes and innovations, the Iraq COIN experience has revealed the problems with that approach.
- *U.S. SOF*: Special forces are suitable for irregular operations, engaging local populations, and building indigenous forces but are a magnitude too small.

Why is the U.S. government so deficient in capabilities to effect improvements in the capabilities of states facing insurgencies when, at first glance, it would seem obvious that the world's superpower should possess them in abundance? The answer is surprisingly simple: Most U.S. government agencies (Justice, Labor, Commerce, DHS, etc.) are structured and equipped to only provide services domestically while those agencies with international-security responsibilities are structured to conduct diplomatic (State), military (DoD), or intelligence (CIA) operations that are not primarily related to strengthening another state under insurgent threat. Having never had much of an empire to manage, the U.S. government is structured to deal with the rest of the world at arms length, politically, economically, and militarily, not to build, organize, and advise other states.⁵ American diplomats are expected to represent their government to other governments, not to improve the performance of other governments. Nor does the U.S. military have the tradition—as the British military once did—of seconding officers for prolonged periods to assist and guide foreign militaries.

⁵ U.S. Department of State Iraq Coordinator David Sutterfield has said that the U.S. Foreign Service is not equipped or sized for nation-building.

Conversely, the departments of the U.S. government with the most competence in public services and other domestic affairs are not oriented or equipped to support other countries. Take for example justice systems, a critical aspect of COIN. The U.S. Department of Justice recruits and develops Federal Marshals and FBI agents based on the size and scope of its operations within the United States, with only minor attention paid to liaison with, much less providing service for, foreign states. This is a very important point. This nation's police forces are sized and organized, mainly at state and local levels, based on their mission of providing law and order for U.S. communities. They are not meant, sized, or organized to support COIN. Domestic agencies are constrained by politics, bureaucratic habit, lack of experience, statutory authority, and budgetary intention to concentrate on *domestic needs*. Being constrained, and given how different U.S. domestic needs are from the needs of states vulnerable to insurgency, U.S. agencies have little capability to strengthen such states. Other nations that have national police forces such as Canada, Italy, and France have a much clearer line of responsibility when it comes to providing assistance to foreign police forces.

The general lack of capacity and organization within the U.S. government to conduct COIN has led it increasingly to use contractors to perform the missions we include in this list. Although contractors can help provide surge capability, the lack of capability and suitable organization for COIN within the U.S. government proper, including DoD, means that assistance for COIN campaigns is often not effectively constituted or managed. In any case, with Type III Islamic insurgency gathering force, the U.S. government can no more outsource the task of supporting vulnerable states than it can outsource diplomacy, warfighting, or intelligence. Using contractors to provide niche services is unavoidable; using them to perform functions of critical national importance borders on dereliction.

Justice and Police

The U.S. government has, as noted, very little capability to build local judicial systems and no organization with the responsibility to acquire, maintain, and employ such a capability. In Iraq, a pick-up team of

retired and reservist lawyers and judges, with minimal bureaucratic backstopping, worked heroically, and frustratingly, to create a justice system on the rubble of the old Iraqi system. Neither the State nor Justice Departments are organized or resourced to perform this function. And while DoD can temporarily run a justice system via military courts martial and tribunals, those are inappropriate substitutes or models for a permanent civil justice system. For example, detention of suspected insurgents by military forces, authorized by processes, and in military facilities is no way to administer justice in a population that already is dubious about its government's competence and legitimacy.

The situation regarding the police is as bad. The State Department has a small, organic capability to assist foreign police through the issuance of contracted personnel through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, but it is not focused on COIN, nor is it well resourced.⁶ The Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority communicated a need for at least 1,500 civilian police trainers and advisors and got 50 in response. The Justice Department has both the FBI and Federal Marshals that could be of assistance to foreign governments struggling to form or improve their police forces, but Justice is not organized to provide large numbers of FBI agents or Marshals for overseas service. The FBI and the Federal Marshals are sized based on their domestic investigative and law-enforcement roles, and any significant diversion of personnel will impact domestic law enforcement and security activities.

There are compelling reasons to place at least some of the responsibility for these capabilities within the U.S. Justice Department. Institutionally, the State Department and DoD know no more about complex civil systems for administering and enforcing justice than the Justice Department knows about diplomacy and military affairs. Obviously, neither State nor DoD is involved in such matters in the United States, and their performance in Iraq on police and justice systems, respectively, provides ample evidence that this is just too great a stretch for their core competencies. It would be easier for the Justice Department to translate its justice and enforcement competence into foreign

⁶ USAID is constrained by law from building police or other security forces.

settings, with the help of the State Department, than for State or DoD to master civil justice systems. Even then, Justice would have to go outside the federal government for personnel, on loan or contract.

Building Local Security Institutional Capacity

For a vulnerable state to counter serious, e.g., Type III, insurgency, its agencies involved in internal affairs, defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, and borders, customs and immigration, as well as interagency systems, must function effectively and earn the confidence and trust of the population. To do this, they need sound structures manned by trained bureaucrats, specialists, technicians, logisticians, accountants, and officials and supported by workable regulations and systems. If the threatened nation lacks this capability, it will, at best, be forced to operate in a catch-up mode, struggling to develop adequate counters to the insurgency. At worst, it will be crippled in its effort to protect and gain the support of the population. States that lack the trained personnel and systems with which to recruit, train, manage, and operate their judicial, police, military, intelligence, and border-security services may fail or else be inordinately dependent on foreign assistance or foreign personnel to perform inherent and critical sovereign functions.

What agency or agencies of the U.S. government have responsibility for planning, training, organizing, and advising these institutions in states facing insurgency? The answer is unclear. To some extent, DoD attempts to address these needs for foreign defense ministries through security-assistance activities, planned by OSD and regional commanders and implemented by the latter. But this approach is not designed to assist in rapid capacity-building from scratch or surging to meet a dynamic situation. DoD has provided limited support for defense-ministry training and advising in Iraq and none for other ministries and agencies. Support from other parts of the U.S. government has been negligible relative to the need. The problems in Iraq's Defense and Interior Ministries and its intelligence service reflect this lack of U.S. capability. A system designed for marginal and gradual change is wholly inadequate for the demands of Type III insurgency. The combination of defunct local security institutions, urgency, violence, and

high-energy global-local insurgency will overwhelm normal security-assistance organizations.

It is not that the United States has never had to develop foreign security institutions on a large scale: It did so reasonably well in the new European democracies that arose from the ashes of Soviet communism.⁷ But this was done over a decade, was ad hoc, enjoyed a national commitment, including a great deal of private support, to help ex-communist states, and was not in the midst of a violent insurgency to which the institutions being built had to respond. That experience shows what is possible but provides no model.

If the U.S. government elected to organize a serious capability to build security institutions in states engulfed by insurgency, there is no current understanding of where it would be placed. DoD includes foreign officers in many of its courses, and it runs small education centers for officials and officers from Europe, East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The State Department has some minor capabilities to build local security institutions, though it can train a very limited number of personnel from any given nation, and much or most of the training they receive is not specifically related to COIN.⁸ The CIA has some capacity to build effective and respectable foreign intelligence services, though implementation has gone poorly in Iraq.

The most feasible and logical option would be for DoD to organize and program the capability to build foreign security institutions, drawing on other agencies for the expertise required for nondefense institution-building. However, it would be unwise to place this responsibility with the uniformed military, which cannot and should not be relied on to build local *civilian* ministries charged with overseeing military forces or foreign intelligence services.⁹ Therefore, this should be

⁷ DoD's George Marshall Center in Garmisch, Bavaria, co-sponsored by Germany, has achieved significant "through-put" in training foreign officers and officials, though not for the sorts of conditions posed by insurgency, much less Type III insurgency.

⁸ USAID is constrained by law from building foreign security forces.

⁹ In Iraq, the task of organizing and coaching the civilian agencies entrusted with security responsibilities was handled by civilians, who have more experience and expertise in civilian functions and civilian control of the military. Apart from the matter of expertise, relying on military personnel to institute civilian control abroad would send the wrong signal.

housed in a civilian office of DoD, which would call on other parts of government to provide nondefense competence.

Organizing, Training, Equipping, and Advising Foreign Armed Forces

Given that having the local security forces in the lead is one of the key goals in a COIN effort, how well is the United States organized to provide planners, trainers, and advisors for local military forces? Today, the best-prepared element within the U.S. military to provide this critical function is the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). When the size of the mission is relatively small (e.g., training a modest number of foreign personnel at any given time) and specialized (i.e., focusing on training foreign SOF counterparts) SOCOM can excel at this task. The problem is when the task is large and includes areas beyond the normal purview of SOCOM personnel, such as organizing and training for large units, artillery, armor, and general-purpose logistics. For example, after the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi governments, the armed forces of those nations had to be completely rebuilt. Literally tens of thousands of personnel had to be recruited, trained, and organized into functioning military organizations in short order—and in the midst of hostilities.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, training teams had to be cobbled together from regular Army or Marines, commercial firms, reserves, and SOF, augmented by British officers (usually with more experience). The principal reason for the poor performance, apart from some daunting situational problems, is that there is no standing organization within the active or reserve U.S. military establishment designed to provide this function. This is not an interagency issue: Responsibility clearly must fall under DoD. But should it be military or civilian? Should it rely heavily or slightly on contractors? Should it be a mission of regular forces, SOF, or a specialized organization? Should the same organization that organizes, trains, and equips be the one that advises and operates in COIN?

The options are addressed later in this chapter, as is the related issue of what element or elements of the U.S. military have as at least one of their missions the conduct of COIN operations and the maintenance of COIN military capabilities.

Employment Impact

There is a heated debate over whether general job-creation programs are cost-effective, or effective at any cost, in expanding employment and thus bolstering public cooperation with the government in insurgency. This study treats that question as moot, focusing instead on targeted job-training and job-placement for critical population segments, e.g., ex-fighters or critical districts. For example, job training for some 30,000 ex-militiamen was required, but never actually provided, in Iraq.

The U.S. government has neither the experience nor the organizations responsible for producing jobs quickly, on a targeted basis, for the inhabitants of other countries (or, since the 1930s, for Americans). While USAID assists through a variety of development activities, their relationship to employment is, at most, indirect and gradual. The UN Development Programme and the World Bank have greater competence and capacity in this area, and the United States should do a better job than it has done in Iraq in engaging, or at least learning from, those organizations. But it should have some organic capability, logically in USAID with the support of the Departments of Labor and Commerce—Labor because it understands employment issues and Commerce because it can promote investment and trade.

Mass Public Education

The U.S. government is not well structured to work with local governments that need assistance in this area. Indeed, various international organizations, including the UN, are better organized and resourced to help establish adequate educational systems. USAID provides some general assistance for education, but not for large-scale and rapid capacity-building. The Department of Education is not organized or structured to provide this kind of service to other countries. And while DoD can physically build schools, it is not structured or trained to establish a detailed educational system within foreign countries.

The field of education is at least as formidable as those of justice, defense, or any others related to COIN. To rely on an institution other than one immersed in the field to build education systems is to ignore its complexity and its importance. The Department of Education is far

from perfect for this function, since it is not involved in schoolteacher capacity-building in the United States and also has no foreign mission. Nevertheless, it is the best place to organize at least a core capability. As in the case of justice, the Department of Education would have to depend on State and USAID and would have to reach out to local public-educational organizations for both competence and capacity.

Generally speaking, the seriousness of Type III insurgency and the complexity of performing critical COIN functions well argue for an overall U.S. approach that places the responsibility for COIN *capabilities* in whatever organization has the most relevant core competency. A summary of the organizations that correspond to key capabilities weaknesses, and whether each organization plays a primary or supporting role in providing the function, is presented in Table 13.1.

Note that no single department has a natural lead in all the functional capabilities for all the areas of concern. Also note that there appears to be at least one department with core competence in each specific function, although, with the exception of DoD for its primary COIN roles, these departments are constrained by competing missions and resources (personnel and funding). The distributed pattern of responsibilities, based on the core-competency principle, implies a strong need for government-wide arrangements to prioritize, program, and pull together disparate COIN capabilities. Thus, the need for interagency management that is so obvious in regard to COIN cam-

Table 13.1
Functional Area Coverage

Organization	Security Institution Capacity- Building	Organize, Train, Equip, and Advise Foreign Military Forces	Justice and Police	Employment Impact	Mass Public Education
DoD	Primary	Primary			
DoS/USAID	Supporting	Supporting	Supporting	Supporting	Supporting
DoC/DoL				Primary	
DoJ			Primary		
DoE					Primary

paigns and operations is also apparent for creating adequate capabilities. The (admittedly extreme) alternative is to concentrate all responsibilities and build all capabilities for COIN in a single (existing or new) government organ. However, for reasons described shortly, there is no satisfactory solution to the single-department approach.

In sum, it is necessary but not sufficient to find organizational homes for every major capability required for effective COIN. There is an additional need to organize the government as a whole—or at least a significant part of the government—to ensure adequate capabilities, which is where the discussion will now turn.

Macro-Structural Considerations

Beyond assigning specific responsibilities to this or that department, the U.S. government itself needs to be organized to accomplish three tasks essential to COIN:

- developing and maintaining complete and balanced capabilities on a continuing basis
- packaging these capabilities for particular campaigns
- employing the capabilities in COIN campaigns and operations.

Today, when the United States elects to assist a nation that is threatened with an insurgency, various agencies are called on to provide capabilities on an ad hoc basis. This same pattern also prevails in planning, programming, funding, building, and maintaining COIN capabilities. A degree of extemporaneousness may be unavoidable and even desirable in the execution but not in the management of capabilities. Indeed, lack of management of the government's portfolio of COIN capabilities since 9/11 helps explain why that portfolio is neither balanced nor complete. And because Type III Islamic insurgency is so potent and threatening, success may not be possible without improved government management.

Of course, one has to consider the upheaval that organizational change invariably entails. Large bureaucracies, especially government

ones, resist change, especially if it involves taking on new missions that are not the norm for the agency. As we have seen, all of the organizations that must be involved for COIN to succeed also have important non-COIN missions, which could be affected by changes intended to give more attention to COIN. Thus, organizational change can be difficult to implement and sustain, can have unintended ramifications, and is nearly always wrenching. Then again, the unimpressive record of the U.S. government in COIN, especially of late, may be a good reason to do some serious wrenching.

There are several options for organizing the U.S. government as a whole to better conduct COIN operations. From least to most dramatic, these include (1) no major structural change (about which we have already voiced our skepticism), (2) enhanced interagency coordination, and (3) a coordinating independent agency. Each of these options is addressed below in respect to (a) overall government management of COIN and (b) the ability to address shortcomings in current capabilities.

A theoretical option (4) is to create a cabinet-level department focused on COIN, not unlike DHS, which was created after 9/11, or the Department of Energy, which was created after the oil shock of 1973–1974. But this option has a fatal flaw: Insofar as U.S. military operations must be anticipated in COIN, the hypothetical department cannot be other than DoD (given the essential and statutory role of the Secretary of Defense in providing civilian oversight of military action). Yet for DoD to have control over *all* capabilities and execution of COIN would be to impose a degree of militarization incompatible with the heavy civil requirements and ultimately political character of COIN. Thus there appears to be no viable candidate department, existing or new, to take complete responsibility for COIN.

This being a study of COIN capabilities, as opposed to COIN policy or tactics, we treat reorganization mainly from this perspective. Because other COIN and non-COIN issues are involved, this chapter is meant to be suggestive—food for thought—not definitive. The purpose here is to highlight, not settle, issues surrounding organizational options. A more detailed analysis of these options is required to understand details, feasibility, required fiscal and personnel resources,

ramifications, and possible legislative changes to implement the various options. In this spirit, the options that follow, as well as others throughout this chapter, are accompanied by summary assessments by the team (in terms of good, moderate, and poor).

Government Option 1: Business-as-Usual

The business-as-usual option recognizes that improved organizational performance is necessary but also focuses on clarifying responsibilities, making changes within existing government agencies, and improving the existing interagency coordination system. It could involve the issuance of executive orders on departmental jurisdictions and measures to make the National Security Council (NSC) system function better.

Performance of the NSC system in coordinating complex political-military operations has been uneven. It is reported to have worked adequately in Haiti in the 1990s, for example.¹⁰ It has clearly not worked well in Iraq, a much more demanding case (and indicative of Type III COIN).¹¹ In any case, the NSC system is likely to remain in place and may even be strengthened as a result of growing concerns, arising not only from COIN, that the new international-security requirement demands interagency responses. However, for COIN at least, the NSC process cannot meet two basic challenges. First, it cannot assure that the right capabilities are built and that resources are allocated accordingly. Second, it cannot provide operational integration; every time the NSC has attempted directly to manage operations, the results have been bad (e.g., in Central America in the 1980s).

The existing system could work for COIN *if* sufficient resources are available and allocated strategically, *if* all the departments and agencies are involved that need to be involved, and *if* those agencies and departments have and act on a common view of the importance of and approach to COIN. But these are huge ifs. To the extent these preconditions are not satisfied, refining the existing organization will not produce necessary results, especially in regard to developing complete

¹⁰ An opinion offered by a key NSC participant, Steven Simon.

¹¹ Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*, confirmed by direct observations by members of the team and through interviews.

and balanced capabilities for COIN. Because this study has found that there are serious capabilities gaps and resource imbalances, it follows that better coordination, while welcome, will not suffice. Perhaps when complete and balanced capabilities exist, it would.

A summary of the assessment of this option is shown in Table 13.2. The option has relatively poor performance in terms of building, combining, and employing COIN capabilities. The absence of dedicated advocacy and management of COIN capabilities at the cabinet level is highly problematic over the long term, thereby endangering operational performance in future contingencies.

Moreover, this approach lacks any ability to package and deliver COIN capabilities—especially civil ones—to the field with adequate scale and speed. Any success or failure would be entirely dependent on the contributing departments executing the missions identified at the national level. Recent experience in this regard is not encouraging: For example, departments not ordinarily engaged in national-security endeavors (e.g., Labor, Education, Commerce, Justice, and Transportation) have not responded robustly to the priority the president has assigned to COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As for addressing the serious functional gaps in COIN capabilities, this option would not likely yield results significantly better than we are currently observing. Indeed, the likelihood that the current set of arrangements might yield better outcomes strikes us as very low because of the fundamental bureaucratic and political-congressional interests of the organizations, and significant pressures they will face in terms of greatly enhancing the COIN-relevant aspects in their organization in the face of the needs of their core missions.

Table 13.2
Government Option 1: Business-as-Usual

Capability	Rating
Maintain and develop	Poor
Assemble resources	Poor for short term, Poor for long term
Manage and execute field activities	Poor to Moderate

Government Option 2: Install a COIN Czar

The rationale of this option is that stronger interagency management capability is required at a high level of government to override some of the bureaucratic tendencies that inhibit the development of COIN capabilities and the effective delivery of those capabilities in COIN campaigns. The creation of “policy czars” has been done in the past, such as the position that was formed to coordinate the interagency effort in the war against illegal drugs. Depending on the issue, the position could last for a considerable number of years. The theoretical advantage of a COIN czar is that the person would have some authority—how much is dependent on Congress and the president—to integrate the efforts of multiple federal agencies under the auspices of a particular issue, drugs or COIN, for example. In this model, the czar is responsible and empowered to act on the president’s behalf to persuade the departments to take measures, allocate resources, and coordinate efforts.

There are two major variants of this process. The first places a single individual at the interagency epicenter of COIN planning and execution. This person is responsible for guiding, prodding, cajoling, and coordinating among the multiple agencies with COIN capabilities and missions. But the czar typically lacks a substantial organization to support the activity and therefore is dependent on the other agencies for information. The czar also does not usually have an executive function, dealing with the details of making sure various organizations manage personnel systems, equipment, etc., to ensure that the mission is properly resourced and accomplished. In areas in which the problems persist for an extended time, the limited scope of the policy czar’s control and resources usually does not provide effectiveness in fighting the bureaucratic weight of the agencies he or she is trying to coordinate with—all of which have other missions, some more central than COIN to their existence.

The second variant of the policy czar option involves trying to improve the existing interagency process. In this variant, the policy czar focuses on trying to improve the interagency process in an attempt to streamline and improve the means available to the Cabinet agencies as they try to work together on a particular issue. This approach has the

potential weakness of being unresponsive, since the policy czar is not directly empowered to make the various federal departments work on the specific issue. Rather, the focus is on attempting to streamline and facilitate interagency cooperation. A typical activity might be a sort of council of peers, in which on a routine basis the agency heads, or most likely their proxies, meet to go over issues. These sorts of arrangements can be quite useful when focused on something of importance to all parties and can be a good way to get things done over the long run. Such activities are good for managing enduring relationships in which largely technical issues predominate, and less effective when the organizations are being pulled in quite different directions based on the bureaucratic interests of the organization. These groups also tend to be slow, and they eventually become dominated by the normal processes within the organization. In this regard, it is important to note that important COIN capabilities will be in agencies not regularly or otherwise involved in national security.

An assessment of the czar option is shown in Table 13.3. (It does not differ fundamentally from the first variant.) In many respects, this approach is suited to problems that cross organizational lines but are not terribly demanding or burdensome in terms of resources and effect on the member organizations involved in the process itself. The coordination function tends to be limited in scope because of dependency on executive functions, including budget formation, in the participating departments. Such limitations allow for little optimism that the COIN capabilities required to meet the threat of global-local Islamic insurgency would be produced. Indeed, the ability of the czar option to redress the most pressing deficiencies in capabilities is likely to be little better than business-as-usual. While the greater coordination between elements will eliminate some of the frictional forces that inhibit opera-

Table 13.3
Government Option 2: Install a COIN Czar

Capability	Rating
Maintain and develop	Poor
Assemble resources	Moderate for short term, Poor for long term
Manage and execute field activities	Poor

tions, it does nothing to address the deep-seated bureaucratic elements that inhibit longer-term development of capabilities.

Government Option 3: Create a COIN Agency

An agency responsible for the support of states threatened by insurgency would have primary responsibility for the creation, assembling, and delivery of U.S. COIN capabilities. Unlike the COIN czar, such a new agency would have a staff and the funding to produce results. This new agency would be responsible for allocation of funding and coordination of activities of other U.S. government departments and agencies as they relate to COIN. Most of the resources (people, funding, supplies) of the agency would be provided from the other government departments (DoD, State, Justice, Energy, etc.).

Such an agency could be embedded within an existing department (either DoD or State) or be independent (reporting to the president). Regardless of where it was located organizationally, it would be helpful if this agency had a single counterpart organization in other departments with COIN responsibilities. This would simplify the coordination process and allow for those departments to have better visibility into the larger COIN efforts.

This option is assessed in Table 13.4. Being dependent on other departments, it does not have the authority or resources to *guarantee* end-to-end functioning of the overall government-wide COIN effort. However, it allows for effective use of resources scattered throughout the government, which would boost efficiency, coherence, and interoperability, while also allowing the agency to concentrate on critical deficiencies. How it plugs the gaps would be dependent on circumstances and available funds, but it is probable that a combination of selectively contributing resources to other organizations (e.g., seed money), contracting out for some activities, and having some deployable in-house expertise might be helpful. Thus, the agency would be able to tackle the most important COIN shortcomings the United States now faces much faster than if they were left to existing departments with competing missions and sluggish bureaucracies. For example, it could kick-start efforts to build justice, education, and job-training capabilities,

Table 13.4
Government Option 3: Create a COIN Agency

Capability	Rating
Maintain and develop	Good
Assemble resources	Good
Manage and execute field activities	Moderate

while relying over time on the departments themselves to step up to the need.

The biggest risk is that other organizations would regard the new agency as a bill-payer for all capabilities even vaguely relevant to COIN, and thus try to shift or avoid costs to protect their core missions. This risk would merit strong presidential oversight. It would also argue for the agency not being subordinate to an existing department—one layer removed from the president—where its voice might be muted outside and even inside that department.

This option has reasonably good prospects for addressing the specific capability gaps, provided that it is given the resources to start filling gaps directly or via other departments. The use of dedicated funding to provide a basic capability in all the necessary functional areas, as well as a dedicated staff to plan and manage activities, would go a long way to providing better capabilities than we have today. As an advocate for funding, the agency would be significantly better than the current system and might provide a way in which COIN could become more of a regularized part of the broader government planning, without forcing agencies to alter their basic culture or compromise other missions.

In sum, without having analyzed feasibility, cost, implementation, and ramifications, there is a case for at least studying the idea of creating a new agency with executive responsibility for COIN. Such an organization could be independent or else formed within one or another of the two prominent COIN departments—DoD or State. The case for an independent agency is worth considering:

- It would be free from bureaucratic parochialism.

- It would not be slanted toward either a military or civil approach to COIN capabilities but instead would be able to balance and integrate them.
- It would answer directly to the president.

Both the Defense and State departments can be expected to argue against an independent agency for a function that bears on their COIN missions. Existing organizations may claim that better inter-agency coordination is all that is needed. Of course they would see it that way: After all, if they thought they were providing inadequately for COIN at present, they presumably would have done something about it. However, this study has clearly found that U.S. problems in countering global-local Islamic insurgency cannot be fully explained by poor coordination. How would better coordination alone give the United States a deliverable capability to build indigenous justice and education systems or to make possible the concentration in a particular country of as many civil reconstruction specialists as are currently on USAID's entire payroll?

Again, the United States lacks adequate and balanced capabilities to counter this threat, and the capabilities it needs span not only DoD and State but also other parts of government. To the extent that countering this threat is critical, the option of a dedicated agency with clout, resources, and connectivity to the rest of government deserves serious consideration.

Defense COIN Options

Thus far, this chapter has examined two organizational questions: What departments should be responsible for correcting current serious deficiencies in COIN capabilities? How should the government as a whole be organized to manage these capabilities and assure they are packaged and used effectively? There is a third organizational question of equivalent significance and perhaps greater sensitivity: How should the U.S. defense establishment be structured to improve and manage military forces for the purpose of providing security in COIN? What

makes this question so critical is that providing security in COIN is different in kind than waging war against the military forces of an enemy state, which is the purpose that informs how the U.S. defense establishment is currently organized. Given the paradox of force at work in insurgency, getting this wrong could result in failure to use force effectively and therefore failure at COIN.

In contrast to the civil organizations of the U.S. government relevant to COIN, it cannot be said that defense and military organizations have been starved of resources or lack capacity. While this study has found that the allocation of defense resources has not been properly aligned with the challenges of COIN, the problem is not that the U.S. defense establishment as a whole is wanting for funding or personnel. This suggests that organizational defects, at least with respect to COIN, may be especially acute in defense.

The options considered below are all designed to improve the capabilities and performance of DoD and U.S. military organizations in the three COIN missions described in Chapter Ten: *preparing* indigenous forces, *enabling* those forces in operations, and *operating* directly. These structures must be able to *build* and maintain, *assemble* when needed, and *employ* the requisite capabilities to perform these three functions effectively, as depicted in Table 13.5. Organizing for COIN within DoD means addressing every cell in this matrix. DoD's present ability, by cell, is indicated by high, low, and medium. Because defense resources are substantial overall—the DoD annual budget has grown to \$600B since 9/11—there is good reason to look not only at priorities but also at how organizational structure affects priorities.

Table 13.5
Requirements for U.S. Defense in COIN

COIN Organization Capabilities	U.S. Ability to Provide the Capability		
	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Build	Low	Medium	Medium
Assemble	Low	Medium	Medium
Employ	Low	Low	Low

U.S. defense organizations must be also able to meet the particular demands on U.S. COIN forces. Finally, and fundamentally, the United States should organize in a way that recognizes the difference between the use of force to provide security in COIN and regular warfare, for the failure to know and abide by that difference can lead not only to the wrong capabilities but also to unproductive or counterproductive use of them.

Defense Option 1: Business-as-Usual

This option perpetuates today's fragmented system within DoD for delivering the capabilities necessary for security-related COIN missions. That the system is fragmented does not necessarily make it dysfunctional. Indeed, fragmentation is a perfectly respectable general model for steady-state organizations, and DoD's machinery works reasonably well for defense missions other than COIN. The military services have Title X (organize, train, and equip) responsibilities. SOCOM has both Title X and operating responsibilities. Regional combatant commands have operating responsibilities in war, peace, and everything in between. Several global commands are expected to provide important joint capabilities. The mission of the professional military education system includes COIN-related training and education for U.S. and foreign officers. And several defense agencies and offices manage a host of critical capabilities and endeavors, including international policy, security assistance, interagency liaison, intelligence, international centers, logistics, research, and procurement.

This fragmented organizational model is designed—more accurately, has evolved—to generate, maintain, and use warfighting capabilities. However, as is abundantly clear from experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (reflected in the summary assessment in Table 13.6), it does not seem to function satisfactorily *for COIN*, including for the various military missions required to counter Type III insurgency. Nor does the status quo provide adequately for the specific high-priority COIN operating niches that U.S. forces should perform, such as border security, urban ISR and strike, and nonlethal weapons, because they are not critical to organizations designed to defeat foreign military forces. Finally, business-as-usual does not address the harm that can

Table 13.6
Defense Option 1: Business-as-Usual

Capability	Rating
Maintain and develop	Poor
Assemble resources	Poor for short term, Moderate for long term
Manage and execute field activities	Poor to Moderate

come from blurring the mission of security in COIN with the mission of waging war. In sum, COIN is sufficiently different from warfighting that a steady-state organization optimized to support warfighting cannot be counted on to deliver the means for COIN. Nor can such an organization be counted on to ensure that COIN is not treated as warfighting. This implies that major organizational changes must at least be considered for COIN, albeit while retaining the capability to fight regular wars.

Defense Option 2: Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM

In this option, SOCOM would absorb all important COIN military functions and build, maintain, and manage the capabilities to perform them. It would retain, update, and enlarge its traditional foreign internal defense (FID) role, along the lines of that required to “prepare and enable” foreign military forces of all types, not just foreign special forces. It would also be expected to develop, or gather from the services, most capabilities needed for direct COIN operations, not only against high-value targets but also for other key roles, e.g., intelligence-liaison, quick-response, and urban operations.

This is a tall order, which implies that SOCOM would become a larger, different, and more complex organization than it is now. Whether this change would be compatible with the institutional and cultural qualities that make U.S. SOF the strongest capability of its kind in the world—not to mention indispensable for certain critical missions, e.g., counterterrorist operations—would require careful thought. At a minimum, SOCOM and SOF would need to be restructured to accommodate wider and somewhat disparate missions. One option would be to structure it for two basic missions: (1) operating

directly and (2) preparing and advising indigenous forces. These two missions are sufficiently dissimilar to suggest two different branches of SOF for purposes of building and assembling capabilities, though the two branches would have to function in effect as one for purposes of employing capabilities in COIN. Another way to structure an expanded SOCOM would be for COIN and “everything else”—in effect, two different “lines of business.” However, what SOCOM would actually do in COIN is not so dissimilar from what it does in other missions to warrant such a substructure.

An assessment of this option is shown in Table 13.7. Its strength comes from building on the expertise, operating concepts, and institutional-cultural qualities of SOF. The flexibility, versatility, and adaptability of SOF are especially well suited for countering complex and dynamic Type III insurgency, as are SOF experience in working with local forces, their comfort with ambiguous and political explosive situations, their ability to conform to the local environment, and their judiciousness in using force.

The drawbacks of this option are associated with the tension between what is desired for preparing and enabling indigenous forces (the numbers and types of personnel needed, and resultant personnel and career experience necessary for creation of an effective COIN capability) on the one hand, and the elite culture of direct and clandestine action on the other. While SOCOM has long been capable of conducting FID missions while performing direct action, the balance of missions would change significantly if the bulk of the organization existed for the former and did not require the skills, fitness, or mind-set of the latter. If current emphasis on direct and clandestine action were to dominate, COIN SOF would face the prospect of marginalization.¹² If instead the mission of preparing and advising local forces came to

¹² The marginalization need not come from any malicious actions. In all likelihood, SOCOM would simply shift its budgetary attention to bigger-ticket items supporting the highest-priority national missions. Similarly, individuals would likely be selected for promotion based on the strengths and attractiveness of their records. The portions of SOCOM engaged in less attractive missions would be at relative disadvantage compared to other personnel in SOCOM, or with their counterparts in conventional warfighting missions from their parent organization.

Table 13.7

Defense Option 2: Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM

Capability	Rating
Maintain and develop	Moderate
Assemble resources	Moderate: resource-constrained; tensions with conventional forces
Manage and execute field activities	Good to Moderate: scaling issues

dominate, the attributes related to direct action might be eroded. Both missions are important to the United States, and neither can be risked. At the same time, SOF is an inherently adaptable capability, just as SOCOM has shown itself to be an adaptable command since it was created in 1987. SOCOM and SOF have lived with the “two-mission, two-culture” problem and should be able to cope with the stresses and strains of a significantly expanded role in COIN.

This option covers some but not all of the critical security-related gaps identified earlier. An expanded and restructured SOCOM could handle most of the requirements to organize, train, equip, and advise indigenous forces, but it could not fill all the operating niches, e.g., border security, precision strike, and logistics support.

This study has noted that the demands of COIN overlap with those of other defense missions, including counterterrorism, stabilization operations, transforming indigenous forces (whether or not for COIN), and other forms of irregular warfare against states and non-states. In this option, SOCOM and SOF could, in effect, become the capability for virtually *all* irregular military operations and for developing and working with indigenous forces, leaving regular forces to concentrate on their traditional mission of regular warfighting. This would imply a still greater expansion of the scope and scale of SOF, as well as a sharp line—perhaps artificially sharp line—between regular and irregular operations. Consideration of such sweeping restructuring of the U.S. military goes beyond this study.

Defense Option 3: Assign COIN as a Principal Mission of Regular Forces

The option looks to obtain and develop the competence and capacity required for COIN either from the existing mix of services or by adding to the mix. Four variants are considered:

- reorienting a significant portion of a service (Army or Marines)
- creating a new branch within one of the services
- creating a standing “center of excellence” for COIN with a cadre element of troops to train general-purpose forces
- forming a reserve element to conduct COIN missions.

All of these options have a common and obvious concern, which is the reverse of the concern about SOF, namely, that significant changes to conventional forces to address national weakness in COIN could affect regular warfighting capabilities and operations. This concern is not addressed systematically in assessing the options—it requires an examination of 21st-century warfare that goes beyond our scope—but it certainly should weigh in judgments about orienting regular warfighting forces for COIN.

The strength of all these options is that today’s conventional forces are large and exist within structures that provide significant abilities to prepare forces for major military operations, e.g., complex procurement, training, and manpower issues associated with large forces. The military services are also capable of generating, delivering, and sustaining forces on a large scale worldwide, which is at least as relevant to COIN as it is to warfighting.

The weaknesses of relying on conventional forces for COIN missions tend to be the flip side of the strengths. The same mechanism that can produce large numbers of highly skilled troops has difficulty keeping and maintaining specialty groups. The same organizational norms that push officers to have great diversity in career assignments and rotation schedules for units is ill suited to COIN, which requires greater field knowledge and longer assignments, for example. Below are the four variants of the Regular Forces option.

A. Reorient an Existing Service

Reorienting a service would mean making COIN its principal mission, or at least a mission of equal standing with warfighting. This is not mere declaratory policy. This sort of change has to work its way into the core and every crevice of the service in question if it is to have a significant effect. Practical but profound changes would be needed in physical and personnel capabilities and in the planning, funding, acquisition, recruitment, training, etc., needed to deliver those capabilities. This is precisely what the services do; indeed, it is why they exist.

The key question, of course, is whether a regular warfighting service could master a second mission, instead of or along with its current one. The difficulties should not be underestimated. The concept underlying conventional warfare is one in which U.S. forces win by destroying the means or resolve of another country to wage war. The concept of COIN is to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of a local government in the face of a violent political movement that means to destroy it. Are these two different varieties of one basic model or two fundamentally different models?

To be more concrete, there is a possibility of reorienting the Marine Corps as the service of choice for both the COIN and “small wars.” (Other critical demands, such as major combat operations, preclude reorienting the entire Army to COIN.) While there is much overlap between the two, housing the function of small wars and COIN would still have some significant tensions. The small-wars mission has an emphasis on warfighting, albeit at a smaller scale and with a smaller footprint than the Army has typically envisioned. All things being equal, one would expect the organization to be dominated over time by the demands of warfighting (expensive equipment and clear proficiency gain) versus the more modest demand for big-ticket items in the COIN mission. As well, there’s the Marines’ “a few good men” slogan, which evokes images of combat, not training and advising. Therefore, the personnel system would tend to focus on the numbers, skills, and experience needed for warfighting, not those needed for COIN. Building systems to satisfy both sets of demands would be extremely challenging.

B. Create a New Branch of Conventional Forces

To take a specific case of this option, COIN capabilities and competence could be concentrated in a branch of the Army, similar to armor, aviation, and infantry today. This is what President Kennedy did in the early 1960s when he created the Army Special Forces for irregular warfare. It would, in practice, mean that the new branch would compete for resources with the other branches within the service. This would allow for specialists to be trained and follow promising career paths within the context of the existing personnel system, as the other branches do today. There would be some overlap in missions between a COIN branch and others, but this is the sort of challenge the Army deals with already.

However simple the theory behind it, the existence of a COIN branch does not assure success in terms of competing for resources or for personnel who may be attracted to the better equipped, more prominent, and more prestigious branches. Moreover, a separate branch would still likely have to utilize the personnel systems that are used for the other branches. This would prove to be a problem because the length of assignments, the relationship of individual to unit, the requirements for training and education, and the opportunities for command would differ significantly between COIN and the regular warfighting branches.

This option is attractive at first glance because of the elevation this mission would receive within the service as a distinct area of professional expertise. But there is a huge gap between standing up an organization and realizing its full potential. If this option were to be pursued, it would prove challenging to protect the branch over an extended period of time. Compared to a reorientation of an entire service, such as the Marine Corps, this option may seem less radical in the short term, but it is also less predictable over the long term.

C. Build a Cadre-Surge Military Capability for COIN

This suboption consists of the creation of a dedicated cross-service center of excellence and robust training program to provide more com-

petent COIN operators in short order.¹³ Such a center could be provided by SOCOM. Thus, COIN operations outside of surge periods would remain in the hands of SOF and only in surge periods would the mainline forces be brought to bear, facilitated by SOF. SOF could both train and serve as embedded advisors with regular forces when the scale must be increased. Joint exercises involving SOF and regular Army and Marine forces would help to ensure the greatest possible leverage of SOF in COIN.¹⁴ This would require some but not a radical increase in the size of SOF, and it would require some but not radical expansion or reorientation of the missions of the regular services.

This would be a good option to provide forces for COIN, much as the British did through extensive retraining activities prior to deployments in Northern Ireland. However, given the current security environment, it may not be adequate in the face of the growing and spreading danger of global-local Islamic insurgency. In effect, the United States already is and may remain in a surge mode.

D. Tailor Reserve Forces for COIN

This suboption envisions placing the majority of non-SOF COIN capabilities in the reserves. The idea here is to capitalize on the civilian experience of experts in areas such as civil affairs, law enforcement, and other activities related to COIN, without the need to have them available in the active-duty elements. In terms of maintaining and assembling resources, reserves have the advantage of access to civil government and the private sector to attract personnel with relevant skills, albeit only in relatively small numbers and for limited periods of time. In terms of operating the field activity, this option seems to be about the same as other conventional military options. Unless reserve forces had the lead over regular forces, it is not likely they would be able to coordinate successful COIN operations.

This option is interesting if COIN is thought of as something that is done infrequently and for brief periods; otherwise, it is not. Yet we know that COIN requires extended commitments of individuals

¹³ Obviously, the Navy and Air Force could also participate.

¹⁴ Pirnie and O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

to foster relationships with the indigenous counterparts and that campaigns often go on for more than a decade. Of course, if COIN is done properly, e.g., preventively, it demands smaller numbers of high-quality people, working mainly to build and advise indigenous capabilities. But the United States cannot count on such fortune, and it is not clear that the reserves would be the right option even if it could, given the need for extended deployments.

In any event, we have to assume that global-local Islamic insurgency is a feature of at least the near- to mid-term future, and thus that the demands will be frequent, large, and protracted. This would seem to eliminate the advantages and the logic of this option.

In a variation of this option, the Army could consider organizing most of the Army National Guard for COIN operations. The trend since the 1991 Persian Gulf War has been for conventional wars to be of very short duration—a few days or weeks. This reality undermines the need to maintain large numbers of National Guard units that require many weeks or months of post-mobilization training before they are considered ready for combat. On the other hand, the experience in the Balkans in the 1990s and in post-2003 Iraq has shown that the United States does need a large pool of ground units that can conduct peace operations or COIN—including missions in which combat is likely. Since most COIN operations last years, the reserve component units earmarked for a COIN operation have plenty of time to mobilize, train, assimilate COIN-specific equipment if needed, and deploy. In the case of Iraq, the Army has maintained roughly 15 brigades/regiments in the country for several years. Given a four-to-one rotation basis, that leads to a requirement of some 60 brigades, whereas the regular Army is just over 40 brigades. The reality of long-duration COIN missions, and operations that could require considerable numbers when sufficient local forces are not available, provides an excellent justification for a fairly large number of National Guard ground units. If those units were specifically trained and equipped for COIN (such as medium Stryker brigades), they would be more useful than if they were configured for high-intensity combat (e.g., armored brigades), and there is also little likelihood that they will be ever employed in the latter role.

Defense Option 4: Create a Defense Security Agency

The option of a security agency within DoD is essentially a hybrid of the SOCOM-related model and a separate service that seeks to avoid the most serious difficulties of either approach. This option removes, or at least “fences off,” COIN-related elements from the conventional forces to create a structure to protect the various COIN elements from direct competition with the rest of those forces. By combining headquarters and planning elements along with field operating entities, it captures many benefits of a full-up service without affecting the host service or requiring the full overhead of a separate department structure. Personnel may be contributed on a sort of one-way basis, such as the current practice for many in SOCOM. This also seeks to create a civilian cadre that can make use of the flexibility in government personnel systems to retain sufficient numbers of personnel with critical skills that are willing to be deployed overseas.

As summarized in Table 13.8, this option offers more flexibility than the other options in terms of establishing a useful mix of capabilities. By divorcing itself to an extent from the existing structures, this option makes it possible to select and develop assets without too much regard for conforming to organization around the delivery of conventional military capabilities or the particularly stressful need of SOF. Thus, in this option, the only capabilities prepared to contribute to COIN would be those for which COIN is designated as the principal mission. However, given the uncertain and potentially large demands posed by Type III insurgency, especially the possibility of having to use ground-combat forces on a large scale (despite misgivings), it would be imprudent and artificial to separate COIN and non-COIN forces.

Table 13.8
Defense Option 4: Create a Defense Security Agency

Capability	Rating
Maintain and develop	Good
Assemble resources	Good
Manage and execute field activities	Moderate


To summarize, none of the broad defense options examined here is ideal to meet the demands of COIN on its own:

- *Business as usual* does not give—certainly has not given—sufficient attention to the demands of COIN, which are different from the demands of regular combat.
- *Expansion and dedication of SOCOM to COIN* would not satisfy important non-SOF military requirements for COIN.
- *Assignment of COIN as the principal mission of regular forces* entails a risk that it will fare poorly in competition for resources with warfighting missions.
- *The creation of a defense agency* with all COIN resources implies a barrier between COIN-specific and other forces.

However, the options are not mutually exclusive. The three with the most promising features, in our judgment, are (a) expansion of the scope and scale of SOCOM to encompass leadership in COIN, (b) a cadre-and-surge approach that would use a core of expertise to leverage the capacity of the regular services, and (c) a defense agency for COIN (and similar missions). Figure 13.1 summarizes the strengths (listed in green text) and the weaknesses (listed in red text) of each of these three options. As the figure shows, by combining these options into a single solution it is possible to address the weaknesses of each. In that hybrid solution, SOCOM would provide the military core around which the services would surge to meet large demand, and a new defense agency would be the civil counterpart of SOCOM, supporting it in management and interagency aspects of COIN.

More specifically, SOCOM would be designated as the global joint command responsible for providing capabilities for irregular military operations, including COIN. It would be expanded by the assignment of additional forces for three primary functions: the preparation of foreign forces, the enabling of foreign forces in operations, and direct action against high-value targets. It would have responsibility to organize, train, and equip U.S. SOF for these purposes. But it would not be built to the size needed for large and especially demanding military intervention; instead, it would cooperate with the services to ensure

Figure 13.1
Merging Defense Options



that the latter could surge to augment SOCOM’s own smaller, COIN-specialized forces. This would help counter the tendency to artificially divide U.S. forces into COIN and non-COIN. In actual operations, COIN-specific SOF could serve as advisors within units provided by the services (especially Army and Marine Corps). Meanwhile, the defense agency would serve as a civilian partner of SOCOM, handling policy, interagency preparations, acquisition, and general administration and thus allowing SOCOM to stay focused on operations. The current office for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC) would form the kernel for this agency.

The matrix shown in Table 13.9 suggests that this architecture would, in theory, score considerably higher than the status quo in building, assembling, and employing the capabilities to fulfill the essential COIN defense missions of preparing and enabling indigenous forces while operating directly as needed. Question marks in the cells in Table 13.9 indicate areas for which there is risk regarding whether the results will be as good in practice as in theory.

Table 13.9
Evaluation of Proposed Organization

COIN Organization Capabilities	U.S. Ability to Provide the Capability		
	Prepare	Enable	Operate
Build	High	High?	High?
Assemble	High?	High	High
Employ	High?	High	High?

Summary

As a general proposition, the organizational approaches that best fit the needs of COIN are ones that create room to develop more complete and balanced capabilities to go with the mission. In this light, the approach that emerges from an assessment of options includes:

- the assignment of responsibility for core COIN capabilities to those departments that possess the most relevant competencies,

including traditional national-security departments and traditional “domestic” departments.

- in view of such a distributed approach to capabilities, the formation of an agency to guide, challenge, and measure the departments; to manage the packaging and delivery of government-wide capabilities; and to invest at least seed money to address critical needs until the departments are ready.
- within DoD in particular, the enlargement of the scope and scale of SOCOM to serve the core of the U.S. capability to prepare and enable indigenous forces for COIN and to operate directly in COIN, while relying on (1) surge capacity from the regular services surrounding this core and (2) a DoD agency to manage acquisition, interagency coordination, and other non-operating tasks.

While complex—though really not very complex by U.S. government standards—this architecture could, with further study, represent an improvement in organizational capability to prepare for and conduct COIN. Whether such significant changes are pursued depends on how serious the government is about countering the global-local Islamic insurgent threat. It has already exhibited its seriousness, post-9/11, by creating DHS and DNI. But again, these organizations do not go to the heart of COIN.

Micro-Structural Considerations

Macro-structural changes of the sort just proposed can yield clearer and better alignment of responsibilities for setting strategy and policy, allocating resources, and providing capabilities for COIN. However, such changes are not sufficient for more effective COIN. Performance *in the field*, where local populations, authorities, security services, and insurgents are directly engaged, depends also, perhaps more so, on how counterinsurgents are organized to operate.

A tenet of classical COIN, as true now as ever, is that operations, like strategy, must be integrated. The failure of military, civilian,

and intelligence actors to act in harmony and provide mutual support has characterized most unsuccessful COIN campaigns, Iraq (thus far) being the latest case of this malady.¹⁵ As previously noted, the textbook solution has been to appoint as “supremo” a senior civilian official or military commander with authority over all aspects of COIN in an embattled country. However, the supremo model will not work against Type III insurgency for two reasons: (1) such insurgencies are not self-contained and may to some extent manifest complex global movements; (2) centralized vertical control in COIN is not agile or sensitive enough to respond to dynamic, distributed, and unpredictable insurgencies.

To some extent, the function of supremo can be fulfilled by information sharing and collaboration, thanks to advanced networking capabilities such as those presented in Chapter Six. The adoption of digital-age principles—user dominance, inclusiveness, and integration—would allow greater sharing and collaboration and thus produce more coherent COIN operations. In addition, networking permits the decentralization of decisionmaking authority and initiative that is crucial in countering Type III insurgency. As previously explained, by substituting horizontal collaboration for vertical direction, networking can reconcile the need for integration with the need for decentralization. However, networking does not reduce the importance of how COIN agents are organized to operate. Indeed, the greater the decentralization, the more important micro-structures in the field are.

Organization for operations is not a simple extension of the macro-structures created to manage policy and capabilities. Whereas mere coordination will suffice “back home,” integration is needed among civilian, military, and intelligence actors in the field. Pressure for such integration is more likely to arise from operational circumstances than from the organizations that manage policy and capabilities. COIN campaigns give rise to micro-structural improvisations that respond to the need for integration, e.g., the French Mobile Operational Administrative Group in Vietnam and Special Administrative Sections in Algeria, and U.S. CORDS in Vietnam and PRT in Afghanistan. Although

¹⁵ Pirnie and O’Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006)*.

these attempts to integrate COIN at the tactical, community, district, or provincial levels have not guaranteed successful COIN, they are a useful point of departure for consideration of micro-structure.¹⁶

Integrated micro-structures for COIN are important not only because of the civil-military coherence they afford but also in their potential to perform civil COIN under hostile conditions, which can be a debilitating problem. As discussed in Chapter Five, measures to strengthen governance, improve public service, build public institutions, create adequate infrastructure, and spur economic development can foster security by engendering greater popular support for and cooperation with the state. Yet, insecurity can imperil and constrain such measures insofar as civilian personnel, development projects, and fledgling institutions may come under attack, as they do in most insurgencies, including Iraq. Consequently, the inability to conduct civil COIN in insecure conditions can perpetuate those insecure conditions or force COIN to rely mainly, or even exclusively, on military forces and action, which is not conducive to success. Perhaps the same sorts of tactical micro-structures that can provide integration can also provide security for civil COIN.

As a starting point, note the multitude of functions, skills, and perspectives that may need to be incorporated in such structures:

- Military
 - mission execution
 - self-protection
 - advisory and liaison
- Civilian
 - development
 - institution-building
 - diplomacy and government liaison
 - sector competence (e.g., justice, education, employment)
- Intelligence
 - collection
 - analysis

¹⁶ Ongoing RAND research on soft power in COIN.


- advisory and liaison
- Coalition personnel
 - any of the above functions
 - liaison
- COIN specialists
- Local affairs specialist
- Local liaison.

The organization of these elements must provide a high degree of operational flexibility, including the option to organize quickly and to shift emphasis among elements based on security and other circumstances. The micro-structures typically should be moderately sized (between platoon and company). The security functions would tend to account for the bulk of variation in size and composition, shifting from civilian to military. Leadership should be either civilian or military, depending on purpose, composition, and security conditions.

Figure 13.2 shows how the composition and leadership of a COIN action unit could change in correspondence with two variables: how good or bad security conditions are and how civil or military the mission is. The different configurations are only illustrative and not to scale. The important point is that units based on this model are integrated, versatile, and adaptable.

Figure 13.2 depicts the variable mix of functions such units would be capable of performing. The size of such units of action could vary significantly as a function of the security environment and the mission and functions of the unit. Each cell might be responsible for a geographic area, such as a village or portion of the city where different types of operations are being conducted. Black areas denote regions where security conditions are bad and military operations predominate. In gray areas, mixtures of operations are required. In the white areas, smaller units might be deployed to work with the local government to help it to improve governance in that area. Figure 13.2 also indicates which command (civilian or military) would be in effect depending on security conditions. Coalition forces could be present and integrated, as shown.

Figure 13.2
Variable Civil-Military COIN Units



RAND MG595/2-13.2

Readers may be skeptical that the hierarchical structures according to which the government is organized—DoD, State, USAID, CIA, other civilian departments—would enable such integrated microstructures to succeed in practice. Such skepticism may overestimate the power of bureaucracy and underestimate the capacity of most people to work well in teams. Assuming that civilian and military professionals show the sort of common purpose and common sense that they usually do, organizing and operating such flexible micro-structures may, in the end, be easier than fitting them with larger organizations. Unlike the micro-structures, in which all the incentives are aligned to drive the group toward mission-defined cooperation and integration, larger organizations have many other forces acting on them that will tend to create obstacles to cooperation. Developing approaches that reduce or even completely eliminate such tendencies will need to be a focus for any effective COIN element that is based on having a high degree of integration.

As an example of such a tension, consider the problem of supporting multinational COIN elements scattered about a country. Deter-

mining who pays for delivery of services and how that is accomplished is a nontrivial problem. Cost shifting, free riding, and conflicting lines of authority would be perceived as real bureaucratic problems by all the participants with responsibility for their individual organization's interests. In all likelihood, there would be real problems in getting this to work well absent clear agreements between all of the parties. Unfortunately, the very flexibility and adaptability of the COIN elements could make it difficult to sort out prior to a conflict. This suggests that considerable effort should be devoted to the selection of appropriate mechanisms that preserve the flexibility and levels of support necessary for these sorts of operations, while minimizing the negative bureaucratic aspects of the problem. Examples from the civilian world, such as in the area of peering arrangements between backbone carriers of Internet traffic, may be instructive in terms of balancing out payments in situations in which measurement of true costs and volumes of activities has proven difficult.¹⁷ An interesting wrinkle here is that the tactical COIN elements primarily provide services (effective COIN) and informational goods (HUMINT and situational awareness) of interest to the higher-level organizations, whereas the supporting organizations provide tangible goods such as food, fuel, munitions, or services such as transport or combat power. How proper values can be associated with these activities could prove to be an interesting problem for those responsible for allocating resources.

Another area of particular concern is how collections of COIN tactical elements will interact with the larger military units that will probably provide support in higher-threat areas.¹⁸ While the military

¹⁷ See Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Khan, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts, and Stephen Wolff, "A Brief History of the Internet," *Internet Society* (1998, as of October 23, 2007: <http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml>) for a brief description of the Internet model, and Joseph P. Bailey, "The Economics of Internet Interconnection Agreements," in Lee W. McKnight and Joseph P. Bailey, eds., *Internet Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) for a description of some of the arrangements for peering-type relationships.

¹⁸ The relationship to civilian organizations will be similar in terms of having to coordinate to obtain timely support, but the interaction with the military is the limiting case. Military forces have more rigid command relationships and, because of their capability of applying

elements could be allocated to support the COIN mission, much as they are used in the United States to support civil affairs, this arrangement would be quite unusual in combat situations and could lead to nonmilitary leaders directing military units assigned to the COIN element or requiring support from military support units not directly assigned to COIN activity. Take the example of multiple COIN elements operating in an area where a brigade is providing support and security for the transport of materials. The brigade is clearly supporting the COIN activities, but fairly large-scale force-protection operations might be conducted to effectively supply the other elements. Harmonizing the different types of operations—assuring that the COIN elements get what they need and that the conventional forces do not hinder the COIN operation—while also protecting the conventional forces will require a significant degree of skill on the part of both the COIN and conventional force commanders. The connection between the parent organization, say a brigade HQ, and those coordinating the COIN operation of the various cells could prove quite cumbersome and could prevent the COIN micro-structures from receiving the vital support they need.

Building the right structure for COIN clearly requires an appreciation of how the different levels of organizations interact with each other, as well as the tensions within each level of organization that might limit their ability to support the COIN mission. The micro-organizations discussed here offer a good mixture of operational capabilities and would be supportable by higher levels of organization if care and careful thinking are devoted to working the problems. The greatest danger here is that there will be a disconnect between the highest levels of policy, where a focus might be put on COIN and the tactical elements created to conduct COIN, and the large military and civilian infrastructures that will be required to support the tactical elements in the field.

As new tactical structures are designed and organized, they must be trained intensively. To strengthen their cohesion, the U.S. govern-

deadly force, have significant downside risks associated with some of their actions in the security domain.

ment should conduct courses and exercises to put civilian-military teams through the sorts of experiences they may encounter. The U.S. military has ample facilities to permit this. The only obstacle is organizational, and this obstacle should not be insurmountable.

Implications and Recommendations

Definitions Matter

Jihadists define their mission as the defense of the Muslim people and their faith from Christian and Jewish attack; the destruction of a political order in the Muslim world that serves anti-Muslim interests; and the eventual establishment of a fiercely fundamentalist Islamic order in its place. They see themselves as fulfilling a personal duty to Allah and answering an altruistic call to defend what they hold dear. So defined, they will wage their war with extraordinary stamina, violence, opportunism, and, as they see it, heroism. They will not compromise. Their demands are nonnegotiable and insatiable.

That we regard these violent extremists as depraved, hateful, and dangerous may clarify *why* we should oppose them, but it does not clarify *how* to do so. That we believe Muslim populations ought to turn against violent extremists does not mean that they will. Because the jihadists themselves are few, they need—and they know they need—the support of those populations to grow stronger and be sustained. Whether they obtain or are denied that support is thus critical to the future of their holy war and to our vital interests.

The jihadist mind-set has three implications for U.S. strategy:

- The United States must be prepared, psychologically and materially, for a long struggle with global and local Islamic violence.
- In that struggle, heavy U.S. reliance on deadly force in the Muslim world can produce hostility and armed resistance among popula-

tions that, while not condoning terrorism, may identify with the jihadist assertion that Islam is under assault.

- The United States can only prevail if these contested Muslim populations are given a realistic path to a better future, both allowing and requiring them to shun violent extremism.

The U.S. government has recognized the first implication, as evidenced by its warning to the American people to expect a long war. It is coming to understand the second implication. However, it is not clear from current declaratory policy or the way federal resources are allocated that the government truly grasps the third implication.

Most Muslim populations face a choice between inept, illegitimate governments that do not respond to their needs and the siren call of radical religion that energizes jihadism. When the United States uses large-scale military force in their midst under the rationale of protecting the American people from terrorism, these populations must also choose between support for resistance to foreign occupation and support for governments that are viewed as abetting that occupation. Because the contested population is the ultimate decider of whether insurgency loses or wins, only the cheeriest of optimists could say that the United States and its partners are on the verge of winning this struggle for the Muslim population. More likely, we will be battling global-local Islamist insurgency for a long time with, at best, mixed results—*if* we do not reshape our strategy and acquire a complete and balanced set of capabilities.

To say that we need to understand how jihadists' definitions motivate terrorism and resonate with angry Muslim populations is not to say that we need to adopt their definitions. Indeed, we must not. If we act out our part in the jihadists' script—the Muslim world under attack—we risk spreading and intensifying precisely the holy war they seek, as both polling and terrorism data suggest is occurring. However irreproachable our intentions, the realities of GWOT have largely conformed to the enemy's narrative—even to the enemy's wishes. As this report suggested at the outset, the right U.S. goal is not to wage and win a global religious conflict but to defuse it consistent with U.S.

interests and security. We must get our own definitions right, lest the war on terror for Americans become a war of resistance for Muslims.

Since 9/11, the U.S. government has defined the danger of organized Islamic violence as an enemy that threatens America from the Muslim world. This definition of the threat is of course technically consistent with the facts of 9/11. But it is at best an inadequate definition, and in its inadequacy has resulted in an incomplete and imbalanced set of capabilities to respond, marked by excessive dependence on U.S. military force. It is a short distance between defining the problem as a threat to America *from the Muslim world* to a strategy of attacking that threat militarily *in the Muslim world* as a way of protecting Americans—striking the enemy’s homeland before it attacks ours again. Such reasoning has not destroyed the threat so far, with violent Islamism now flourishing in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine, Algeria, Somalia, and elsewhere.

The belief that the United States had to show the will and ability to strike back hard militarily in the Muslim world—and not only in Afghanistan¹—contributed if not to the decision to invade Iraq then certainly to public enthusiasm for that decision.² Such confidence in the utility of sheer military power overlooked an important fact: Islamic terrorists exist and circulate among a billion Muslims searching for identity, safety, help, and hope. This enemy’s strategy is increasingly to hide and operate within that population, not just in some remote wilderness. Operationally, it is no surprise that attrition warfare has worked poorly against fleeting, shadowy, urban jihadists who are indistinguishable from ordinary Arab males. Apart from the perils of using heavy force amid inhospitable populations, regular combat forces designed for fighting other combat forces are not suitable for either counterterrorist or counterinsurgent operations. Strategically, we have witnessed the religious radicalization of local-political insurgency; growing popular hostility to U.S. military presence; and the successful

¹ Woodward on Kissinger—Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

² Long after the American people accepted that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, a majority still believed that Saddam Hussein was somehow behind 9/11.

provocation by al Qaeda of war between Shias and Sunnis—all pointing toward the demise of a unified and capable Iraqi state and wider conflict in the region.

What if we define the problem of violent extremism as an aspect of competition for the orientation of Muslim populations between two paths: one open, practical, tolerant, pluralistic, and safe; the other closed, reactionary, puritanical, intolerant, tyrannical, and violent? The vast majority of these populations, however aggrieved, would surely, rationally, opt for the former if their governments actually offered it—a critical “if.” As it is, these populations exist under governments, even those recently installed by the United States, which lack effectiveness, integrity, and accountability, and whose security forces reflect these deficiencies.

If the right definition and diagnosis is one of competition for a population—thus, insurgency/counterinsurgency—large-scale U.S. military action in the Muslim world is not likely to lead to favorable outcomes. U.S. military power can compensate for and thus help perpetuate feckless local governance. Yet, when it comes to offering the contested population a choice, U.S. military power cannot mitigate for poor government. Worse, large-scale U.S. military occupation and operations, consistent with the jihadist story, stimulates support for “resistance”—a term commonly used by both Sunnis and Shias in Iraq.

Much of this report is predicated on the finding that the United States is *excessively dependent* on large-scale use of physical combat power to counter Islamic insurgency. This dependence is partly post-9/11 psychological reflex, partly a matter of policy choice, and partly a result of having insufficient and imbalanced capabilities for successful COIN. As a result, the United States runs the risk of providing the jihadists with grist for their narrative that the Muslim world is under attack by powerful Crusaders. Large-scale conventional U.S. military power is, generally speaking, ineffective against a distributed, mobile, adaptable, uninhibited, and fearless enemy, and it does not address the crux of the problem, which is the sentiment and direction of Muslim populations. Redefining the problem as one of insurgency, though different from classical insurgencies in many respects, is the first step toward responding effectively. Redefining the goal as one of “changing

core Muslim attitudes toward the West,” and then aligning our capabilities and strategies with that goal, makes success more likely.³

As COIN is embraced as the way to respond, which appears increasingly the case among professionals in the U.S. national-security establishment, the question of COIN capabilities arises. And as that question is addressed, in this study and elsewhere, it is becoming apparent that U.S. capabilities are far from complete and balanced. This report does not question that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are overextended, as of late 2007, nor whether these forces should be expanded to meet total current U.S. defense requirements (which are obviously under stress because of Iraq). What it calls into question is (1) an approach to Islamic insurgency that has led to the overextension of those forces and (2) a belief that the solution to the COIN capabilities problem is to enlarge U.S. forces.

Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities

The preceding chapters offer numerous suggestions for creating more complete and balanced U.S. military and civil capabilities for COIN. A simple method of testing these ideas is to relate them to *criteria* for countering global-local insurgency of the type now occurring in the Muslim world. Briefly, based on analysis of historical insurgencies, of recent and current insurgencies, and of the general characteristics of complex insurgency, U.S. COIN capabilities should

- be acceptable, not menacing, to local populations, which ultimately decide whether insurgencies succeed or fail
- strengthen the responsibility, authority, standing, and performance of local governments
- be able to prepare and enable local security forces, which are more acceptable to the population than American forces
- take on critical tasks that local forces cannot perform, at least until they can perform them

³ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

- be sustainable materially, economically, and politically (again, success in COIN takes over a decade on average)
- place “population protection” before “force protection”
- take full advantage of information networking and be able to communicate with local authorities, services, and populations
- balance civil and military contributions
- make effective use of complementary capabilities of partners and international organizations
- permit decentralized decisionmaking and horizontal collaboration, as defeating this enemy demands
- promote law, order, and justice, and the respect for same in the population.

Current U.S. COIN capabilities measure poorly against these criteria. Compared to needs and to military capabilities, civil capabilities are uneven and generally weak. The ability to build effective law-enforcement and justice systems—the key to preventing, damping down, or containing insurgency—is among the weakest. Information networking is inadequate and far behind those today’s technology permits; networking rules penalize users through exclusion and compartmentalization; information is not readily available or openly shared, especially across agency, international, and local boundaries. The bulk of U.S. ground and air forces for COIN are those designed to conduct combat operations against the regular forces and war-making capability of enemy states; consequently, they are built to cause destruction and to protect themselves, not to support local forces and protect local citizens against large numbers of small groups of insurgents distributed in the population. The nature of current U.S. military capabilities for COIN and the deficiencies of U.S. civil capabilities for COIN do not bolster the responsibility, authority, standing, and performance of the local government. This multicount indictment of U.S. capabilities to counter Islamic insurgency is more serious than the criticism of U.S. policy and execution that get more attention: The latter can be readily corrected, whereas the former requires investment, resources, and time.

Using the challenges of global-local insurgency as the basis for requirements, this report has identified certain capabilities that measure up to these criteria and that, taken together, would give the United States the complete and balanced COIN capabilities it needs. These capabilities can be summarized as

- substantially larger numbers of qualified civil professionals, with sufficient funding, to strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of local governments in providing public service, stimulating economic development, and promoting pluralistic politics
- integrated and inclusive information networks, based on the principle of user primacy, to improve government awareness and responsiveness, engage and liberate the people from the identities that divide and harm them, provide timely, reliable, and relevant information during operations, and foster collaboration, coherence, and trust throughout all those engaged in COIN
- cognitive excellence in objective analysis of insurgency, rational strategy-development, and operational decisionmaking under conditions of urgency and uncertainty
- the capacity and competence to develop COIN-capable indigenous security capabilities in threatened countries, especially institutional management and command, justice systems and police, intelligence systems and services, information operations, and ground forces
- high-leverage U.S. military capabilities essential for enabling indigenous forces in operations and for performing those missions and tasks that indigenous forces cannot perform, especially advanced sensors and networks for border security and COIN operations, special forces for covert action against high-value targets, nonlethal force options, logistics and mobility
- better education and training for leaders, individuals, and units that may have to conduct COIN operations, civil and military.

Will It Really Work?

In no field of conflict is the distance greater between elegant theory and messy reality. COIN has a way of falling short of expectations (which may say something about expectations). Despite almost always having larger and superior forces, greater resources, and the advantages of governing authority, embattled governments and their international backers (including the United States) have won only about one-third of all major insurgencies since World War II. If we are right that Type III insurgency poses greater difficulties than familiar types (I and II), it is important to ask whether the complete and balanced capabilities proposed here will really work, in the sense of preventing Islamist insurgents from succeeding.

We know what does not work because we can observe it: failure to build high-quality local security services; inadequate civil COIN in sectors of great interest to the population (jobs, schools, justice); indifferent performance in sharing and use information; and rotating virtually the entire U.S. Army and Marine Corps through operations in the Muslim world. One can expect that capabilities designed to reduce these shortcomings and based on analysis of Type III insurgency will work better. But that does not mean they will necessarily work well enough, especially taking into account the complexity and unpredictability of real-world COIN.

Answering the question “will it really work?” requires a combination of empirical, anecdotal, and inferential analysis. As already noted, Type III insurgency is consistent with traditional insurgency, yet different enough to argue against pure empiricism. Nevertheless, some data can be brought to bear (based on the 89 major insurgencies since World War II analyzed in Appendix A).

One way to infer from empirical data whether the civil, information, local, and U.S. military capabilities prescribed here will work is to consider the conditions that “predict” success and then to relate these conditions to those one might reasonably expect if the prescribed capabilities are used. Five strong predictors of insurgent failure are (1) popular antipathy, (2) competent government, (3) popular government, (4) democratic government, and (5) social-political inclusiveness.

Although the proposed capabilities will not necessarily deliver these conditions, one can infer that improved capabilities for civil COIN, in particular, can produce important results. In addition, there are notable cases in which civil COIN has produced significant results. Where civil COIN was stressed and done capably, it contributed importantly to overall success in the Philippines (1899–1902), Malaya (1948–1960), Oman (1968–1975), and Egypt (1992–1997). Forthcoming RAND research finds a strong connection between “soft power” (i.e., civil measures) and success in COIN.⁴ The CORDS program for coordinating civil COIN in Vietnam (described in Chapter Five) yielded impressive results against Vietcong insurgents. (It took North Vietnamese military invasion to achieve in 1975 what insurgency in South Vietnam could not.) Again, having capabilities and using them effectively in confused and hostile conditions are different matters. Nonetheless, the empirical correlation is strong enough to suggest increased probability of success.

It is harder to muster solid evidence that digital-age information capabilities, sharing, and use produce success in COIN. The reason, to put it bluntly, is that it has never been tried. This is in part because only in the last decade or so has the opportunity existed to exploit information networking in COIN. But it is also because the U.S. military has not generally adopted the principles, practices, skills, reforms, and corporate culture to exploit networking. The military has barely begun to operationalize networking capabilities in high-intensity warfare, yet the results (e.g., in the initial actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq) are generally positive, although more remains to be learned in this area. While one can claim, as we do, that results in COIN would be at least as positive, there is no way to show this because it has not been generally tried.

That said, we have already noted the experience in and around Mosul (in Northern Iraq) in which U.S. military and intelligence officers, circumventing established procedures, instituted information-sharing rules akin to those recommended in this report and discovered marked improvement in the timeliness of decisions. In addition, con-

⁴ Ongoing RAND research by Andrew Rathmell et al.

tacts with U.S. law-enforcement bodies reveal that ICONic capabilities and principles represent the direction they are taking to improve information access and sharing regarding analogous threats (e.g., organized gangs).⁵ In any case, an effort to develop and test new ways to use information power in COIN (and similar irregular operations) lends itself to experimentation, which we strongly encourage.

It goes without saying that capable local security forces are more likely to achieve success than incapable ones. Less obvious is how feasible it is to organize, train, and equip local security forces capable of countering Type III insurgents. The concept of high-quality indigenous security services in the Muslim world might strike some readers as an oxymoron. Yet there is anecdotal evidence that such forces are not invariably weak, corrupt, or brutal. In Iraq, for instance, Kurdish security forces (*peshmerga*) are of high quality by any standard. Well organized, trained, equipped, supported, and overseen, by able civilians, they are generally effective not only at public safety and combat but also at COIN. They perform better, in comparable situations, than other Iraqi forces. They know how to work with the population, counter sophisticated and fanatical insurgents, conduct themselves properly, and work with others (e.g., U.S. forces). They set a high standard for Iraqi security forces. Although Kurdish forces were developed over a decade (1992–2002), they demonstrate what is possible for security forces in the Muslim world.

Still, it is impossible to dispel all doubt about the feasibility of creating high-quality local state security forces. Kurdish forces notwithstanding, experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is mostly discouraging, though the United States has not consistently put forward the best performance and capabilities that it could to create Iraqi forces. The implication of this uncertainty about the adequacy of local forces, even with better U.S. efforts in building them, is that the United States must improve its own military capabilities to counter Type III insurgency in the Muslim world. Although this study has raised doubts about the wisdom of relying on large-scale use of U.S. force in the Muslim world, it also recommends having the option to do so.

⁵ LAPD and FBI contacts (see Libicki et al., *Byting Back*, for details).

Where U.S. forces themselves are concerned, once again, empirical evidence is neither abundant nor clear. As noted in Chapter Ten, large-scale foreign military intervention tends not to produce successful COIN. Moreover, data show that urbanization of insurgency, the availability of foreign sanctuary, and the provision of foreign support—all characteristics of Type III insurgency—correlate with insurgent success. This suggests that special forces, precise and nonlethal force, border security, mobility, and ISR are key capabilities. Continuation of force transformation of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps can be justified not only by high-intensity combat but also by COIN.

Implementation Strategy

The strategy to create these capabilities has five main elements:

- investment strategy
- organizational reform
- an innovative approach to harnessing information power
- getting allies on board
- getting local governments of concern to take responsibility.

Investment

As detailed in Chapter Twelve, building more complete and balanced U.S. COIN capabilities will require investment on the order of \$20–30B, depending on how forthcoming U.S. international partners are toward expanding and using their COIN capabilities. For purposes of constructing an overall investment portfolio strategy, the needed capabilities and the time and cost required to produce them differ greatly—a pattern that any investor knows. Table 14.1 illustrates how these investments might be *ranked* in terms of cost, time to fruition, impact, and “return,” with 1 being most promising and 4 being least promising.⁶ These rankings are qualitative and based on the judg-

⁶ By “return,” we do not mean to imply a forecast result, only the implication of cost, timing, and impact combined.

Table 14.1
Building an Investment Portfolio

Investment	Cost	Time	Impact	Return ^a
Civil	3	3	1	2
Information and cognitive	1	1	1	1
Local security forces	2	4	1	2
U.S. forces	4	2	2	3

NOTE: Investments are ranked in order from most to least promising, with 1 being most promising.

^a By return, we do not mean to imply a forecast result, only the implication of cost, timing, and impact combined.

ments of the authors (not derived through quantitative analysis of the sort that accompanies investment comparisons in the business world). While they follow from the findings of this study, they are offered in hopes of stimulating and structuring further analysis, not as the only possible view.

Note that three of the investments (civil, information, and local security services) are tied for first in regard to impact. To be clear, *all* of these investments are essential to acquire a complete and balanced set of COIN capabilities; but the strategy for acquiring them must take their differences into account. Thus, the fact information capabilities are ranked first in return is a reflection of the low cost and short time required to create them; but this does not make the other types of capabilities necessary.

Generally stated, this suggests an investment strategy that would

- look for *quick returns* for fairly low cost in information and cognitive layers
- require *large investments* and lots of patience for civil and local security capabilities
- *specifically target* U.S. military capabilities that are critical to COIN and that only the United States can provide, taking into account the investment in local security capabilities.

Such an approach will be familiar to most investors, who balance high return with large long-term holdings with niche investments.

Organization

The United States has ample raw competence and potential capacity to provide complete and balanced capabilities to conduct COIN. These are largely but not entirely embodied in the U.S. government: DoD and the Intelligence Community have substantial capacity; the State Department and USAID have some, though not enough; and several “domestic” departments (e.g., Justice and Education) have some relevant competence but little capacity. Just as insurgencies are usually highly complex, so are the capabilities required to counter it. These capabilities cannot be organized into any single part of the federal government; rather, they are to be found mainly in those organizations with core competencies—again, DoD, State, USAID, Justice, Education, Labor, Health, and Treasury, to name the most important ones. This implies that for purposes of strengthening *capabilities* for complex COIN (as opposed to operations), a distributed organizational approach is better than the alternatives.

This, in turn, suggests a need for a strong central management capability to guide, propose, prod, measure, invest, coordinate, and report to the president on the COIN capabilities of the various departments. Interagency coordination via the NSC staff cannot meet this need. Indeed, while better coordination is always welcome, and in fact acutely needed for COIN at present, it will not touch the larger problem of inadequate and imbalanced capabilities. Tackling the larger problem will require at least a powerful interagency executive (like the drug czar) or an independent agency (like the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] before it was put under DHS). Of these two options, the latter is more likely to produce a complete and balanced set of COIN capabilities and to assemble and deliver the capabilities needed for a particular campaign. While most capabilities would be in the departments, the federal COIN agency would have high-leverage skills, experience, management capability, and resources for crucial investments. Such an agency could also manage multidepartmental

capabilities for foreign post-conflict reconstruction and other nation-building endeavors, whether or not an insurgency is taking place.

If the capability gaps on the civil side of government can be attributed mainly to lack of personnel and funding, the gaps in defense and military capabilities are to a large extent a consequence of organization. As a rule, the way the defense establishment allocates resources for capabilities is a reflection of the way it is structured. COIN is not the primary responsibility of *any* major defense command, agency, or service, which hardly seems adequate given the seriousness of the global-local insurgent threat. To remedy this, the following DoD organizational scheme for COIN should be considered:

- SOCOM should be expanded into a joint global command for all special and irregular operations, including COIN. For COIN, its missions should be to prepare and enable indigenous forces and to operate directly insofar as indigenous forces cannot. It would intensify its recent emphasis on direct action against high-value targets while also enlarging its capabilities for building and advising local forces.
- For these purposes, SOCOM would comprise “cadre” capabilities and work with the Army and other services to “surge” as strategic and operating circumstances dictate.
- In COIN field campaigns and operations, Army and Marine units—down to the *platoon*—should include SOF COIN specialist-advisors for all military aspects of COIN.
- A civilian defense agency should be created, possibly to complement and support SOCOM (and the services) in COIN planning, budgeting, acquisition, police, and interagency tasks.
- Starting with the PRT concept, combined civil-military action units of variable size and composition should deliver better integrated COIN and increase the possibility of civil measures in nonpermissive conditions.

Harnessing Information Power

However the U.S. government is organized for COIN, it must reform the manner in which it acquires and employs information technology,

especially dynamic networks and solutions of the sorts emerging constantly and rapidly in the nongovernmental world. This is a matter of process, not of structure. As Chapter Six explained, existing DoD practices for acquiring complex military systems would be absolutely the wrong way to try to field ICON. There should be no huge integration contract; no reliance on the military-system industry to deliver what is, after all, not a military system at all; no creation of a program office; no blueprint; no implementation plan; no waste of billions of dollars and precious time. In short, those charged with responsibility to bring ICON to life should jettison standard procedures for developing and buying new military capabilities.

Instead, DoD and other agencies should articulate a vision of the capabilities it would like to see, disseminate this vision, conduct targeted R&D, promote the ICONic principles of user primacy, inclusiveness, and integration; advise COIN agencies, operators, and users on how to participate; and use security assistance to finance access in local states and populations of interest and concern.

Multilateral COIN

Defining the challenge of Islamic violence as insurgency and the appropriate response as COIN obliterates any notion that the United States can meet the challenge alone. Quite apart from the global and local legitimacy that comes from broad-based multilateralism, the demands for civil capabilities and capabilities to build effective local government and security forces exceed the resources and competencies that the U.S. government can realistically assemble. Unilateralism is not an affordable option.

Obviously, the United States must build a consensus, starting with its allies (NATO plus Australia, Japan, Korea, and several other key states), that global-local Islamic violence is a form of insurgency, and a very threatening one at that. From that, it follows that COIN is the appropriate response and that no one power, not even the United States, can mount the preventive effort, sustain long-term political-economic campaigns, and conduct COIN operations wherever they may be required. This is not only a clear implication of serious analysis of the problem but also an inescapable lesson from Iraq.

U.S. allies, working through NATO and the EU, have made a growing contribution to creating security, from the Balkans to parts of the former Soviet Union to Afghanistan. Yet, their combined contributions to 21st-century COIN fall well short of that of the United States. U.S. allies also have immense capacity for COIN, largely undeveloped. Like the United States, they have not decided systematically to improve their capabilities for COIN. This said, they should be amenable to a combined effort; after all, they have been lecturing the United States since 9/11 (and even before) that the problem of Islamic violence cannot be solved by a military strategy alone. Thus, the United States would in effect be agreeing with the European analysis that it takes a broad civil-military strategy that integrates all elements of power and influence to prevail over the jihadists.

There are, loosely speaking, two strands of political-strategic thought in Europe regarding the problem of Islamist insurgency (setting aside, for our purposes, the strand in European opinion that does not admit there is a threat that requires European involvement at all). The first, found mainly on the political right and in countries with continuous experience in global security (e.g., the UK and France), is that violent groups must be dealt with harshly, whether at home or abroad. In general, they are not hesitant to use force. The second strand, found mainly on the political left, is that the root causes of conflict at home and abroad, including the causes of Islamic violence, must be dealt with through inclusive politics, forthcoming policies, and avoidance of force. This, of course, is an age-old argument, not confined to COIN. But in this context, it tends to polarize opinion and policymaking between favoring civil and favoring military action.

One of the advantages in thinking of the danger of Islamic violence as global-local insurgency, apart from the analytic merits, is that it demands that governments consider COIN as the response. Whether in its traditional 20th-century variety or in its more complex and dynamic 21st-century variety, COIN demands a broad and integrated, political-and-military, hard-and-soft approach, as well as the capabilities to carry out such an approach. Thus, instead of treating the problem as either warfare or social policy, the insurgency/COIN paradigm requires the synthesis of the two. This idea could form the basis for a

new consensus not only across the Atlantic but also within Europe on what must be done.

In this regard, British thinking about 21st-century insurgency and COIN is starting to gel in ways that could benefit thinking both in Europe and across the Atlantic (just as British thinking has shaped past COIN theory). The British analysis done for this study reflects a school of thought that recognizes full well the danger of global-local Islamic insurgency (including in the UK itself), prescribes a determined effort to meet that danger more at the cognitive level than at the physical level, stresses the need to make force legitimate when it must be used, and endorses the need for balanced capabilities and integrated operations. That analysis suggests a new collective purpose for the United States and its allies: “security based on a more inclusive relationship between Muslim populations and the West—not by conducting military campaigns against an endless supply of disaffected young jihadists but by disarming the sense of exclusion and animosity and by bringing Muslim populations into their own success.”⁷ This would demand the sort of “comprehensive approach” currently under discussion between the United States and its allies in NATO. While NATO will often not be the ideal instrument for conducting COIN, especially in the Muslim world, it can provide the framework for the United States and its principal allies to develop and maintain multilateral capabilities.

Progress in creating complete and balanced COIN capabilities on a multilateral basis will require that the members of NATO and the members of the EU—most of whom are members of both—insist that these organizations develop a cooperative relationship whereby the mainly military capabilities of NATO can be married with the mainly civil capabilities of the EU. The convoluted diplomacy and political jealousies that have prevented such cooperation must be brushed aside in the interest of security from a common danger.

Engendering Local Responsibility

A tenet of COIN against global-local insurgency—for that matter, any type of insurgency—is to align all efforts toward enhancing the

⁷ Mackinlay and al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*.

legitimacy and effectiveness of the local government that must compete with insurgency for the population's support. The purpose of civil COIN is to improve the ability of local government to provide for the material needs and political expectations of its citizens. One of the primary aims in harnessing information power for COIN is to enable local government to communicate with the population. The highest priority, and most serious shortfall, in COIN security capabilities is that of building local security services. Even enhancements in U.S. forces for COIN are intended mainly to complement the local capabilities in creating adequate security. Of course, all of this presupposes that local states are equally committed not only to defeating insurgent threats but also to increasing their own legitimacy and effectiveness, which is the only sure way to prevail in COIN.

This presupposition of local commitment is only partly warranted. Some states (e.g., Jordan, Qatar, the Philippines) facing potential insurgencies understand the need to offer their populations more inclusive politics, educational reform, and widely available economic opportunity. Others (e.g., Egypt, Thailand) appear satisfied that robust intelligence organizations, secret police, and crack military units obviate the need to address grievances. Still others (e.g., Saudi Arabia) seem to think that the radicals can be co-opted through financial dependence. Some (e.g., Bangladesh) may not fathom the dangers they face. Yet, success in countering global-local insurgency cannot be realized if the states it threatens either ignore it or believe they can simply crush it. The U.S. government has a responsibility to protect Americans. But the basic nature of the threat is such that the U.S. government cannot fulfill its security responsibility unless local governments fulfill their responsibility to offer promising political and economic life for their citizens. U.S. efforts to avert or weaken Islamic insurgency by increasing assistance to threatened governments and security services will be wasted if not accompanied by a clear diplomatic strategy to gain local agreement to this basic strategy.

It could also be helpful if the United States declared that an important element of its COIN strategy is to organize, train, equip, advise, and enable high-quality indigenous security services as the principal means to provide security. This would, at once, reassure local

allies that U.S. military intervention is not a favored instrument and put them on notice that their own forces, with U.S. help, will have to handle insurgents.

Getting Started: Specific Recommendations for Immediate Attention

This study has found that the United States should invest in those capabilities that can increase the effectiveness of its COIN and reduce its heavy reliance on direct, large-scale use of its military power in the Muslim world, namely:

- civil capabilities to strengthen local government
- information and cognitive capabilities
- capabilities to build indigenous security services
- military capabilities that provide the most leverage in enabling local services and filling critical niches.

The study further suggests an investment strategy and other measures concerning organization, multilateral COIN, and local partners that would significantly improve United States' capability to counter this threat.

Just as the threat will last a long time, such investment and other measures will take years to produce the capabilities the United States needs—a reflection of how serious its current deficiencies are. One of the worst habits in government planning is to defer what can help in the long term but not in the short term, something no business could do and still survive. The investments and measures proposed here may or may not have any bearing, at least through 2008, on what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan—conflicts which, quite rightly, preoccupy the U.S. government. But in no way does this reduce the urgency of the investments and measures needed. Indeed, they are overdue. The longer they are deferred, the greater the danger from global-local insurgency the United States will face. Accordingly, this report recommends initial steps that should be taken without delay.

Civil COIN

- Develop agreed interagency analysis of required civil capabilities (people, skills, funding), to be published and discussed with Congress.
- Design, propose, and gain congressional support for specific programs to address the most glaring deficiencies—in particular, capacity-building for mass public education and for job-training and job-placement programs.
- Develop options for deployable civil-professional capabilities, utilizing both standing and surge capacity.
- Create an I&W system to preempt proto-insurgency and radicalization of local insurgency, to be published and discussed with Congress.
- Assess realistic funding requirements for these capabilities.

Information and Cognition

- Form a DoD-chaired interagency working group to examine ICON and associated COIN information capabilities. As its first step, bring in information-industry people with Internet and other *nongovernment* network experience.
- Develop plans for R&D targeted on those specific ICON requirements for which there is no commercial demand and development.
- Develop a system to support vetting for local governments.
- Create information programs to support an I&W system.
- Develop agreed interagency analysis on required cognitive skills and profiles for success in COIN analysis, shaping, and operational decisionmaking. Assess deficiencies in existing personnel standards, education, and training.
- Review existing military (DoD) and civil (State) IO and public-diplomacy capabilities and themes with a view toward aligning them directly with local governments competing with insurgents for the allegiance of Muslim populations.
- Assess funding requirements for these capabilities.

Local Security Services

- Design, propose, and gain congressional support for programs to address the most glaring deficiencies for indigenous security capacity-building—at a minimum, institutional-management, justice system, police, constabulary, military, and intelligence-service capabilities.
- Identify specific features needed in local capabilities to make them suitable for COIN.
- Clarify what department, agency, or service is responsible for each of these areas.
- Assess funding requirements for these capabilities.

U.S. Forces

- Review the existing DoD program of record with a view toward what is needed to enable indigenous forces for COIN.
- Invest in promising border-security sensors and other systems.
- Develop a plan and program for the capability to organize, train, and equip local ground forces for COIN on a large scale.
- Solicit SOCOM proposals for the expansion and restructuring of the command to strengthen COIN capabilities.
- Solicit SOCOM proposals for investment in SOF combat support and weaponry designed for COIN.
- Develop CONOPS for providing security for civil COIN personnel and projects.
- Intensify research and experimentation nonlethal and scaleable-effect weapons and other capabilities for use in potentially hostile population concentrations.
- Create capacity for advanced training and other preparation of U.S. forces destined for COIN duty—in prepare, enable, and operate missions.
- Support investment in ground-force mobility suitable for COIN.

Multilateral

- Conduct an analysis in NATO (to include key non-NATO countries) of insurgency and COIN, with particular emphasis on global-local Islamic insurgency.
- Develop requirements for complete and balanced capabilities.
- Take stock of existing military capabilities among NATO members and other key states.
- Step up efforts to organize, train, equip, and advise constabulary capabilities.
- Institute practical NATO-EU cooperation on planning and providing both military and civil capabilities for COIN.
- Initiate discussions with key UN agencies, the World Bank, and other international organizations.

Organization

- Executive and/or congressional commissioning of an independent study of creating an agency to manage U.S. capabilities for COIN and similar demanding overseas endeavors. This study should not be left to existing organizations.
- Examination by DoD, to be reported to the White House and Congress, of the architecture (SOCOM-surge-agency) suggested above to build, assemble, and employ military COIN capabilities.
- Conduct experimentation and training for combined civil-military COIN action units of variable size, composition, and leadership.

Conclusion

The general finding of this study is that the United States cannot succeed in countering the growing danger of Type III Islamic insurgencies with its current capabilities. Its heavy reliance on large-scale military power and the use of that power in the Muslim world will not result in the defeat of this distributed, elusive, often urban jihadist-insurgent threat. Success requires the active cooperation of the Muslim popu-

lations within which the jihadist-insurgents reside and operate. The presence and use of U.S. military power in the Muslim world does not necessarily foster such popular cooperation. Instead, the enemy uses it as cognitive ammunition to gain support for resistance to infidel occupation and attack. Continued heavy reliance on direct and large-scale military force can suck the United States into a whirlpool of growing Muslim hostility and self-perpetuating jihad.

Since 9/11, four-fifths of the growth in U.S. national-security spending has gone toward buying advanced military (ground, air, space, and naval) equipment and conducting large U.S. combat operations in the Muslim world. Yet, little of this equipment is useful in countering insurgency, and the operations are clearly not working. The inescapable truth is that the United States is not allocating its resources to deal effectively with the greatest danger it faces and, as a consequence, is not prepared to succeed. When the United States found itself in such circumstances in the past—on entering World War II and at the outset of the Cold War, notably—it did something about it.

As this is written, there is a groundswell of support for expanding U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground forces. This raises an obvious question: Why expand U.S. ground forces if, as this study finds, the large-scale use of such forces in the Muslim world cannot defeat these distributed and elusive insurgents, cannot enable local governments to win the contest for the loyalty of their populations, and may even increase the susceptibility of those populations to the jihadist argument that the infidels must be resisted? Although this study did not examine whether the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are too small, the authors cannot disagree that these services have been weakened by the conflict in Iraq. Because of its global interests and responsibilities, beyond countering Islamic insurgency, the United States cannot do without strong ground forces.

If, however, the government believes that more ground forces are needed for the long term so that they can be deployed to the Muslim world to defeat Islamist insurgents via large-scale, direct combat operations, this study finds no basis for such a belief. The reason for restoring the strength of U.S. ground forces is not that they are the ideal instrument for COIN but rather that they are a poor instrument for COIN

that has been overused. Moreover, it would be a mistake for the United States to build up precisely those forces that are generally unsuitable for COIN in the Muslim world at the expense of the crucial civil, indigenous, and information capabilities it currently lacks. U.S. security interests will suffer if federal resources are used to expand regular military forces *instead of* capabilities it needs for 21st-century COIN. A better case can be made for (1) improving selective U.S. military capabilities with the greatest expected COIN payoff, (2) committing additional resources to nonmilitary capabilities and (2) looking for quicker, larger payoff in information power for COIN.

Strategically, the United States faces three options. As just noted, the option of increasing reliance on the use of U.S. ground forces to counter insurgency in the Muslim world cannot be reconciled with analysis of the true character of and best way to counter this type of insurgency. Another option is to disengage from COIN in the Muslim world, concentrating instead on defending the United States itself and its interests elsewhere, not unlike the way the United States disengaged from Indo-China after losing the Vietnam War. After that earlier disengagement, the United States discovered that Indo-China was not, after all, the apex of the struggle with Soviet communism. Arguably, the disengagement helped the United States prevail in the larger struggle by enabling it to redirect investment toward a global and technological strategy that ultimately overwhelmed the Soviets.

But today's strategic situation is different. The United States cannot disengage from the reality of global-local insurgency. Reasonable people can argue about whether the invasion of Iraq was a "war of choice" or one of necessity. But countering global-local Islamic insurgency is clearly a necessity. The United States cannot abandon global-local COIN without running enormous risks to its interests and friends, to global security in general, and to its own safety. Just as it would be dangerous to escalate the use of U.S. military power in the Muslim world, it would be dangerous to think that a strategic retreat from that world would mollify the jihadists and end Islamic violence. As others have put it, "achieving a . . . settlement with Islamist extremists is unlikely given their sweeping demands: the replacement of the existing governments in the Middle East, Central Asia, and much of

East Asia with Taliban-style theocratic regimes, and a severe reduction in the influence and perhaps presence of non-Muslims in the region.”⁸ “Because of the scope of [their] grievances, broader agenda of rectifying humiliation, and poisoned worldview that glorifies jihad as a solution, appeasing [Islamic extremists] is difficult in theory and impossible in practice. It is hard to imagine what would suffice.”⁹

In sum, if the United States should neither disengage nor stick with its current strategy of relying mainly on the use of large-scale U.S. military power in the Muslim world, it follows that it must mount a serious and sustained effort to build complete and balanced capabilities for COIN. Doing this while also grappling with the serious operational problems it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan will require extraordinary clarity, skill, and bipartisanship.

⁸ Campbell and Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism*, p. 37.

⁹ Byman, Daniel L., “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?” *World Politics* (Vol. 56, No. 1, October 2003, pp. 139–163).

Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings

Martin C. Libicki

One way to understand insurgencies—what leads to victory or defeat, and how they end—is to examine them statistically. To do so, we generated a list of 89 insurgencies, listed in Table A.1.¹ For each one, we evaluated some basic parameters of the country they take place in and various attributes both insurgents and the government bring to the fight: for example, how competent or popular they are and where they may be getting help.

Table A.1
The 89 Insurgencies

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	Result
Greece	1945	1949	Government Wins
Philippines (HUK Rebellion)	1946	1955	Government Wins
Burma	1948	2006	Government Wins
Malaya	1948	1960	Government Wins
Kenya	1952	1956	Government Wins

¹ A starter set of 127 insurgencies was taken from James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 75–90), who defined them as internal wars where more than 1,000 were killed, with at least 100 on each side. To their list of 127, we

- added 11 insurgencies that passed the 1,000-dead mark after their data cutoff date of 1999
- subtracted 51 insurgencies that were more in the nature of coups, counter coups, and spontaneous insurrections, and
- made a few other adjustments.

Table A.1—Continued

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	Result
Indonesia (Daru Islam)	1958	1960	Government Wins
Lebanon	1958	1959	Government Wins
Tibet	1959	1974	Government Wins
Congo/Katanga	1960	1965	Government Wins
Guatemala	1960	1996	Government Wins
Iraq Kurdistan	1961	1974	Government Wins
Uruguay	1963	1973	Government Wins
Biafran Secession	1967	1970	Government Wins
Argentina	1968	1979	Government Wins
Northern Ireland	1969	1999	Government Wins
Jordan	1970	1971	Government Wins
Philippines (MNLF)	1971	1996	Government Wins
Balochistan	1973	1977	Government Wins
Angola (UNITA)	1975	2002	Government Wins
Morocco	1975	1991	Government Wins
Indonesia (Aceh)	1976	2005	Government Wins
Philippines (MILF)	1977	2006	Government Wins
Peru	1981	1992	Government Wins
Turkey (PKK)	1984	1999	Government Wins
Uganda (ADF)	1986	2000	Government Wins
Sierra Leone	1991	2002	Government Wins
Algeria (GIA)	1992	2004	Government Wins
Croatia	1992	1995	Government Wins
Colombia (La Violencia)	1948	1962	Mixed Outcome
Yemen	1962	1970	Mixed Outcome
Dominican Republic	1965	1966	Mixed Outcome
East Timor	1975	2000	Mixed Outcome
Lebanese Civil War	1975	1990	Mixed Outcome
Mozambique (RENAMO)	1976	1995	Mixed Outcome

Table A.1—Continued

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	Result
Kampuchea	1978	1992	Mixed Outcome
El Salvador	1979	1992	Mixed Outcome
Senegal	1980	2002	Mixed Outcome
Nicaragua (Contras)	1981	1990	Mixed Outcome
Papua New Guinea	1988	1998	Mixed Outcome
Bosnia	1992	1995	Mixed Outcome
Georgia/Abkhazia	1992	1994	Mixed Outcome
Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1994	Mixed Outcome
Tajikistan	1992	1997	Mixed Outcome
Burundi	1993	2003	Mixed Outcome
Chechnya I	1994	1996	Mixed Outcome
Kosovo	1996	1999	Mixed Outcome
Nepal	1997	2006	Mixed Outcome
Congo (anti-Kabila)	1998	2003	Mixed Outcome
China	1934	1950	Government Loses
Indochina	1946	1954	Government Loses
Cuba	1953	1959	Government Loses
Algerian Independence	1954	1962	Government Loses
Eritrea	1960	1993	Government Loses
Laos	1960	1975	Government Loses
Namibia	1960	1989	Government Loses
South Africa	1960	1994	Government Loses
South Vietnam	1960	1975	Government Loses
Angolan Independence	1962	1974	Government Loses
Guinea-Bissau	1962	1974	Government Loses
Mozambique Independence	1962	1974	Government Loses
Zimbabwe	1965	1980	Government Loses
Cambodia	1968	1975	Government Loses
Bangladesh	1971	1972	Government Loses

Table A.1—Continued

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	Result
Afghanistan (anti-Soviet)	1978	1992	Government Loses
Nicaragua (Somoza)	1978	1979	Government Loses
Somalia	1980	1991	Government Loses
Sudan (SPLA)	1984	2004	Government Loses
Liberia	1989	1997	Government Loses
Moldova	1990	1992	Government Loses
Rwanda	1990	1994	Government Loses
Afghanistan (post-Soviet)	1992	1996	Government Loses
Afghanistan (Taliban)	1996	2001	Government Loses
Zaire (anti-Mobutu)	1996	1997	Government Loses
Colombia (FARC)	1963		Ongoing
Philippines (NPA)	1969		Ongoing
India Northeast	1975		Ongoing
Sri Lanka	1976		Ongoing
India-Naxalite	1980		Ongoing
Uganda (LRA)	1987		Ongoing
Kashmir	1989		Ongoing
Nigeria (Niger Delta)	1991		Ongoing
Somalian (post-Barre)	1991		Ongoing
Chechnya II	1999		Ongoing
Israel	2000		Ongoing
Afghanistan (anti-Coalition)	2001		Ongoing
Ivory Coast	2002		Ongoing
Darfur	2003		Ongoing
Iraq	2003		Ongoing
South Thailand	2004		Ongoing

We then parceled out the 89 insurgencies to various RAND analysts and research assistants, most of whom had enough knowledge of

the region or insurgency to reach conclusions on their character based on earlier research. They assigned values to such parameters for each country they examined. These parameters, in turn, were examined to see if they correlated with a government victory (28 cases), a government defeat (25 cases), a mixed outcome² (20 cases), or the fact that an insurgency was still going on (16 cases).

General Characteristics

Insurgencies (the Irish Republican Army aside) have either been a phenomenon of the developing world or the post-Communism breakup of multiethnic states such as Russia and Yugoslavia. As Table A.2 shows, except for sub-Saharan Africa, win-loss-draw records are roughly the same all over the world. Part of the African difference lies in the large number of insurgencies that come under the rubric of decolonization (Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and Kenya) or, what is similar, the struggle for black majority rule (Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa). If those seven are subtracted, sub-Saharan Africa is an outlier but not dramatically so.

Table A.2
Number of Insurgencies by Region, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Americas	Europe	East Asia	Middle East	Sub-Saharan Africa
Government Wins	4	3	9	7	5
Mixed Outcome	4	4	4	4	4
Government Loses	2	1	6	4	12
Ongoing	1		5	5	5

Table A.3 shows that governments of countries completely within the Islamic world are somewhat less apt to lose and far less apt to settle for a mixed outcome than countries completely outside the Islamic

² Including three cases—East Timor, Kosovo, and Nicaragua—in which the outcome was what the insurgents wanted but which they played no real role in achieving.

world. Note, though, how many insurgencies are separatist movements by Islamic regions from countries that are not Islamic, or separatist movements by non-Islamic regions from countries that are Islamic. Indeed, the last two categories (which account for just over 10 percent of the total insurgency database) account for 5 of the 15 ongoing insurgencies (Israel, Chechnya II, South Thailand, and Kashmir on the one hand and, technically, the Niger Delta on the other).

Table A.3
Number of Insurgencies as a Function of the Local Religion,
Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Ummah	Not Ummah	Dissident Islamic Region	Dissident Non-Islamic Region
Government Wins	12	14	1	1
Mixed Outcome	3	11	1	5
Government Loses	7	17		1
Ongoing	4	7	4	1

Table A.4 and Figure A.1 show that, once insurgencies get a head of steam, they generally last a long time from beginning to end—the medium length is ten years, but with long tails. The half-life at birth of the 89 insurgencies was 12 years. After an insurgency has lasted ten years, this half-life declined to six years (that is, half of the insurgencies that make it to ten years survive at least another six more years) and then returns to the 10–15-year level. Put another way, there is a good chance that insurgencies can be concluded within 16 years, but if the insurgency survives that long, hopes of an expeditious conclusion from then on tend to evaporate.

Among insurgencies that are concluded within 20 years, those that are won, lost, or tied by the government show a similar wrap-up rate. Past the 20-year mark, one sees divergence: 25 percent (7 of 28) of the government-won; 10 percent (2 of 20) of the mixed-outcome; 12 percent (3 of 25) of the government-lost; but 30 percent (5 of 16) of the ongoing insurgencies lasted 20 years. Perhaps once an insurgency starts its third decade, the government takes longer to win it than to lose it. Perhaps, also, one hoary cliché may need to be rethought: Insurgents


do not necessarily win so long as they do not lose. Were it so, then the average length of insurgent-won conflicts would exceed the average length of government-won conflicts—but they do not.

Table A.4
Surviving Insurgencies After N Years, Sorted by Outcome

	Number Surviving After N Years						
Outcome	N=0	N=2	N=4	N=6	N=8	N=10	N=12
Government Wins	28	25	20	19	19	17	12
Mixed Outcome	20	16	14	12	11	7	7
Government Loses	25	21	19	17	13	13	9
Ongoing	16	16	12	10	9	9	9
	N=14	N=16	N=18	N=20	N=22	N=24	N=26
Government Wins	10	7	7	7	7	7	6
Mixed Outcome	4	3	3	2	1	1	0
Government Loses	8	4	4	3	3	3	3
Ongoing	9	7	6	5	5	5	4
	N=28	N=30	N=32	N=34	N=36	N=38	N=40
Government Wins	5	2	2	2	1	1	1
Mixed Outcome	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Government Loses	3	2	2	0	0	0	0
Ongoing	4	3	2	2	2	1	1

Table A.5 shows that the rate at which insurgencies have started has not shown much of a trend one way or the other since World War II ended—every two years sees roughly three insurgencies get under way.

Figure A.1
Length of Insurgency in Years from Shortest to Longest, Sorted by Outcome



NOTE: The number of insurgencies in each category was normalized to 28 (the number of insurgencies in the government-won category) by arraying insurgency-lengths in monotonic order and then inserting interpolated results evenly throughout the range. This method does not significantly change the percentile rankings of the results.

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Table A.5
Number of Insurgencies by Decade of Onset, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Up to 1955	1956–1965	1966–1975	1976–1985	1986–1995	1996–2005
Government Wins	5	7	8	4	4	0
Mixed Outcome	1	2	2	5	7	3
Government Loses	4	9	2	4	4	2
Ongoing		1	2	2	4	7

Although there has been no trend in win-loss ratios over the decades since WWII, an increasing percentage of insurgencies are resulting in mixed outcomes—either through explicit negotiations or

through the tacit acceptance of outcomes that constitute *de facto* political arrangements.

Because income and urbanization levels tend to be highly correlated, they can be treated together. It is not a complete surprise to find that richer, more urban countries tend to be those in which insurgents are apt to lose, as shown in Table A.6.

Table A.6
Number of Insurgencies by Country Income, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Income		
	Over \$7,000	\$2,000 to \$7,000	Under \$2,000
Government Wins	7	15	6
Mixed Outcome	4	8	8
Government Loses	2	9	14
Ongoing	5	5	6

NOTE: Income figures are per capita, in 2006 dollars.

A similar, perhaps sharper tale can be told for urbanization. Table A.7 shows that terrain—e.g., whether a country is flat (like Illinois) or mountainous (like West Virginia)—makes little difference, though.

Table A.7
Number of Insurgencies by Level of Urbanization, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Percentage Urban		
	More Than 70	40 to 70	Less Than 40
Government Wins	6	14	8
Mixed Outcome	3	8	9
Government Loses	1	5	19
Ongoing	3	4	9

Insurgent Characteristics

The outcome of any given insurgency has a lot to do with the goals sought by the insurgents.³ Insurgencies fought for independence from colonial rule or for majority rule have been almost always successful once they get going.⁴ Conversely, insurgencies fought for secession have failed more often than they have succeeded. (When the goal is colonial independence or majority rule, the insurgents want to take over the existing local government; when the goal is secession, the insurgents want to form a new, separate government.) Otherwise, the won-lost record is mixed whether the goal is establishing a Marxist or Islamic state or overthrowing the government (that is, changing the regime without necessarily changing the governing ideology). These data are summarized in Table A.8.

Goals such as independence, majority rule, Marxism, or Islamism tend to be either-or propositions and only four⁵ of the 34 insurgencies with such goals have resulted in a mixed outcome. Conversely, when secession/autonomy or power arrangements are at issue, the dif-

Table A.8
Number of Insurgencies by Goal of Insurgents, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Secession/ Autonomy	Overthrow	Marxist	Islamist	Independence/ Majority Rule
Government Wins	13	5	7	2	1
Mixed Outcome	8	8	3	1	
Government Loses	5	6	5	1	8
Ongoing	6	3	3	2	2

³ Although nationalism is not on the list of insurgency goals, it has been an important sub-text to insurgencies whose primary goal has been Marxism or Islamism.

⁴ The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya is an exception, but, even then, independence followed seven years after the rebellion ended.

⁵ The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nepal, and Tajikistan (the first three insurgencies having Marxist goals; the fourth had Islamist goals).

ference can often be split, and mixed outcomes have characterized 15 cases, or nearly 30 percent of such insurgencies.

Another critical and very military influence on outcomes is the force ratio between the insurgents and the government. Table A.9 shows that, as a general rule, the greater the government-to-insurgent force ratio, the lower the odds of an insurgent victory (taking into account the difficulty of getting even remotely accurate numbers for as many as a fifth of the insurgencies). The relationship is not particularly strong. What is striking is the correlation between weak insurgent forces and the inability to conclude an insurgency: All of the ongoing insurgencies can be characterized by insurgent forces that are less than one-third the size of government forces.

Table A.9
Number of Insurgencies by Force Ratio, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Over 9:1	From 3:1 to 9:1	From 1:1 to 3:1	Under 1:1
Government Wins	7	13	6	2
Mixed Outcome		9	5	6
Government Loses	2 ^a	6	10	7
Ongoing	10	4		2

^a Algeria and Cuba.

The first issue is how good the insurgents were at conducting insurgency from a military perspective. Without harder information, one might naturally credit winning insurgents as having thereby proven themselves more militarily competent, but Table A.10 shows that, surprisingly, there seems to be little correlation.

Table A.10
Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Competence,
Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Insurgent Competence		
	High	Medium	Low
Government Wins	6	18	4
Mixed Outcome	2	10	8
Government Loses	4	18	3
Ongoing	3	7	6

The *popularity* of the insurgency, whether one refers to the insurgents or the insurgents' cause, appears to be somewhat correlated with the outcomes. Table A.11 shows that, when the group's popularity was high (or rising) the insurgents lost only one-third of the time. When its popularity was low, it lost over two-thirds of the time.

Table A.11
Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Popularity,
Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Insurgent Popularity		
	High	Medium	Low
Government Wins	12	5	11
Mixed Outcome	10	8	2
Government Loses	14	7	4
Ongoing	4	3	9

This can be seen more clearly by removing the 33 insurgencies that sought secession or autonomy, as has been done in Table A.12. Because such insurgents (or at least their causes) tend to be popular within their region, the outcome of their insurgency tends to depend in part on the strength of the region compared to the nation as a whole. Overall, government has won conflicts over secession far more often than it has lost. Thus there is a large subclass of insurgencies, those where secession is the goal, where the insurgents are popular but lost anyway—but this does not mean that popularity and outcome are inversely correlated.

Table A.12
Number of Non-Secessionist Insurgencies by Insurgent Popularity,
Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Insurgent Popularity		
	High	Medium	Low
Government Wins	2	2	11
Mixed Outcome	4	7	1
Government Loses	10	7	4
Ongoing	1	1	6

NOTE: This table excludes insurgencies in which succession was the goal.

As for structure, most insurgent groups are hierarchies—as one might expect from a quasi-military organization. With the emergence of networked terrorism, the presumption has arisen that networking is a useful innovation for antigovernment forces, making them more resilient and flexible, and thereby more likely to win. As shown in Table A.13, however, the numbers do not bear out such a belief, or at least not yet. Networked insurgents have lost significantly more often than they have won, while hierarchically organized insurgents have a more even record. It remains to be determined whether this result reflects the fact that networked organizations do not fight wars very well, or whether, instead, weak insurgencies are those incapable of enforcing hierarchy and therefore organize themselves as networks for lack of a better alternative.

Table A.13
Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Structure,
Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Vertical C2	Mixed	Horizontal C2 (Networked)
Government Wins	18	3	7
Mixed Outcome	12	1	7
Government Loses	19	3	3
Ongoing	8	1	7

NOTE: C2 = command and control.

A correlated indicator—how many different insurgent groups there are—does not seem to make much difference, though.

Does terrorism do insurgents very much good? Quite the contrary: When terror has been broadly used, the government has won more than half of the decided contests (11 out of 21), as shown in Table A.14. When terror has been used selectively or not at all, the insurgents have won just under half of all decided contests (18 out of 40). This suggests that the indiscriminate use of terrorism often an indicator of an insurgency’s weakness in that the insurgents do have the means to confront government forces and, hence, must attack soft civilian targets.

Table A.14
Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Use of Terror, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Indiscriminate	Mutual Atrocities	Selective ^a	Little or None
Government Wins	11	3	10	4
Mixed Outcome	5	3	7	5
Government Loses	5	2	15	3
Ongoing	7	4	4	1

^a Including two cases coded as first indiscriminate and then selective.

It would seem that an insurgency that can garner international support would, by that fact alone, be more likely to succeed. Not only can such help add to its assets, but it is also a leading indicator of success; it can often serve to boost the credibility and legitimacy of an insurgency and may help pressure the government into negotiations. Countries, like people, prefer betting on potential winners. The numbers shown in Table A.15 validate that presumption, at least to some degree, but they also clearly differentiate support of a state from similar support of a movement or a diaspora. Insurgencies that have gained the support of other states have won more than half of the time. Those with nonstate support have done average, and those with no outside support whatsoever have never won. Where state support ended (these cases are noted in parentheses in the “state support” column) insurgents did far worse than average, and even worse than those who had received neither state nor nonstate support.

Table A.15
Number of Insurgencies by Level of State Support, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	State Support (Which Ended)	Nonstate Actor Support Only	No Support
Government Wins	11 (8)	5	12
Mixed Outcome	13 (7)	3	4
Government Loses	21 (2)	4	0
Ongoing	8 (3)	3	5

Among the various forms of support for nonstate actors it appears that getting help from fellow ethnic groups across the border is worth somewhat more to insurgents than getting help from brothers in the faith from anywhere—but the numbers may be too small in any case to permit strong conclusions.

Foreign jihadists, notably those contributed by or at least associated with al Qaeda, account for most of the presence of foreign soldiers these days. Because the organization, itself, is of recent standing, its support is associated with only twelve conflicts, eight of which are still ongoing. Its record is two-and-two where outcomes are known (they supported the defeat of the Communists in 1992 and the accession of the Taliban in 1996, but were defeated with the Taliban in 2002, and can be associated with the defeat of GSPC in Algeria).

The ability of insurgents to enjoy sanctuary is a significant help, often making the difference between success and failure. As shown in Table A.16, insurgents that have enjoyed sanctuary have won almost half of the conflicts (23 out of 52) that have been decided while those that did not won very few (Eritrea, Cuba, Laos, and Moldova). However, when the sanctuary was involuntary (that is, the receiving state had no great desire to shelter insurgents but had little means to stop them), insurgents did not do better than average. This suggests that sanctuary may be more an indicator of broader and hence more valuable state support rather than something that can be exploited in and of itself.

Table A.16
Number of Insurgencies by Type of Sanctuary, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	No Sanctuary	Involuntary Sanctuary	Voluntary Sanctuary
Government Wins	13	3	12
Mixed Outcome	5	4	11
Government Loses	4	3	18
Ongoing	8	4	4

Finally, insurgencies that had a single dominant charismatic *military* leader did somewhat better than average, as shown in Table A.17. However, governments that took out that leader (e.g., Abimael Guzman of Peru’s Shining Path) prevailed more than half the time, while those that faced a dominant leader and could not or would not remove the leader won only 6 of 29 such insurgencies. The same is not true for taking out a leader who was dominant but only in the political sphere; many colonial or white-majority regimes did so but with little success.

Table A.17
Number of Insurgencies by the Presence and Removal of Dominant Military Leader, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Insurgents Had a Dominant Military Leader	Who Was Removed
Government Wins	14	8
Mixed Outcome	7	1
Government Loses	18	3
Ongoing	4	2

Government Characteristics

Just as democracies are not supposed to go to war with each other, can it also be argued that democracies will not fall to an insurgency? Yes—provided that the state is a true democracy, in the sense of having full franchise and rule of law. Anocracies—imperfect democracies, as

it were⁶—have a decidedly poor won-loss record; as Table A.18 shows, when anocracies and democracies are combined, they fare no better than autocracies. What is also notable about the record of democracies is the large number of insurgencies that have yet to finish.

Table A.18
Number of Insurgencies by Type of Government, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Democracy	Anocracy	Autocracy	Colonial
Government Wins	9	1	16	2
Mixed Outcome	5	5	10	0
Government Loses	0	6	13	6
Ongoing	10	3	2	1

The next issue is the potential correlation between government *military* competence⁷ at *counterinsurgency* and outcomes. Competence here refers to military competence—the ability to plan and carry out military operations of relevance to counterinsurgency. Table A.19 shows that governments that were judged to have high levels of competence won two-thirds of all completed insurgencies, compared with only a third of the completed insurgencies when government competence was only medium or worse.

This correlation is even stronger when the eight anticolonial or antiwhite rule insurgencies of Africa (one of which, Algeria, is counted within the Middle East in Table A.2) are omitted, as has been done in Table A.20. Without such cases, there is no instance in which the government was defeated despite high competence at counterinsurgency. Combining this (admittedly modest) conclusion with the one above

⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, in “Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971,” *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 68, No. 4, December 1974, p. 1,487, footnote 11), wrote that an anocratic state is one that “has minimal functions, an uninstitutionalized pattern of political competition, and executive leaders constantly imperiled by rival leaders.” For our purposes, an anocratic state is an intermediate state in which elites maintain themselves in power despite the existence of democratic procedures.

⁷ This is a narrower notion of competence than one which incorporates intelligence, psychology, economics, and, politics.

Table A.19
Number of Insurgencies by Government Competence, Sorted by Outcome

Competence	Government Competence			NA or Unknown
	High	Medium	Low	
Government Wins	9	8	8	3
Mixed Outcome	1	8	7	4
Government Loses	4	8	9	4
Ongoing	2	7	4	3

Table A.20
Number of Insurgencies by Government Competence, Sorted by Outcome ("Africa 8" Excluded)

Competence	Government Competence			NA or Unknown
	High	Medium	Low	
Government Wins	7	8	8	2
Mixed Outcome	1	8	7	4
Government Loses	0	5	9	4
Ongoing	2	7	3	3

suggests that, at least at the operational level, the outcomes of insurgencies are less a matter of insurgents winning than government losing.

Correlation is at least equally pronounced when the subject is government rather than insurgent popularity. Table A.21 shows that governments whose popularity was high or even medium won outright nearly half of the insurgencies they fought (16 out of 31 decided). But unpopular governments lost outright more than half (23 out of 42 decided).

Table A.22 shows that this effect is only somewhat more pronounced when the 33 insurgencies motivated by secession or autonomy are subtracted away.

By contrast, other factors—the degree of government strength (in terms of its ability to enforce laws and collect taxes in normal times), the degree of social exclusion, and the government’s fear of coups (lead-

ing it to keep its military divided) do not seem to have made much difference.

Table A.21
Number of Insurgencies by Government Popularity,
Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Government Popularity		
	High	Medium	Low
Government Wins	10	6	12
Mixed Outcome	2	10	8
Government Loses	1	2	22
Ongoing	2	9	5

Table A.22
Number of Insurgencies by Government Popularity, Sorted by
Outcome (Insurgencies Motivated by Secession or Autonomy
Excluded)

Outcome	Government Popularity		
	High	Medium	Low
Government Wins	8	3	4
Mixed Outcome	1	7	4
Government Loses	1	2	17
Ongoing	2	5	2

Outside Intervention

Outside intervention characterized 29 insurgencies: 21 times directly (i.e., with ground troops or bombing; the intervening countries are listed in Table A.23) and 8 times indirectly (i.e., with money, or advisors).

The results, shown in Table A.24, are somewhat counterintuitive. A beleaguered government that gets direct assistance from an outside intervener has no better win-loss record than one that gets no significant assistance. Instead, outside intervention is correlated with a higher

likelihood of a mixed settlement (specifically Tajikistan, Lebanon,⁸ El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Bosnia, Cambodia 1978, and Congo 1998). Governments that had significant outside *indirect* intervention, however, did worse than average.

Table A.23
Insurgencies for Which the Government
Had Direct Support from Other Countries

Insurgency	Pro-Government Interveners
Angola (UNITA)	Cuba
Eritrea	Cuba
Liberia	ECOMOG
Yemen	Egypt
Somalia (post-Barre)	Ethiopia
Sri Lanka	India
Tajikistan	Russia
Lebanese Civil War	Syria
Sierra Leone	UK
Congo/Katanga	UN
Lebanon	USA
Iraq	USA
Bosnia	USA
Laos	USA
Afghanistan (anti-Coalition)	USA
El Salvador	USA
South Vietnam	USA
Dominican Republic	USA
Afghanistan (anti-Soviet)	USSR
Kampuchea	Vietnam
Congo (anti-Kabila)	Zimbabwe et al.

⁸ Although many countries intervened in the Lebanese civil war, the reference is to Syria's intervention, especially toward the end of the conflict.

Table A.24
Number of Insurgencies by Outside Intervention, Sorted by Outcome

Outcome	Direct Intervention	Indirect Intervention	None
Government Wins	4	2	22
Mixed Outcome	8	2	10
Government Loses	5	4	16
Ongoing	4		12

Among the 21 cases of direct intervention, the competence of the intervener's forces is not a particularly good predictor of outcomes; nor, for that matter is the question of whether or not the intervener or its forces are considered popular in the country. As for the question of timing, it appears best for the intervener to jump in soon after the conflict starts but not before it starts—although that conclusion may also be a statistical artifact.

Caveats

A certain caution is advisable any time one tries to wring conclusions from a relatively small and heterogeneous dataset whose parameters are approximate. Thus, the following caveats apply:

The field of insurgency and counterinsurgency has more than its share of ambiguities. Some are definitional (e.g., what is “competence?”), others factual (insurgencies tend to take place where not everything is a matter of record), and yet others are deliberate (insurgents and counterinsurgents do not always tell the truth about themselves or their foes). Many of the parameters discussed are necessarily subjective and different people might evaluate them differently. Something as simple as when an insurgency started and ended can be subject to debate. Even if everyone agrees on a specific subjective assessment, not everyone will place boundaries between “high,” “medium,” and “low” in precisely the same place. This study, in particular, used a number of regional experts. Although efforts were made to ensure con-

sistent coding (mostly by ensuring that the same definitions were used throughout) differing judgments are unavoidable.

Because the number of insurgencies is small and the number of potential ways they can be characterized is large, statistically significant results are the exception not the rule. Reclassifying one or two insurgencies may change the apparent nature of some conclusions.

By limiting ourselves to insurgencies that passed a certain threshold, we have ignored the many proto-insurgencies⁹ that died before reaching it. Thus, while concluding, for instance, that most insurgencies that fought for independence succeeded, we implicitly omit all the proto-insurgencies that sought their country's independence but never achieved sufficient momentum to make the threshold for inclusion.

Conversely, any such treatment implicitly assumes that every insurgency is equally informative of the entire class of insurgencies. The few exceptions, however, may be more important than the many that follow the rule.

We had to pick and choose among explanatory factors, leaving many factors unexplored. Even where factors were considered, critical distinctions may be blurred in an effort to generate enough cases. Thus, all outside interventions are considered members of the same class, despite a potential disparity in intervener approaches (e.g., massive forces over a short time period versus smaller forces over a longer time period).

Insurgencies last a long time, and thus many factors, such as competence, popularity, or governance, can change substantially over the course of the conflict. Of particular note, a conflict that starts as an insurgency may conclude as a conventional conflict.¹⁰

⁹ A proto-insurgency can be defined as the early stages of what might become an insurgency; such stages would include political organization and planning, but not escalation into widespread anti-government violence.

¹⁰ For example, many argue that South Vietnam won the guerilla war by 1972 but fell to a conventional invasion in 1975. See William Egan Colby, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989) and Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999).

Finally, *correlation is not the same as causality*. Outside support to insurgents, for instance, correlates with insurgent victory. This does not necessarily mean that such support spelled the difference between victory and defeat (i.e., actually *caused* it), nor does outside support necessarily cause an insurgency to succeed that was not on the road to victory anyway. Even when some correlates are causative, some may not be—the strength of correlation is no guide as to which factors really mattered. For the social scientist, these are issues that may elude even the best of available research methods.

Conclusions

Some of the major lessons from this study are:

- Insurgencies, once they get going, are extended affairs whether or not the result is a government victory, insurgent victory, or a mixed outcome.
- Insurgencies rarely succeed in middle-income and urbanized countries.
- Insurgencies that seek independence or majority rule have generally succeeded. Those whose aim has been regional secession have generally failed. Attempts at government overthrow win or lose equally.
- Although insurgent military competency (if it can be measured correctly) makes little difference, government competency, internal strength, relative freedom from the threat of coup, and favorable force ratios make some difference to outcomes.
- Popularity, whether of the insurgents (which is not always the same as the insurgent's cause) or of the government, is correlated with success for the popular side.
- Unified hierarchies do better at insurgency than fractionated networks.
- International support helps insurgents, but only if it is state support; so, perhaps, does having many foreign fighters. Obtaining sanctuary also helps a lot.

- Broad terror campaigns by insurgents correlate with their losing.
- Although democracies have a good record at fighting insurgents, anocracies have a bad record (if democracies and anocracies are lumped together, they are no better than autocracies).
- Governments do not do markedly better than average when they get direct support from another government, but they seem to do markedly worse when they get indirect support.

Multilateral COIN Capacity

The tables in this appendix provide indicative (not comprehensive) information about institutions and countries with capabilities and/or activities relevant to COIN.

Table B.1 lists COIN-relevant international organizations together with their capabilities, countries, and regions in which they have experience, and the funds they expended on foreign aid and health development in 2003 and 2004. Table B.2, which begins on page 405, provides similar information for countries with COIN-relevant capabilities.

Table B.3, which begins on page 408, lists a variety of COIN capabilities, indicates whether a country or group of countries besides the United States could potentially provide the capability, and lists countries with noteworthy potential in the capability.

Finally, Tables B.4a through B.4e, which begin on page 412, show which countries have proven experience in a variety of COIN missions and the operation or region in which the experience was gained.

Table B.1
Multilateral COIN Capacity: International Organizations

Organization	Type of Organization	Capability	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
African Development Bank	Development bank	Financial aid	Africa	1,057	586	NA	NA
Asia Development Bank	Development bank	Financial aid	Asia	1,084	1,138	NA	NA
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML)	Anti-corruption	Anti-corruption	Asia	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cairns Group (Australia, Canada, New Zealand)	Trade development organization	Trade	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay	NA	NA	NA	NA
Caribbean Development Bank	Development bank	Financial aid	Caribbean	60	37	NA	NA

Table B.1—Continued

Organization	Type of Organization	Capability	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)	International organization	Anti-corruption	Caribbean	NA	NA	NA	NA
Centre for Democratic Institutions (Australia)	NGO	Inclusive political system	Asia-Pacific	NA	NA	NA	NA
EU Directorate General (DG) Development	Multinational parliamentary organization	Public education, physical infrastructure, conditions conducive to investment, trade, technical aid	Africa, Caribbean, Pacific	42,887 (EU countries combined)	37,130 (EU countries combined)	NA	NA
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Development bank	Financial aid	Eastern Europe	53	53	NA	NA
European Community	Multinational parliamentary organization	Financial aid	Worldwide	8,704	7,173	278.5	372.9
European Investment Bank	Development bank	Financial aid	Eastern Europe			NA	NA
European Union	Multinational parliamentary organization	Financial aid	Former Yugoslavia	42,886 (EU countries combined)	37,130 (EU countries combined)	NA	NA

Table B.1—Continued

Organization	Type of Organization	Capability	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
G7 countries	Consortium of countries	Financial aid	Worldwide	57,561	49,982	NA	NA
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)	Development bank	Financial aid	Latin America, Caribbean	560	593	NA	NA
International Finance Corporation (IFC)	Development bank	Conditions conducive to investment	Worldwide	2,126	2,301	NA	NA
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	Development bank	Financial and technical aid	Worldwide	281	264	NA	NA
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)	NGO	Electoral system	Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, South and Central America, Middle East, Africa			NA	NA
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	Development bank	Financial and technical aid	Worldwide	1,204	1,187	NA	NA
Regional Development Banks (African, Asian, and Inter-American)	Development bank	Financial aid	Africa, Asia, Latin America	2,701	2,317	56.72	76.46

Table B.1—Continued

Organization	Type of Organization	Capability	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
Transparency International	Anti-corruption	Anti-corruption	Worldwide	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN	International organization	Justice system	Kosovo			NA	NA
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)	International organization	Health	Worldwide	449	430	NA	NA
UN Development Programme (UNDP)	International organization	Constitutional law, civil and criminal law	Kosovo	312	271	NA	NA
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	International organization	Security	Worldwide	650	629	NA	NA
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)	International organization	Health	Worldwide	347	534	NA	NA
UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)	International organization	Security, technical aid	Worldwide	434	504	NA	NA
UN Transitional Authority (UNTA)	International organization	Government, justice system	Worldwide	268	319	NA	NA
World Bank	Development bank	Communications infrastructure, conditions conducive to investment, financial aid, technical aid	Worldwide	9,214	10,628	0.035	0.05

Table B.1—Continued

Organization	Type of Organization	Capability	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
World Food Program (WFP)	International organization	Basic resources	Worldwide	265	484	NA	NA
WTO	Trade development organization	Trade	Worldwide	NA	NA	NA	NA

SOURCE: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Developmental Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), *Developmental Co-Operation Report 2005* (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, February 2006).

Table B.2
Multilateral COIN Capacity: U.S. Allies

Country (National Agency)	Capabilities	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
Australia (AusAid)	Public education, Public health, and physical infrastructure	Asia-Pacific	1,460.00	1,219.00	108.04	99.958
Austrian Development Agency (ADA)	Justice system, public education, public health, physical infrastructure, technical aid	Central and Latin America, East and Southern Africa, The Himalayas/Hindukush, South-Eastern Europe	678.00	505.00	39.324	23.23
Austrian Development Agency (ADA)	Public education	Africa, Peru, Ecuador, Vietnam, Palestine	678.00	505.00	39.324	23.23
Belgium (Belgian Development Corporation)	Public health, physical infrastructure, and inclusive political system	Africa, Peru, Ecuador, Vietnam, Palestine	1,463.00	1,853.00	92.169	85.238
Canada	Health	Worldwide	2,599.00	2,031.00	122.153	174.666
Denmark	Public education, public health, communications infrastructure, physical infrastructure, inclusive political system, trade, technical aid	Africa, Asia, Latin America, Balkans	2,037.00	1,748.00	167.034	166.06
Finland	Health	Worldwide	655.00	558.00	53.055	45.198
France	Health	Worldwide	8,473.00	7,253.00	364.339	188.578
Germany	Public education, public health, trade technical aid	70 countries worldwide	7,534.00	6,784.00	150.68	169.6
Greece	Health	Worldwide	465.00	362.00	20.925	33.304

Table B.2—Continued

Country (National Agency)	Capabilities	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
Ireland	Public education, public health, physical infrastructure, inclusive political system	Africa, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Vietnam, East Timor	607.00	504.00	136.575	114.912
Italy	Health	Worldwide	2,462.00	2433.00	115.714	121.65
Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA)	Public education, public health, inclusive political system	Asia	8,906.00	8880.00	382.958	177.6
Lux-Development (Luxembourg)	Public education, public health, technical aid	Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Laos, Vietnam	236	194	41.536	0
Netherlands	Health	Worldwide	4,204	3,972	231.22	135.048
New Zealand (NZAID)	Public education, public health, trade, technical aid	Asia-Pacific	212	165	10.176	9.24
Norway	Public education, physical infrastructure, trade	Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa	2,199	2,042	112.149	136.814
Portugal	Public education, public health	Africa, East Timor	1,031	320	11.341	14.08
Spain	Health	Worldwide	2,437	1,961	151.094	131.387
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)	Public education, public health, inclusive political system, trade, technical aid	120 countries worldwide	2,722	2,400	130.656	98.4

Table B.2—Continued

Country (National Agency)	Capabilities	Significant Experience	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2004 (\$ millions)	Foreign Aid Expenditures 2003 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2004 (\$ millions)	Health Development 2003 (\$ millions)
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	Public education, public health, inclusive political system	63 countries worldwide	1,545	1,299	47.895	38.97
United Kingdom (Department for International Development)	Justice system	Sierra Leone	7,883	6,282	338.969	502.56
United Kingdom (Department for International Development)	Public education, public health, trade, technical aid	Worldwide	7,883	6,282	338.969	502.56

SOURCE: OECD DAC, *Developmental Co-Operation Report 2005* (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, February 2006); OECD DAC, *Developmental Co-Operation Report 2004* (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, February 2005).

Table B.3
Mission-Specific Capabilities for COIN

Capability	Does a Non-U.S. Aggregate Capability Exist? ^a	Countries with Noteworthy and Proven Potential
Internal Security Capacity-Building		
Regular police	Yes	Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, UK, China, Brazil, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Australia, Austria, Jordan, Pakistan
Quick-response police	Yes	France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Austria
For civil unrest	Yes	France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Austria
For proto-insurgency	No	France
Military force training	Yes	Canada, Czech Rep, Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, UK, Australia, Jordan, Pakistan
Police force training	Yes	Canada, Czech Rep, France, Germany, Slovenia, Turkey, Finland, Jordan
Intelligence service training	No	Greece
National-security policymaking and crisis management system	No	Denmark, Australia
Management capacity (key ministries)	Marginal	Canada, Australia
Operations support for local services	Yes	Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Finland, Australia
Air traffic control/air operations	Yes	Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Australia
Blue and Green Security Capabilities		
Command and control	Yes	Canada, France, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia
Interagency coordination	No	Australia

Table B.3—Continued

Capability	Does a Non-U.S. Aggregate Capability Exist? ^a	Countries with Noteworthy and Proven Potential
Mobility and logistics	Yes	Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Australia, South Korea, Japan
Ground/sea logistics	Yes	Bulgaria, France, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia, South Korea, Japan
Air mobility	Yes	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, South Korea, Japan
Communications	Marginal	Spain, United Kingdom, Australia
Quick-response forces	Yes	Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Russia
Special forces	Marginal	Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia
Ground forces	Yes	Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, Brazil, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Australia, South Korea, Japan, India, Austria, Jordan, Pakistan
Air forces	Yes	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, Russia, Australia, Austria
Precision strike	Yes	Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia
Aerial refueling	Marginal	France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia
Explosive ordnance	Marginal	France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia
Naval/coastal/riverine forces	Yes	Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan

Table B.3—Continued

Capability	Does a Non-U.S. Aggregate Capability Exist? ^a	Countries with Noteworthy and Proven Potential
Divers	No	No data
Coastal/border security	Marginal	Italy, United Kingdom, China, Australia
Force protection	Yes	Belgium, Czech Rep, Greece, Romania, United Kingdom
For coalition military forces	Yes	Belgium, Czech Rep, Greece, Romania, United Kingdom
For NGO/green/noncombatant partners	Marginal	Czech Rep, Greece, United Kingdom
Military police/law enforcement	Marginal	Czech Rep, Portugal, United Kingdom
Public safety	Yes	Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, Russia, Finland, South Korea, Japan, Jordan
Demining (on land)	Yes	Belgium, Czech Rep, Denmark, Norway, Slovenia, Finland, Jordan
Reconstruction/ combat engineers	Yes	Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom, Finland, South Korea, Japan
Nuclear/chemical/biological decontamination	Marginal	Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Germany
Medical services (combat or clinic)	Yes	Czech Rep, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom, Russia, South Korea, Jordan
Mortuary affairs/forensics	No	Finland
Intelligence (analysis, TPED, etc.)	Marginal	Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Romania, United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia
Surveillance/reconnaissance (air, sea, ground)	Marginal	Canada, France, United Kingdom, Australia
Human intelligence	Marginal	United Kingdom, Australia
Information operations	Marginal	United Kingdom, Australia

Table B.3—Continued

Capability	Does a Non-U.S. Aggregate Capability Exist?^a	Countries with Noteworthy and Proven Potential
Psychological operations	No	No data
Public affairs	Marginal	United Kingdom, Australia
Detention	Marginal	United Kingdom, Australia

^a The entries of “Yes,” “No,” or “Marginal” in these cells indicate whether a non-U.S. country or group of countries is capable of providing approximately 25 percent or more of the U.S. capability.

Table B.4a
Mission-Specific Capabilities, by Country: A–Ch

Capability	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Bulgaria	Canada	China
Internal Security Capacity-Building							
Regular police	UNFICYP/ Cyprus, UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/East Timor	UNTAET/ East Timor, UNMIBH/ Balkans, SFOR	Kosovo, OEF/ Afghanistan, Congo, Lithuania	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/ East Timor , UNAVEM III/ Angola	UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET, East Timor, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/East Timor
Quick-response police		SFOR					
For civil unrest		SFOR					
For proto- insurgency							
Military force training	OIF					OEF/ISAF	
Police force training						OEF/ISAF, UNSMIH/Haiti	
Intelligence service Training							
National-security policymaking and crisis management system	OIF						
Management capacity (key ministries)	OIF					OEF/ISAF	
Operations support for local services	OIF				OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF	
Air traffic control/ air operations	OIF				OEF/ISAF		

Table B.4a—Continued

Capability	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Bulgaria	Canada	China
Blue and Green Security Capabilities							
Command and control	UNTAET/East Timor, OEF/ISAF, OIF					SFOR/IFOR (brigade)	
Interagency coordination	OIF						
Mobility and logistics	UNTAET/East Timor, OEF/ISAF,		OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		OIF	UNSMIH/Haiti, SFOR/IFOR	
Ground/sea logistics	UNTAET/East Timor, OEF/ISAF,				OIF		
Air mobility	UNTAET/East Timor, OEF/ISAF, OIF		OEF/ISAF			UNSMIH/Haiti, SFOR/IFOR	
Communications	OEF/ISAF, OIF						
Quick-response forces							
Special forces	OEF/ISAF, OIF					SFOR/IFOR	
Ground forces	UNMISSET/East Timor	UNFICYP/Cyprus, UNDOF, Syria	UNPROFOR/Balkans, UNTAES/Balkans, OEF/ISAF	UNAVEM III/Angola	OIF	SFOR/IFOR, UNPROFOR/Balkans, UNSMIH/Haiti	
Air forces	OEF/ISAF, OIF	EUFOR	OEF			UNSMIH/Haiti	
Precision strike	OEF/ISAF, OIF						
Aerial refueling	OEF/ISAF						

Table B.4a—Continued

Capability	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Bulgaria	Canada	China
Explosive ordnance							
Naval/coastal/riverine forces	OEF					OEF	
Divers							
Coastal/border security	OEF						
Force protection			OEF				
For coalition military forces			OEF				
For NGO/green/noncombatant partners							
Military police/law enforcement							
Public safety			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR	OEF/ISAF, SFOR	
Demining			OEF				
Reconstruction/combat engineers			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR	OEF/ISAF, SFOR	
Nuclear/chemical/biological decontamination					OEF		
Medical services (combat or clinic)							
Mortuary affairs/forensics							

Table B.4a—Continued

Capability	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Bulgaria	Canada	China
Intelligence (analysis, TPED, etc.)	OIF, OEF		OEF			SFOR/IFOR	
Surveillance/ Reconnaissance (air, sea, ground)	OEF/ISAF, OIF					SFOR/IFOR	
Human intelligence	OEF/ISAF, OIF						
Information operations	OEF/ISAF, OIF						
Psychological operations							
Public affairs	OEF/ISAF, OIF						
Detention	OEF/ISAF, OIF						

NOTES: EUFOR = European Union Force, IFOR = Implementation Force, ISAF = International Security Assistance Force, KFOR = Kosovo Force, MFO = Multinational Force and Observers, OEF = Operation Enduring Freedom, OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom, SFOR = Stabilisation Force, UNAMSIL = UN Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAVEM = UN Angola Verification Mission, UNDOF = UN Disengagement Observer Force, UNFICYP = UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNIFIL = UN Interim Force in Lebanon, UNMIBH = UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIS = UN Mission in Sudan, UNMISSET = UN Mission of Support to East Timor, UNPROFOR = UN Protection Force, UNSMIL = UN Support Mission in Haiti, UNTAES = UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, UNTAET = UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.

Table B.4b
Mission-Specific Capabilities, by Country: Ci–G

Capability	Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Internal Security Capacity-Building							
Regular police	UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIBH, UNPROFOR/ Balkans		UNMIS/Sudan, UNMIBH, UNPROFOR/ Balkans, UNTAES/ Balkans	UNSMIH/Haiti, UNMIBH, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIBH/ Balkans
Quick-response police					UNSMIH/Haiti		
For civil unrest					UNSMIH/Haiti		
For proto-insurgency					UNSMIH/Haiti		
Military force training	OIF	OIF	OIF		OEF/ISAF		OEF/ISAF
Police force training	OIF			OIF	UNSMIH/Haiti	OEF/ISAF	
Intelligence service training							OEF/ISAF
National-security policymaking and crisis management system		OEF/ISAF					
Management capacity (key ministries)							
Operations support for local services		OEF/ISAF		OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF/ISAF		
Air traffic control/air operations	OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF		OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF

Table B.4b—Continued

Capability	Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Blue and Green Security Capabilities							
Command and control					SFOR/IFOR, OEF/ISAF		
Interagency coordination							
Mobility and logistics		OEF/ISAF		OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR, UNIFIL, Lebanon	OEF/ISAF	SFOR/IFOR
Ground/sea logistics					UNIFIL, Lebanon	SFOR/IFOR	
Air mobility		OEF/ISAF			OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	SFOR/IFOR
Communications							
Quick-response forces						NATO AIRNORTH/ EUFOR	
Special forces		OEF/ISAF			KFOR, OEF/ ISAF		
Ground forces	KFOR, UNPROFOR/ Balkans, OEF/ ISAF	KFOR, SFOR, UNPROFOR/ Balkans, OIF, OEF		UNIFIL/ Lebanon, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	ISAF, KFOR, SFOR/IFOR, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	KFOR, SFOR, ISAF	KFOR, SFOR, IFOR
Air forces		SFOR, OEF			OEF/ISAF, SFOR	SFOR, IFOR, OEF	IFOR

Table B.4b—Continued

Capability	Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Precision strike		SFOR			OEF/ISAF, SFOR	SFOR, IFOR	
Aerial refueling					OEF/ISAF, SFOR		
Explosive ordnance	OEF	OEF					
Naval/coastal/riverine forces		OIF			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR
Divers							
Coastal/border security							
Force protection	OEF						OIF
For coalition military forces	OEF						OIF
For NGO/green/noncombatant partners	OEF						OIF
Military police/law enforcement	OIF						
Public safety	OEF	OEF, OIF		OIF, OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF	OEF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR
Demining	OEF	OEF		OIF			
Reconstruction/ combat engineers	OEF			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF	OEF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR
Nuclear/chemical/ biological decontamination	OEF					OEF	

Table B.4b—Continued

Capability	Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Medical services (combat or clinic)	OIF	OIF			OEF	OEF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR
Mortuary affairs/forensics				OIF			
Intelligence (analysis, TPED, etc.)					OEF		OEF
Surveillance/Reconnaissance (air, sea, ground)					OEF		
Human intelligence							
Information operations							
Psychological operations							
Public affairs							
Detention							

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Table B.4c
Mission-Specific Capabilities, by Country: H–M

Capability	Hungary	India	Italy	Japan	Jordan	Latvia	Lithuania
Internal Security Capacity-Building							
Regular police	MFO/Egypt, UNMIBH/ Balkans, SFOR	UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIBH/ Balkans, SFOR		UNMIBH, UNTAES/ Balkans, UNTAET/ East Timor, UNAVEM III/ Angola		UNMIBH/ Balkans
Quick-response police	SFOR		SFOR				
For civil unrest	SFOR		SFOR				
For proto- insurgency							
Military force training					UNPROFOR/ Balkans, OIF		
Police force training					OIF		
Intelligence service training							
National-security policymaking and crisis management system							
Management capacity (key ministries)							
Operations support for local services							
Air traffic control/ air operations							OEF/ISAF

Table B.4c—Continued

Capability	Hungary	India	Italy	Japan	Jordan	Latvia	Lithuania
Blue and Green Security Capabilities							
Command and control							
Interagency coordination							
Mobility and logistics			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OIF			OIF
Ground/sea logistics				OIF			OIF
Air mobility			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OIF			
Communications							
Quick-response forces							
Special forces							
Ground forces	SFOR	UNMEE/ Eritrea, UNAVEM III/ Angola	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OIF, UNMISET, East Timor	UNMEE/ Eritrea, USTAES, UNPROFOR/ Balkans, KFOR	OEF	
Air forces			SFOR, IFOR				OIF, OEF
Precision strike			SFOR, IFOR				
Aerial refueling			SFOR				
Explosive ordnance							
Naval/coastal/riverine forces			OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF, OIF			
Divers							

Table B.4c—Continued

Capability	Hungary	India	Italy	Japan	Jordan	Latvia	Lithuania
Coastal/border security			MFO/Egypt				
Force protection							
For coalition military forces							
For NGO/green/noncombatant partners							
Military police/ law enforcement							
Public safety	SFOR/IFOR		OEF	OIF	OEF		OEF/ISAF, OIF
Demining					OEF		
Reconstruction/ combat engineers	SFOR/IFOR			OIF			
Nuclear/chemical/ biological decontamination							
Medical services (combat or clinic)	OEF		OEF		OEF		OEF/ISAF, OIF
Mortuary affairs/ forensics							
Intelligence (analysis, TPED, etc.)							
Surveillance/ reconnaissance (air, sea, ground)							
Human intelligence							

Table B.4c—Continued

Capability	Hungary	India	Italy	Japan	Jordan	Latvia	Lithuania
Information operations							
Psychological operations							
Public affairs							
Detention							

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Table B.4d
Mission-Specific Capabilities, by Country: N–R

Capability	Netherlands	Norway	Pakistan	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia
Internal Security Capacity-Building							
Regular police	UNMIS/Sudan, UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/ East Timor, UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/ East Timor, UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIBH, UNTAES, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	UNAVEM III/Angola, UNTAET/East Timor	UNMIBH/ Balkans, SFOR	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/ East Timor, UNMIBH, UNPROFOR/ Balkans
Quick-response police						SFOR	
For civil unrest						SFOR	
For proto-insurgency							
Military force training	OIF	OIF	UNPROFOR/ Balkans			OEF/ISAF	
Police force training							
Intelligence service training							
National-security policymaking and crisis management system							
Management capacity (key ministries)							
Operations support for local services							
Air traffic control/ air operations						OEF/ISAF	

Table B.4d—Continued

Capability	Netherlands	Norway	Pakistan	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia
Blue and Green Security Capabilities							
Command and control							
Interagency coordination							
Mobility and logistics	OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR			OEF/ISAF		
Ground/sea logistics	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR			OEF/ISAF			
Air mobility	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR			OEF/ISAF		
Communications							
Quick-response forces				SFOR/IFOR (AB bn)	SFOR/IFOR (AB bn)		SFOR/IFOR (AB bn)
Special forces		OEF/ISAF					
Ground forces	ISAF, SFOR/IFOR, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	OEF/ISAF, UNIFIL/ Lebannon	UNAMSIL/ Sierra Leone, UNSMIH, UNTAES, UNPROFOR/ Balkans	UNPROFOR/ Balkans, SFOR/IFOR (AB bn), UNDOF/Syria, UNIFIL, Lebanon	SFOR/IFOR (AB bn), UNAVEM III/Angola, UNMISSET, East Timor	UNAVEM III/Angola, OEF/ISAF, OIF, KFOR	SFOR/IFOR, UNTAES, UNPROFOR/ Balkans
Air forces	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF					OEF
Precision strike	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF					
Aerial refueling							

Table B.4d—Continued

Capability	Netherlands	Norway	Pakistan	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia
Explosive ordnance		OEF					
Naval/coastal/riverine forces	SFOR/IFOR						
Divers							
Coastal/border security							
Force protection						OEF	
For coalition military forces							
For NGO/green/noncombatant partners							
Military police/law enforcement					OIF		
Public safety		OIF, OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		OEF, UNIFIL, Lebanon		OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF
Demining		OEF					
Reconstruction/combat engineers		OIF		OEF			
Nuclear/chemical/biological decontamination							
Medical services (combat or clinic)		OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		UNIFIL, Lebanon		OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF
Mortuary affairs/forensics							

Table B.4d—Continued

Capability	Netherlands	Norway	Pakistan	Poland	Portugal	Romania	Russia
Intelligence (analysis, TPED, etc.)						OEF	
Surveillance/ reconnaissance (air, sea, ground)							
Human intelligence							
Information operations							
Psychological operations							
Public affairs							
Detention							

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Table B.4e
Mission-Specific Capabilities, by Country: S–Z

Capability	Slovakia	Slovenia	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Turkey	United Kingdom
Internal Security Capacity-Building							
Regular police		UNTAET/East Timor, SFOR		UNTAET/ East Timor, UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/ East Timor, UNMIBH/ Balkans	UNMIS/Sudan, UNTAET/ East Timor	UNTAET/East Timor, UNMIBH/ Balkans
Quick-response police		SFOR					
For civil unrest		SFOR					
For proto-insurgency							
Military force training		OIF				OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF/ISAF
Police force training		OIF				OEF/ISAF, OIF	
Intelligence service training							
National-security policymaking and crisis management system							
Management capacity (key ministries)							
Operations support for local services		OIF					OEF/ISAF, OIF
Air traffic control/ air operations							

Table B.4e—Continued

Capability	Slovakia	Slovenia	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Turkey	United Kingdom
Blue and Green Security Capabilities							
Command and control						OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Interagency coordination							
Mobility and logistics			OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF/ISAF		OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Ground/sea logistics			OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF			OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Air mobility			OEF/ISAF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR	OEF/ISAF		OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Communications				OEF/ISAF			OIF
Quick-response forces				SFOR/KFOR (cav sqn)			SFOR/IFOR
Special forces							OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Ground forces	OIF/OEF	SFOR	OIF	OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR/ KFOR	SFOR/IFOR/ KFOR	ISAF, KFOR, SFOR	UNPROFOR/ Balkans, OEF/ ISAF, OIF, SFOR/ IFOR, UNFICYP/ Cyprus
Air forces				OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		SFOR	OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Precision strike				OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR		SFOR	OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Aerial refueling				SFOR/IFOR			OEF/ISAF, OIF

Table B.4e—Continued

Capability	Slovakia	Slovenia	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Turkey	United Kingdom
Explosive ordnance							OEF/ISAF, OIF
Naval/coastal/riverine forces				OEF/ISAF, SFOR/IFOR			OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Divers							
Coastal/border security							OEF/ISAF, OIF
Force protection							OEF
For coalition military forces							OEF
For NGO/green/noncombatant partners							OEF
Military police/law enforcement							OEF
Public safety	OEF/ISAF, UNTAES/Balkans	OIF	OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF			OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR, UNFICYP/Cyprus
Demining		OIF					
Reconstruction/combat engineers	OEF/ISAF, UNTAES/Balkans		OEF/ISAF, OIF				OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR, UNFICYP/Cyprus
Nuclear/chemical/biological decontamination							
Medical services (combat or clinic)			OEF/ISAF, OIF	OEF			OEF/ISAF, OIF

Table B.4e—Continued

Capability	Slovakia	Slovenia	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Turkey	United Kingdom
Mortuary affairs/ forensics							
Intelligence (analysis, TPED, etc.)					OEF		OEF/ISAF, OIF, SFOR/IFOR
Surveillance/ reconnaissance (air, sea, ground)							SFOR/IFOR
Human intelligence							OEF/ISAF, OIF
Information operations							OEF/ISAF, OIF
Psychological operations							
Public affairs							OEF/ISAF, OIF
Detention							OEF/ISAF, OIF

NOTES: EUFOR = European Union Force, IFOR = Implementation Force, ISAF = International Security Assistance Force, KFOR = Kosovo Force, MFO = Multinational Force and Observers, OEF = Operation Enduring Freedom, OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom, SFOR = Stabilisation Force, UNAMSIL = UN Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAVEM = UN Angola Verification Mission, UNDOF = UN Disengagement Observer Force, UNFICYP = UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNIFIL = UN Interim Force in Lebanon, UNMIBH = UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIS = UN Mission in Sudan, UNMISSET = UN Mission of Support to East Timor, UNPROFOR = UN Protection Force, UNSMIL = UN Support Mission in Haiti, UNTAES = UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, UNTAET = UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.

Indicators and Warnings

Daniel Byman¹

Indicators for proto-insurgencies fall into two general categories: indicators that a proto-insurgency may break out, and indicators that a proto-insurgency may become a full-blown insurgent movement.² However, because proto-insurgencies involve small numbers of people who are often divorced from the population as a whole, society-wide measures often provide few benefits for judging when a proto-insurgency will arise. This appendix focuses instead on *measures that indicate when proto-insurgencies may grow into full-blown insurgent movements*. Thus the indicators assume that there already exist at least a few individuals who have turned to violence and meet the definition of a proto-insurgency but that their group has not turned into a large and capable insurgent movement.

The Transition from Proto-Insurgency to Full-Blown Insurgent Movement

There are several categories of indicators to consider when trying to determine whether a proto-insurgency is able to make the transition to a full-blown insurgency: (1) the strength of the proffered identity,

¹ This outline of indicators and warnings for insurgency was prepared by Daniel Byman and is drawn from his RAND study, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies*.

² Another RAND project involved data collected by Martin Libicki based on coding by RAND researchers to determine correlates for insurgent success and development since 1946.

(2) group composition, (3) relations with other community members, (4) use and response to violence, (5) sanctuary, (6) external support, and (7) the state response.³

Identity Measures

The proto-insurgency is engaged in a battle of identities. It is trying to both promote its preferred identity (Islamist, ethnic, etc.) and undermine rival ones proposed by the state or other community members. Several indicators shed light on how well the proto-insurgent is faring in this battle:

- The strength of the state identity. Do society members consider themselves first and foremost to be members of the nation championed by the state? How strong is patriotic sentiment? Are national holidays enthusiastically celebrated? Is the dominant literature of a country in the language proposed by the state? Are there rival cultural elites who do not except the national identity (and are there national cultural elites who disparage other identities)? Do all members of society believe they have a shared history?
- The strength of alternative identities. Using similar measures, what are the strengths of rival identities, such as tribe, ethnicity, and religion?
- Do attacks (criminal, political, etc.) on one member of the population provoke outrage from individuals of different tribes, religious communities, or ethnic groups who do not know the person?
- How have identity measures changed over time? Which ones are getting stronger and weaker? Under what conditions do some identities fluctuate? Is there important regional variation?
- Is the would-be insurgent group able to harness nationalism or a similar “us versus an outsider” dynamic in its contest? Is the state perceived as being led by people who are resistant to foreign pres-

³ One of the best sources is the CIA “Analysis of Insurgency” handbook, pp. 6–10, which looks at indicators for incipient insurgency, which “encompasses the preinsurgency and organizational stages of an insurgency conflict” (p. 6). A number of these measures are taken from this source. Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, undated.)

sure or are state leaders perceived as too close to Washington or another foreign power?

- Do media exalt individuals and causes that the group claims as its own (e.g., Saudi media glorifying the exploits of *mujahideen* in Afghanistan and the Balkans)?
- Does the group control generators of identity? Who controls schooling? What are language policies in the country in question? Are there movies and books in the language the group champions?

Group Composition Measures

Although considerable attention focuses on the cause championed by the proto-insurgent, success or failure often comes down to a question of group dynamics: Can the group recruit effectively, and does it have the resources to wage a full-blown insurgency?

- Size. One of the definitional distinctions between a proto-insurgency and a full-blown movement is the size of the movement. Going beyond an active membership in the dozens to one in the hundreds is one clear indicator. It is always necessary to track the size of full-time cadre, part-time cadre, active supporters, and potential supporters.
- Membership motivation. Members of small terrorist or insurrectionary groups are often highly idealistic, a necessary characteristic given the overwhelming odds in favor of the state and the high level of danger the individuals face. Large-scale insurgencies, however, have many members who joined because they were coerced or because they saw a chance of personal gain from membership. The more members who joined because of fear or reward, as opposed to idealism, the more likely the insurgency is in the process of becoming full-blown.
- Breadth of membership. Many small groups are bound by tribe, family, and region or are otherwise limited in who joins the group. Such networks play a vital role early in an insurgency in helping ensure operational security and decreasing barriers to trust. Success, however, requires transcending this narrow base. If the

group is able to draw on multiple sub-identities, it is more likely to develop into a full-blown insurgency.

- Weapons and materiel. How large are the weapons and materiel caches of the group? Are they able to replace lost weapons? How sophisticated are the weapons?
- Is the group able to “tax” parts of the population? How much of this taxation is voluntary? How much is involuntary, that is, extortion? (Both are useful, as the insurgent must be able to use suasion and fear—but if individuals are giving *despite* their preferences, it suggests a high degree of insurgent strength.) In which regions is it able to collect taxes?
- How much money does the group have access to? Is it able to pay followers? Can it pay followers more than other likely economic opportunities? Is it able to bribe officials?

Measures on Relations with Other Community Members

What is the relationship between the group in question and the broader movement as a whole? The prevalence of smaller, more radical groups has paralyzed groups such as Fatah, hindering its ability to marshal all the resources available to the Palestinian nationalist cause. Similarly, many small groups were unable to develop into a broader movement because peaceful political movements were able to effectively advance the agenda.

- How popular is the overall cause the group espouses? How many people show up at demonstrations? How many people are members of nonviolent political and social organizations with a similar agenda?
- Relations with rivals. Is the group incorporating other small rivals (as Hezbollah did) or is it constantly dividing into smaller groups (as happened to many Pakistan-backed groups fighting in Kashmir)?
- What are the attitudes of key cultural and religious figures who are not part of the group? Do they endorse the group’s activities and see it as legitimate? Does the group have an informal presence

in unions, political parties, churches/mosques, or other legitimate social organizations?

- How tenable is the moderate option? Is peaceful political change plausible? Likely?
- Is the group able to coordinate its activities with a broader political movement? Is the group able to dominate that movement to the point that the broader movement acts only with the group's tacit approval?
- Are members of the moderate movement joining the radical wing or vice-versa? Are leaders moving from one camp to another?
- How do members of a cause or movement who do not embrace violence see the group? Are their activities beyond the pale, or are they seen as Robin Hoods?
- How extensive are group propaganda and proselytization efforts? Are they expanding to new areas?
- Is the group able to establish a social services network to extend its reach and popularity?

Measures on the Use of Violence and the Response

The prevalence of violence is an indicator, albeit an imperfect one, of the relative strength of an insurgency. Similar, the most skilled groups are able to plan for the state response to violence and use it to advance their cause.

- What is the rate of attacks on government forces? On the civilian population? Is the group able to attack guarded or other "hard" targets?
- How wide is the group's area of operations?
- Are armed fighters able to show themselves openly? In how wide an area?
- Is there violence against diplomats or other key figures overseas?
- How disciplined are the fighters? Do they conserve ammunition, recover bodies of fallen comrades, and otherwise display a degree of professionalism?

After a group uses violence, the reactions of the population often indicate the strength and potential influence of the group.

- Do civilians flee after attacks? If the state is trusted and the group is perceived to be weak, the use of violence will not shake civilian confidence in police and security services. Thus, they are more likely to stay in areas despite the risk of violence.
- How are failed attacks perceived? When potential support is deep, even failed attacks can be successfully portrayed as heroic attempts to resist the government. When the group's attack does not succeed tactically, is it able to convert this into a strategic success?
- How does the group respond to initial arrests of its members? Has it planned for their replacement? Are its security procedures robust enough to ensure that low-level arrests do not devastate the group? What is the impact on group morale?
- Does the population at large support increased control and repression measures after a violent attack? Does this support extend to the communities the would-be insurgents seek to woo?
- Is the group able to sustain its campaign of violence? Is it able to extend its reach into new areas?

Sanctuary Measures

Access to sanctuary is often essential for a group to flourish, providing it with a place to hide and grow in the face of government counter-measures. (Measures for external sponsors that provide sanctuary are addressed below.)

- Is the terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare? What is the overall presence of mountainous, jungle, or other less accessible forms of terrain? Are these areas near where the initial cadre of the group is based? Are they easily cordoned off?
- Are there refugee camps outside the control of the government that the group can exploit?
- Are parts of the country a “no-go” zone for police and security forces because of violence, ethnic antipathy, or insurgent activity? What is the size of this zone and how is it changing?

- Are the insurgents able to sleep or rest in towns and villages outside the sanctuary area?

External State Support Effectiveness Measures

External support can be both a blessing and a curse, as it can greatly boost a group's capabilities and provide an invaluable sanctuary while at the same time reducing its freedom of movement and overall appeal.

- What is the type and scale of support provided? Is the group receiving assistance in operational security? Operational planning? Logistics? Financial support? Do large numbers of group members travel to receive such assistance?
- Can the group draw on diaspora support? How much is provided and what is the overall potential for support?
- Do group members in different foreign sanctuaries work together well, or do the different powers try to use them as proxies against other external backers?
- How many constraints does the external sponsor impose? Are they limiting the type and nature of the group attacks or other activities for reasons that are tied to the sponsor's concerns (as opposed to helping the group make better decisions)?
- Does the sponsor seek to control the overall movement? Does it divide the movement into smaller groups to better assure its own control?
- Does the foreign sponsorship decrease the group's legitimacy among different segments of the population? Among the group's potential core supporters?
- Is state support a substitute for local strength? Does the group have local networks that the foreign support augments?

State Response Measures

Perhaps the greatest source of growth for the group is a clumsy state response to violence, whereas a deft crackdown can end a group once and for all. Measures to consider include the following:

- How flexible is the government regarding the identity and grievance the group seeks to exploit? Does the government recognize the need to meet some of the grievances being advanced? Is the government able to co-opt elements of the group's cause? Is the government able to harness nationalism in its response?
- How skilled are the police and intelligence services? Do they understand the need to use force in a restrained way and in combination with precise intelligence? Do the intelligence services have information on all segments of society?
- How capable is the administration and bureaucracy? Can it deliver services? Can it collect taxes?
- How high is the overall level of corruption? Do the police and security services reflect the overall level of corruption in society?
- How high is popular faith in the bureaucracy and the police? Do the police have the trust of local communities?
- Is the government able to exploit, and perhaps create, divisions within the opposing movement as a whole?
- Is the government willing and able to distinguish between peaceful opponents and violent ones? Do its policies allow moderate politicians to flourish?
- Has the insurgency successfully penetrated parts of the government in the region where the insurgency is most active? In other regions? Does this include the police and intelligence services?

Ground-Force Tasks and Improvements

Table D.1 indicates how four recommended enhancements for U.S. ground forces would contribute to specific functions of such forces in COIN. A check mark indicates the possibility for improved performance.

Table D.1
Four Recommended Enhancements for Ground Troops

Task	COIN Training	Non-Lethal Force	Suitable Mobility	Information Sharing
Know local culture and security	√			√
Overcome the language barrier	√			√
Develop sources of local information	√			√
Conduct dismounted patrols		√		√
Operate traffic control points				√
Secure centers of communal life	√	√		√
Protect civilian leaders	√			√
Develop picture of terrorists	√			√
Kill or capture key terrorists	√	√	√	√
Disrupt sources of funding and transport	√			√
Develop intelligence on insurgent groups	√			√
Control weapons and munitions		√	√	√
Clear urban areas		√	√	√

Table D.1—Continued

Task	COIN Training	Non-Lethal Force	Suitable Mobility	Information Sharing
Isolate and search insurgent areas		√	√	√
Respond quickly to insurgent threats		√	√	
Conduct raids		√	√	√
Protect religious celebrations	√	√		√
Control riots and public disorder	√	√	√	√
Keep border areas under surveillance	√			√
Interdict illicit traffic			√	√
Secure oil pipelines and refineries			√	√
Secure airports and seaports		√	√	√
Secure government centers		√	√	√
Reduce risks to dismounted forces		√		√
Reduce risks to vehicular traffic		√	√	√
Secure bases of operation		√	√	√
Elicit crime tips from population	√			√
Protect public gatherings	√	√	√	√
Disperse and control riots	√	√	√	√
Stop sectarian violence	√	√	√	√
Reduce risk of bombing attacks				√
Suppress death squads		√	√	√
Disband and demobilize militias		√	√	√
Engage and destroy insurgents		√	√	√
Minimize collateral damage		√	√	
Prevent civilian casualties		√	√	
Inform public of operations	√			√
Dispose of unexploded ordnance	√			√

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